Warner, et al. v. McLaughlin

2016 DNH 154

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 30, 2016
• Docket: 16-cv-034-JD
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Adelbert H. Warner, II, et al

v. Civil No. 16-cv-034-JD Opinion No. 2016 DNH 154 James McLaughlin

O R D E R

Adelbert H. Warner, II, Kenneth J. Rowe, Kyle Olsen, and J.

Randall Ismay, who are prisoners proceeding pro se, brought suit

against James McLaughlin, a detective in the Keene, New

Hampshire, Police Department. The plaintiffs allege that

McLaughlin violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

(“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., when he intercepted their

on-line communications while posing as an adolescent boy. As a

result of McLaughlin’s investigations, all four of the

plaintiffs were convicted on charges of the distribution and/or

production of child pornography and received lengthy sentences.

See United States v. Warner, 08-cr-63-PLM (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20,

2008); United States v. Rowe, 10-cr-19-KKC-REW (E.D. Ky. Feb.

11, 2011); United States v. Olsen, 10-cr-374 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27,

2011); United States v. Ismay, 08-cr-39-AG (C.D. Cal. July 26,

2010). Because the plaintiffs are pro se prisoners, the magistrate

judge conducted a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and Local Rule 4.3(d)(1) and also ruled

on the plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment. The

magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on June 9,

2016, and Warner, Rowe, and Olsen filed objections. That report

and recommendation was vacated on August 12, 2016, after Ismay

filed a “Certification” that he intended to join in the suit

despite having not signed the complaint.

The magistrate judge issued a second report and

recommendation for preliminary review of the complaint and

review of the motion for default judgment, which included

consideration of Ismay’s claim. The magistrate judge again

recommended that the complaint be dismissed and that the motion

for a default judgment be denied. The objections filed in

response to the first report and recommendation, along with

supplemental filings by Warner and Rowe, are considered here.

Ismay has now moved to voluntarily dismiss his claim

without prejudice. Because McLaughlin has not yet filed an

answer, the motion is construed as a notice of dismissal under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A), which operates to

dismiss Ismay’s claim against McLaughlin without prejudice.

2 Standard of Review

The court conducts a de novo review of those portions of

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which an

objection is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court “may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. Warner,

Rowe, and Olsen filed objections, but Ismay did not.

On preliminary review under § 1915A, the court uses the same

standard that applies to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d

207, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2016); De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520,

524 (4th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 12(b)(6), “the complaint must

contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Miller v. Town of Wenham, --- F.3d ---,

2016 WL 4206375, at *3 (1st Cir. Aug. 20, 2016). The court takes

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs but

disregards conclusory statements. Wilson v. HSBC Mortg. Servs.,

Inc., 744 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014). In applying the standard,

the court liberally construes the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs.

Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 75 (1st Cir. 2014).

Discussion

The plaintiffs allege that McLaughlin violated § 2518(8)(a)

by using computer word processing software to copy their

3 communications to affidavits. They also assert that McLaughlin

altered and fabricated evidence against them. They contend that

their claims are not untimely because they are entitled to

equitable tolling. The plaintiffs ask that their convictions be

vacated and expunged from their records and seek statutory

damages along with attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.

As a preliminary matter, Rowe charges that the magistrate

judge improperly vacated the first report and recommendation and

then issued a second report and recommendation. Rowe is

mistaken. Because his fellow plaintiff, Ismay, failed to sign

the complaint, his claim was not considered in the first report

and recommendation. Ismay, however, filed a certification to

join in the complaint after the first report and recommendation

issued. Therefore, the magistrate judge properly vacated the

first report and recommendation, in order to consider Ismay’s

claim, and then issued a report and recommendation as to the

claims of all of the plaintiffs. As noted above, however, Ismay

has now voluntarily dismissed his claim.

A. Report and Recommendation and Objections

The magistrate judge found that the plaintiffs’ allegations

did not demonstrate that McLaughlin’s recording of their

communications violated § 2518(8)(a) and recommended dismissal

of the complaint for that reason. The magistrate judge also

4 found that the action was barred by the two-year statute of

limitations, § 2520(e), and that the plaintiffs had not alleged

grounds to support tolling of the limitation period. With

respect to the motion for a default judgment, the magistrate

judge noted that the plaintiffs had correctly conceded that

default judgment should not enter and recommended the motion be

dismissed.

Warner objects to the report and recommendation,

challenging the standard of review, the report on the merits of

the claims, the application of the statute of limitations, and

failure to find that his motion for default judgment was moot.

In addition to challenging the magistrate’s authority to vacate

the first report and recommendation, Rowe asserts that the

plaintiffs alleged facts to show that McLaughlin violated

§ 2518(8)(a) and that the statute of limitations does not apply

because he is innocent. Olsen also disputes the recommendation

to dismiss the claims on the merits and argues that his

counsel’s ineffective representation prevented Olsen from

knowing that McLaughlin violated § 2518(8)(a).

B. Relief Sought

The plaintiffs ask for statutory damages and also ask the

court to vacate their convictions. Claims cannot be brought for

5 damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that “would render a conviction

invalid” unless the plaintiff can show “that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Generally, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the

proper means to challenge a federal conviction, but the

plaintiffs have not brought petitions under § 2255.

Although 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(1) includes equitable relief as a

remedy for a violation, vacating a conviction is not within the

realm of equitable relief that might be granted under the

statute.

C. Violation of Section 2518(8)(a)

Detective McLaughlin worked undercover, on the internet, to

investigate child pornography. Through his investigations, he

intercepted and recorded emails and other electronic

communications from individuals all over the county, including

the plaintiffs in this case. McLaughlin then sent copies of his

recordings to law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over

the plaintiffs. Each of the plaintiffs was convicted of child

pornography offenses based on evidence provided by McLaughlin.

6 During Ismay’s trial, McLaughlin explained the process he

used to collect and copy internet communications. The

plaintiffs, all federal prisoners, met when they were

incarcerated together in a federal prison in Marion, Illinois.

There, they exchanged information about their convictions on

child pornography charges and discovered that McLaughlin had

provided evidence against all of them. They then brought suit

in this court against McLaughlin, alleging that his affidavits

violated § 2518(8)(a) of the ECPA.

Under the ECPA, “[e]xcept as provided in section

2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic

communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used

in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from

the person or entity, other than the United States, which

engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”1

§ 2520(a). Section 2518(8)(a) provides that “[t]he contents of

any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted by any

means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded

on tape or wire or other comparable device . . . [and] shall be

done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or

other alterations.” To recover damages, a plaintiff must prove

1 The plaintiffs do not challenge McLaughlin’s authority to record their communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).

7 by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a

provision of the ECPA.2 Lewton v. Divingnzzo, 772 F. Supp. 2d

1046, 1058 (D. Nev. 2011).

by copying recordings of their internet communications into word

processing documents titled “Supporting Affidavits.” They

allege that because word processing documents can be edited,

their communications were not protected in violation of

§ 2518(8)(a). They also allege that by using a word processing

document that included content prepared before their

communications were intercepted McLaughlin’s process shows that

he could have altered the content of their communications.

To state a claim under § 2520(a) and § 2518(8)(a), the

plaintiffs must allege facts that show that it was possible for

McLaughlin to record their communications in a way that would

protect the recording from editing or alteration and that he did

not do so. The complaint and attached exhibits, however, show

that McLaughlin took “screen captures” of communications and

printed communications and that parts of those recordings were

copied and pasted into his affidavits. The plaintiffs use the

2 In their complaint, the plaintiffs mistakenly rely on 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) to put the burden on McLaughlin.

8 screen captures and print-outs to contest the content of the

affidavits.

While the plaintiffs challenge the affidavits created by

McLaughlin, they apparently accept the accuracy and validity of

the other recordings made by McLaughlin and do not contend that

those violated § 2518(8)(a). Therefore, because the plaintiffs

allege that McLaughlin saved their communications through other

means that did not violate § 2518(8)(a), they have not alleged

facts to show that McLaughlin violated the ECPA. In addition,

even if the copy and paste method were the only means by which

the plaintiffs’ communications were recorded, that would not

necessarily violate § 2518(8)(a). See Harmon v. United States,

2016 WL 815595, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2016).

The plaintiffs focus most of the complaint on their charges

that McLaughlin tampered with their communications and

fabricated evidence against them in the affidavits, relying on

United States v. Williams, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1301 (N.D. Okla.

2014), and United States v. Jackson, 488 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870-71

(D. Neb. 2007). Because this is a civil case under the ECPA,

not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a motion in a

criminal proceeding, those cases provide no support for the

plaintiffs here.

9 In addition, as the magistrate judge found, the plaintiffs

have not shown that fabrication or material alterations

occurred. The plaintiffs provide copies of the screen captures

and print-outs of their communications with McLaughlin and

contrast those to McLaughlin’s pasted copies in the affidavits.

They offer their own analysis of the copy-and-pasted documents,

faulting McLaughlin for minor changes between the screen capture

and printed versions of the communications, which the plaintiffs

credit as authentic, and the affidavits. The small changes do

not show any material fabrications or alterations, contrary to

the plaintiff’s conclusory accusations.

Further, in Jackson, an expert provided an examination of

the evidence to show that material alterations had occurred.

Here, the plaintiffs’ analysis focuses on minutiae, and the

probative value of their challenges to the communication

evidence, compared to an analysis by an expert, lacks persuasive

power. See Harmon, 2016 WL 815595.

In any case, the plaintiffs concede that McLaughlin made

other recordings of their communications and do not allege that

those recordings violate § 2518(8)(a). Indeed, the plaintiffs

rely on the other recordings to challenge McLaughlin’s

affidavits. Therefore, the plaintiffs fail to allege a claim

that McLaughlin did not record their communications “in such a

10 way as will protect the recording from editing or other

alteration.” § 2518(8)(a).

D. Statute of Limitations

A civil action under § 2520 must be brought within “two

years after the date upon which the claimant first has a

reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.” § 2520(e).

The plaintiffs filed this suit on February 25, 2016. Therefore,

their claims are time barred if they had a reasonable

opportunity to discover the alleged violation before February

25, 2014.

The plaintiffs knew from their criminal cases that

McLaughlin had intercepted their online communications and

provided that information, including the affidavits, to the

prosecutors.3 As the magistrate judge reported, each of the

plaintiffs was represented by counsel during the criminal cases.

Although the details about McLaughlin’s techniques in

intercepting their communications apparently were at issue only

in Ismay’s case, none of the plaintiffs provide any reason why

The plaintiffs’ reliance on Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 3

(2010), is misplaced, as the Supreme Court there addressed equitable tolling for purposes of limitations periods imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The plaintiffs have provided no cognizable grounds for equitable tolling here.

11 the details were unavailable to them, except that they had no

legal background and counsel did not raise the issue during

their criminal cases.

The plaintiffs’ incarceration does not toll the limitations

period. Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Det. Facility, 334 F. Supp.

2d 114, 127 n.7 (D.R.I 2004); accord Fiore v. Dupre, 2011 WL

2748191, at *6 (D.R.I. June 16, 2011). In addition, the

plaintiffs’ lack of legal training or understanding of the law

does not provide grounds to toll a limitations period. Holmes

v. Spencer, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 2610658, at *3 (1st Cir. May

6, 2016). While counsel’s conduct during and after a criminal

action may provide extraordinary circumstances to support

equitable tolling for purposes of the limitations period

applicable to habeas corpus petitions, no such rule applies

here. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (discussing

equitable tolling for purposes of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)).

Warner was convicted in 2008, and Rowe and Olsen were

convicted in 2011. The plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity

to discover the alleged violation of the ECPA long before the

limitations period expired. Indeed, their allegations in the

complaint and their filings in their criminal cases show that

12 they were aware of the bases for the ECPA claim more than two

years before they filed suit here.4

The plaintiffs also contend that the limitations period

should be tolled because they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction.5 The validity of their convictions is not

at issue in this case. The actual innocence ground for tolling

applies to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, not to civil

actions under the ECPA where innocence and guilt are not at

issue. See, e.g., Brown v. Reilly, 2015 WL 4510376, at *2

(D.N.H. July 23, 2015) (citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct.

1924, 1935 (2013)). As a result, even if the plaintiffs had

provided any plausible support for a claim of actual innocence,

which is absent, that would not provide grounds to toll the

limitations period in this case.

Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims under the ECPA are barred

by the statute of limitations.

4 According to the complaint in this case, the details of McLaughlin’s methods were described in Ismay’s case in 2008, and Olsen further investigated McLaughlin’s methods in 2010. Warner filed an amended petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on August 23, 2012, challenging McLaughlin’s interception of his communications under § 2518(8)(a), based on Ismay, 08-cr-39 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Rowe filed a motion in his criminal case on June 18, 2013, raising the issue of McLaughlin’s interception of his communications under § 2518 based on Ismay.

5 Warner also raises a miscarriage of justice ground for tolling that applies in habeas cases but not here.

13 Because leave to amend would be futile in this case, the

claims brought by Warner, Rowe, and Olsen are dismissed with

prejudice.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the report and recommendation

(document no. 37) is accepted as modified by this order.

The report and recommendation issued on June 9, 2016,

(document no. 20) has been vacated.

The motion for default judgment (document no. 6) is

terminated as moot.

Ismay’s motion to withdraw, construed as a notice of

voluntary dismissal, (document no. 50) is granted. Ismay’s

claim is dismissed without prejudice.

The complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to Warner,

Rowe, and Olsen.

The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and

close the case.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Joseph DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge

August 30, 2016

14 cc: John A. Curran, Esq. J. Randall Ismay, pro se Kyle Olsen, pro se Kenneth J. Rowe, pro se Adelbert H. Warner II, pro se