WALLS v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

District Court, M.D. North Carolina·Decided September 30, 2022·No. 1:20-cv-00098·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

LAURA M. WALLS, Individually ) and as Executor of the Estate ) of ROBIE W. WALLS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:20-CV-98 ) FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge. Plaintiff Laura Walls, individually and as executor of the estate of her now deceased husband Robie Walls, asserts claims for Mr. Walls’ alleged wrongful death from mesothelioma. (ECF No. 138 ¶¶ 1, 2.) Before the Court is a Motion in Limine and Motion under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) to Exclude Flawed Data from a 1938 Saranac Laboratory Experiment, filed by Defendant Pneumo Abex LLC (“Abex”). (ECF No. 328.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Abex’s motion to exclude the will be granted. I. BACKGROUND In the interest of efficiency, the Court incorporates the factual and procedural background of this case as laid out in its prior orders concerning the parties’ motions for summary judgment and various motions to exclude expert testimony. (ECF Nos. 487 at 4–7; 488 at 2–5; 539 at 2–3.) During the course of this litigation, Plaintiff and Defendants have filed approximately twenty-five Daubert motions to exclude expert testimony.1 Following a conference with parties to discuss the need to eliminate duplicative motions, Defendants moved to join Defendant Ford’s Daubert motions and briefing, thereby “obviat[ing] the need for the Court to issue separate rulings on” Defendants’ remaining motions, with the exception of the instant motion.

(ECF No. 539 at 3.) Defendant Abex’s motion to exclude data from the 1938 Saranac Laboratory experiment was not addressed in the Court’s order resolving those Daubert motions. Abex seeks to exclude all documents, lay testimony, and expert testimony about an alledged flawed finding of tumors in mice in Experiment 774 from the Saranac Laboratory. (ECF No. 332 at 1.) The Court will now address Abex’s motion herein.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The admissibility of expert opinion is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The principles of Daubert and Rule 702 apply with equal force to scientific documentary evidence and lay testimony; trial courts “must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S.

at 589. Rule 702 provides that a witness “who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:”

1 See ECF Nos. 237; 239; 243; 251; 253; 255; 256; 258; 262; 264; 269; 273; 277; 279; 281; 297; 301; 303; 305; 307; 308; 309; 329; 333. (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Thus, expert testimony is admissible only if: (1) the expert is qualified, (2) the testimony is relevant, and (3) the testimony is based on reliable scientific methodology. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95. The Court must find these elements “at the outset” and “by a preponderance of proof.” Id. at 592, 592 n.10. An expert is qualified if he or she has “specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 379 (4th Cir. 2019). A witness’ qualifications are “liberally judged by Rule 702,” and “a person may qualify to render expert testimony in any one of the five ways listed” by the Rule: “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Cooper v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, Inc., 150 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 1998). An expert who is qualified must provide testimony that is relevant. An expert’s opinion is relevant if it “fit[s]” the facts of the case, meaning it has “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92. “This ensures that the expert ‘helps “the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”’” Sardis v. Overhead Door Corp., 10 F.4th 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir. 2017)). “Simply put, if an opinion is not relevant to a fact at issue, Daubert requires that it be excluded.” Id. Finally, relevant testimony must also be sufficiently reliable. An expert’s opinion is reliable if it is “based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and not on belief or speculation.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oglesby v. Gen. Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)). While the subject of scientific testimony must not “be ‘known’ to a certainty,” it must be “derived by the scientific method” and “supported by appropriate validation—i.e.,

‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. Reliability is a “flexible” inquiry that must focus “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 594–95. In Daubert, the Court outlined a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide lower courts in assessing reliability, including: (1) whether the theory can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its potential rate of error; (4) whether

standards exist to control the technique’s operation; and (5) the degree of acceptance of the methodology within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593–94. These factors “may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony,” and courts have “broad latitude” in choosing which factors are “reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150–53 (1999).

“Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge . . . exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.

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Related

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
526 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Oglesby v. General Motors Corp.
190 F.3d 244 (Fourth Circuit, 1999)
Howard Nease v. Ford Motor Company
848 F.3d 219 (Fourth Circuit, 2017)
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United States v. Nicholas Young
916 F.3d 368 (Fourth Circuit, 2019)
Lance Belville v. Ford Motor Company
919 F.3d 224 (Fourth Circuit, 2019)
Ellis v. Pneumo Abex Corp.
62 F. Supp. 3d 833 (C.D. Illinois, 2014)
Kopf v. Skyrm
993 F.2d 374 (Fourth Circuit, 1993)