Voss v. City of Oklahoma City

1980 OK 148, 618 P.2d 925, 1980 Okla. LEXIS 331
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedOctober 7, 1980
Docket52215
StatusPublished
Cited by78 cases

This text of 1980 OK 148 (Voss v. City of Oklahoma City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Voss v. City of Oklahoma City, 1980 OK 148, 618 P.2d 925, 1980 Okla. LEXIS 331 (Okla. 1980).

Opinions

HODGES, Justice.

The resolution of the following questions is necessary to determine this appeal: 1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to determine a contractual dispute after the employee had utilized the grievance procedures provided for by the union collective bargaining agreement; 2) may the decision of the arbitrator be challenged because the arbitrator acted in excess of his authority; and 3) did the union waive the rights of the employee to proceed in district court by adoption of the collective bargaining agreement.

The City of Oklahoma City [City-appel-lee] terminated Lawrence Voss’s employment as a firefighter. The firefighter, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement1 and the Oklahoma City Employees Grievances Procedures2 incorporated in the [927]*927collective bargaining agreement, sought review of his discharge. In accordance with these procedures, he received a hearing before the Union Grievance Committee and the Grievance Review Board. The decision to discharge Voss was upheld by the City Manager, whose decision under the Oklahoma City Employees Grievance Procedure was final. Subsequently, he instituted an action in the district court for breach of the contract of employment between the City and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 1524.

The matter was tried to a jury which returned a $20,978.00 verdict for Voss. The City filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The City argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the collective bargaining agreement contained negotiated grievance procedures which constituted the firefighters exclusive, final, and binding remedy. The motion was sustained.

I

Arbitration is the referral of a dispute by the voluntary agreement of the parties to one or more impartial arbitrators for a final and binding decision as a determination of their dispute. An arbitration award is made on the basis of evidence and argument presented by the parties who agree in advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.3 An award which is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is as binding as was the agreement authorizing it. In some instances, it is as binding as a judgment of a court. A labor arbitrator is usually selected because the parties have confidence in his impartiality, knowledge, and personal judgment. The arbitrator is a part of a system of self-government which the parties have created. Parties are relatively free to select individuals as arbitrators although certain minimum standards of knowledge, impartiality and moral character are required which tend to equate a private arbitrator with a public judge.4 The United States Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301, 305 held that courts should be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, because arbitrators are completely free to decide the law and determine the facts and are not subject to appellate review.

The fundamental purpose of arbitration is to preclude court intervention into the merits of disputes when arbitration has been provided for contractually. The basis for the institution of an arbitration proceeding may be either an agreement which provides for arbitration of future controver[928]*928sies or for submission of existing controversies. An agreement for the submission of an issue to arbitrators is a prerequisite to the commencement of a valid arbitration agreement.5 Where arbitration has been contracted for it constitutes a substantive and mandatory right. There cannot be a valid arbitration or award without a binding submission to arbitration or an impartial arbitrator.6

Courts generally favor arbitration statutes and collective bargaining agreements because they provide substantial justice by an immediate and speedy resolution with a minimum of court interference.7 The function of the court is generally limited to ascertaining whether the party is making a claim which is governed by the contract when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to an arbitrator. The Steelworkers Trilogy decisions8 simultaneously determined by the United States Supreme Court held that courts are limited to determining whether: 1) there is a collective bargaining agreement in existence; 2) there is an arbitration clause; and 3) if there is an allegation that a provision of the agreement has been violated. If the arbitration clause is broad enough to include the alleged dispute, arbitration must be ordered. If the arbitrator stays within the submission and makes an award within the authority established by the contract, the award must be enforced.9

A similar situation was presented in City of Midwest City v. Harris, 561 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okl.1977). This Court in interpreting 11 O.S.1971, § 584.12 [presently codified as 11 O.S.Supp.1977 § 51-111]10 determined pursuant to the statute a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police should contain the procedure for required arbitration. The Court held that: the district court lacked jurisdiction; arbitration was required; and the opinion of the arbitrators was binding and final on both parties.

The statutory language expresses a clear legislative intent that any disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the binding collective bargaining agreement shall have an immediate and speedy resolution by required arbitration. The Oklahoma City Employees Grievance Procedure was specifically incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement reached between the City and the firefighters. The collective bargaining agreement limited the employee to the rights and remedies specified therein. The grievance provisions of the collective bargaining agreement controlled the procedure to be followed in the settlement of grievances. Voss had a full hearing before the Union Grievance Committee and the Oklahoma City Employees Grievance Review Board. His grievance was denied by two entirely separate grievance boards and by the City Manager. The firefighter was accorded every grievance remedy provided by the collective bargaining agreement and the City Personnel Grievance Review Board. The Union waived the rights of the employee to [929]*929proceed in district court by the adoption of the collective bargaining agreement.

There was no allegation raised either at the trial court or on appeal that the arbitrator acted in excess of his authority. Unless some improper discrimination against the individual is inherent in the system or is likely to be brought to bear against him in the particular case by the employer or the union through control of the procedure,11 the grievance procedure delineated in a collective bargaining agreement should be regarded as the exclusive method of adjusting grievances.

AFFIRMED.

LAVENDER, C. J., and WILLIAMS, BARNES and OPALA, JJ., concur. IRWIN, V. C. J., concurs in result. SIMMS, DOOLIN and HARGRAVE, JJ., dissenting.

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Bluebook (online)
1980 OK 148, 618 P.2d 925, 1980 Okla. LEXIS 331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/voss-v-city-of-oklahoma-city-okla-1980.