Wadeea v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

District Court, S.D. California·Decided September 22, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-01587·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MASHID WADEEA, Individually and on Case No.: 24-cv-1587-H-DDL Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiff, 13 DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S v. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 14 ORDER MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a 15 Delaware Corporation, [Dkt. No. 95] 16 Defendant. 17

19 20 Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) moves for a protective order 21 limiting the topics in Plaintiff Mashid Wadeea’s deposition notice under Federal Rule of 22 Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). The Court has considered the parties’ briefing and counsel’s 23 arguments at the September 18, 2025 motion hearing. For the reasons set forth below and 24 at the September 18 hearing, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 LEGAL STANDARDS 2 “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 3 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 26(c)(1). “The burden is upon the party seeking the order to ‘show good cause’ by 5 demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result from the discovery.” Ribera v. NIBCO, 6 Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). 7 Rule 30(b)(6) “imposes reciprocal obligations on proponent and deponent: the 8 proponent must specify which subject matters it intends to inquire into, and the deponent 9 must take affirmative steps to learn about those topics.” Coppel v. Sea World Parks & 10 Ent., Inc., No. 21-CV-1430-RSH-DDL, 2024 WL 4472352, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 11 2024). The party noticing the deposition must describe “with reasonable particularity” the 12 matters upon which the organization will be asked to testify. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 30(b)(6)). “For Rule 30(b)(6) to ‘effectively function, the requesting party must take care 14 to designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are intended to 15 be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute.’” Coppel, 2024 WL 4472352, 16 at *6 (quoting Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., 308 F.R.D. 656, 661 (D. Or. 2015)). 17 “[C]ourts have repeatedly emphasized the practical constraints on the scope of a Rule 18 30(b)(6) deposition in that it is not feasible for a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to know the intimate 19 details of everything.” Alvarado-Herrera v. Acuity, 344 F.R.D. 103, 107 (D. Nev. 2023), 20 aff’d sub nom. Alvarado-Herrera v. Acuity A Mut. Ins. Co., No. 222CV00438CDSNJK, 21 2023 WL 5035323 (D. Nev. Aug. 4, 2023) (citation omitted); see also Apple v. Samsung 22 Elecs. Co., No. C 11-1846 LHK PSG, 2012 WL 1511901, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) 23 (229-topic 30(b)(6) notice “render[s] unworkable the obligation of the responding party to 24 make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable persons . . . and to 25 prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject 26 matter”). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 DISCUSSION 2 Wadeea’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice contains 47 topics, 41 of which are 3 disputed. Dkt. No. 118-2. The 6 undisputed topics include the deponent’s background 4 (Topic 1), three topics that Wadeea agreed to limit as proposed by MBUSA (Topics 37, 5 38, 44) and two topics Wadeea agreed to withdraw (Topics 9, 42). Id. 6 Notwithstanding the parties’ representation that they engaged in a fulsome meet and 7 confer process regarding the deposition topics, their inability to agree on the remaining 41 8 topics (i.e., 87%) strongly suggests otherwise. And over the course of the September 18 9 hearing, it was apparent to the Court that the parties are unable or unwilling to engage with 10 each other in the constructive manner that the District’s Local Rules and the undersigned’s 11 Chambers Rules require. See Civil Local Rules 2.1 and 26.1; Chambers Rules for the 12 Honorable David D. Leshner, § III.A. The Court will address those shortcomings in a 13 separate order. 14 At the September 18 hearing, the Court provided tentative rulings with respect to all 15 41 disputed topics. An overarching issue is MBUSA’s assertion that it does not possess 16 responsive information with respect to 28 disputed topics either because the information 17 does not exist or because the information is not within its knowledge (although it has agreed 18 to produce a witness as to certain aspects of some of those topics). Dkt. No. 118-2 (Topics 19 3, 10-28, 31-35, 40, 41, 46). MBUSA correctly points out that Rule 30(b)(6) “does not 20 require one entity which is not under the control of a second entity to inquire into and 21 testify as to the knowledge of the second entity.” Luken v. Christensen Grp. Inc., No. C16- 22 5214 RBL, 2018 WL 1994121, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 2018). And it makes sense 23 that a Rule 30(b)(6) topic seeking nonexistent information “would be an exercise in futility 24 resulting in waste of time, effort, money, and resources.” Jones v. Hernandez, No. 16-CV- 25 1986-W(WVG), 2018 WL 539082, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018), objections overruled, 26 No. 16-CV-1986 W (WVG), 2018 WL 1981207 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2018). But neither 27 Luken nor Jones supports MBUSA’s refusal to designate a witness on the topics under the 28 circumstances presented here. 1 In Luken the plaintiff sought to compel two entities, CGI and the Christensen Trust, 2 “to answer questions that largely have to do with the inner workings of CSL,” a third entity. 3 Luken, 2018 WL 1994121, at *3. As such, the Luken court declined to “require CGI and 4 the Christensen Trust’s designees to familiarize themselves with the broad range of topics 5 contained in Luken’s 30(b)(6) notices that are unrelated to those organizations.” Id. The 6 disputed topic in Jones sought information about Border Patrol “agents’ completion of 7 various investigation reports,” but the plaintiff had “deposed various agents on their 8 practices,” and the defendants represented “that no written policies are known to exist.” 9 Jones, 2018 WL 539082, at *4. The court found a deposition on the topic of policies 10 “would be an exercise in futility” given “the depositions of individual agents, and accepting 11 Defendants’ representation that known written policies do not exist.” Id. 12 Here, unlike Luken, Wadeea’s Rule 30(b)(6) notice does not, on its face, seek to 13 require MBUSA to testify about the inner workings of another entity. Nor does the current 14 record demonstrate that Wadeea is able to depose individuals on the disputed topics as was 15 the case in Jones. For example, Topic 10 seeks, in part, “[i]nformation within the 16 possession, custody or control of [MBUSA], or its subsidiaries and agents, relating to the 17 design, development and manufacture of class vehicles.” Dkt. No. 118-2 at 9. This topic 18 is broad, and it might not otherwise withstand scrutiny given that Rule 30(b)(6) does not 19 require a responding party to prepare a witness “on every facet of the litigation.” Apple 20 Inc., 2012 WL 1511901, at *2. But MBUSA instead argues that because it “does not 21 develop, design, test, analyze, produce, or manufacture the Class Vehicles or their 22 component parts,” it does not have responsive information and “will not designate a 23 witness on that basis.” Dkt. No. 118-2 at 9. Simply because MBUSA did not design or 24 produce the Class Vehicles does not mean it necessarily lacks information on this topic. 25 Moreover, the record does not contain evidence, whether in the form of a declaration or a 26 verified discovery response, showing that MBUSA does not possess responsive 27 information or that any responsive information would be so diffuse within MBUSA as to 28 render it unduly burdensome to prepare a witness to testify.

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Wadeea v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

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