Keller v. Stevenson

6 So. 2d 569
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 2, 1942
DocketNo. 6393.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 6 So. 2d 569 (Keller v. Stevenson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keller v. Stevenson, 6 So. 2d 569 (La. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

The lower court has stated and determined this case in the following written opinion:

"In this case suit for damages suffered by a minor child, a little girl, as the result of said child being struck by an automobile operated by Smith Stevenson.

"The child in question was six years old at the time of the accident and was not placed on the stand by plaintiff nor called for cross-examination by the defendant. The child was carried home in a car operated by a cousin of the defendant and the other occupants of the car were the little brother of the girl and the grown sister of the lady who operated the car.

"They carried the little girl to a point on the highway right outside of the Town of Bastrop, opposite and across from the point where she lived and stopped the car, intending for the children to get out and go home. The defendant, Smith Stevenson, driving in the car, was returning toward Bastrop after having carried Mr. Fred Carpenter to his home a short distance beyond the scene of the accident. A few feet to the rear of the car in which the plaintiff had been a guest and on the right hand side of the road traveling toward Bastrop, was a very bad mud hole which made that side of the road completely impassable to automobiles, necessitating that traffic pull to the left and use the left side of the highway only at that point.

"When Mr. Stevenson approached the parked car in which plaintiff was the guest, he was operating his car at an estimated speed of 20 to 30 miles. All of the witnesses agree that as he reached the parked car he recognized his cousin and spoke to her. He proceeded toward Bastrop and toward the left hand side of the highway, in order to pass the mud hole which was to the rear of the parked automobile. Mr. Stevenson testifies that when he was at a point approximately in the neighborhood of the rear of the parked automobile, for the first time he saw the little girl over the left fender of his car. At that time he could only see her head; that he immediately applied his brakes, brought the car to a standstill after it had traveled approximately the length of the car. The little girl was struck by the car and suffered grave injuries to her legs. Fortunately, medical skill restored most of the use of this limb, but the doctors feel a strong probability that the growth of the limb will be affected and in later years the use of the limb will be hampered. A large portion of the flesh above the knee along the thigh of the leg was ground away and while the use of the *Page 571 limb at present is possible, the injuries and scars present a pitiful sight.

"There were a number of witnesses called in this case who testified as to what happened just previous to the accident and just after the accident, but as stated above, the little girl was not called and Mr. Stevenson was the only witness in the whole case who testified as to what actually happened right at the time of the accident. The two ladies in the car with whom the child was riding, testified that they did not know the little girl was outside the car or was attempting to cross the road. The point at which the accident happened was immediately to the rear of the parked automobile. Mr. Stevenson, in operating his car, as he stated himself, was pursuing a course which took him to the left side of the highway in order to avoid the mudhole on the right side and he saw the car parked on the left side of the highway between him and the mudhole.

"It is the duty of the operator of an automobile, when leaving the regular lanes of traffic on the highway in operating his car, to proceed with great caution. The Court is impressed with one fact in interpreting the evidence in this case, — that Mr. Stevenson saw the child immediately before the child was struck by the automobile, but he did not see the child while it was proceeding from the left side of the parked automobile to the rear of the automobile and to the place of the accident, some four or five feet to the rear of the parked automobile and some five or six feet from the left side of the highway. Mr. Stevenson does not contend or testify that this child ran from behind the parked automobile out in front of his car or that she ran from the left side of the road out in front of his car as he turned in behind the parked automobile. In other words, according to his testimony, the first he saw of the child was when she was in front of his car. The interpretation of this testimony can lead to but one conclusion and that is that Mr. Stevenson was not keeping a continuous lookout in front of his car as he was passing the parked automobile for if he had been watching the highway in front of his car he would have been in a position to testify how the little girl arrived at the scene of the accident, that is, whether she had been standing in the highway waiting to cross or had suddenly run out to this point.

"The Court feels that the evidence clearly shows that Mr. Stevenson evidently turned his eyes from the road to the parked automobile where his cousin was sitting as he passed and spoke to her. As stated above, the law imposes a high duty and caution on anyone operating an automobile which leaves the regular lanes of traffic and uses the left or wrong side of the highway. Had Mr. Stevenson been watching and seen this child when she reached the point on the highway in front of his car, the Court feels that this accident could have easily been avoided because the evidence shows that even though he did not see the child until she was immediately in front of his fender, he was able to stop the car before anything except the front wheels, bumper or fender had struck the child and that had he been watching and seen this child when she came onto the left side of the highway, he had plenty of opportunity to avoid the accident by cutting to the right even though it would have put him in the mudhole, as this accident happened on the left hand side of the highway a short distance from the curb or ditch and there was nothing on the remaining portion of the left side and the entire right side of the highway except the mudhole and had he been watching and seen the child, he could have easily avoided the accident by driving his car in the mudhole or cutting to the right. As stated above, this is not a case where it is contended that the child suddenly ran out in front of defendant; no explanation whatsoever is offered as to how this child reached the scene of the accident or the point where the accident occurred. The Court, therefore, after careful consideration of the testimony, is of the opinion that the accident was caused by the negligence of Mr. Stevenson in not keeping a proper lookout, as he was passing the parked car, using the left side of the highway, operating his car out of the regular lane of traffic.

"The Court feels that there should be judgment for the benefit of the minor in the sum of $7500.00.

"Let there be judgment for actual damages for the father for the hospital, nurses, medicine, —

Hospital Bill $422.50 Special Nurses' Bill 347.50 Special Nurses' Bill 191.50 Medical Bill 130.92 *Page 572

"The Court thinks that $1000.00 would be a reasonable amount to allow for medical expenses in this case, that is, for doctors' expenses, which would make a total altogether of actual damages of $2092.42."

Defendants are prosecuting this appeal and plaintiffs have answered the appeal praying for an increase in the amount of the award made by the lower court.

Mr. Fred Carpenter is the Sheriff of Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, and is one of the defendants herein. Mr. Smith Stevenson is his cousin and also his Chief Criminal Deputy. Mrs. Sue Jones and Miss Louise Carpenter, now Mrs.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 So. 2d 569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keller-v-stevenson-lactapp-1942.