Wainwright v. Globe Indemnity Company
This text of 75 So. 2d 554 (Wainwright v. Globe Indemnity Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Leo WAINWRIGHT et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
GLOBE INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
*555 Lunn, Irion, Switzer, Trichel & Johnson, Shreveport, for appellants.
Love & Rigby, Shreveport, for appellees.
AYRES, Judge.
The object of this suit is to recover judgment for damages and personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs, husband and wife, in a collision occurring at approximately 9:00 o'clock P.M. December 30, 1952, between their Plymouth automobile, driven at the time by the husband, accompanied by the wife, with a Chevrolet ambulance owned by Benevolent Funeral Home, Inc., at the intersection of Texas and Market Streets in the City of Shreveport. The ambulance struck the Plymouth on its left side, adjacent to Mrs. Wainwright, who was sitting on the left side of the front seat, knocking the Plymouth some 10 to 15 feet and throwing Mrs. Wainwright against the side of the car, particularly against the armrest and door handle.
Plaintiff, Clotilde Wainwright, claimed damages for past, present and future pain and suffering, mental anguish and permanent injuries and disabilities in the sum of $65,000. Plaintiff, Leo Wainwright, claimed damages for repairs to his automobile, for medicines and professional treatment and physicians' and hospital bills for his wife, and other services incidental thereto, in the sum of $19,173.96.
After trial by jury and pursuant to its verdict, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, Leo Wainwright, for the sum of $1,406.24 and in favor of Mrs. Wainwright for $15,000, from which the defendants, Benevolent Funeral Home, Inc., and its insurer, Globe Indemnity Company, prosecute an appeal.
In this court, as in the trial court, defendants admitted liability, and the issue is restricted to the question of quantum or the amount of award. Defendants contend that the awards are excessive and should be reduced. Plaintiffs have answered the appeal, asserting that the awards are inadequate and should be increased.
*556 There is no definite rule applicable to all cases for the measurement of damages in personal injury actions. The amount to be awarded in each case must be determined from its peculiar facts. Le Blanc v. Checker Cab Co., Inc., 8 La.App. 472; Parks v. Hall, La.App., 182 So. 347; Matthews v. Gremillion, La.App., 174 So. 703; Mathews v. Hayne, La.App., 188 So. 462; Keller v. Stevenson, La.App., 6 So. 2d 569; Grissom v. Heard, La.App., 47 So.2d 108.
It is also well recognized that awards made in similar cases are to be considered by the courts so that within the limits permitted by particular states of facts a degree of uniformity will be maintained, so far as possible and practicable, to the end that awards will not be out of all proportion one with the other. Cavicchi v. Gaiety Amusement Co., Inc., La.App., 173 So. 458; Matheny v. United State Fidelity v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., La.App., 1 So.2d 439; Grissom v. Heard, supra.
Factors to be considered in determining damages for personal injuries include the unprecedented decrease in the purchasing power of money, Scott v. Claiborne Electric Cooperative, Inc., La.App., 13 So.2d 524; Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., La.App., 15 So.2d 132; Kelly v. Neff, La.App., 14 So.2d 657; Burnett v. Yellow Cab Co. of Shreveport, Inc., La. App., 50 So.2d 670, as well as defendants' ability to pay. Gallman v. Young, 6 La. App. 137; Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., supra. Much discretion is left to the judge or jury, Williams v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., Inc., 187 La. 462, 175 So. 28; McGee v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 206 La. 121, 19 So.2d 21; Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 218 La. 987, 51 So.2d 600, and the amount of damages being discretionary, a determination by the trial court or the jury should not be disturbed except for serious and manifest error. Landry v. McNeil Hunter Motor Co., Inc., 11 La.App. 380, 122 So. 293; Thiel v. Kearn, La.App., 34 So.2d 296.
With these general principles in mind we shall now proceed to consider the nature and extent of plaintiffs' damages and injuries. Mrs. Wainwright, who was approximately 52 years of age at the time of the accident, was carried from the scene of the accident by ambulance to Schumpert Sanitarium and thereafter on the same night to the Physicians and Surgeons Hospital, where she was hospitalized for a period of thirteen days. She was treated by Dr. Joe E. Holoubek, Dr. Wallace H. Brown, Dr. Claude M. Pasquier, Jr., Drs. Sutton and Faludi and Dr. D. F. Overdyke, Jr., and by Mrs. Lucy Mell Platt, a physiotherapist. She was examined on one or two occasions by Dr. Willis J. Taylor for the defendants.
On his first examination, Dr. Holoubek testified that she complained of intense pain in her right flank and could not move her right leg except with pain, but that he found no cuts or gross bruises or broken bones but muscle spasms in the back and right leg sufficient to cause, and which, in his opinion, were the sources of pain.
After Mrs. Wainwright had been confined to the hospital for about six days, she developed a thrombophlebitis of the right leg, which was a blood clot in the vein, producing inflammation and swelling. This condition was described as painful and, in all probability, had its cause or origin in the trauma received in the accident. This condition subsided after several days. Dr. Brown, along with Dr. Holoubek, found plaintiff suffered injuries to her chest, and Dr. Overdyke was of the opinion that she suffered a sprain of the lumbodorsal and lumbar spine, plus a contusion and minor sprain of the right hip at the time of the accident. He found also that plaintiff was suffering pain of the right groin, which caused the automatic release of the quadriceps mechanism or muscle, which caused buckling of the right knee. On two occasions plaintiff sustained falls, or almost falls, by the buckling of her knee, once in the sanitarium and once while attending church. Dr. Taylor found plaintiff additionally suffering with osteochondritis, a roughening of the back surface of the *557 patella, or knee cap, which, he says, could have been caused by the accident.
We are convinced that Mrs. Wainwright has suffered considerable and aggravating pain for several months following her injuries and that in all probability, she will no doubt suffer some pain, discomfort and inconvenience hereafter, the duration of which is problematical and perhaps of prolonged duration.
Prior to the accident Mrs. Wainwright was apparently in good health and very active in her home and in church work; however, at the time of the trial she was only able to do the lighter portion of her household duties and had only begun to renew her church activities. There is testimony to the effect that she will never be able to fully resume all of these activities.
For our consideration as to the award to be made, defendant cited McNulty v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., La.App., 73 So.2d 23, 28, where a 46 year old lady was awarded $20,500 in the district court, which amount was reduced to $17,500 in the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit. As to her injuries the court said:
"The injuries sustained by Mrs. Bowen on August 2, 1950, were of a severe nature; she suffered excruciating pains for nearly two years, was bedridden for some fourteen months, several of which were spent in traction, a painful and most uncomfortable medical procedure.
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75 So. 2d 554, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wainwright-v-globe-indemnity-company-lactapp-1954.