OPINION
CHÁVEZ, Justice.
{1} Worker prevailed in a heavily litigated worker’s compensation claim and was awarded $58,599 in medical expenses, plus $26,761 in past and future weekly benefits. At the hearing on attorney fees, the worker’s attorney sought $61,125 in attorney fees, of which the worker would have been liable for $30,562. See NMSA § 52-l-54(J) (2003) (providing worker and employer shall share payment of attorney fees equally except as otherwise provided by the statute). Worker argued the $12,500 limitation on attorney fees in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(1) (1993, prior to 2003 amendment) should not apply because such a limitation violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.1 The Workers’ Compensation Judge took judicial notice of the chilling effect of miserly fees on representation but found the $12,500 award for attorney fees to be reasonable.
{2} The employer appealed the worker’s award to the Court of Appeals and the worker cross-appealed the attorney fee award. The Court of Appeals certified the issue of the constitutionality of the limitation on attorney fees and otherwise proposed affirming the compensation award. We accepted certification to decide whether the limitation on attorney fees in Section 52-1-54(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act violates Worker’s state constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.
{3} We review the attorney fee limitation provision under rational basis scrutiny, as the record in this ease fails to demonstrate that the limitation has a sufficient impact on important rights to trigger a higher level of scrutiny. We hold that the fee limitation is rationally related to legitimate government purposes, particularly those of maximizing the limited benefits workers may currently obtain through the workers’ compensation system. On these facts, were we to declare the fee limitation unconstitutional, the worker’s benefits of $26,761 would be insufficient to pay his share of the $61,125 in requested attorney fees. The $12,500 attorney fee limitation, which in this case limits the worker’s share of attorney fees to $6,250, still allows the worker to take home $20,511 in benefits. Therefore, while we do not decide whether other provisions of Section 52-1-54 would pass constitutional muster, we uphold the fee limitation itself. We adopt and append the Court of Appeals’ analysis to all other issues raised in this appeal and cross-appeal. See Wagner v. AGW Consultants, No. 22,370 (N.M.Ct.App. Oct. 24, 2003) (certification order).
BACKGROUND
{4} David Wagner (Worker) filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against AGW Consultants, d/b/a Turner Environmental Consultants (AGW), a ground-water hydrology consulting firm where he was injured while employed as a geologist. After realizing that AGW was a business trust, Worker amended his complaint to add as a defendant William Turner, AGW’s sole trustee, in the event that Turner was the real party in interest. Turner appeared pro se to challenge Worker’s claim, while separate counsel represented AGW.
{5} Several issues were heavily litigated at trial, including the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) to AGW, whether Turner was a real party in interest, the extent of Worker’s injury, and the constitutionality of the attorney fee limitation. Turner himself filed a significant number of the roughly 2,500 pages of pleadings, independent of post-judgment motions and this appeal. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) noted that although the issues were of average complexity, the case had the most extensive pleading record he had ever seen. At one point the WCJ stated on the record that had Turner been an attorney, the WCJ would have issued sanctions against him for repeatedly filing motions without merit. The WCJ did not initially enter findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding whether the parties engaged in bad faith, and therefore whether either party was entitled to additional attorney fees up to $2,500 under Section 52-1-54(1). On appeal the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction but ordered the WCJ to enter findings and conclusions regarding the issue of bad faith. The WCJ found that some of Turner’s pleadings were frivolous and without sound basis in law, but concluded that Turner’s bad faith was irrelevant to awarding additional attorney fees under Section 51-2-54(1) because Turner was not Worker’s employer. The WCJ ultimately found that Worker was an employee of AGW and that AGW was subject to the WCA, ordering AGW to pay Worker $58,599 in medical expenses and $26,671 in past and future weekly benefits.
{6} At the subsequent hearing on attorney fees, Worker’s attorney claimed to have worked more than 400 hours, at $150 per hour, on the pre-trial and trial work. Worker’s attorney argued the $12,500 statutory limitation on attorney fees was unreasonable in this case given the extraordinary amount of time involved, and that the limitation was unconstitutional due to its chilling effect on workers’ ability to obtain adequate representation. Worker presented expert testimony that the fee limitation can be unfair and can make it uneconomical for attorneys to pursue certain time-consuming cases. AGW and Turner challenged the jurisdiction of the WCJ to declare Section 52-1-54 unconstitutional and did not present evidence in support of the fee limitation.
{7} The WCJ awarded Worker $12,500 in attorney fees and made the following findings: (1) Worker’s attorney reasonably expended over 200 hours at an hourly rate of $175 per hour,2 (2) the miserly fee limitation has a chilling effect on representation, and (3) $12,500 was a reasonable fee in this case. On certification, Worker argues the attorney fee limitation violates state equal protection and substantive due process, claiming that as applied, the limitation unconstitutionally infringes on the right to access the courts and the right to an appeal guaranteed in the New Mexico Constitution. AGW contends Worker does not have standing to challenge the fee limitation and that in any event the fee limitation is constitutional.
I. Worker Has Standing to Challenge Fee Limitation
{8} AGW claims Worker lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the fee limitation under Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶22, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518, because the WCJ specifically found the $12,500 attorney fee to be reasonable and declined to find that Worker’s attorney would have been entitled to a higher attorney fee but-for the limitation. We disagree.
{9} To have standing, Worker must either show, or the WCJ must explicitly find, that but for the fee limitation, reasonable attorney fees would have exceeded the awarded amount. See Meyers v. Western Auto & CNA Ins. Cos., 2002-NMCA-089, ¶29, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79; cf. Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (holding the claimant had standing where the WCJ specifically found the value of the attorney’s services to exceed the limitation). Although the WCJ found $12,500 to be a reasonable fee, the WCJ also found that Worker’s attorney reasonably expended over 200 hours representing Worker at a fee of $175 per hour. While these findings appear inconsistent, the latter indicates at a minimum that but for the limitation, Worker’s attorney would have been reasonably entitled to at least $35,000 in attorney fees even before this appeal. Unlike in Meyers, where the claimant lacked standing because he neither reached the fee limitation nor showed that he would have secured a higher attorney fee in the absence of the limitation, 2002-NMCA-089, ¶ 29, 132 N.M. 675Í 54 P.3d 79, here Worker not only reached the limitation, but the WCJ found that his attorney reasonably expended over 200 hours at $175 an hour, bringing him well over the limitation of $12,500.
{10} We note that the fact Worker is represented by counsel, who continues to honor her ethical duty to represent him, does not preclude standing in this case. See Rule 16 — 116(B)(5) NMRA 2005 (declining or terminating representation). In Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, the Court of Appeals held the claimant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the unilateral limitation on workers’ attorney fees although claimant continued to be represented by counsel. 119 N.M. 199, 202, 889 P.2d 234, 237 (Ct.App.1994), overruled on other grounds in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶32, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (Trujillo III) (overruling Com to the extent it adopted a fourth tier of scrutiny, while affirming Corn’s holding and subsuming its “heightened rational basis” analysis under a “modern rational basis” standard). The WCJ in Com found that but for the limitation, the claimant’s attorney would have been entitled to nearly $20,000, and noted that although attorneys exceeded the limitation in only one of five hundred cases, the limitation caused workers to be at an unfair disadvantage compared to employers and significantly reduced the number of competent attorneys willing to take workers’ compensation eases. Id. at 201, 208, 889 P.2d at 236, 243. Although the claimant in Com was represented, the court found a significant risk of future injury because his attorney could withdraw during the appeals process if the lack of payment posed an unreasonable financial burden, which would have required claim'ant to “pursue matters of impairment and permanent disability without the aid of counsel.” Id. at 202, 889 P.2d at 237.
{11} Thus, despite the fact that Worker is represented by counsel, he has shown that he is at risk of significant injury because of his inability to compensate a lawyer on appeal. Section 52-1-54 prohibits Worker from paying his counsel more than $12,500, either before the WCA or on appeal. See § 52-1-54(A), (I), (N) (making it unlawful to accept fees except as provided in the Act, punishable as a misdemeanor offense). The ethical rules allow Worker’s lawyer to withdraw if the case poses an “unreasonable financial burden,” and Worker would be unable to offer a new attorney any compensation on appeal. See id.; Rule 16 — 116(B)(5). This evidence certainly does not detract from Worker’s having standing; if anything, it strengthens his argument. We hold Worker has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the fee limitation.
II. Rational Basis is the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
{12} Before turning to the merits of the equal protection and due process challenges, we must identify the appropriate level of scrutiny for reviewing the challenged law. What level of scrutiny we use depends on the nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the classifications created by the statute. See Mieras, 1996— NMCA-095, 1124, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. Ordinarily we defer to the Legislature’s judgment in enacting social and economic legislation such as the WCA. See Com, 119 N.M. at 204, 889 P.2d at 239. So long as such legislation does not impact important rights or protected classes, it is upheld unless the challenger can show the provision at issue is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 14, 26,125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305; Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶30, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. If legislation impacts important but not fundamental rights, or sensitive but not suspect classifications, intermediate scrutiny is warranted and we require the State to demonstrate that the law is substantially related to an important government purpose.3 Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶ 26, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. If a law draws suspect classifications or impacts fundamental rights, we apply strict scrutiny and require the State to demonstrate that the provision at issue is closely tailored to a compelling government purpose. See id. ¶ 25.
{13} Worker and amicus New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association (NMTLA) urge us to review the attorney fee limitation under intermediate or strict scrutiny, arguing that the fee limitation impacts important or fundamental rights. They contend that certain claimants cannot obtain adequate representation because the fee limitation discourages lawyers from taking their cases, and that this lack of adequate representation threatens the meaningful exercise of two separate rights: (1) meaningful access to the courts as implied in the due process clause of the state constitution, see N.M. Const, art. II, § 18; Richardson, 107 N.M. at 696, 763 P.2d at 1161; and (2) the explicit constitutional right to an appeal in New Mexico. N.M. Const, art. VI., § 2. To warrant intermediate or strict scrutiny, Worker must first persuade us that at least one of these rights is “important” or “fundamental,” and secondly that such a right is sufficiently impacted to warrant more than minimal scrutiny.
Worker Fails to Demonstrate the Impact on Important Constitutional Rights Is Sufficient to Trigger Intermediate Scrutiny
{14} New Mexico appellate courts have previously recognized that the right to access the courts and the right to an appeal are important, although not fundamental, rights for purposes of constitutional analysis. See Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 18-19, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305; Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 287, 288, 587 P.2d 434, 435 (1978); Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶¶ 48, 51, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (Hartz, J., specially concurring). Because the right to access the courts and the right to an appeal are synonymous in the context of the workers’ compensation system, as both are implicated when a litigant seeks to appeal an administrative decision to the judicial branch, we consider them collectively. See Herndon, 92 N.M. at 288, 587 P.2d at 435; Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305; Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶¶ 48, 51, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (Hartz, J., specially concurring). Any legislation shown to truly impact these appellate rights should be subjected to more than rational basis review. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 830-32 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a statute that limited medical malpractice recovery, after holding the right to recover for personal injuries was an important right under the state constitution).
{15} Worker argues that the fee cap impacts workers’ appellate rights because it discourages lawyers from taking complex or time-consuming cases, depriving those claimants of meaningfully exercising their appellate rights. Meaningful access to our appellate courts depends in part on an individual’s ability to obtain adequate representation. See Herndon, 92 N.M. at 288, 587 P.2d at 435; Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶48, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (Hartz, J., specially concurring) (“A statute that deprives someone of the ability to obtain adequate representation in litigation could, in a very real sense, deprive the person of a right of access to the courts.”); Com, 119 N.M. at 210, 889 P.2d at 245 (Apodaca, J., concurring). Whether representation is “adequate,” however, depends on the circumstances, including the nature of proceedings and the ability of the other side to secure representation. See United States Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 733-34, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring) (distinguishing the complexities and adversarial nature of the regulatory system for obtaining benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act from the more informal Veterans Administration system at issue in Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985), such that the due process challenge in Triplett would have been successful had claimants shown the fee limitation deprived claimants of legal representation in proceedings under the Act); Corn, 119 N.M. at 207-OS, 889 P.2d at 242-43.4
{16} In arguing that intermediate scrutiny applies, it is not enough to simply point to an important constitutional right; the challenger must show that the legislation in fact impacts the exercise of this right. See Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶¶ 48-52,122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (Hartz, J., concurring). To support their argument that the fee limitation makes it difficult for those with complex or highly contested cases to obtain representation, and that such a “chilling effect” effectively deprives these workers of their appellate rights, Worker and amicus NMTLA rely on testimony presented at trial about the impact of the fee limitation on representation. Worker’s expert, a workers compensation attorney, opined that the number of New Mexico attorneys who exclusively represent claimants in workers’ compensation proceedings have decreased to about two or three since the benefits scheme was restructured in 1991,5 and that in light of this reduction in available benefits, the fee limitation can be unfair to workers’ attorneys in some circumstances, may discourage claimants’ attorneys from pursuing complex or time-consuming cases, and should be relaxed in particularly time-consuming cases.
{17} The record in this case is not meaningfully different from that in Mieras, where the Court of Appeals was unpersuaded that the fee limitation infringed on the right to access the courts by preventing a class of workers from obtaining adequate representation. See Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶¶27, 34, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518; see also id. ¶¶ 49-52 (Hartz, J., specially concurring) (noting that claimant failed to show the cap actually prevented workers with complex cases from obtaining adequate representation). In Mieras, the claimant demonstrated that the limitation on attorney fees prevented her attorney from being compensated for the time he reasonably expended on behalf of his client. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. The claimant failed, however, to illustrate how the fee limitation resulted in workers being denied adequate representation, either in theory or fact. Id. ¶¶ 49-52 (Hartz, J., specially concurring). The court therefore applied rational basis review. Id. ¶ 27.
{18} As in Mieras, the record here fails to demonstrate that some claimants are unable to obtain representation in workers’ compensation proceedings, either initially or on appeal, or that a decrease in available attorneys renders access to our appellate courts any less meaningful. Worker’s expert did not directly attribute a decline in available lawyers to the attorney fee limitation, nor did Worker offer any direct evidence in support of this testimony. Rather, Worker’s expert seemed to emphasize that the decline in lawyers representing workers was due to the overall reduction in benefits to injured workers. While the WCJ found a “chilling effect of miserly attorney fees on representation,” the record fails to show that this chilling effect has impacted claimants’ ability to access the courts sufficiently to trigger intermediate scrutiny of Section 52-1-54(1). See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 724, 110 S.Ct. 1428 (holding the affidavits of three lawyers, which stated anecdotally that there were fewer qualified lawyers available to take black lung cases due to the attorney fee limitation, were “blatantly insufficient” to demonstrate that claimants could not obtain representation due to the fee limitation, even if assertions were left unrebutted); see also Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 19-23, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305.
{19} Before finding that the fee limitation meaningfully impacts claimants’ appellate rights, therefore, we would require more evidence in the record, such as testimony or data showing that workers with complex cases are unable to obtain representation due to the fee limitation. See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 723-24, 110 S.Ct. 1428. Our conclusion might also be different in a case in which, because of the fee limitation, a worker’s lawyer were unable to continue representing the worker on appeal because of the unreasonable financial burden, thus relieving the lawyer of the ethical duty to continue representation, or a worker were dissatisfied with his attorney but could not afford to hire a new attorney on appeal. See, e.g., Crosby v. State of New York, Workers’ Compensation Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 305, 456 N.Y.S.2d 680, 442 N.E.2d 1191, 1194-95 (1982); cf Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶ 34, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (recognizing that the fee limitation “may under certain circumstances preclude any additional award of attorney fees for appellate legal services when the maximum limit has been attained for legal services rendered at the trial level,” although those circumstances did not exist in that case).
{20} In seeking to elevate our review to intermediate scrutiny under the facts of this case, the dissent suggests a more “charitable” approach, even to the extent of selectively considering anecdotal information not of record. Dissent, ¶¶ 51-52. However, the facts and record of this case simply do not demonstrate how the fee limitation impacts the right to access the courts and the right to an appeal. Worker was free to appeal her case from the workers’ compensation proceedings and did so. She continues to be represented by her counsel, whom we commend for her skilled and committed advocacy on behalf of her client, particularly in light of the volume of “frivolous and excessive” pleadings filed by the pro se litigant at the administrative level. Because this case fails to demonstrate that the fee limitation impacts important rights or sensitive classes, rational basis is the proper standard of review for reviewing the equal protection and due process challenges.
III. Equal Protection Challenge to Fee Limitation
{21} The New Mexico Constitution provides that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws. N.M. Const, art. II, § 18. Like its federal equivalent, this is essentially a mandate that similarly situated individuals be treated alike, absent a sufficient reason to justify the disparate treatment. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 537, 893 P.2d 428, 433 (1995).
{22} In Com, we evaluated an equal protection challenge to the WCA fee limitation and declared the fee limitation unconstitutional because it applied only to the worker’s attorney. Corn, 119 N.M. at 209, 889 P.2d at 244. While Com was pending, the Legislature partially corrected the inequality by amending the fee limitation provision to apply to both employers and workers. § 52-1-54(A) (1990). Nonetheless, the Legislature continues to treat workers and employers differently in a manner which may disparately affect workers’ rights to access our appellate courts by requiring workers to obtain judicial approval for attorney fees without imposing the same requirement on employers under Section 52-l-54(C). Employers, through their insurance companies, are free to contract to pay their attorneys up to $12,500 for each workers compensation case, regardless of the work expended or any of the factors relevant to assessing reasonable fees for workers’ attorneys. Compare Tex. Lab.Code Ann. §§ 408.221, 408.222 (Vernon 2005) (requiring agency or judicial approval of attorney fees for both claimants and employers). Further, employers’ attorneys are compensated whether they win or lose, while workers’ attorneys are only paid if they secure benefits for the worker. See § 52-1-54(G). The statutory scheme may allow employers to absorb the cost of time-consuming cases by compensating their attorneys over the long run in a way that workers may not, and, as a result, may disparately impact the appellate rights of workers. However, because this issue was not raised and briefed by the parties below, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. See Richardson, 107 N.M. at 692, 763 P.2d at 1157. Therefore, our inquiry is confined to whether the fee limitation in Section 52-1-54(1) distinguishes between similarly situated individuals, and if so whether Worker has demonstrated that the limitation is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
{23} As applied, Section 52-1-54(1) creates two classes of workers compensation litigants: those who do and do not reach the limitation at the administrative stage, and consequently those who can and cannot lawfully pay an attorney a reasonable fee on appeal.6 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (holding law violated equal protection as applied, although neutral on its face). Although Worker also urges us to recognize a class of workers with complex cases who are unable to obtain adequate representation because of the fee limitation, Worker fails to demonstrate both that this class exists and how he would be a member of such a class. Worker’s case was not found to be unusually complex; rather, the record suggests the case was time-consuming because of the pro se litigant’s frivolous and excessive pleadings.7 Nonetheless, having determined that Section 52-1-54(1) does differentiate between two classes of workers compensation litigants, we must now decide whether such disparate treatment is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See Trujillo III, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 14,125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305.
{24} While our rational basis test is neither “toothless” nor a “rubber stamp” for challenged legislation, it nonetheless requires us to defer to the validity of the statute, with the challenger carrying the burden of persuasion. See id. ¶¶ 14, 30. To successfully challenge the statute under this standard of review, Worker must demonstrate that the classification created by the legislation is not supported by a “firm legal rationale” or evidence in the record. See Com, 119 N.M. at 203-04, 889 P.2d at 238-39. This Worker fails to do.
Section 52-1-54(1) is Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Purpose
{25} The WCA was enacted as an exclusive remedy for employees to subject employers to liability without fault for work-related injuries. Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶ 30, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. We have consistently stated our approval of the Legislature’s principal objectives in enacting the WCA: (1) maximizing the limited recovery available to injured workers, in order to keep them and their families at least minimally financially secure; (2) minimizing costs to employers; and (3) ensuring a quick and efficient system. NMSA 1978, § 52-5-1 (1990); see Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking Inc., 1997-NMSC-003, ¶ 7, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155; Sanchez v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co., 103 N.M. 294, 296-97, 706 P.2d 158, 160-61 (Ct.App.1985). We believe the first goal, maximizing a worker’s recovery, is particularly important in the workers’ compensation arena, where workers’ ability to recover needed benefits is circumscribed by the legislation itself. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 321-22, 334, 105 S.Ct. 3180 (recognizing the rational government policy of maximizing claimants’ awards in rejecting a procedural due process challenge to the ten dollar limitation on attorney fees for those seeking benefits for service-connected deaths or disabilities in Veterans Administration proceedings); cf. Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶39, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (Hartz, J., specially concurring) (describing the severe restrictions on recovery in workers’ compensation actions).
{26} Worker does not challenge these government purposes for the attorney fee limitation, but rather argues that the fee limitation is not rationally related to these purposes. Contrary to Worker’s argument, we find there to be a firm legal rationale, supported by the record of this case, to justify the $12,500 attorney fee limitation as a rational means to achieving the Legislature’s goals. As we recognized in Corn, it is certainly rational for the State to minimize the role of attorneys in seeking to maximize claimants’ awards, quickly and efficiently. 119 N.M. at 208, 889 P.2d at 243. In addition, as we have already noted, the fee limitation is important to maximizing the limited benefits available to workers, particularly when workers must generally pay half of their attorneys’ fees. See § 52 — 1—54(J); Mieras, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶38, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518 (Hartz, J., specially concurring); see also Corn, 119 N.M. at 207, 889 P.2d at 242.
{27} In this case, Worker’s $12,500 attorney fee award represented just under fifteen percent of Worker’s total award, not including future medical benefits. This is well within the parameters that this Court has identified as generally appropriate for attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum, 102 N.M. 333, 338, 695 P.2d 483, 488 (1985) (noting, inter alia, that in states that set attorney fees at some percentage of the worker’s recovery, ten to twenty percent is generally considered to be an appropriate range). On the other hand, the fee proposed by Worker’s attorney was $61,125, or 407.5 hours at $150 an hour. In contrast to the generally accepted ratio of attorney fees to total recovery, this proposed fee would have amounted to roughly seventy-two percent of the Worker’s total award, not including time spent on appeal. Further, of the $85,360 that the WCJ awarded to Worker, only $26,761 was for actual compensation, while the bulk of the award was to cover Worker’s medical expenses. Because Worker would have been liable for half of his attorney’s proposed fee of $61,125, Worker’s attorney fees would have exceeded his actual compensation. Were we to strike the fee limitation, Worker would be required to deplete his entire compensation award and dig into his own pocket to pay his attorney fees. While we do not pass on whether such attorney fees were reasonable in this case, these figures certainly suggest that the attorney fee limitation of $12,500 is a rational means to maximize a worker’s take-home award.
{28} Worker points to no legal authority or evidence in the record to show the $12,500 fee cap is an arbitrary and irrational means to achieve the State’s objectives. For instance, there is no evidence in the record to suggest either what percentage of claimants approach or reach the fee limitation at the administrative level, or the typical amount of time expended by attorneys either at the administrative level or on appeal in such cases, to somehow demonstrate that $12,500 is an irrational figure.8 Cf. Corn, 119 N.M. at 208, 889 P.2d at 243 (finding that the WCA’s data that less than one fifth of one percent exceeded the limitation undermined the State’s rationale by showing a de minimus effect from the unilateral limitation). There is simply no evidence in the record to demonstrate that, other than in this particular case, $12,500 has been insufficient to cover workers’ attorney fees at the administrative and appellate levels. The dissent proposes, as an alternative to the current scheme it describes as inflexible, that the Legislature maintain an attorney fee limitation but create a separate category of fees on appeal. Dissent, ¶ 60. The dissent does not necessarily quarrel with a fee limitation but disagrees on where to draw the line. It remains unclear what the dissent believes would be an appropriate limitation for appellate fees, presumably because of the lack of any evidence in the record to suggest what such a limit should be, or how this alternative would make the fee limitation more flexible. If the legislation provided for a limit of $10,000 in attorney fees at the administrative level and $2,500 on appeal, how would that make the scheme more flexible or less burdensome on the worker? The dissent also fails to address the fact that such fees would still reduce the worker’s take-home award.
{29} We find nothing in Worker’s argument to undermine the rationale that by limiting attorney fees at $12,500, Section 52-1-54(1) helps to maximize workers’ take-home awards, minimize costs to employers and increase the efficiency of the system for the reasons discussed above.9 Further, the fact that the Legislature increased the fee limitation to $16,500 in 2003 suggests to us that rather than setting the fee limitation arbitrarily, the Legislature continues to consider the role of attorney fees in order to maximize workers’ awards while minimizing litigation costs. Because Worker fails to show the $12,500 fee limitation is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, his equal protection challenge must fail.10
IY. Due Process Challenge to Fee Limitation
{30} The due process clause in the New Mexico Constitution reads: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law ... ”. N.M. Const, art. II, § 18. Substantive due process cases inquire whether a statute or government action “‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” See State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, 122 N.M. 246, 259, 923 P.2d 1131,1144 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (quoted authorities omitted)). Worker and amicus NMTLA argue the fee limitation unconstitutionally interferes with workers’ substantive due process rights to access the courts and to an appeal by chilling qualified lawyers from taking their cases. Using the rational basis standard discussed in Section II, we uphold Section 52-1-54(1) under substantive due process unless Worker shows it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. ¶¶ 101-02.
{31} For the reasons stated above, Worker and amicus NMTLA fail to show that Section 52-1-54(1) is not rationally related to the legitimate government purposes. See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 723-24, 110 S.Ct. 1428 (holding that anecdotal evidence, in the form of attorneys’ conclusions that a fee limitation would negatively impact the quality of representation or cause attorneys to leave the field of practice, was insufficient to prove due process violation); Rhodes v. Indus. Comm’n, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467, 470-71 (1993). Under the facts and record of the present challenge, the fee limitation satisfies substantive due process as well as equal protection.
CONCLUSION
{32} We hold that under the record in this case, the WCA attorney fee limitation satisfies state guarantees of equal protection and due process. Section 52-1-54(1) is rationally related to legitimate government purposes, particularly the important goal of maximizing workers’ recovery. Assuming the Legislature limits workers’ recovery in a constitutional manner, the fee limitation is a rational means to advance this goal. We adopt the Court of Appeals’ analysis and conclusions regarding the remaining issues that were raised on appeal. We affirm.
{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: PAMELA B. MINZNER, PATRICIO M. SERNA, and PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justices. RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).