Walen v. Department of Corrections

505 N.W.2d 519, 443 Mich. 240

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: August 17, 1993
• Docket: 92566, (Calendar No. 7)
• Status: Published

Opinions

Cavanagh, C.J.

This case involves the Freedom of Information Act (foia),¹ the Administrative Procedures Act (apa),² and the Department of Corrections Act (doca).³ We are asked to determine whether the foia applies to Department of Corrections disciplinary hearings. The foia covers any "contested case,” as defined by the apa. The hearing handbook’s⁴ definition of department disciplinary hearings falls within the apa definition of "contested case.” In its brief to this Court, the department states that it "does not contest that a prison disciplinary hearing meets the parameters” of the apa definition. The Court of Appeals held that because the apa, § 115,⁵ exempts department disciplinary hearings from the apa, chapters 4 and 8, the hearings are exempt from the apa’s definition of "contested case.” Therefore, the foia does not apply. We hold that the Freedom of Information Act does apply to Department of Corrections disciplinary hearings.

I

Pursuant to MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3)(1), plaintiff, a Michigan prisoner, requested permission to inspect various final orders and decisions of the Department of Corrections hearings and records on which the decisions were made. Plaintiff instituted the present action after the department denied his request. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, holding that the foia publication requirement did not apply to department disciplinary hearings, and that only the affected prisoner could mandate a copy of the proceeding.⁶

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a two to one decision,⁷ holding that the Legislature exempted disciplinary hearings from the publication requirement when it enacted MCL 24.315; MSA 3.560(215). We granted leave to appeal and now reverse.

II

A review of the statutes shows that the foia applies to department disciplinary hearings. Because the statutes do not conflict, and the language is plain and unambiguous, interpreting the statutes is unnecessary.⁸ Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich 1, 9-10; 84 NW2d 327 (1957). See also Gilroy v General Motors Corp (After Remand), 438 Mich 330, 341; 475 NW2d 271 (1991).

A

We must first examine the foia provisions⁹ that require disclosure of records to the public. The foia, § ll(l)(a),¹⁰ requires state agencies to "publish and make available to the public all of the following: (a) Final orders or decisions in contested cases and the records on which they were made.” The foia does not define the term "contested case,” but defers to the term’s meaning as ascribed in the apa, chapters 1 through 7.¹¹

The apa, chapter 1, defines "[contested case” as "a proceeding, ... in which a determination of the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a named party is required by law to be made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.”¹² The hearing handbook explains that the department must conduct all hearings that "may result in the loss by a prisoner of a right . . . .”¹³ The department admits and the Court of Appeals held that "a prison disciplinary case falls within the definition of a 'contested case.’ ” 189 Mich App 373, 376; 473 NW2d 722 (1991). We agree.

The apa, chapter 8, § 122,¹⁴ states that for purposes of chapter 8, a contested case "does not include a case that is settled or a case in which a consent agreement is entered into or a proceeding for establishing a rate or approving, disapproving, or withdrawing approval of a form.” Chapter 8, however, does not apply here. The foia only requires the court to apply the definition of "contested case” as used in the first seven chapters of the apa. Additionally, the apa, chapter 7, § 115, states that department disciplinary hearings are exempt from chapter 8 of the apa.

The remaining provisions of the apa do not redefine "contested case,” but merely defer to the chapter 1 definition. If the Legislature intended to define "contested case” for department disciplinary hearings differently from the express apa definition, then the Legislature could have adopted explicit language expressing that intent or amending MCL 15.241(6); MSA 4.1801(H)(6). See Gordon SelWay, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 506; 475 NW2d 704 (1991).

B

The apa, chapter 7, § 115, also exempts department disciplinary hearings from the apa’s contested case procedures, chapter 4. Although exempt from those procedures, department disciplinary hearings are not exempt from the definition of "contested case.” We believe the Legislature intended only to remove department disciplinary hearings from the apa’s procedural requirement for contested cases. This is evidenced by the fact that such hearings are not exempt from the remaining chapters of the apa. The Court of Appeals recognized that the hearings are subject to chapter 6 of the apa, which applies only to a "contested case:”

When a person has exhausted all administrative remedies available within an agency, and is aggrieved by a final decision or order in a contested case, whether such decision or order is affirmative or negative in form, the decision or order is subject to direct review, by the courts as provided by law. [MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201). Emphasis added.]

Since department disciplinary hearings are subject to chapter 6, it must be because they are "contested cases.”¹⁵

The Court of Appeals believes "that the reason the Legislature did not simply define 'contested cases’ as not including prison disciplinary hearings was the fact that for the purposes of judicial review, the apa still applied. However, this is not true for disclosure requirements.” 189 Mich App 377. There is no evidence that would draw this Court to that conclusion. We will not hold that department disciplinary hearings meet the definition of a "contested case” for one provision, but not another, absent evidence that the Legislature intended that result. The House Legislative Analysis, HB 4105, June 19, 1979, does not suggest that removing department disciplinary hearings from the foia was even considered:

The manner in which these disciplinary hearings are conducted has been the subject of a great deal of controversy in recent years, and the issue of how best to structure the hearings has been highlighted by a recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision. In that decision, Lawrence v Michigan Department of Corrections [88 Mich App 167; 276 NW2d 554 (1979)], the court ruled that disciplinary hearings in Michigan correctional facilities fall within the definition of contested cases in the Administrative Procedures Act (a.p.a.), and must be conducted according to its provisions. These provisions include a number of rights which have not been part of the department’s disciplinary hearings policy, such as the right to counsel, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. Many people feel that some of the a.p.a. requirements are inappropriate to the prison disciplinary hearings process.

The Legislature refused to exempt department disciplinary hearings from the apa altogether¹⁶ because "the quality of prison disciplinary hearings could be improved by incorporating some of the a.p.a. due process provisions.”¹⁷ Id. By allowing department disciplinary hearings to remain subject to the definition of "contested case” for purposes of the apa, the Legislature also intended to allow the hearings to remain subject to § 11 of the foia. It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws. Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 138; 468 NW2d 479 (1991).

A recent amendment to the doca also provides evidence that the Legislature did not intend to exempt department disciplinary hearings from the foia. MCL 791.230; MSA 28.2300 specifically describes prison-related documents that are exempt from disclosure under the foia if requested by or on behalf of a prisoner. Exempt items include log books and daily reports of department employees, staffing charts and daily assignment sheets. Final orders or decisions of prison disciplinary hearings are not exempt under this section.¹⁸ If the Legislature intended to exempt final orders or decisions, then those items could certainly have been included in the list of exempted material.

C

The Court of Appeals also suggests that the "creation of the procedure to obtain information on prison misconduct hearings evidences the legislative intent that prison misconduct hearings are not 'contested cases’ for the purposes of the foia.” 189 Mich App 377. We disagree. The procedure to which the Court of Appeals referred is exclusively for the prisoner who was the subject of the hearing. The hearing handbook requires sending a copy of the decision to the subject of the hearing. It also requires the decision to be posted for the reporting officer to examine. The foia does not discuss sending a copy to the subject of the hearing, but applies to the general public.

Together, the provisions ensure that the subject of the hearing automatically receives a copy and that the records are made available to the public, unless otherwise exempt from disclosure. The intent behind requiring publication to the public and requiring the subject of the hearing to receive a copy differ, but the distinction does not suggest an intent to exempt department disciplinary hearings from the foia.

III

Defendant requests prospective application of our decision because retrieving the requested documents would be an onerous task.¹⁹ We stated in Washtenaw Co v State Tax Comm, 422 Mich 346, 378-379; 373 NW2d 697 (1985), that a "considerable administrative burden” can justify limiting a holding to a prospective application.

Whether there is an onerous burden in this case cannot be determined until after the trial court decides whether the records are exempt by any provision within the foia. Only then can it be determined what course of action the department would be required to take and whether that action creates an onerous burden.

Section 11 of the foia compels the Department of Corrections to "publish and make available to the public” the final orders and decisions of disciplinary hearings. Section 11 explicitly defines the term publish:

Publications may be in pamphlet, looseleaf, or other appropriate form in printed, mimeographed, or other written matter.

"[M]ake available to the public” simply means that members of the public can obtain access to documents required to be published by following the procedures set forth in § 3. In short, § 11 describes what is to be published and the acceptable form of publication, while § 3 describes the rights and opportunities publication creates.²⁰

The foia is composed of eleven sections,²¹ each serving as a piece of the foia puzzle. Section 3 explains how a person may utilize his right to inspect the public record, but explicitly "does not require a public body to create a new public record, except as required in sections 5 and 11 . . . .” MCL 15.233(3); MSA 4.1801(3X3). Only these sections, and primarily § 11, require a state agency to create a public record. It follows from the structure of the statute that § 11, which offers no explanation about how inspection will take place, is essentially concerned with compelling agencies to create certain records. A contrary construction would render § 3 meaningless.²²

The Department of Corrections conceded in its brief that the requested final orders and decisions are in written form and are retained in prisoner files. The § 11 publication requirement permits records to be maintained in such written form, thus the agency has satisfied the publication requirement. Nonetheless, the agency still must allow the public access to the documents-pursuant to § 3.²³ Therefore, on remand, the question should be whether the prisoner’s § 3 request is sufficiently descriptive to allow the Department of Corrections to find the desired public record in light of the extensive redaction the § 13 exemptions will doubtlessly require.²⁴ If the request is not sufficiently descriptive, the prisoner’s request should be denied. MCL 15.235; MSA 4.1801(5).

IV

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that by removing Department of Corrections disciplinary hearings from certain chapters of the apa, the Legislature intended to alter the definition of the term "contested case.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Brickley, Boyle, Griffin, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

1 MCL 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq.

2 MCL 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq.

3 MCL 791.201 et seq.; MSA 28.2271 et seq.

4 "Hearing handbook” is the commonly used name for chapter iiia of the doca and it sets forth the department’s hearing procedures. MCL 791.251 et seq.; MSA 28.2320(51) et seq.

5 MCL 24.315; MSA 3.560(215), which provides:

Chapters 4 and 6 shall not apply to proceedings conducted under the worker’s disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Chapters 4 and 8 shall not apply to a hearing conducted by the department of corrections pursuant to chapter iiia of Act No. 232 of the Public Acts of 1953, being sections 791.251 to 791.255 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Chapter 8 shall not apply to a contested case or other proceeding regarding the granting or renewing of an operator’s or chauffeur’s license by the secretary of state; the Michigan employment relations commission; worker’s disability compensation act under Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969; or unemployment compensation under Act No. 1 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936, being sections 421.1 to 421.73 of the Michigan Compiled Laws; or to department of social services public assistance hearings under section 9 of Act No. 280 of the Public Acts of 1939, being section 400.9 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

6 The trial judge based his decision on MCL 791.252(k); MSA 28.2320(52)(k).

7 189 Mich App 373; 473 NW2d 722 (1991).

8 If the statutes did conflict, it would be this "Court’s duty to read the statutes together to avoid rendering any provision meaningless.” Nelson v Transamerica Ins Services, 441 Mich 508, 513; 495 NW2d 370 (1992).

9 Although not raised in this Court, we note that MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3X1) requires a "public body,” defined in MCL 15.232(b); MSA 4.1801(2)(b), to permit a person to "inspect, copy, or receive copies of a public record of a public body, except as otherwise expressly provided by section 13.” The department.is a public body under the foia. The trial court must determine whether the records are exempt under § 13, however. The trial court also must consider whether plaintiff submitted a request that "describes the public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find the public record . . . .” MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3)(1).

10 MCL 15.241(l)(a); MSA 4.1801(H)(1)(a).

11 MCL 15.241(6); MSA 4.1801(H)(6) provides:

As used in this section, "state agency,” "contested cases,” and "rules” shall have the same meanings as ascribed to those terms in Act No. 306 of the Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being sections 24.201 to 24.315 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

12 MCL 24.203(3); MSA 3.560(103)(3).

13 MCL 791.251(2); MSA 28.2320(51X2).

14 MCL 24.322(1); MSA 3.560(222)(1).

15 Chapter 6, § 101, also makes an indirect reference to the separate disciplinary hearing procedures set forth in the hearing handbook, by stating that "[ejxhaustion of administrative remedies does not require the filing of a motion or application for rehearing or reconsideration unless the agency rules require the filing before judicial review is sought.” The hearing handbook does require a motion for resentencing before seeking judicial review.

16 The Lawrence Court also invited legislative action by emphasizing that its "ruling here is necessitated by the nature of our judicial function. We urge the Legislature, however, to consider the practical effect of the necessary application of the statute.” Id. at 174.

17 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals reasoning is not convincing in light of § 115’s explicit exemption of prison disciplinary hearings from chapters 4 and 8. There would.be no need for § 115 if the Legislature intended only chapter 6 of the apa to apply.

18 Some information contained in the final orders and decisions may need to be redacted if it pertains to exempt material. See MCL 15.244; MSA 4.1801(14).

19 The department has explained that the final orders and decisions from prison disciplinary hearings are not centrally filed. Instead, if the final determination of the hearing officer is that the prisoner is guilty of a disciplinary infraction, that record is placed in the prisoner’s individual file. If it is determined that the prisoner is not guilty of a disciplinary infraction, the hearing report is maintained by the presiding hearing investigator for two years. Because plaintiff requested numerous files, the burden of locating the files would be onerous.

20 We reject the Court of Appeals conclusion that § 3 and § 11 have distinct inspection requirements.

In contrast to § 3, [§ 11] does not require a specific oral or written request. Thus, unless made exempt by another provision of the act, the insurance bureau is required to make available for public consumption those documents submitted by Blue Cross in support of its contested rate adjustment petition. [Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v Ins Bureau, 104 Mich App 113, 127-128; 304 NW2d 499 (1981).]

The Court of Appeals holding is unsound and fails to appreciate both the structure of the foia and its explicit language.

21 Section 1, MCL 15.231; MSA 4.1801(1); §2, MCL 15.232; MSA 4.1801(2); §3, MCL 15.233; MSA 4.1801(3); §5, MCL 15.235; MSA 4.1801(5); § 6, MCL 15.236; MSA 4.1801(6); § 10, MCL 15.240; MSA 4.1801(10); § 11, MCL 15.241; MSA 4.1801(11); § 13, MCL 15.243; MSA 4.1801(13); § 13a, MCL 15.243a; MSA 4.1801(13a); § 14, MCL 15.244; MSA 4.1801(14).

22 After plaintiff commenced this action, originally entitled Walen v Boyd, Docket No. 86-55731-AW, David Desorcy moved to intervene, naming the Department of Corrections as the defendant. Mr. Desorcy sought actual publication of department disciplinary hearings and not merely the right to inspect the documents. Although Mr. Desorcy appealed his claim in the Court of Appeals, he did not appeal in this Court. Nonetheless, the department remains the defendant. Defendant does not challenge that decision, but does challenge the nature of plaintiff’s appeal. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the records should be disclosed pursuant to the publication requirement, MCL 15.241(1); MSA 4.1801(H)(1), but in his complaint he only argued he had the right to inspect the documents, MCL 15.233; MSA 4.1801(3). It was Mr. Desorcy who originally filed a complaint pursuant to § 11. In light of today’s ruling, the department’s challenge to the form of plaintiff’s appeal is irrelevant.

23 The dissents’ debate regarding the definition of publish is not helpful in this case because the foia defines publish for us. Furthermore, the dissent fails to realize that its broad dictionary definition of publish renders the phrase “make available to the public” unnecessary, because the dictionary definition of publish encompasses being available to the public.

24 The trial court must determine whether the records requested are otherwise exempt from disclosure. For example, the records may be exempt from disclosure for failure to comply with the foia requirements for submitting a request. The records also might be exempt under § 13 for one or more reasons listed, such as:

(a) Information of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.

(c) A public record which if disclosed would prejudice a public body’s ability to maintain the physical security of custodial or penal institutions occupied by persons arrested or convicted of a crime or admitted because of a mental disability, unless the public interest in disclosure under this act outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure.

(d) Records or information specifically described and exempted from disclosure by statute.