Opinion
EVANS, J.
Defendant Thornsberry appeals from an adverse $9,447.96 judgment. We affirm.
Plaintiff is the assignee for collection of an account receivable of Super Secur Comfort Stations (Super Secur), a division of Aluminum Plumbing Fixture Corporation. Super Secur is a manufacturer of metal prefabricat[844]*844ed restrooms, one of which was sold to defendant, a general contractor, for installation at the Berenda Reservoir Launching Facilities. Super Secur, not licensed as a contractor, agreed to furnish, assemble, and install the unit upon a concrete foundation prepared by defendant or his subcontractors. The restroom came on the jobsite in prefabricated pieces consisting of steel columns, beams, girders, steel connections, metal siding and roof, all precut to size. Super Secur employees assembled the' component parts and attached the completed unit to the concrete foundation by means of bolts through a metal channel along the base of the wall.
Defendant failed to pay Super Secur the purchase price of the product.
The only issue presented is whether plaintiff’s assignor (hereafter plaintiff) is barred from recovery under Business and Professions Code section 70311 because he did not possess a contractor’s license. The trial court concluded that Super Secur was not required to have a contractor’s license to place the prefabricated structure on the site prepared by the defendant and therefore was not precluded from recoveiy.
“The licensing requirement of Business and Professions Code section 7031 was enacted to protect the public from risks attendant to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors. (Davis Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [81 Cal.Rptr. 453]; Rushing v. Powell, 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604-605 [130 Cal.Rptr. 110].) It reflects the significance the Legislature has placed on the deterrence of unlicensed persons from [845]*845engaging in the contracting business. The policy to be served outweighs any harshness which may be sustained by a party. (Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 151 [308 P.2d 713].)” (Scientific Cages, Inc. v. Banks (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 885, 887-888 [146 Cal.Rptr. 780].) However, it has also been recognized that “. . . the penalties are harsh and there has been no tendency by the courts to overly liberalize the statute’s [§ 7031] application.” (Jackson v. Pancake (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 307, 310 [72 Cal.Rptr. 111].) The contractors licensing law does exempt certain activities from its provisions; section 7045 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) this chapter does not apply to the sale or installation of any finished products, materials or articles of merchandise, which do not become a fixed part of the structure, or shall it apply to a materialman or manufacturer furnishing finished products, materials, or articles of merchandise who does not install or contract for the installation of such items. The term ‘finished products’ shall not include installed carpets. [If] (b) This chapter shall apply to: [If] (1) The construction, installation, alteration, repair, or preparation for moving of a mobilehome when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling. [If] (2) The construction, installation, erection, repair, or preparation for moving of mobilehome accessory buildings or structures when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling.”
Section 7046 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) this chapter does not apply to any construction, alteration, improvement or repair of personal property. [1] (b) This chapter shall apply to: [If] (1) The construction, installation, alteration, repair, or preparation for moving of a mobilehome when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling. [If] (2) The construction, installation, erection, repair, or preparation for moving of mobilehome accessory buildings or structures when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of human habitation or occupancy.”
Defendant argues the exemption of section 7045 is not applicable, and that the evolution of the exemption sections of the contractors licensing law regarding installation of carpet (§ 7058) and on-site construction for the placement of mobilehomes. or mobilehome accessory buildings (§§ 7046, 7027) manifests a legislative intent to include within the license law installation of finished products when there is a substantial on-site contribution of work that is considered to be within the specialized building trade.
[846]*846We agree with the reasoning posed but arrive at the contrary conclusion that the exemption afforded by section 7045 does apply and affords an exemption to Super Secur. An examination of previous judicial discussion of the exempt sections and their predecessors discloses judicial support for our interpretation.
In Los Angeles Scenic Studios v. Television (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 356 [61 P.2d 1192], plaintiff sued upon a contract to construct an exhibit for an exposition. Since appeal was on the judgment roll alone, the nature of the exhibit was unclear. However, defendants contended recovery was barred by plaintiff’s failure to allege and prove it was a licensed contractor. The Contractors License Law at that time did not apply to: “(g) Any work or operation connected with the sale or installation of any finished product, material, or article of merchandise, which is not fabricated into and does not become a permanent fixed part of the structure; [If] (h) Any construction, alteration, improvement or repair of personal property except as limited by subdivision (g) of this section.” (Stats. 1933, ch. 573, § 2, p. 1484.)
The court observed that “[i]t would appear from the act in general that it was intended to apply to contractors who engage in work upon structures or projects which are or are to become a part of the real property upon or in connection with which the work is done. The portions of section 2 above quoted specifically exempt from the provisions of the act any construction or repair work upon personal property which is not fabricated into and does not become a permanent fixed part of the structure.
“. . . Whether this exhibit took the form of a building or was an exhibit of another nature, we are not required to assume that it was fabricated into and became a permanent fixed part of the Electric Products Building, in which it was located. It is common knowledge that many exhibits in such exposition buildings are not affixed to the premises in such a way as to become a part of the real property. Such an exhibit could well take the form of a small movable building, and the fact that it is called a ‘building’ would not be conclusive in determining whether or not it was fabricated into and had become a permanent part of the structure within which it was located. ... If the exhibit in question was not of such a nature that it became a fixed part of the structure in which it was located the complaint stated a cause of action . . . .” (Id., at pp. 358-359.)
[847]
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Opinion
EVANS, J.
Defendant Thornsberry appeals from an adverse $9,447.96 judgment. We affirm.
Plaintiff is the assignee for collection of an account receivable of Super Secur Comfort Stations (Super Secur), a division of Aluminum Plumbing Fixture Corporation. Super Secur is a manufacturer of metal prefabricat[844]*844ed restrooms, one of which was sold to defendant, a general contractor, for installation at the Berenda Reservoir Launching Facilities. Super Secur, not licensed as a contractor, agreed to furnish, assemble, and install the unit upon a concrete foundation prepared by defendant or his subcontractors. The restroom came on the jobsite in prefabricated pieces consisting of steel columns, beams, girders, steel connections, metal siding and roof, all precut to size. Super Secur employees assembled the' component parts and attached the completed unit to the concrete foundation by means of bolts through a metal channel along the base of the wall.
Defendant failed to pay Super Secur the purchase price of the product.
The only issue presented is whether plaintiff’s assignor (hereafter plaintiff) is barred from recovery under Business and Professions Code section 70311 because he did not possess a contractor’s license. The trial court concluded that Super Secur was not required to have a contractor’s license to place the prefabricated structure on the site prepared by the defendant and therefore was not precluded from recoveiy.
“The licensing requirement of Business and Professions Code section 7031 was enacted to protect the public from risks attendant to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors. (Davis Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [81 Cal.Rptr. 453]; Rushing v. Powell, 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604-605 [130 Cal.Rptr. 110].) It reflects the significance the Legislature has placed on the deterrence of unlicensed persons from [845]*845engaging in the contracting business. The policy to be served outweighs any harshness which may be sustained by a party. (Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 151 [308 P.2d 713].)” (Scientific Cages, Inc. v. Banks (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 885, 887-888 [146 Cal.Rptr. 780].) However, it has also been recognized that “. . . the penalties are harsh and there has been no tendency by the courts to overly liberalize the statute’s [§ 7031] application.” (Jackson v. Pancake (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 307, 310 [72 Cal.Rptr. 111].) The contractors licensing law does exempt certain activities from its provisions; section 7045 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) this chapter does not apply to the sale or installation of any finished products, materials or articles of merchandise, which do not become a fixed part of the structure, or shall it apply to a materialman or manufacturer furnishing finished products, materials, or articles of merchandise who does not install or contract for the installation of such items. The term ‘finished products’ shall not include installed carpets. [If] (b) This chapter shall apply to: [If] (1) The construction, installation, alteration, repair, or preparation for moving of a mobilehome when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling. [If] (2) The construction, installation, erection, repair, or preparation for moving of mobilehome accessory buildings or structures when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling.”
Section 7046 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) this chapter does not apply to any construction, alteration, improvement or repair of personal property. [1] (b) This chapter shall apply to: [If] (1) The construction, installation, alteration, repair, or preparation for moving of a mobilehome when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of occupancy as a dwelling. [If] (2) The construction, installation, erection, repair, or preparation for moving of mobilehome accessory buildings or structures when such work is performed upon a site for the purpose of human habitation or occupancy.”
Defendant argues the exemption of section 7045 is not applicable, and that the evolution of the exemption sections of the contractors licensing law regarding installation of carpet (§ 7058) and on-site construction for the placement of mobilehomes. or mobilehome accessory buildings (§§ 7046, 7027) manifests a legislative intent to include within the license law installation of finished products when there is a substantial on-site contribution of work that is considered to be within the specialized building trade.
[846]*846We agree with the reasoning posed but arrive at the contrary conclusion that the exemption afforded by section 7045 does apply and affords an exemption to Super Secur. An examination of previous judicial discussion of the exempt sections and their predecessors discloses judicial support for our interpretation.
In Los Angeles Scenic Studios v. Television (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 356 [61 P.2d 1192], plaintiff sued upon a contract to construct an exhibit for an exposition. Since appeal was on the judgment roll alone, the nature of the exhibit was unclear. However, defendants contended recovery was barred by plaintiff’s failure to allege and prove it was a licensed contractor. The Contractors License Law at that time did not apply to: “(g) Any work or operation connected with the sale or installation of any finished product, material, or article of merchandise, which is not fabricated into and does not become a permanent fixed part of the structure; [If] (h) Any construction, alteration, improvement or repair of personal property except as limited by subdivision (g) of this section.” (Stats. 1933, ch. 573, § 2, p. 1484.)
The court observed that “[i]t would appear from the act in general that it was intended to apply to contractors who engage in work upon structures or projects which are or are to become a part of the real property upon or in connection with which the work is done. The portions of section 2 above quoted specifically exempt from the provisions of the act any construction or repair work upon personal property which is not fabricated into and does not become a permanent fixed part of the structure.
“. . . Whether this exhibit took the form of a building or was an exhibit of another nature, we are not required to assume that it was fabricated into and became a permanent fixed part of the Electric Products Building, in which it was located. It is common knowledge that many exhibits in such exposition buildings are not affixed to the premises in such a way as to become a part of the real property. Such an exhibit could well take the form of a small movable building, and the fact that it is called a ‘building’ would not be conclusive in determining whether or not it was fabricated into and had become a permanent part of the structure within which it was located. ... If the exhibit in question was not of such a nature that it became a fixed part of the structure in which it was located the complaint stated a cause of action . . . .” (Id., at pp. 358-359.)
[847]*847Prior to amendment in 1961, section 7045 read “This chapter does not apply to the sale or installation of any finished products, materials or articles of merchandise, which are not actually fabricated into and do not become a permanent fixed part of the structure.” (Stats. 1939, ch. 37, p. 385.) In Costello v. Campbell (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 452 [184 P.2d 315], the court determined that installation of cold storage plants used in the operation of a hatchery and poultry ranch was within the exemption where the equipment installed was prefabricated and did not become a permanent fixture. In E.A. Davis & Co. v. Richards (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 237 [260 P.2d 805], the installation of a patented prefabricated kitchen unit consisting of seven wall cabinets, six base cabinets, a dishwasher, and a sink attached to the floor and walls was held to come within the exemption to the requirement that the manufacturer be a licensed contractor, despite the necessity for minor plumbing, electrical, and linoleum work incidental to the installation of the finished unit.
Finley-Gordon Carpet Co. v. Bay Shore Homes, Inc. (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 131 [55 Cal.Rptr. 378], construed the relevant parts of section 7045 as it presently reads. In that case carpet was installed by a “tackless strip method” under which the carpets could be easily removed without damage to the floor. The court upheld the trial court’s finding the carpet did not become a “fixed part of the structure.”
In Johnson v. Mattox (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 714, 718 [65 Cal.Rptr. 185], plaintiffs, who lacked contractor’s licenses, sought recovery for labor and materials in constructing a “baseball school” in which the work performed included installation of a sprinkler system, building various signs and setting them in concrete, and excavating and constructing dugouts. The court held sections 7045 and 7046 were not applicable. “Sections 7045 and 7046 were intended to apply to installations in which construction activity is merely incidental, such as the installation of kitchen appliances (E. A. Davis & Co. v. Richards [1953] 120 Cal.App.2d 237 [260 P.2d 805]), and not to the installation of a sprinkler system, which is constructed out of lengths of pipe and buried in the ground where it is intended to be used.” (Italics ours; ibid.)
The trial court concluded that Super Secur was not required to have a contractor’s license. Implicit in that decision is a determination that the prefabricated unit did not become a fixed part of the structure. Whether the goods installed become a fixed part of the structure is a question of fact. (Costello v. Campbell, supra, 81 Cal.App.2d at p. 453; Finley-Gordon Carpet Co. v. Bay Shore Homes, Inc., supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p. 132.)
[848]*848The contract between Super Secur and defendant did not require Super Secur to undertake the installation of concrete foundation, rough plumbing, or installation of plumbing fixtures, stalls, wood roofing, and painting upon which to place the prefabricated restroom. Super Secur employees merely assembled the pieces and bolted the structure to the foundation. Their contribution of labor to the finished restroom was at most minor and incidental.
That activity was within the purview of the exemption provided by section 7045.
Our disposition predicated upon the provisions of section 7045 obviates the necessity of determining whether the restroom is personal property within the meaning of section 7046, also providing an exemption to the licensing statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
Paras. Acting P. J., concurred.