Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins.

239 F.R.D. 376, 2006 WL 1286189
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMay 8, 2006
DocketCiv. Nos. 01-4183, 03-1801
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 239 F.R.D. 376 (Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins., 239 F.R.D. 376, 2006 WL 1286189 (D.N.J. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

HOCHBERG, District Judge.

I. Introduction:

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel production of documents claimed by Defendants to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Motion contends that the documents sought fall within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

On November 22, 2005, this Court issued an Order setting forth a procedure for review of the contested documents. The Court held oral argument on February 28, 2006.

This opinion and order will also address the production of e-mails ordered by this Court at the hearing held on February 28, 2006; Defendants’ Appeal of Judge Shwartz’s March 9, 2006 Order; Defendants’ Motion on Short Notice for a Stay of Judge Shwartz’s March 9, 2006 Order; Plaintiffs’ appeal of Judge Shwartz’s Order, entered on July 28, 2005, denying Plaintiffs’ request for leave to file a supplemental expert report of Bernard Siskin, Ph.D.; Defendants’ appeal of Judge Shwartz’s August 31, 2005 Order excluding certain defense witnesses for failure to disclose sufficiently the identity of those individuals pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A); Defendants’ appeal of Judge Shwartz’s October 17, 2005 Order granting sanctions against defendants for spoliation; and Defendants’ appeal of Judge Shwartz’s December 28,2005 Order. •

II. Crime-Fraud Exception

A. Legal Standard

The attorney-client privilege protects communications between an attorney and his/her client made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Because the privilege has its costs, it is not absolute. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989) (“Since the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.”) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Doe, 429 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir.2005) (“Because this ancient and valuable privilege is at the expense of the full discovery of the truth, it should be strictly construed.”).

The crime-fraud exception allows for disclosure of otherwise privileged communications when they are made with the intent to further a continuing or future crime or a fraud. See Doe, 429 F.3d at 4541 The purpose of the crime-fraud exception is “to assure that the ‘seal of secrecy’ between lawyer and client does not extend to communications ‘made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud’ or crime.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619 (citations omitted).

The Third Circuit has established a multi-step process for determining whether a party’s claim of privilege should be pierced by the crime-fraud exception. First, in order to invoke the exception, the party seeking discovery must make a prima facie showing that (1) the client claiming the privilege was engaging or intended to engage in a crime or fraud at the time of the attorney-client communication, and (2) that the communication was in furtherance of the continuing or intended crime or fraud. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213 (3d Cir.2000); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266 (3d Cir.2006) (explaining that a client’s misuse of communications with her [379]*379attorney in furtherance of an improper purpose is sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the crime-fraud exception). The prima facie showing requires that the party seeking discovery “present evidence which, if believed by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-fraud exception were met.” Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir.1992); see also Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572, 109 S.Ct. 2619 (“Before engaging in in camera review to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, the judge should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”) (citations and quotations omitted).

This evidentiary showing, which is required before the Court may conduct an in camera review of the contested documents, is a lesser standard than that which is ultimately required for disclosure under the crime-fraud exception. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572, 109 S.Ct. 2619 (holding that a lesser evidentiary showing is needed to trigger in camera review than is required ultimately to overcome the privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation, No. 06-1474 at 13 (describing as not particularly heavy the burden to make the necessary prima facie showing for the crime-fraud exception); Haines, 975 F.2d at 96 (noting that “the decision to engage in in camera review implicates a much more lenient standard of proof than the determination to apply the crime/fraud exception, as the intrusion on the asserted privilege is minimal”) (citations omitted). Where this Court uses the term “prima facie showing” in this opinion, it is referring to the standard set forth by the Third Circuit, which requires a factual basis “to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that the materials may reveal evidence of a crime or fraud.” See Haines, 975 F.2d at 96.

If the court determines that the party seeking discovery has presented sufficient evidence at stage one, it may decide to conduct an in camera evaluation of the contested documents. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572, 109 S.Ct. 2619 (“[T]he decision whether to engage in in camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district court.”). The Court then must determine if the party asserting the privilege has sustained its burden of proof, specifically if it has given a reasonable explanation of its conduct. See Gutter, 124 F.Supp.2d. at 1307; see also In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir.1988) (explaining that the prima facie case requires the adverse party, “the one with superior access to the evidence and in the best position to explain things, to come forward with that explanation”). The Third Circuit requires that “the party defending the privilege be given the opportunity to be heard, by evidence and argument” as to why the privilege should not be pierced. See Haines, 975 F.2d at 97; see also Laser Ind., Ltd. v. Reliant Tech., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 430 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that a court must “permit the holder of the privilege to submit evidence and argument that tends to rebut an inference of any of the necessary elements of the crime/fraud exception”).

Finally, the court must decide if the evidence, including the communications themselves and the arguments presented, shows that it is more likely than not that the holder of the privilege sought or used legal advice to commit or try to commit a crime or fraud. See Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc.,

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Bluebook (online)
239 F.R.D. 376, 2006 WL 1286189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wachtel-v-guardian-life-ins-njd-2006.