Washington v. Downstate Administrative Nurse

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 8, 2021·No. 7:21-cv-07159·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JEREMIAH D. WALKER WASHINGTON, JR., Plaintiff, 21-CV-7159 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND DOWNSTATE ADMINISTRATIVE NURSE; MS. DINELIO, Albany Medical Director, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action alleging that Defendants denied him medical treatment. He names as Defendants an Administrative Nurse at Downstate Correctional Facility (as a Doe defendant) and Ms. Dinelio, an “Albany Medical Director” at the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). Plaintiff invokes this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under both the federal question and diversity of citizenship statutes and claims that Defendants violated unspecified federal laws and committed medical malpractice, a state-law claim. By order dated September 23, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the complaint: In 2016, while in the custody of the City of New York Department of Correction, Plaintiff was prescribed the medication, Paxil, without being informed of its side effects. At some later point, Plaintiff “went to medical for a call-out to see the Nurse Practitioner . . . when [Plaintiff] told her about the pain that [he had] in [his] chest.” (ECF 2, at 4). The Nurse – who appears to be Defendant “Downstate Correctional Facility Administrative Nurse” – informed Plaintiff that his “chest is swollen and put [him] in to

take Blood for [his] (Prolactin Level and [his] Testosterone Level)[.] She asked [Plaintiff] what medication [he] was taking.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[s]ince then [he] went to see [a] specialist in the outside hospital and Coxsackie C.F. . . . [and] [t]he Endocrinology told [him] that [he] need[ed] surgery[,] [but] [t]he Regional Medical Director in Albany denied [him].” (Id.) He also alleges that “[t]hey sent [him] out to see endocrinology and [he] went to Albany Medical Center for an elevated Prolactin level.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states that he suffers from gynecomastia – breast enlargement – and currently is in pain. According to publicly available records maintained by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), DOCCS took custody of Plaintiff on July 13, 2017.

DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied surgery while in the custody of DOCCS, the Court construes the complaint as asserting, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical care. To state a claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Deliberate indifference is evaluated under a two-pronged test comprised of both objective and subjective components. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). The objective component requires that a prisoner “show that the conditions, either alone or in combination,

pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The deliberate indifference standard “contemplates a condition of urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019); see Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the medical need must be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in depriving him of adequate medical treatment. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)). That is, the prisoner must state facts showing that the correctional staff possessed “a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that the subjective component requires that the plaintiff show that a medical professional “was aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that the officer drew the inference). Where a medical professional inadvertently or negligently fails to provide adequate care, a prisoner cannot state a claim of a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Thus, a “mere disagreement over the proper treatment” is not actionable. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Hill, 657 F.3d at 123 (holding that medical officer who prescribed Motrin rather than stronger pain medication to treat a broken wrist did not have the “culpable state of mind” to satisfy the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard).

Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants because he does not appear to satisfy either component of such a claim; that is, he does not allege facts suggesting that either Defendant was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to his medical condition, and then ignored that risk.

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Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Charles v. Orange County
925 F.3d 73 (Second Circuit, 2019)
Hathaway v. Coughlin
99 F.3d 550 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Chance v. Armstrong
143 F.3d 698 (Second Circuit, 1998)
Harrison v. Barkley
219 F.3d 132 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Goord
467 F.3d 263 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Nielsen v. Rabin
746 F.3d 58 (Second Circuit, 2014)