[782]*782OPINION
Opinion by
Justice ROSS.
John Arlin Walters was convicted by a jury for murder. The jury assessed punishment at thirty-two years’ imprisonment, and he was sentenced accordingly. Walters appeals, contending the trial court erred by: 1) refusing to allow him to introduce evidence contradicting the State’s evidence; 2) improperly instructing the jury at the guilt/innocence phase; 3) failing to grant a mistrial at the punishment phase when the State commented on Walters’ failure to testify; and 4) admitting evidence of expert opinions.
I. BACKGROUND
Walters shot and killed his older brother, Russell L. Walters, Jr. At the time, Walters was in his late fifties, and Russell1 was in his late sixties. The shooting was the climax of an apparent long-standing animosity between the two and occurred on a church parking lot after an argument over a water bill. That Walters shot his brother is not at issue. According to Walters, his brother approached Walters’ pickup truck while Walters was driving away from the parking lot. Russell followed alongside the pickup on foot, threatening his younger brother. Russell opened the pickup door and had his right hand behind his back. When he did, Walters shot him twice, once in the neck and once in the torso. The only question was whether Walters acted in self-defense. The jury failed to so find.
II. Improper Jury Instructions
Because the Court unanimously agrees that Walters’ second point of error requires reversal and remand for a new trial, we address it first. Walters contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Specifically, he contends the court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury concerning threats made by the deceased and the proper consideration of the jury concerning such threats. He also contends the charge erroneously limited his self-defense by including language regarding provocation when there was no evidence to support such a charge.
A. Failure to Instruct on Threats by the Decedent
The entirety of the defense in this case was focused on self-defense. In its charge to the jury, the trial court gave a somewhat confusing, cut-and-paste, instruction on self-defense. Walters requested, and tendered to the court, a proper instruction concerning threats by the deceased:
You are instructed that where a defendant accused of murder seeks to justify himself on the grounds of threats against his own life, he is permitted to introduce evidence of the threats made, but the same shall not be regarded as affording justification for the offense unless it be shown that at the time of the killing, the person killed, by some act then done, manifested an intention to execute the threats so made and provided that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would not have retreated.
The trial court denied the request.
There is considerable evidence in the record supporting Walters’ request. Walters testified that he informed the sheriffs office in a telephone conversation that his brother had threatened him with a gun in the past. Jackie Ray Patrick, a business acquaintance of Walters, corroborated Walters’ testimony by stating that he was [783]*783present on two occasions when Russell pointed a firearm at Walters. Finally, Walters testified that his brother threatened him just before the killing. He testified that Russell told him, “I’m going to come looking for you, and you’re not going to like it,” and “I’m going to put a stop to you today, once and for all.”
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of the trial court’s opinion about the credibility of the defense. VanBrackle v. State, 179 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.).
Walters complains that the charge, as given, did not adequately inform the jury that apparent danger was to be measured from the standpoint of the defendant, and completely failed to instruct the jury that it could consider prior threats made by the decedent. When a jury considers whether a defendant acted in self-defense, it must “view the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions solely from the defendant’s standpoint.” Ex parte Drinkert, 821 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Bennett v. State, 726 S.W.2d 32, 37-38 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)). As the court stated in Bennett, the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief “must be judged from the standpoint of the accused at the instant he responds to the attack.” 726 S.W.2d at 37-38; Davis v. State, 104 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).2
That viewpoint necessarily includes verbal threats that occurred before, as well as at the time of, the incident at bar. The instruction on self-defense sent to the jury in this case does instruct the jury that the defendant may use deadly force to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself, and then later defines a “Reasonable belief’ as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” It does not, however, contain any language explaining to the jury that it could, in its consideration of self-defense, consider verbal threats made by the decedent toward Walters. Further, the only mention of verbal provocation found in the instruction is a limitation on self-defense stating that the use of force “is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone.”3
As acknowledged by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ellis v. State, 811 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), a defendant is entitled to a charge regarding verbal threats made by the victim toward the defendant — and not only those that occurred at the time of the shooting. See Barkley v. State, 152 Tex.Crim. 376, 214 S.W.2d 287 (1948) (cited by Ellis, 811 S.W.2d at 101, also noting threats on days before the killing).
The standard of review for errors in the jury charge depends on whether the defendant properly objected. Mann v. State, 964 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex.[784]*784Crim.App.1998); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); Gomick v. State, 947 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.). If a proper objection was raised, reversal is required if the error “is calculated to injure the rights of defendant.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In other words, an error that has been properly preserved is reversible unless it is harmless. Id.
Counsel objected on these grounds and tendered a correct instruction. In light of the fact that self-defense was the only real issue before the jury, we hold that the trial court’s failure to specifically instruct the jury concerning prior verbal threats by the decedent was “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant” and was, therefore, harmful, and reversible error. We sustain Walters’ contention.
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[782]*782OPINION
Opinion by
Justice ROSS.
John Arlin Walters was convicted by a jury for murder. The jury assessed punishment at thirty-two years’ imprisonment, and he was sentenced accordingly. Walters appeals, contending the trial court erred by: 1) refusing to allow him to introduce evidence contradicting the State’s evidence; 2) improperly instructing the jury at the guilt/innocence phase; 3) failing to grant a mistrial at the punishment phase when the State commented on Walters’ failure to testify; and 4) admitting evidence of expert opinions.
I. BACKGROUND
Walters shot and killed his older brother, Russell L. Walters, Jr. At the time, Walters was in his late fifties, and Russell1 was in his late sixties. The shooting was the climax of an apparent long-standing animosity between the two and occurred on a church parking lot after an argument over a water bill. That Walters shot his brother is not at issue. According to Walters, his brother approached Walters’ pickup truck while Walters was driving away from the parking lot. Russell followed alongside the pickup on foot, threatening his younger brother. Russell opened the pickup door and had his right hand behind his back. When he did, Walters shot him twice, once in the neck and once in the torso. The only question was whether Walters acted in self-defense. The jury failed to so find.
II. Improper Jury Instructions
Because the Court unanimously agrees that Walters’ second point of error requires reversal and remand for a new trial, we address it first. Walters contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Specifically, he contends the court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury concerning threats made by the deceased and the proper consideration of the jury concerning such threats. He also contends the charge erroneously limited his self-defense by including language regarding provocation when there was no evidence to support such a charge.
A. Failure to Instruct on Threats by the Decedent
The entirety of the defense in this case was focused on self-defense. In its charge to the jury, the trial court gave a somewhat confusing, cut-and-paste, instruction on self-defense. Walters requested, and tendered to the court, a proper instruction concerning threats by the deceased:
You are instructed that where a defendant accused of murder seeks to justify himself on the grounds of threats against his own life, he is permitted to introduce evidence of the threats made, but the same shall not be regarded as affording justification for the offense unless it be shown that at the time of the killing, the person killed, by some act then done, manifested an intention to execute the threats so made and provided that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would not have retreated.
The trial court denied the request.
There is considerable evidence in the record supporting Walters’ request. Walters testified that he informed the sheriffs office in a telephone conversation that his brother had threatened him with a gun in the past. Jackie Ray Patrick, a business acquaintance of Walters, corroborated Walters’ testimony by stating that he was [783]*783present on two occasions when Russell pointed a firearm at Walters. Finally, Walters testified that his brother threatened him just before the killing. He testified that Russell told him, “I’m going to come looking for you, and you’re not going to like it,” and “I’m going to put a stop to you today, once and for all.”
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of the trial court’s opinion about the credibility of the defense. VanBrackle v. State, 179 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.).
Walters complains that the charge, as given, did not adequately inform the jury that apparent danger was to be measured from the standpoint of the defendant, and completely failed to instruct the jury that it could consider prior threats made by the decedent. When a jury considers whether a defendant acted in self-defense, it must “view the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions solely from the defendant’s standpoint.” Ex parte Drinkert, 821 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing Bennett v. State, 726 S.W.2d 32, 37-38 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)). As the court stated in Bennett, the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief “must be judged from the standpoint of the accused at the instant he responds to the attack.” 726 S.W.2d at 37-38; Davis v. State, 104 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).2
That viewpoint necessarily includes verbal threats that occurred before, as well as at the time of, the incident at bar. The instruction on self-defense sent to the jury in this case does instruct the jury that the defendant may use deadly force to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself, and then later defines a “Reasonable belief’ as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” It does not, however, contain any language explaining to the jury that it could, in its consideration of self-defense, consider verbal threats made by the decedent toward Walters. Further, the only mention of verbal provocation found in the instruction is a limitation on self-defense stating that the use of force “is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone.”3
As acknowledged by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ellis v. State, 811 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), a defendant is entitled to a charge regarding verbal threats made by the victim toward the defendant — and not only those that occurred at the time of the shooting. See Barkley v. State, 152 Tex.Crim. 376, 214 S.W.2d 287 (1948) (cited by Ellis, 811 S.W.2d at 101, also noting threats on days before the killing).
The standard of review for errors in the jury charge depends on whether the defendant properly objected. Mann v. State, 964 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex.[784]*784Crim.App.1998); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); Gomick v. State, 947 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.). If a proper objection was raised, reversal is required if the error “is calculated to injure the rights of defendant.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In other words, an error that has been properly preserved is reversible unless it is harmless. Id.
Counsel objected on these grounds and tendered a correct instruction. In light of the fact that self-defense was the only real issue before the jury, we hold that the trial court’s failure to specifically instruct the jury concerning prior verbal threats by the decedent was “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant” and was, therefore, harmful, and reversible error. We sustain Walters’ contention.
B. ERroneous Provocation Instruction
Walters also states, in a single sentence in his brief, that the charge erroneously included language regarding provocation by the defendant, although there was no evidence that he provoked the decedent. This contention is unsupported by any analysis or argument. When a point of error is inadequately briefed, we will not address it. Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). We may not brief a defendant’s case for him or her. See Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Although this issue was clearly preserved at trial, it is inadequately briefed on appeal, and is overruled.
III. Three 9-1-1 Calls and a Fourth Telephone Call
Walters also contends the trial court erred by “allowing the State to publish 911 tape conversations to the jury, then denying defendant’s request to introduce identical, contradictory evidence, thereby denying him confrontation of witnesses for the State and requiring him to testify in his own defense.” The context of this alleged error came during the testimony of sheriffs deputy Sean English, a dispatcher for the sheriffs office at the time of the shooting.
English testified on direct examination concerning three 9-1-1 calls received at the sheriffs office on the day of the shooting, and one telephone call he initiated to Walters immediately following the 9-1-1 calls. The first 9-1-1 call, received at 2:06 p.m., was from an unidentified female calling from the Tabernacle Baptist Church about “some type of disturbance.” English dispatched an officer to the area. At 2:08 p.m., English received another 9-1-1 call with regard to the situation at the Tabernacle Baptist Church. This call was from an unidentified male at Walters’ residence who informed English that “[a] man has been shot at the ... church.” English then dispatched emergency medical services’ personnel and other officers to the scene. A third 9-1-1 call was received at 2:13 p.m. from a person identified as Carolyn Mobley, calling from a cell phone. This caller advised she was at the church parking lot with the shooting victim, whom she identified as “Russell Walters.” She further advised that “John Walters” was the shooter and that he had gone to his residence. Mobley described the location of that residence, which was nearby. English advised the officers of this information, and two units went to Walters’ residence. The State then offered its Exhibit No. 1, a CD recording that included the three 9-1-1 calls from that day. Walters objected on the ground of hearsay, but the objection was overruled and the recording of the three 9-1-1 calls was played for the jury-
[785]*785English then testified that, after the three 9-1-1 calls, at approximately 2:25 p.m., he placed a telephone call to the “John Walters residence” from which he had received the second 9-1-1 call. English testified that the male person who answered the telephone identified himself as “John Walters” and that it appeared to be the same person who made the second 9-1-1 call. English said he then asked Walters if he wanted to talk about what had happened. The State interrupted English and proceeded to question him about what was said to Walters concerning the firearm used in the shooting. English testified he told Walters to unload the firearm and put it away. He also said he told Walters the officers were outside his house and for him to “come out with his hands up where the officers could see them.” English quoted Walters as saying “he’d hang the phone up, and he’d be right out.” This telephone conversation between English and Walters was also recorded at the sheriffs office.
On cross-examination, English reiterated that, after the three 9-1-1 calls, he telephoned Walters and asked him if he wanted to talk about what had happened. However, when Walters’ counsel asked English what Walters had said in response, the State objected on the ground of hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection.
Walters later offered into evidence a CD recording of the three 9-1-1 calls, plus the telephone call English initiated to Walters. The trial court reiterated its previous ruling concerning the call English made to Walters and denied Walters’ offer to publish that conversation to the jury. The court, however, received the evidence for the record on Walters’ offer of proof. That evidence shows that, when English telephoned Walters and asked him, ‘What’s happening, man?” Walters responded, “My brother came up here threatening me, one of several times. He told me one time that he was going to kill me, out there at the barn.” Walters contends this evidence was admissible under three rules of evidence: the rule of optional completeness,4 as a present sense impression,5 and as an excited utterance.6 Because the rule of optional completeness compelled the admission of this evidence, it is unnecessary to discuss the other grounds for admission contended by Walters.
A. Standard op Review
The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling under the rules of evidence is abuse of discretion. Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). As explained below, to admit into evidence — over a hearsay objection — three of four related telephone conversations, and then exclude the fourth conversation — by sustaining a hearsay objection — was an abuse of discretion.
B. Rule op Optional Completeness
Under the rule of optional completeness, when only a portion of an act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement is introduced, the adverse party is entitled to introduce into evidence the remaining parts or any related act, declaration, writing, or recorded statement necessary to a full understanding of the evidence, or to explain that evidence. Tex.R. Evid. 107. Rule 107 is one of admissibility and permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence when that evidence is necessary to fully [786]*786and fairly explain a matter “opened up” by the adverse party. See Johnson v. State, 747 S.W.2d 451, 453-54 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). “The so-called rule of optional completeness takes effect when other evidence has already been introduced but is incomplete and misleading.” Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd). “Once an evidentiary door has been opened by one side, this rule serves to allow the other side to complete the picture.” West v. State, 121 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).
Rule 107 was implicated in this case when English testified that he asked Walters if he wanted to talk about what had happened. To then exclude Walters’ response deprived the jury of the remaining parts necessary to a full understanding of the evidence, in violation of the rule of optional completeness. Walters’ recorded response to English’s question was “necessary to fully and fairly explain a matter ‘opened up’ by the adverse party.” See id. at 103. The absence of Walters’ response made English’s testimony incomplete.
The State contends this evidence was properly excluded as hearsay. However, when a party “opens the door” on an issue by attempting to present an incomplete picture of an incident, the opposing party is then permitted to complete the picture by presenting evidence that would have otherwise been inadmissible. Arebalo v. State, 143 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Tex.App.Austin 2004, pet. ref'd).
Walters contends that, because he did not offer the recording for the truth of the words spoken, it was not hearsay. He argues that, because the State was allowed to create a false impression that Walters was calm about shooting his brother, the excluded evidence was necessary to dispel that falsehood and in order for him to cross-examine witnesses regarding his alleged calmness.
The State made Walters’ state of mind a key issue in this case by focusing on Walters’ calm demeanor during the conversations with police. Walters’ demeanor was so presented to show that his actions were calmly intentional and premeditated. This focus is apparent in the State’s questioning of English concerning the second 9-1-1 call:
Q I want to talk to you specifically about the second 9-1-1 call that came from the suspect, John Walters’, residence. From that phone call, was there any indication, during that call, as to that the person calling was the person that did the shooting?
A Not at that time, no.
Q Was there anything that would suggest that during that call?
A No, sir.
Q All right. And would you classify the emotional state of that particular caller as being excited?
A No, sir.
Q What would you characterize it as being during that call?
A Calm.
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Q ... From your experience as being a dispatcher for three years, have you ever received calls like this before with regards to incidents?
A Like this before?
Q Yeah.
A No, sir.
Q Where just somebody would call and say, “Hey, somebody’s been shot”?
A No, sir, not exactly in those words.
Q All right. Seemed to be a little out of the ordinary?
A A little bit.
Q What would you have expected?
[787]*787A Somebody very excited, shaky, even, maybe.
Q Did you get that here on this 9-1-1 call?
A No, sir.
English’s testimony concerning his conversations with Walters consisted of the declarations of two individuals as recounted by one participant, including only a portion of the content, but describing Walters’ demeanor. Walters sought to introduce a recording of the entirety of those conversations, that would have included the remainder of the content, and allowed the jury to determine for itself his demeanor without filtration through a third party. This is the very purpose of the rule of optional completeness. Compare Credille v. State, 925 S.W.2d 112, 116-17 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd) (when defendant questioned witness about content of videotaped interview, State entitled to offer videotape into evidence); and Solano v. State, 728 S.W.2d 428, 430-81 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, pet. ref'd).
C. Harm Analysis
The next question is whether the error harmed Walters. At trial, and now on appeal, Walters argued that because the recording was not admitted, it would become necessary for him to relinquish his Fifth Amendment rights and take the stand in order to place his emotional state before the jury. The State contends the exclusion of the evidence was necessarily harmless because Walters testified about those matters. That misses the point of Walters’ argument: that he only testified because the court erroneously refused to admit the only other evidence that could show his state of mind or demeanor and that it, therefore, became necessary for him to testify and give up his right to remain silent in order to have any way to adequately confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Walters contends the recording would have assisted the jury in determining his state of mind and demeanor — certainly more than his trial testimony — and that, had that recording been admitted, he would not have subjected himself to cross-examination. This is the same argument raised before the trial court, and it is fairly before us now.
Walters’ contention contains connected constitutional components. The right to remain silent is raised, the argument being that it was violated because the erroneous exclusion of evidence required Walters to testify so that his defensive theory could be raised by something more than rank speculation. His right to adequately confront and cross-examine the State’s witnesses is likewise raised. A defendant’s federal Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is an essential element of a fail1 trial. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees the accused an adequate opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). The constitutional right of confrontation means something more than merely bringing the accused and the witnesses face to face; it embodies and carries with it the valuable right of cross-examination of the witness. Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
Error in the admission of evidence is not itself typically of constitutional dimension.7 Exclusions of evidence reach [788]*788constitutional dimension and are unconstitutional if they “significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused’s defense.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998); Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666. In this case, the record shows that error directly resulted in the violation of not one, but two separate constitutional rights. The error is constitutional in scope. As a constitutional error, the appellate court applies Rule 44.2(a) and reverses unless it determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the appellant’s conviction or punishment. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a). It cannot be so determined in this case.
Neither the record nor the State suggest any other method by which Walters might have provided any underpinning to his defensive argument — that his actions were not premeditated or calmly and coolly taken — than either the excluded evidence or his own testimony. Counsel stated categorically at the trial that Walters would have to take the stand if the evidence was not admitted, and that is precisely what happened. Walters did present his position, but also subjected himself to exhaustive cross-examination by the State totaling ninety-one pages of the reporter’s record.
Further, neither the record nor the State suggest any other method of providing Walters with a basis for confronting and adequately cross-examining English about Walters’ mental or emotional state as shown by the recording, or a nurse who also opined about his emotional state during the second 9-1-1 call.
Under these facts, and in light of the entirety of the record, it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to Walters’ conviction or punishment.
Conclusion
Because we unanimously hold that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury concerning prior verbal threats by the decedent was harmful error, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for a new trial.
Concurring Opinion by Justice CARTER.