Ward v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 17, 2022
Docket6:21-cv-00512
StatusUnknown

This text of Ward v. Commissioner of Social Security (Ward v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ward v. Commissioner of Social Security, (M.D. Fla. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

SUE ANN WARD, Plaintiff, v. CASE NO. 6:21-cv-512-MCR ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. / MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of a partially unfavorable decision denying her application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Following an administrative hearing held on February 24, 2020, the assigned Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled from May 31, 2015, the alleged disability onset date, through September 24, 2019.2 (Tr. 14.) Based on a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.

1 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 18.)

2 Plaintiff had to establish disability on or before September 30, 2018, her date last insured, in order to be entitled to a period of disability and DIB. (Tr. 14.) I. Standard of Review The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have

reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a

whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the

Commissioner’s factual findings). II. Discussion A. Issues on Appeal Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC’) determination is unsupported by

substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to reconcile the opinion of Dr. McCarthy with the RFC determination, despite affording it significant weight. (Doc. 25 at 8.) Had Dr. McCarthy’s opinion been adopted, Plaintiff argues, she would have been limited to sedentary work and found disabled

five years earlier. (Id. at 9.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain why Ms. Ward’s subjective statements were apparently contradicted by the medical evidence. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff asserts: [E]xcept for the generalized language that the medical evidence did not preclude an ability to perform competitive work, no explanation was provided as to how the ALJ reached this conclusion. Therefore, the analysis of Ms. Ward’s subjective complaints is nothing more than a conclusory statement.

(Id.)

As to the first issue, Defendant counters by stating, “the ALJ fully considered Dr. McCarthy’s opinion, including the limitation Plaintiff now cites, and properly found it supported his RFC assessment (Tr. 17-18.)” (Doc. 26 at 14.) Defendant continues by asserting “because Dr. McCarthy was a one-time examiner and not a treating doctor, his opinion was not entitled to any deference or special consideration,” and that “[a]lthough the ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. McCarthy’s opinion (Tr. 17-18), the ALJ had the responsibility of assessing Plaintiff’s RFC based on all the relevant evidence and was not required to adopt Dr. McCarthy’s opinion verbatim. (Id.)

As to the second issue, Defendant argues that the ALJ thoroughly recapped Plaintiff’s allegations and that “Plaintiff’s argument ignores the ALJ’s discussion and actual findings, which compared Plaintiff’s allegations to Plaintiff’s medical records and opinion evidence (Tr. 16-19.)” (Id. at 12.)

B. Standard for Evaluating Opinion Evidence The ALJ is required to consider all the evidence in the record when making a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(3), 416.920(a)(3). With regard to medical opinion evidence, “the ALJ must state

with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). However, “the ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.” Wainwright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.

06-15638, 2007 WL 708971, *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2007) (per curiam); see also Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (same). “The ALJ is required to consider the opinions of non-examining [S]tate agency medical and psychological consultants because they ‘are highly

qualified physicians and psychologists, who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation.’” Milner v. Barnhart, 275 F. App’x 947, 948 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also SSR 96-6p3 (stating that the ALJ must treat the findings of State agency medical consultants as expert opinion

evidence of non-examining sources). While the ALJ is not bound by the findings of non-examining physicians, the ALJ may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to them in his decision. SSR 96-6p. C. Standard for Evaluating Subjective Pain Testimony

When a claimant seeks to establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit’s three- part “pain standard” applies. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). “If the ALJ decides not to credit such testimony, he must

articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Id. The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.

Id. Once a claimant establishes that his pain is disabling through objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that shows a medical

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Related

Cassandra L. Milner v. Michael J. Astrue
275 F. App'x 947 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Billy D. Crawford v. Comm. of Social Security
363 F.3d 1155 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security
631 F.3d 1176 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Sims v. Apfel
530 U.S. 103 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Edwards v. Sullivan
937 F.2d 580 (Eleventh Circuit, 1991)

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