REID, Associate Judge:
This case involves a dispute as to whether the Superior Court (“the trial court”) or the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”) should exercise initial jurisdiction over appellants’ claims, as they are articulated in separate complaints filed by the Washington Teachers’ Union, Local # 6 (“WTU”) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District Council 20, Local 2921, AFL-CIO (“AFSCME”) (collectively, “appellants”). In their respective complaints, appellants alleged that appellees, the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), the Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools (then Clifford B. Janey) (“the Superintendent”), and the District of Columbia Board of Education (“the Board”) (collectively, “appellees”), violated the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”) by improperly eliminating jobs and terminating around 700 teachers and school-based personnel (‘WTU lawsuit”) and about 26 Union-represented school employees — clerical employees and educational aides — (“AFSMCE lawsuit”), through a 2004 reduction in force (“RIF”).
Appellants appeal from the trial court’s order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss their complaints.
We hold that appellants must present their claims in the first instance to OEA. We further hold, in general agreement with the trial court, that the Abolishment Act procedures, imposed for budgetary reasons, appear to apply to the 2004 RIF, rather than the general RIF provisions of the CMPA. We also conclude that instead of dismissing appellants’ complaints, the trial court should have stayed its proceedings and transferred the case to the OEA for a determination of OEA’s jurisdiction; and for initial resolution of appellants’ claims, if OEA confirms its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for a stay of proceedings and a transfer of the case to the OEA.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The record before us shows that on October 22, 2004, and November 10, 2004, WTU and AFSCME, respectively, filed virtually identical complaints in the trial court. They alleged that in May of 2004, the DCPS notified approximately 700 teachers and school-based personnel,
and
approximately 26 Union-represented employees, that their positions were being abolished in a RIF,
effective June 30, 2004.
The abolishment was conducted in accordance with the Abolishment Act, D.C.Code § 1-624.08
(Repl.2006),
and
the Board’s regulations governing “the termination of the employment of employees of the Board ... due to the lack of funds, lack of work, or reorganization of functions,” 5 DCMR. § 1500.1, and other provisions of Chapter 15. Specifically, appellants alleged in Count I of their complaints, that DCPS and the Superintendent violated D.C.Code § l-624.08(d) “by conducting an abolishment of [employees] ... and denying one round of lateral competition in accordance with Chapter 24 of the District of Columbia Personnel Manual.” Count II asserted that the Board of Education violated D.C.Code § l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i) of the CMPA,
“by failing to
issue rules and regulations which provide for RIF procedures with a prescribed order of separation based on tenure of appointment and length of service; and which provide for priority re-employment consideration.” Count III claimed that the Board “acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority, in violation of [D.C.Code] § l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i) by issuing the RIF regulations contained in 5 DCMR, Chapter 15, which preclude separation based on tenure of employment and length of service and which deny employees the right to priority re-employment consideration.” In their prayer for relief, appellants, in part, sought an order compelling appellees (1) “to comply with all applicable provisions of the CMP A, specifically §§ l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i), 1-624.02,
and 1-624.08”; (2) “to rescind the current regulations contained in Title 5, Chapter 15 of the DCMR”; (3) “to provide for one level of lateral competition based on retention standing and priority re-employment consideration ... for all teachers and employees affected by the 2004 abolishment”; and (4) “to make whole all affected employees[.]”
On July 16, 2005, appellees filed a motion to dismiss appellants’ complaints pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). After listening to the arguments of the parties at a hearing on July 26, 2006, the Honorable Leonard Braman agreed with appellees that CMPA requires appellants’ claims to be presented to the OEA. In addition, the trial court stated that the general RIF procedures found in D.C.Code § 1-624.02 were inapplicable to this matter. Rather, said the trial judge, the RIF procedures under the Abolishment Act applied, and the general RIF procedures were “in a state of suspension” while the Abolishment Act was in effect. That is, “the Abolishment Act displaces the general RIF statute[,]” or “suspends it while the fiscal emergency continues.” The trial court determined that under the Abolishment Act’s RIF procedures, D.C.Code § l-624.08(d) entitles an affected employee, who otherwise would be eligible to compete for retention, “to one round of lateral competition”; and D.C.Code § l-624.08(e) calls for a thirty-day notice of the proposed separation. Furthermore, the trial court declared that under D.C.Code § 1-624.08(f)(2), an affected employee is authorized to file an appeal with OEA. After examining the counts in appellants’ complaints, the trial court decided that OEA has jurisdiction over each of the counts, not the trial court. Consequently, the court orally granted appellants’ motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court issued a short written order, which referenced the hearing and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants filed notices of appeal.
ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaints on the ground that OEA has jurisdiction over their claims. They argue that their “claims ...
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REID, Associate Judge:
This case involves a dispute as to whether the Superior Court (“the trial court”) or the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”) should exercise initial jurisdiction over appellants’ claims, as they are articulated in separate complaints filed by the Washington Teachers’ Union, Local # 6 (“WTU”) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District Council 20, Local 2921, AFL-CIO (“AFSCME”) (collectively, “appellants”). In their respective complaints, appellants alleged that appellees, the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), the Superintendent of the District of Columbia Public Schools (then Clifford B. Janey) (“the Superintendent”), and the District of Columbia Board of Education (“the Board”) (collectively, “appellees”), violated the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”) by improperly eliminating jobs and terminating around 700 teachers and school-based personnel (‘WTU lawsuit”) and about 26 Union-represented school employees — clerical employees and educational aides — (“AFSMCE lawsuit”), through a 2004 reduction in force (“RIF”).
Appellants appeal from the trial court’s order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss their complaints.
We hold that appellants must present their claims in the first instance to OEA. We further hold, in general agreement with the trial court, that the Abolishment Act procedures, imposed for budgetary reasons, appear to apply to the 2004 RIF, rather than the general RIF provisions of the CMPA. We also conclude that instead of dismissing appellants’ complaints, the trial court should have stayed its proceedings and transferred the case to the OEA for a determination of OEA’s jurisdiction; and for initial resolution of appellants’ claims, if OEA confirms its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for a stay of proceedings and a transfer of the case to the OEA.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The record before us shows that on October 22, 2004, and November 10, 2004, WTU and AFSCME, respectively, filed virtually identical complaints in the trial court. They alleged that in May of 2004, the DCPS notified approximately 700 teachers and school-based personnel,
and
approximately 26 Union-represented employees, that their positions were being abolished in a RIF,
effective June 30, 2004.
The abolishment was conducted in accordance with the Abolishment Act, D.C.Code § 1-624.08
(Repl.2006),
and
the Board’s regulations governing “the termination of the employment of employees of the Board ... due to the lack of funds, lack of work, or reorganization of functions,” 5 DCMR. § 1500.1, and other provisions of Chapter 15. Specifically, appellants alleged in Count I of their complaints, that DCPS and the Superintendent violated D.C.Code § l-624.08(d) “by conducting an abolishment of [employees] ... and denying one round of lateral competition in accordance with Chapter 24 of the District of Columbia Personnel Manual.” Count II asserted that the Board of Education violated D.C.Code § l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i) of the CMPA,
“by failing to
issue rules and regulations which provide for RIF procedures with a prescribed order of separation based on tenure of appointment and length of service; and which provide for priority re-employment consideration.” Count III claimed that the Board “acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority, in violation of [D.C.Code] § l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i) by issuing the RIF regulations contained in 5 DCMR, Chapter 15, which preclude separation based on tenure of employment and length of service and which deny employees the right to priority re-employment consideration.” In their prayer for relief, appellants, in part, sought an order compelling appellees (1) “to comply with all applicable provisions of the CMP A, specifically §§ l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i), 1-624.02,
and 1-624.08”; (2) “to rescind the current regulations contained in Title 5, Chapter 15 of the DCMR”; (3) “to provide for one level of lateral competition based on retention standing and priority re-employment consideration ... for all teachers and employees affected by the 2004 abolishment”; and (4) “to make whole all affected employees[.]”
On July 16, 2005, appellees filed a motion to dismiss appellants’ complaints pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). After listening to the arguments of the parties at a hearing on July 26, 2006, the Honorable Leonard Braman agreed with appellees that CMPA requires appellants’ claims to be presented to the OEA. In addition, the trial court stated that the general RIF procedures found in D.C.Code § 1-624.02 were inapplicable to this matter. Rather, said the trial judge, the RIF procedures under the Abolishment Act applied, and the general RIF procedures were “in a state of suspension” while the Abolishment Act was in effect. That is, “the Abolishment Act displaces the general RIF statute[,]” or “suspends it while the fiscal emergency continues.” The trial court determined that under the Abolishment Act’s RIF procedures, D.C.Code § l-624.08(d) entitles an affected employee, who otherwise would be eligible to compete for retention, “to one round of lateral competition”; and D.C.Code § l-624.08(e) calls for a thirty-day notice of the proposed separation. Furthermore, the trial court declared that under D.C.Code § 1-624.08(f)(2), an affected employee is authorized to file an appeal with OEA. After examining the counts in appellants’ complaints, the trial court decided that OEA has jurisdiction over each of the counts, not the trial court. Consequently, the court orally granted appellants’ motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court issued a short written order, which referenced the hearing and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants filed notices of appeal.
ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaints on the ground that OEA has jurisdiction over their claims. They argue that their “claims ... are not merely a challenge to DCPS’s application of its RIF regulations during the 2004 RIF.” Rather, “the validity of the RIF regulations themselves is the basic premise of [appellants’] claims that the Court should review.” They assert that “OEA’s purpose is to entertain appeals by individual District employees who have been impacted by an agency personnel action”; and that “[n]either the statute nor the regulations contain any language even suggesting that the Council [of the District of Columbia] intended OEA to stand in judgment over the legal sufficiency of other agencies’ personnel regulations.” They insist that “OEA’s authority is limited to the review of an agency’s application of existing RIF regulations,” and that
“OEA’s expertise is in the application of rules, but not the design of those rules .As appellants put it, “this case does not rest solely on the District’s ‘conduct in handling personnel’ actions that implicate OEA’s jurisdiction[;][r]ather, this case concerns the District’s implementation of regulations in the first place, and a review of the propriety of those regulations does not rest exclusively or primarily with OEA.” Relatedly, they rely on “[t]he presumption of reviewability of DCPS’s RIF regulations by the court[ ]....”
Appellees’ response notes that appellants have presented on appeal a claim that is different from that in the complaint, that is, “a stand-alone challenge to the RIF regulations, wholly unrelated to the [2004] RIF conducted pursuant ■ to those regulations.” Furthermore, they emphasize that “[u]nder CMPA, employees separated under a RIF cannot bring an original action arising out of that RIF in Superior Court.” Thus, they argue, “[b]ecause the OEA has exclusive jurisdiction over an employee’s challenge to a RIF, and the Abolishment Act expressly precludes review of a RIF brought by anyone other than a separated employee, the trial court properly held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over [appellants’] claims.” Alternatively, appellees contend, “[t]o the extent that [appellants’] lawsuit[s] can be interpreted to raise ... a stand alone challenge [to the validity of the regulations], it is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.”
In their reply brief, appellants attempt to clarify their position. They maintain that “[t]he 2004 RIF is an important basis of [their] standing to challenge the Board of Education’s RIF regulations^] ... [b]ut in this appeal, [they] are challenging only the [trial] court’s rulings pertaining to the lawfulness of the regulations DCPS followed in the 2004 RIF, not the lawfulness of the application of those regulations.” According to appellants, even though “the regulations were unlawful from their inception, it was their actual application that caused the injury necessary to give [them] standing to justify suit.” They state that “[w]ithout such injury, [they] likely would have lacked standing to challenge the validity of the regulations, and any such challenge would not have been ripe for review.” They contend that their lawsuits are timely because “[i]t was not until 2002 that DCPS issued regulations that could and did apply to the 2004 abolishment.”
Like the trial court, we reject appellants’ attempt to circumvent the possibility of OEA jurisdiction through a re-configuration of their complaints. The reconfiguration ignores Count I, alleging the denial of one round of lateral competition, as well as that part of appellants’ prayer for relief pertaining to the denial of one round of lateral competition and the “make whole” remedy for the affected employees. The trial court properly read appellants’ complaints as principally encompassing more than an allegation relating to the validity of the reduction-in-force regulations.
As we note later in this opinion, without
Count I, appellants’ claims probably would not be justiciable.
We turn now to the applicable legal principles. “[W]here, [as here,] the matter under review requires invocation or declaration of a fact-free general principle of law, the court will designate the issue as a question of law, and review the matter ‘de novo.’ ”
Moreover, “if a ‘substantial question’ exists as to whether the CMPA applies, the Act’s procedures must be followed, and the claim must initially be submitted to the appropriate District agency”; and “the determination whether the OEA has jurisdiction is quintessentially a decision for the OEA to make in the first instance.”
That decision is conferred on OEA because of its specialty in personnel matters.
At the time of its creation, the Council described the OEA as “an independent personnel appeals authority which will hear all personnel-related employee appeals.”
After examining the legislative history of the CMPA and its provisions, we said: “It would seem ... from the purpose and text of CMPA, including its judicial review provisions, that the Council ‘plainly intended’ CMPA to create a mechanism for addressing virtually every conceivable personnel issue among the District, its employees, and their unions — with a reviewing role for the courts as a last resort, not a supplementary role for the courts as an alternative forum.”
We further determined that CMPA was designed to provide “exclusive remedies for claims arising out of employer conduct in handling personnel ratings, employee grievances, and adverse actions.”
Subsequently, we said more broadly: “The [OEA] has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over claims against the District arising under the CMPA.”
Yet, our decisions also have been guided by the principle which presumes judicial reviewability of agency actions, especially where employees still enjoy certain common law rights to sue for injuries.
Hence, “the actions of government agencies are normally presumed to be subject to judicial review unless [the legislature] has precluded review or a court would have no law to apply to test the legality of the agency’s actions.”
The two main exceptions to this principle are: “First, the legislature may commit the challenged action entirely to agency dis
cretion. Second, it may preclude review, explicitly or implicitly, by statute.”
Statutory provisions in the CMPA are relevant to our determination as to whether the presumption of judicial reviewability applies to the matter before us, as to whether OEA must first confirm and then exercise initial jurisdiction, and as to which statutory procedures apply to the 2004 RIF at issue here. In construing statutes, “[w]e look to the plain meaning of the statute first, construing words according to their ordinary meaning.”
“The literal words of [a] statute, however, are not the sole index to legislative intent, but rather, are to be read in the light of the statute taken as a whole, and are to be given a sensible construction and one that would not work an obvious injustice.”
In addition where, as here, “divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought ... to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them ....”
Thus, “[i]f related statutes conflict, we must reconcile them.”
Our statutory review is
de novo.
We begin our analysis with the Board’s RIF resolution and the statutory framework. The Board’s May 11, 2004 resolution authorized the 2004 RIF at issue here for budgetary reasons, that is, to ensure balanced budgets rather than deficits in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005; to “maintain fiduciary responsibility”; and to “address and eliminate a longstanding structural budgetary problem,” traceable to declining enrollment of pupils and the administrative impact of that decline. Therefore, the 2004 RIF triggered the Abolishment Act provisions, D.C.Code § 1-624.08. The procedures established in § 1-624.08 appear to have governed that RIF, rather than the regular RIF procedures found in D.C.Code § 1-624.02 which were then applicable to the Educational Service pursuant to § l-624.02(a). Section 1-624.02 contained more extensive procedures than those in § 1-624.08. The ordinary and plain meaning of the words used in § l-624.08(c) appears to leave no doubt about the inapplicability of § 1-624.02 to the 2004 RIF:
Notwithstanding any rights or procedures established by any other provision of this subchapter [that is, subchapter 24, which includes both § 1-624.02 and § 1-624.08], any District government employee, regardless of date of hire, who encumbers a position identified for abolishment shall be separated without competition or assignment rights, except as provided in this section.
Similarly, unlike § 1-624.02, § 1-624.08 plainly limited the procedures to which an affected employee is entitled; these include (1) in subsection (d) “one round of lateral competition ... limited to positions in the employee’s competitive level”; (2) in subsection (e) “written notice of at least 80 days before the effective date of his or her
separation”; and (3) in subsection (h) “rights under either the Agency Reemployment Priority Program or the Displaced Employee Program[] _” Furthermore, again unlike § 1-624.02, § 1-624.08(f) generally prohibited review of the employee’s separation, but carved out two areas for exception, one of which is relevant here. Subsection (f)(2) provided, in essence, that if an affected employee wished to challenge the separation procedures of subsections (d) and (e), as applied, the employee could file an appeal with OEA:
(f) Neither the establishment of a competitive area smaller than an agency, nor the determination that a specific position is to be abolished, nor separation pursuant to this section shall be subject to review except that:
(2) An employee may file with the Office of Employee Appeals an appeal contesting that the separation procedures of subsections (d) and (e) were not properly applied.
The critical question raised by this litigation is whether appellees correctly applied the statutory procedures governing a RIF under the Abolishment Act. The procedures governing the 2004 RIF conducted by appellees appear to be explicitly set forth in § 1-624.08, and appellants’ complaint seeks specific relief for employees affected by the 2004 RIF.
Those procedures include one round of lateral competition and proper written notice, and the procedures do not affect a separated employee’s rights under the Reemployment Priority Program and the Displaced Employee Program. When ex
amined and read together, it is possible to reconcile the provisions of §§ 1-624.02 and 1-624.08 in chapter 24 of the CMPA, relating to reductions-in-force, with § 1-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i) in chapter 8-A of the CMPA, concerning the Educational Service and rulemaking governing specified reduction-in-force procedures. Sections 1-624.02 and l-608.01a (b)(2)(L)(i) are closely related in material substance; they both embody broader RIF procedures than those found in the Abolishment Act, § 1-624.08. Rulemaking for an Abolishment Act RIF is not essential because, as the trial court recognized, all of the material RIF procedures are encompassed within § 1-624.08. With respect to the procedures which might require more technical knowledge, Congress provided as a point of reference Chapter 24 of the Personnel Manual, not because that chapter is generally applicable to the Educational Service (it is not), but because it not only defines “one round of competition,” (§ 2499.1) but also explains competitive levels and how they are established (§§ 2410 and 2411), as well as provides information regarding an agency Reemployment Priority Program (§§ 2427 and 2428) and a Displaced Employee Program (§§ 2429 and 2430).
The area of lateral competition involves specialized considerations for which there are no judicially manageable standards relating to competitive levels.
However, “the independent personnel appeals authority,” OEA, has specialized expertise and experience in such matters. Undoubtedly, this is why § 1 — 624.08(f)(2) provides for a permissible appeal to the OEA with respect to challenges pertaining to subsection (d), and why that section does not mention the trial court as an appropriate initial forum. Given the specialized nature of the personnel issues presented by appellants in their respective complaints, the District’s courts are best suited for “a reviewing role” and not as an “alternative forum” to an agency with specialized expertise.
Indeed, in a RIF case on which appellants rely, appellant filed his appeal with OEA in the first instance, and then sought review in the trial court.
In sum, we hold that appellants must present their claims in the first instance to OEA, the independent, specialized agency established to handle “all personnel-related employee appeals.”
If OEA confirms its jurisdiction over appellants’ claims, it should then proceed to resolution of the merits of those claims. In addition, we hold that the Abolishment Act procedures appear to apply to the 2004 RIF, rather than the general RIF provisions of the CMPA. We also conclude that
rather than dismissing the appellants’ complaints, the trial court should have stayed its proceedings and transferred the case to the OEA for a determination of OEA’s jurisdiction, and for initial resolution of appellants’ claims, assuming confirmation of its jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand the case to the trial court for a stay of proceedings and a transfer of the matter to the OEA.
So ordered.