Warman v. Warman

2017 Ohio 7462
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided September 5, 2017·No. CA2016-08-170·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY

DAWN K. WARMAN, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2016-08-170

: OPINION

- vs - 9/5/2017 :

GUY M. WARMAN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. DR2015-01-0063

Frank J. Schiavone IV, 6 South Second Street, Suite 520, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiffappellee

Mark Conese, 633 High Street, Suite 102, Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendantappellant

RINGLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Guy Warman ("Father"), appeals from a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, following his divorce from appellee, Dawn Warman ("Mother"). For the reasons detailed below, we affirm.

{¶ 2} Father and Mother were married on September 13, 2000 and had one child born on October 29, 2003. Mother filed a complaint for divorce on January 29, 2015. Father

answered Mother's complaint and filed a counterclaim for divorce on March 17, 2015.

{¶ 3} The matter was tried to the court where the parties introduced testimony with respect to parenting arrangements and allocation of marital property and debts. The evidence showed that the parties had substantial credit card debt that needed to be allocated. It is undisputed that Father was the primary source of income for the family. Father had an approximate annual income of $130,000, while Mother worked part-time earning an approximate annual income of $17,000.

{¶ 4} Following the hearing, the trial court named Mother sole residential parent of their daughter, ordered child support and spousal support in favor of Mother, and allocated the parties' property and debt. The trial court divided the marital debts between Mother and Father, but also found Father responsible for a large portion of credit card debt that was found to be Father's separate debt. Father now appeals the decision of the trial court, raising three assignments of error for review.

{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT APPELLANT ONLY RECEIVE DR610 PARENTING TIME.

{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Father alleges the trial court erred in its decision allocating parenting time. As noted above, Father argues the trial court should not have allocated parenting time pursuant to the Butler County Standard Parenting Time order DR610. Father argues that he has a good relationship with his daughter and should be allowed additional parenting time beyond what is provided in the standard parenting schedule. We find no merit to Father's argument.

{¶ 8} A juvenile court is vested with broad discretion in determining the visitation rights of a nonresidential parent, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gray v. King, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2013-01-006, 2013-Ohio-3085, ¶ 12. In

making this determination, the juvenile court's primary concern is the best interest of the child. Carr v. Carr, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2015-02-015 and CA2015-03-020, 2016-Ohio- 6986, ¶ 47

{¶ 9} In establishing a specific parenting-time schedule, a trial court is required to consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D). Bristow v. Bristow, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-05-139, 2010-Ohio-3469, ¶ 16. The factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the child's interaction and interrelationship with his or her parents, (2) the geographical location and distance between the parents' respective homes, (3) the child and parents' available time, including each parent's employment schedule, (4) the age of the child, (5) the child's adjustment to his or her home, (6) the health and safety of the child, (7) the mental and physical health of all the parties, (8) the parent more likely to honor and facilitate court- approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights, and (9) "any other factor in the best interest of the child." R.C. 3109.051(D).

{¶ 10} Based on our review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its order regarding parenting time. In the present case, the trial court heard testimony from the child's counselor that the child had vocalized her desire to live with Mother and visit with her Father. Though Father argues that he should be entitled to more than the standard parenting schedule, he fails to set forth any articulable argument as to why his daughter's best interests are served by an alternative arrangement.

{¶ 11} To be clear, the testimony reflects that both Father and Mother are good parents and their daughter is bonded with both parents. There is no indication from the record that the trial court intended to punish Father or provide him with limited visitation with his daughter. Simply, the record reflects that the trial court found it in the best interest of the child to name Mother residential parent and provide Father with standard visitation. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering standard visitation.

Father's first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 2:

{¶ 13} THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY ALL OF THE MARITAL DEBT.

{¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay all marital debt. Father's argument is without merit.

{¶ 15} Property division in a divorce proceeding is a two-step process that is subject to two different standards of review. Grow v. Grow, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2010-08-209, CA2010-08-218, and CA2010-11-301, 2012-Ohio-1680, ¶ 11. Initially, pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(B), "the court shall * * * determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property." "Although the statute does not mention debt as an element of marital and separate property, the rules concerning marital assets have been consistently applied to marital and separate debt." Ohmer v. Renn-Ohmer, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012- 02-020, 2013-Ohio-330, ¶ 35. An appellate court reviews the trial court's classification of property or debt as marital or separate under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Oliver v. Oliver, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-01-004, 2011-Ohio-6345, ¶ 8.

{¶ 16} After classifying the property as separate or marital, "the court shall disburse a spouse's separate property to that spouse" and divide the marital property equally. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) and (D). However, if the court finds an equal division would be inequitable, then the court must divide the property in a manner it determines is equitable. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1); Roberts v. Roberts, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2012-07-015 and CA2012-07- 016, 2013-Ohio-1733, ¶ 34. As mentioned above, the concepts related to "property" relate to both the parties' assets and debts. Ohmer at ¶ 35. The trial court is given broad discretion in fashioning a property or debt division and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Williams, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-08-074, 2013-Ohio-3318, ¶ 54. To find

abuse of discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

{¶ 17} We find the trial court did not err in its decision allocating marital debt. Though Father acknowledges that he has a significantly higher income than Mother, he argues that the debt should be "divided more evenly" or the trial court "should have split the marital debt evenly."

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