Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc.

266 N.W.2d 148, 402 Mich. 546, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 398
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 7, 1978
Docket59347, (Calendar No. 1)
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 266 N.W.2d 148 (Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 148, 402 Mich. 546, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 398 (Mich. 1978).

Opinions

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff asks us to examine the Court of Appeals application of Fera v Village Plaza, Inc, 396 Mich 639; 242 NW2d 372 (1976), to plaintiff’s proof of lost profits based on its inability to open its women’s wear store in a shopping center on the date it expected to open. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished per curiam opinion dated January 18, 1977, found the proof of lost profits insufficient to support the jury’s award of $27,000. We disagree.

I

Plaintiff operates five women’s wear stores in the Flint area, including one in the Genesee Valley Shopping Center. Genesee Valley is a 54-store shopping mall anchored on one end by Sears and on the other by J. L. Hudson Co. Defendant, substantially owned by the corporation that controls Hudson’s, developed Genesee Valley. Plaintiff leased a large store near the Hudson’s end before construction.

From the beginning, the parties contemplated an opening for the mall and Hudson’s in July of 1970. In early May, 1970, a public opening was set for July 16, 1970, to be preceded by a private sale on July 14 and 15 to 60,000 personally invited [548]*548area residents. Defendant knew by late May that it was going to have serious labor problems that might delay the opening. On June 5, however, it was still telling the tenants:

"The grand opening of Genesee Valley is July 16, 1970. It is imperative that all of our tenants cash in, so to speak, on the large amount of customers that we are expecting at the center during the grand opening days. This means that your construction department should get their contractors moving in order to complete your store so that you will be opened and doing business with the public on these days.”

A strike extended through the month of June to June 29. On July 1, defendant notified plaintiff that it had rescheduled the grand opening for August 3, but it would allow Hudson’s to open on July 14, as originally scheduled.

Plaintiff sued defendant on a promissory estoppel theory and sought lost profits for the 17-day delay in opening. A jury awarded plaintiff damages of $27,000.

II

Plaintiff’s position at trial was that the tremendous promotional campaign associated with the Hudson’s opening would have generated substantial sales at its store. Plaintiff characterized as "anticlimatic” the subsequent opening of the remainder of the mall.

Plaintiff’s accountant testified that its Genesee Valley store generated in excess of $61,000 in sales during the 17 days following August 3. He computed a 27% profit factor based on plaintiff’s Gene-see Valley operations for the remainder of the [549]*549fiscal year. Two of plaintiffs officers, qualified as experts by reason of their trade experience, estimated lost sales for the store of a minimum of $100,000 during the 17-day period of non-operation.

Also testifying for plaintiff was a New York-based management consultant who advised women’s wear retail stores in 30 states. He had been involved in opening stores in "several hundred” shopping centers. He testified that the sales during the second opening suffered because the momentum of the Hudson’s opening had been lost and customer enthusiasm generated by the initial opening could not be reinstituted. In measuring lost sales, he relied on both his trade experience and his experience with the insurance industry in establishing recoveries under business interruption policies. He explained the components of his analysis to the jury. As a result of his analysis, he pegged lost sales at approximately $104,000, calling this figure fair, conservative and realistic.

Defendant thoroughly cross-examined plaintiffs witnesses and itself introduced the deposition of a witness with four years experience as a ladies’ wear merchandise manager. The witness testified that in her opinion plaintiff’s sales at its Genesee Valley store during the 17-day period following Hudson’s opening would not have been as great as the nearly $62,000 in sales the store realized during the 17-day period following its own opening.

The trial judge considered the question of whether or not to submit the issue of lost profits to the jury. He expressed some difficulty with the testimony on this issue, but noted that it concerned an expansion of an existing business, rather than a new business. He decided to allow the issue to go to the jury and instructed them on [550]*550the question of speculativeness.1 Subsequently, in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, he repeated his belief that the issue was properly one for the trier of fact.

Ill

In Fera, supra, we held that a new business may recover damages for lost profits through a breach of a lease. We found that the plaintiff’s proof of lost profits was reasonably certain and therefore sufficient to support the jury verdict. In so ruling we gave considerable weight to the opinion of the trial judge who, as here, found that the verdict was justified by the evidence.

Plaintiff’s experts computed their estimation of lost profits by using the history of sales in plaintiff’s Genesee Valley store during a period immediately following the complained-of delay. By contrast, the lost profits found to be established with reasonable certainty in Fera were computed on a history of sales in different types of stores, at more remote times, and in different locations.

Defendant does not dispute that during the second 17-day period plaintiff’s gross sales amounted to nearly $62,000. It argues, rather, that the issue should not have gone to the jury because there was no competent proof of lost sales as a multiple or fraction of this $62,000 figure. Defendant focuses on the admission of the management consul[551]*551tant called by plaintiff that his figure was to a certain extent "speculative” despite his experience in the trade and his familiarity with the insurance industry formula used in establishing recoveries under business interruption policies. But, as the witness said, "It has to be, because the store was not open”.

Our review of the record convinces us that reasonable minds could disagree as to the adequacy of plaintiff’s proof of the store’s lost profits. The trial judge instructed the jury that they "may not guess, speculate or conjecture” and the jury found the proofs adequate.2 Accordingly, we hold that it [552]*552was improper for the reviewing court to invade the jury’s determination of fact.

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the trial court’s judgment on the verdict and remand to the Court of Appeals for considera[553]*553tion of issues not reached in its earlier decisions. Costs to plaintiff.

Kavanagh, C.J., and Williams, Fitzgerald, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.

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Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc.
266 N.W.2d 148 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
266 N.W.2d 148, 402 Mich. 546, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 398, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vogue-v-shopping-centers-inc-mich-1978.