DENECKE, J.
While riding on a motorcycle Jerry Waller was killed by an uninsured motorist. The defendant insurer had issued an automobile liability insurance policy to the plaintiff, H. E. Waller, who is the personal representative and the father of Jerry Waller. Plaintiff contends his son was covered under the uninsured motorist provision of defendant’s policy and that he is entitled to recover benefits on behalf of his son. The trial court, sitting without a jury, held for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
In order for plaintiff to recover he must prove that his son was an insured under defendant’s policy. The policy provides uninsured motorist coverage for its “insured,” defined as follows: “The unqualified word ‘insured’ means (1) the named insured [H. E. Waller, the father and plaintiff] and, while residents of the same household, his spouse and relatives. # # #>> riial court made a finding of fact that “Jerry Waller was not a resident relative of the same household as the named insured, H. E. Waller, at the time of the accident * *
We treated the question of whether one was a resident of the household of a named insured as a fact issue in Schehen v. North-West Insurance, 258 Or 559, 484 P2d 836 (1971). In the Schehen case, however, we held there was insufficient evidence to submit the question of fact to the jury. The two decisions from other jurisdictions which are relied upon by the plaintiff also treat the question as one of fact. American States Ins. Co., Western Pac. Div. v. Walker, 26 Utah2d 161, 486 P2d 1042 (1971), and Travelers Insurance Company v. Mixon, 118 Ga App 31, 162 [72]*72SE2d 830 (1968). We continue to regard the question as one of fact and the plaintiff does not contend to the contrary.
The next question is, what is the scope of our review of this question of fact? Is this proceeding in law or in equity? This is a frequent issue in litigation involving insurance coverage. If we are in equity, we review the facts de novo. If we are in law, we merely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact.
Plaintiff filed a complaint praying for damages. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint praying for specific performance of defendant’s agreement as provided in its policy, to arbitrate its liability. Defendant filed a counterclaim stated to be a proceeding for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that Jerry Waller was not a resident of plaintiff’s household at the time of Jerry Waller’s death.
The case was tried without any indication whether it was believed to be in law or in equity. In its judgment order the trial court held: “Count Three of defendant’s counterclaim for declaratory relief is resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Finding, as a matter of fact, that at the time of the accident, Jerry Waller was not a resident relative of the named insured’s household * # The trial court further stated in its judgment: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that defendant provided no coverage to Jerry Waller at the time of the injuries * * * and that as a consequence thereof, defendant is not required to arbitrate the claim.”
Of the several recent decisions we have made on this issue, Frontier Ins. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 262 Or 470, 499 P2d 1302 (1972), is probably the most relevant. The plaintiff filed a “ ‘Complaint in Equity for Declaratory Decree and Judgment,’ ” naming the [73]*73insurer as a defendant. Plaintiff prayed for a declaration of the rights of the parties “and for a decree reforming the insurance policy * * 262 Or at 475. We observed that reformation is a form of equitable relief; however, we were of the opinion that what the plaintiff sought in effect was to enforce the written policy as orally amended which was not the remedy of reformation. We, therefore, held that the proceeding should be regarded as an action at law.
Plaintiff’s position in this case is similar to that of the plaintiff in Frontier Ins. v. Hartford Fire Ins., supra (262 Or 470). Plaintiff is seeking declaration that Jerry Waller was covered under the policy and to enforce the policy as so interpreted. Plaintiff’s intent is further revealed by his prayer for attorney fees and his contention on appeal that he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to ORS 743.114. Attorney fees are only awardable under this statute if the insured seeks recovery on the policy. Hardware Mut. Cas. v. Farmers Ins., 256 Or 599, 609-612, 474 P2d 316 (1970); Foles v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 259 Or 337, 345-347, 486 P2d 537 (1971).
Unless the proceedings are clearly and properly in equity we have adopted the general rule that proceedings to determine insurance coverage are to be regarded as in law. Falk v. Sul America Terrestres, 255 Or 246, 248, 465 P2d 714 (1970); May v. Chicago Insurance Co., 260 Or 285, 292, 490 P2d 150 (1971); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Bill Olinger Mercury, 262 Or 8, 10-11, 495 P2d 1201 (1972).
For these reasons we hold that this proceeding is to be treated as an action at law. Our review, therefore, is limited to deciding whether there is evidence supporting the finding of the trial court that Jerry Waller was not a resident of his father’s household.
The facts are largely uncontroverted and many [74]*74were stipulated. The inferences to he drawn from the evidence are in dispute.
Jerry Waller was 24 years old and unmarried. He was discharged from the Navy in September 1967. Thereafter, he worked at several jobs and lived with his parents in Salem, Oregon. In May 1968 he visited his friend Eon Austin, in McCleary, Washington, which is about 200 miles from Salem. On May 15th he started living at the home of Eon Austin’s parents, in McCleary, and lived there until his death on July 20th. He returned to Salem every weekend or every other weekend. His parents had an extra bedroom where he always slept. He took his toilet articles and some of his clothes to McCleary. He left other clothes and his Navy uniform in Salem. After living in McCleary for a few weeks he brought his television set from Salem.
He did not change his mailing address from Salem. He also did not change his Oregon driver’s license or car registration. On May 29th he went to work as a full-time employee of Simpson Timber Co., in McCleary. On his employment application he stated his address as Salem. On the subsequent forms he filled out for his employer he gave as his address the Austins’, in McCleary.
Jerry Waller wanted at some time to return to Salem to live. He expressed a desire to work with deaf people. His mother was deaf and the Oregon Deaf School is at Salem. He talked about going to school to get training for teaching the deaf. He indicated a desire to go to a college about 25-30 miles from Salem and live at home. He picked up an application form from the Deaf School, in Salem.
Just before the fatal collision he told Eon Austin he wanted to move back to Salem in a few months. He wanted Eon to go back with him and live [75]*75at Ms folks’ house until they could find an apartment. Ron “didn’t want to do that [live with Jerry’s parents].”
The death certificate stated the decedent was a resident of Washington. There was testimony this information was furnished by the plaintiff.
In Schehen v. North-West Insurance,
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DENECKE, J.
While riding on a motorcycle Jerry Waller was killed by an uninsured motorist. The defendant insurer had issued an automobile liability insurance policy to the plaintiff, H. E. Waller, who is the personal representative and the father of Jerry Waller. Plaintiff contends his son was covered under the uninsured motorist provision of defendant’s policy and that he is entitled to recover benefits on behalf of his son. The trial court, sitting without a jury, held for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
In order for plaintiff to recover he must prove that his son was an insured under defendant’s policy. The policy provides uninsured motorist coverage for its “insured,” defined as follows: “The unqualified word ‘insured’ means (1) the named insured [H. E. Waller, the father and plaintiff] and, while residents of the same household, his spouse and relatives. # # #>> riial court made a finding of fact that “Jerry Waller was not a resident relative of the same household as the named insured, H. E. Waller, at the time of the accident * *
We treated the question of whether one was a resident of the household of a named insured as a fact issue in Schehen v. North-West Insurance, 258 Or 559, 484 P2d 836 (1971). In the Schehen case, however, we held there was insufficient evidence to submit the question of fact to the jury. The two decisions from other jurisdictions which are relied upon by the plaintiff also treat the question as one of fact. American States Ins. Co., Western Pac. Div. v. Walker, 26 Utah2d 161, 486 P2d 1042 (1971), and Travelers Insurance Company v. Mixon, 118 Ga App 31, 162 [72]*72SE2d 830 (1968). We continue to regard the question as one of fact and the plaintiff does not contend to the contrary.
The next question is, what is the scope of our review of this question of fact? Is this proceeding in law or in equity? This is a frequent issue in litigation involving insurance coverage. If we are in equity, we review the facts de novo. If we are in law, we merely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact.
Plaintiff filed a complaint praying for damages. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint praying for specific performance of defendant’s agreement as provided in its policy, to arbitrate its liability. Defendant filed a counterclaim stated to be a proceeding for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that Jerry Waller was not a resident of plaintiff’s household at the time of Jerry Waller’s death.
The case was tried without any indication whether it was believed to be in law or in equity. In its judgment order the trial court held: “Count Three of defendant’s counterclaim for declaratory relief is resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Finding, as a matter of fact, that at the time of the accident, Jerry Waller was not a resident relative of the named insured’s household * # The trial court further stated in its judgment: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that defendant provided no coverage to Jerry Waller at the time of the injuries * * * and that as a consequence thereof, defendant is not required to arbitrate the claim.”
Of the several recent decisions we have made on this issue, Frontier Ins. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 262 Or 470, 499 P2d 1302 (1972), is probably the most relevant. The plaintiff filed a “ ‘Complaint in Equity for Declaratory Decree and Judgment,’ ” naming the [73]*73insurer as a defendant. Plaintiff prayed for a declaration of the rights of the parties “and for a decree reforming the insurance policy * * 262 Or at 475. We observed that reformation is a form of equitable relief; however, we were of the opinion that what the plaintiff sought in effect was to enforce the written policy as orally amended which was not the remedy of reformation. We, therefore, held that the proceeding should be regarded as an action at law.
Plaintiff’s position in this case is similar to that of the plaintiff in Frontier Ins. v. Hartford Fire Ins., supra (262 Or 470). Plaintiff is seeking declaration that Jerry Waller was covered under the policy and to enforce the policy as so interpreted. Plaintiff’s intent is further revealed by his prayer for attorney fees and his contention on appeal that he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to ORS 743.114. Attorney fees are only awardable under this statute if the insured seeks recovery on the policy. Hardware Mut. Cas. v. Farmers Ins., 256 Or 599, 609-612, 474 P2d 316 (1970); Foles v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 259 Or 337, 345-347, 486 P2d 537 (1971).
Unless the proceedings are clearly and properly in equity we have adopted the general rule that proceedings to determine insurance coverage are to be regarded as in law. Falk v. Sul America Terrestres, 255 Or 246, 248, 465 P2d 714 (1970); May v. Chicago Insurance Co., 260 Or 285, 292, 490 P2d 150 (1971); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Bill Olinger Mercury, 262 Or 8, 10-11, 495 P2d 1201 (1972).
For these reasons we hold that this proceeding is to be treated as an action at law. Our review, therefore, is limited to deciding whether there is evidence supporting the finding of the trial court that Jerry Waller was not a resident of his father’s household.
The facts are largely uncontroverted and many [74]*74were stipulated. The inferences to he drawn from the evidence are in dispute.
Jerry Waller was 24 years old and unmarried. He was discharged from the Navy in September 1967. Thereafter, he worked at several jobs and lived with his parents in Salem, Oregon. In May 1968 he visited his friend Eon Austin, in McCleary, Washington, which is about 200 miles from Salem. On May 15th he started living at the home of Eon Austin’s parents, in McCleary, and lived there until his death on July 20th. He returned to Salem every weekend or every other weekend. His parents had an extra bedroom where he always slept. He took his toilet articles and some of his clothes to McCleary. He left other clothes and his Navy uniform in Salem. After living in McCleary for a few weeks he brought his television set from Salem.
He did not change his mailing address from Salem. He also did not change his Oregon driver’s license or car registration. On May 29th he went to work as a full-time employee of Simpson Timber Co., in McCleary. On his employment application he stated his address as Salem. On the subsequent forms he filled out for his employer he gave as his address the Austins’, in McCleary.
Jerry Waller wanted at some time to return to Salem to live. He expressed a desire to work with deaf people. His mother was deaf and the Oregon Deaf School is at Salem. He talked about going to school to get training for teaching the deaf. He indicated a desire to go to a college about 25-30 miles from Salem and live at home. He picked up an application form from the Deaf School, in Salem.
Just before the fatal collision he told Eon Austin he wanted to move back to Salem in a few months. He wanted Eon to go back with him and live [75]*75at Ms folks’ house until they could find an apartment. Ron “didn’t want to do that [live with Jerry’s parents].”
The death certificate stated the decedent was a resident of Washington. There was testimony this information was furnished by the plaintiff.
In Schehen v. North-West Insurance, supra (258 Or at 562), we construed identical language in an insurance policy. We stated:
“Although the term ‘household’ may he somewhat elastic, all of the definitions seem to have a common factor. They require that the members of the ‘household’ dwell or live together. We believe the term was intended to he so used in the present context.”
In that case we held there was no evidence from which the trier of fact could find the plaintiff was a resident of the named insured’s household. The facts in that case, however, were substantially different than those in the present case.
We hold in tMs case that there are reasonable inferences to he drawn from the evidence which will support the trial court’s finding.
The decedent was an adult. He had not lived in Salem for over two months before his death. He had a full-time job in McClearv and physically spent at least the nights of the working week at Ron Austin’s house, in McClearv. He did not plan to move back into his family’s home in Salem, except perhaps on a very temporary basis, and that at an indefinite time. This evidence, together with the evidence of lesser significance, supports the inference that Jerry Waller did not “dwell or live” together with his family in Salem.
The cases from other jurisdictions relied upon by plaintiff are not contrary to our holding. In both American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, supra (26 Utah2d [76]*76161), and Travelers Insurance Company v. Mixon, supra (118 Ga App 31), the courts held the evidence was sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the person was a resident of the household. Even if the evidence in those cases is believed to be comparable to the evidence in the present case, the holding in those two cases is merely that a question of fact was presented. The clear implication of both cases is that if the trier of fact had decided that the person was not a resident of the household, as the trial court did here, such a finding would have been sustained.
Plaintiff also contends Jerry Waller was a named insured in the policy and, therefore, entitled to the uninsured motorist coverage of the policy. The trial court made a conclusion of law that he was not.
The initial policy stated that the plaintiff, H. E. Waller, is the “named insured.” The policy as initially written contained an endorsement which stated, in part, “* * * insurance under this policy shall not be in force and effect as to any motor vehicle while the driver or operator of such motor vehicle is any male who is under the age of 25 years.” When his son returned from the service, Mr. Waller had his agent add a Pontiac to the vehicles insured and add his son as a new driver. An additional premium was charged for this change. An endorsement to the policy was issued by the defendant adding the Pontiac as an insured vehicle. The amended declaration continued to name H. E. Waller as the only “named insured.”
We agree with the trial court that Jerry Waller was not a “named insured.”
The uninsured motorist supplement provides coverage for persons who are deemed “insured.” The policy provides:
“The unqualified word ‘insured’ means (1) the named insured and, while residents of the same [77]*77household, his spouse and relatives of either; and (2) any other person while in or upon or while entering into or alighting from (1) the insured automobile provided the actual use thereof is by or with the permission of the named insured, or (2) any other automobile which is being operated by the named insured.”
All persons defined as “insured” were covered by defendant’s policy except, at least for liability coverage, male drivers under 25 were not covered. To negate that exception, Jerry was added as a new driver. This addition did not make Jerry a “named insured.” It removed the applicability of the young driver exception and made him an “insured” if he otherwise qualified under the definition of “insured.”
1 Long, Law of Liability Insurance 3-3, § 301 (1966), states the accepted law:
“* * * Two descriptive expressions are used in the policy to designate the person covered by insurance, ‘named insured’ and ‘insured.’ Whenever the description ‘named insured’ is used, only the person named in the declarations of the policy is meant. Whenever the word ‘insured’ is used, it includes any other person who may be covered by the policy.”
In Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash2d 533, 197 P2d 999 (1948), the Washington court held a person expressly named in the policy but not expressly designated as the “named insured” was not a named insured. A Mrs. Uhlman owned the car and was designated in the policy as the “named insured.” Mrs. Uhlman did not drive and her daughter Betty did the driving. An endorsement was added stating, “NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS, OTHER THAN AFORESAID HUSBAND AND WIFE, WHO ARE RELATIVES OF AND RESIDENTS IN THE HOUSEHOLD OF THE NAMED INSURED AND WHO ARE TO BE COVERED HEREUNDER AS INSURED: Betty [78]*78Lou Uhlman, College Student, Daughter.” 31 Wash2d at 538. Her daughter, Betty, permitted the defendant to drive. The defendant collided with plaintiff and sought coverage under the policy as an omnibus insured. The policy covered any person using the car “provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named Insured.” 31 Wash2d at 538. The court held that although the daughter was named as an insured in the endorsement, she was an additional insured and not the named insured and, therefore, the defendant was not driving with the permission of the named insured.
In Griffin v. State Farm, 129 Ga App 179, 199 SE2d 101 (1973), Harland Griffin, bought a car for his daughter, Mary Elizabeth Griffin. He had the car insured under a family insurance policy which had been issued in the name of his wife, Nellie Ruth Griffin. The issue was whether Mary Elizabeth Griffin was an uninsured motorist. State Farm had the uninsured motorist coverage on the injured party and was contending that Mary Elizabeth Griffin was insured :
“State Farm contends that the amendment to the Travelers’ policy which added Mary Elizabeth Griffin as a driver of the vehicle made her a named insured. The policy defines a named insured as ‘any individual named in Item 1 of the declarations and also includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household.’ The only person named in the amendment to the policy under Item 1 is Nellie Ruth Griffin, the spouse of Harland Griffin. Thus, there is no merit to the contention.” 199 SE2d at 104.
We hold Jerry Waller was not a named insured.
The dissent would hold that Jerry Waller did have uninsured motorist coverage as he was “designated as a named insured.” The policy did not provide for one “designated as a named insured”; [79]*79however, the statute requires such a clause and, therefore, the policy should be construed as containing such clause. ORS 743.069 and 743.792(2)(a)(A).
This contention was not made by the plaintiff in his pleadings, in the trial court, or in this court. At our request the parties furnished supplemental briefs on this issue.
The dissent contends the defendant did name Jerry Waller as a designated insured. The dissent would so conclude as a matter of law. We are of the opinion that the evidence would not support a factual determination that Jerry Waller was a “designated” insured, much less a conclusion as a matter of law.
With some limitations, the usual rule of contracts that the intention of the parties governs is applicable to insurance contracts. Ramco, Inc. v. Pacific Ins., 249 Or 666, 673, 439 P2d 1002 (1968). The parties did not know the statute required the policy to provide for one “designated as a named insured.” Under those circumstances it seems to us that it would be very unlikely, if not impossible,' to find from the evidence that the parties nevertheless intended to and did designate Jerry Waller as a named insured.
We find another contention of the dissent more troublesome; that is, that plaintiff had “reason to suppose” under the circumstances stated to the agent of defendant that Jerry Waller was a designated named insured or was designated in some other manner so as to provide uninsured motorist insurance covering him at the time of his death. We believe we correctly paraphrase this contention of the dissent by stating: If the defendant had provided for a designated named insured in its policy, as it should have, Jerry Waller would have been so designated in order to accomplish the purpose of plaintiff and his son.
From the evidence we are unable to conclude [80]*80that Jerry Waller would have been so designated. The lack of evidence probably results from this question not being in issue at the trial.
We do not know whether an additional premium is charged for adding one as a designated named insured. If so, that would have been a factor in the decision of plaintiff and his son whether to add his son as a named insured. We do not know whether the additional premium charged for uninsured motorist insurance when the Pontiac was added was charged for the additional car or because Jerry Waller was added as an insured. At the time the endorsement was written the son had uninsured motorist coverage because he was a resident relative of the household of the named insured. According to the stipulated facts, when the defendant was requested to add the endorsement the defendant was informed that Jerry Waller “would be living at home.” Defendant’s agent testified that “the policy was written in that manner; that he would be living at home.” One of the plaintiff’s principal arguments is that Jerry Waller was a resident relative at the time of his death. If this were so, it would not have been necessary to name Jerry Waller as a designated insured.
The dissent has cited one writer who has stated when it is good practice to designate a party as a named insured:
“* * * In the case of the father-son relationship referred to in subsection 19.1, supra, it would be good practice for the father, who has legal title to the vehicle, to be the ‘named’ insured and the son, who owns and uses the vehicle, to be the ‘designated insured.’ ” Pretzel, Uninsured Motorists, 34-35, § 19.2 (1972).
Assuming that writer to be correct, the evidence does not reveal whether the legal title to the Pontiac was in the plaintiff father or in the son. There is no [81]*81evidence why that should make a difference hut Pretzel believes it does.
The dissent suggests that if the evidence is not sufficient to decide this issue we should remand the case back to the trial court with instructions to take further evidence.
In almost all instances we will not reverse a case on an issue not presented in the trial court. Fawver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 267 Or 292, 516 P2d 743 (1973). Except perhaps in very special circumstances we should not reverse and remand a case to the trial court to take evidence on an issue not raised in the trial or appellate court. The obvious reason for avoiding such a practice is that litigation must end. We do not find any special circumstances in this case.
Affirmed.