Walker v. Department of Correction

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 22, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-06383
StatusUnknown

This text of Walker v. Department of Correction (Walker v. Department of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Department of Correction, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KEVIN V. WALKER, Plaintiff, 1:23 Civ. 6383 (LGS) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, et al., Defendants. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Kevin Walker, who is currently incarcerated in the Cayuga Correctional Facility, brings this action pro se seeking injunctive relief and damages. He names as defendants: (1) the City of New York; (2) the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”); (3) unidentified “unnamed persons”; (4) Correction Officer King (assigned to the DOC’s Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island); (5) Correction Officer Colon (assigned to either the AMKC or the DOC’s Vernon C. Bain Center (“VCBC”), in the Bronx, New York); (6) unidentified Correction Officer “John Doe” (assigned to the VCBC’s “Dorm 1BB,” and described as “in the bubble (White Guy)”); (7) unidentified Correction Officer “Jane Doe” (assigned to the VCBC’s Dorm 1BB, and described as “working on the floor in” that unit); (8) unidentified Correction Officer “John Doe” (assigned to the VCBC’s “1BB bubble” on July 2, 2023, during the 7 a.m.-to-3 p.m. tour of duty); (9) unidentified inmate “John Doe” (described as having punched Plaintiff in the face three times in the VCBC’s “Dorm 3BB” mess hall on June 22 or 23, 2023); (10) multiple unidentified “John Doe” inmates (described as having punched Plaintiff in his ribs and chest in VCBC’s Dorm 1BB, on July 2, 2023, during the 7 a.m.-to-3 p.m. tour of duty); (11) three unidentified “John Doe” Correction Officers (described as having taken Plaintiff from the AMKC to the VCBC’s intake building); (12) Correction Officer Jackson (assigned to either the AMKC or the VCBC); (13) Correction Officer Firshein (assigned to either the AMKC or the VCBC); and (14) multiple unidentified Correction Officers (apparently described as working in the VCBC during a morning tour of duty, on or about July 2, 2023, when Plaintiff was transferred from the VCBC to what appears to be a Rikers Island facility).

The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under state law. By order dated July 25, 2023, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 The Court: (1) dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC; (2) directs the Clerk of Court to add Correction Officer James as a defendant; (3) requests that the City of New York, and Correction Officers King, Colon, James, Jackson and Firshein waive service of summonses; (4) directs that the abovementioned identified defendants comply with Local Civil Rule 33.2; and (5) directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide Plaintiff and the Court with the identities, service addresses and, if appropriate, badge numbers of the unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible -- not merely possible -- that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. Claims against the DOC Plaintiff brings claims against the DOC; as an agency of the City of New York, however, the DOC is not a separate entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited

from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court notes that the City of New York is another named defendant in this action. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the DOC for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Correction Officer James Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Jenkins v. City Of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.
118 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. New York, 2015)

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Walker v. Department of Correction, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-department-of-correction-nysd-2024.