Walker v. Thornsberry

97 Cal. App. 3d 842, 158 Cal. Rptr. 862, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2232
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 18, 1979
DocketCiv. 17824
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 97 Cal. App. 3d 842 (Walker v. Thornsberry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Thornsberry, 97 Cal. App. 3d 842, 158 Cal. Rptr. 862, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions

Opinion

EVANS, J.

Defendant Thornsberry appeals from an adverse $9,447.96 judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiff is the assignee for collection of an account receivable of Super Secur Comfort Stations (Super Secur), a division of Aluminum Plumbing Fixture Corporation. Super Secur is a manufacturer of metal prefabricat[844]*844ed restrooms, one of which was sold to defendant, a general contractor, for installation at the Berenda Reservoir Launching Facilities. Super Secur, not licensed as a contractor, agreed to furnish, assemble, and install the unit upon a concrete foundation prepared by defendant or his subcontractors. The restroom came on the jobsite in prefabricated pieces consisting of steel columns, beams, girders, steel connections, metal siding and roof, all precut to size. Super Secur employees assembled the' component parts and attached the completed unit to the concrete foundation by means of bolts through a metal channel along the base of the wall.

Defendant failed to pay Super Secur the purchase price of the product.

The only issue presented is whether plaintiff’s assignor (hereafter plaintiff) is barred from recovery under Business and Professions Code section 70311 because he did not possess a contractor’s license. The trial court concluded that Super Secur was not required to have a contractor’s license to place the prefabricated structure on the site prepared by the defendant and therefore was not precluded from recoveiy.

“The licensing requirement of Business and Professions Code section 7031 was enacted to protect the public from risks attendant to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors. (Davis Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [81 Cal.Rptr. 453]; Rushing v. Powell, 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604-605 [130 Cal.Rptr. 110].) It reflects the significance the Legislature has placed on the deterrence of unlicensed persons from [845]*845engaging in the contracting business. The policy to be served outweighs any harshness which may be sustained by a party. (Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 151 [308 P.2d 713].)” (Scientific Cages, Inc. v. Banks (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 885, 887-888 [146 Cal.Rptr. 780].) However, it has also been recognized that “. . . the penalties are harsh and there has been no tendency by the courts to overly liberalize the statute’s [§ 7031] application.” (Jackson v. Pancake (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 307, 310 [72 Cal.Rptr. 111].) The contractors licensing law does exempt certain activities from its provisions; section 7045 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) this chapter does not apply to the sale or installation of any finished products, materials or articles of merchandise, which do not become a fixed part of the structure, or shall it apply to a materialman or manufacturer furnishing finished products, materials, or articles of merchandise who does not install or contract for the installation of such items. The term ‘finished products’ shall not include installed carpets. [If] (b) This chapter shall apply to: [If] (1) The construction, installation, alteration, repair, or preparation for moving of a mobilehome when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling. [If] (2) The construction, installation, erection, repair, or preparation for moving of mobilehome accessory buildings or structures when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling.”

Section 7046 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) this chapter does not apply to any construction, alteration, improvement or repair of personal property. [1] (b) This chapter shall apply to: [If] (1) The construction, installation, alteration, repair, or preparation for moving of a mobilehome when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling. [If] (2) The construction, installation, erection, repair, or preparation for moving of mobilehome accessory buildings or structures when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of human habitation or occupancy.”

Defendant argues the exemption of section 7045 is not applicable, and that the evolution of the exemption sections of the contractors licensing law regarding installation of carpet (§ 7058) and on-site construction for the placement of mobilehomes. or mobilehome accessory buildings (§§ 7046, 7027) manifests a legislative intent to include within the license law installation of finished products when there is a substantial on-site contribution of work that is considered to be within the specialized building trade.

[846]*846We agree with the reasoning posed but arrive at the contrary conclusion that the exemption afforded by section 7045 does apply and affords an exemption to Super Secur. An examination of previous judicial discussion of the exempt sections and their predecessors discloses judicial support for our interpretation.

In Los Angeles Scenic Studios v. Television (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 356 [61 P.2d 1192], plaintiff sued upon a contract to construct an exhibit for an exposition. Since appeal was on the judgment roll alone, the nature of the exhibit was unclear. However, defendants contended recovery was barred by plaintiff’s failure to allege and prove it was a licensed contractor. The Contractors License Law at that time did not apply to: “(g) Any work or operation connected with the sale or installation of any finished product, material, or article of merchandise, which is not fabricated into and does not become a permanent fixed part of the structure; [If] (h) Any construction, alteration, improvement or repair of personal property except as limited by subdivision (g) of this section.” (Stats. 1933, ch. 573, § 2, p. 1484.)

The court observed that “[i]t would appear from the act in general that it was intended to apply to contractors who engage in work upon structures or projects which are or are to become a part of the real property upon or in connection with which the work is done. The portions of section 2 above quoted specifically exempt from the provisions of the act any construction or repair work upon personal property which is not fabricated into and does not become a permanent fixed part of the structure.

“. . . Whether this exhibit took the form of a building or was an exhibit of another nature, we are not required to assume that it was fabricated into and became a permanent fixed part of the Electric Products Building, in which it was located. It is common knowledge that many exhibits in such exposition buildings are not affixed to the premises in such a way as to become a part of the real property. Such an exhibit could well take the form of a small movable building, and the fact that it is called a ‘building’ would not be conclusive in determining whether or not it was fabricated into and had become a permanent part of the structure within which it was located. ... If the exhibit in question was not of such a nature that it became a fixed part of the structure in which it was located the complaint stated a cause of action . . . .” (Id., at pp. 358-359.)

[847]

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Walker v. Thornsberry
97 Cal. App. 3d 842 (California Court of Appeal, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
97 Cal. App. 3d 842, 158 Cal. Rptr. 862, 1979 Cal. App. LEXIS 2232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-thornsberry-calctapp-1979.