1 2 3 6 7 VIRAL DRM, LLC, Case No. 3:24-cv-00731-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9 v. REGARDING VIRAL DRM’S STANDING
Defendant. 11
12 13 Plaintiff Viral DRM LLC brings copyright infringement claims against Defendant Uong 14 Sy Thanh alleging they downloaded and copied Viral DRM’s copyrighted materials from 15 YouTube, and then re-uploaded infringing versions of its copyrighted media content to their 16 YouTube channel NA Weather. This is one of several related copyright infringement actions. See 17 Case Nos. 23-4300, 23-5045, 23-5594, 23-5977, 23-6261, 23-6598, 24-733, 24-739, 24-746, 24- 18 747. After Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, Viral DRM moved for entry of default, 19 which the Clerk granted, and now moves for entry of default judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 23, 27.1) At 20 the hearing on Viral DRM’s motion for default judgment, the Court raised an issue regarding Viral 21 DRM’s standing to bring the copyright infringement claims and directed Viral DRM to submit a 22 copy of its license with the copyright holders. (Dkt. No. 32.) Having considered the supplemental 23 submission, the Court ORDERS Viral DRM to SHOW CAUSE as to its standing to enforce the 24 copyrights at issue. 25 Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act specifies who has standing to sue for infringement: 26 “The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the 27 1 [registration] requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that 2 particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Section 106 3 sets forth an “exhaustive list” of those exclusive rights. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t., Inc., 402 4 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106). These include:
5 the rights “to do and to authorize” others to do six things with the copyrighted work: to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works 6 based upon the work, to distribute copies of the work, to perform the work publicly, to display the work publicly, and to record and perform 7 the work by means of an audio transmission. 8 Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 17 9 U.S.C. § 106). In Minden, the Ninth Circuit held “either an assignment (which transfers legal title 10 to the transferee) or an exclusive license (which transfers an exclusive permission to use to the 11 transferee) qualifies as a ‘transfer’ of a right in a copyright for the purposes of the Act.” Minden, 12 795 F.3d at 1003 (emphasis in original). In contrast, a “‘nonexclusive license’ does not constitute 13 a ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ and therefore cannot confer standing to assert an infringement 14 claim.” DRK Photo v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 15 2017) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 16 Viral DRM’s other copyright-based claims for violation of 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) and 17 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, respectively, also have limitations on who may bring a claim. See 17 18 U.S.C. § 512(f) (authorizing claims for damages for material misrepresentations by the “copyright 19 owner or copyright owner’s authorized licensee”); 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (“Any person injured by a 20 violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States district 21 court for such violation). 22 This action is brought by Viral DRM “a syndicator of award-winning videographic content 23 created by talented videographers.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 14.) According to the Complaint, “Viral 24 DRM was the exclusive licensee of the Works at issue in this case” and “Viral DRM registered the 25 Works at issue in this case with the Register of Copyrights pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).” (Id. at 26 ¶¶ 38, 39.) The Registration Certificates attached to the Complaint, however, show one of the 27 works is registered to “Michael Brandon Clement” and “Brett Adair,” jointly, and the other work 1 support of the motion for default judgment, he is a principal and one of the owners of Viral DRM 2 LLC. (Dkt. No. 27-2 at ¶ 1.) Mr. Clement attests “[a]ll the works are exclusively licensed to Viral 3 DRM for distribution and syndication pursuant to written agreements that provide Viral DRM 4 with the necessary rights to sue for the infringements at issue in this case.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) 5 In response to the Court’s inquiry at the hearing, Viral DRM filed its “Exclusive Copyright 6 Management Agreement” purportedly with the videographer holding the copyrights.2 (Dkt. No. 7 33-3.) Not so. As explained above, the copyright registrations for the works at-issue in this action 8 are held by Michael Brandon Clement and Brett Adair jointly, and Reed Trimmer, but the 9 Agreement offered here is between Viral DRM and “Ronald Brian Emfinger.” (Compare Dkt. 10 No. 1-2 with Dkt. No. 33-3.) Mr. Emfinger is listed as the author of the work for which Mr. 11 Clement and Mr, Adair are the copyright claimants. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3.) Because Viral DRM 12 filed the Agreement with Mr. Clement in the related action Case No. 23-5594, Dkt. No. 70-3, and 13 the Agreement with Mr. Trimmer in Case No. 23-4300, Dkt. No. 105-3, and the agreements are 14 otherwise identical, the Court will consider them here, but ORDERS Viral DRM to file the correct 15 licenses for this action within seven days of the date of this Order. For the copyright held by 16 Clement and Adair jointly (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3), the license with Clement is insufficient to confer 17 standing on Viral DRM to sue for a copyright held by Clement and Adair jointly. See Corbello v. 18 DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (“a third-party assignee or licensee lacks standing to 19 challenge the attempted assignments or licenses of other copyright owners.”). Viral DRM must 20 also have a license with Adair. 21 2 Viral DRM requests leave to file the Agreement under seal because its agreements with the 22 videographers “are confidential with its photographers, not only to protect Viral DRM’s assets and terms, but also to protect the photographer’s private information.” (Dkt. No. 33.) A party seeking 23 to file documents under seal “bears the burden of overcoming [the] strong presumption” in favor of public access to court records. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 24 (9th Cir. 2016). “[C]ompelling reasons must be shown to seal judicial records attached to a dispositive motion.” Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th 25 Cir.2006); see also Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 347 F. App’x 275, 276 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating default judgment is “case dispositive”).
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1 2 3 6 7 VIRAL DRM, LLC, Case No. 3:24-cv-00731-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9 v. REGARDING VIRAL DRM’S STANDING
Defendant. 11
12 13 Plaintiff Viral DRM LLC brings copyright infringement claims against Defendant Uong 14 Sy Thanh alleging they downloaded and copied Viral DRM’s copyrighted materials from 15 YouTube, and then re-uploaded infringing versions of its copyrighted media content to their 16 YouTube channel NA Weather. This is one of several related copyright infringement actions. See 17 Case Nos. 23-4300, 23-5045, 23-5594, 23-5977, 23-6261, 23-6598, 24-733, 24-739, 24-746, 24- 18 747. After Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, Viral DRM moved for entry of default, 19 which the Clerk granted, and now moves for entry of default judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 23, 27.1) At 20 the hearing on Viral DRM’s motion for default judgment, the Court raised an issue regarding Viral 21 DRM’s standing to bring the copyright infringement claims and directed Viral DRM to submit a 22 copy of its license with the copyright holders. (Dkt. No. 32.) Having considered the supplemental 23 submission, the Court ORDERS Viral DRM to SHOW CAUSE as to its standing to enforce the 24 copyrights at issue. 25 Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act specifies who has standing to sue for infringement: 26 “The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the 27 1 [registration] requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that 2 particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Section 106 3 sets forth an “exhaustive list” of those exclusive rights. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t., Inc., 402 4 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106). These include:
5 the rights “to do and to authorize” others to do six things with the copyrighted work: to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works 6 based upon the work, to distribute copies of the work, to perform the work publicly, to display the work publicly, and to record and perform 7 the work by means of an audio transmission. 8 Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 17 9 U.S.C. § 106). In Minden, the Ninth Circuit held “either an assignment (which transfers legal title 10 to the transferee) or an exclusive license (which transfers an exclusive permission to use to the 11 transferee) qualifies as a ‘transfer’ of a right in a copyright for the purposes of the Act.” Minden, 12 795 F.3d at 1003 (emphasis in original). In contrast, a “‘nonexclusive license’ does not constitute 13 a ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ and therefore cannot confer standing to assert an infringement 14 claim.” DRK Photo v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 15 2017) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 16 Viral DRM’s other copyright-based claims for violation of 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) and 17 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, respectively, also have limitations on who may bring a claim. See 17 18 U.S.C. § 512(f) (authorizing claims for damages for material misrepresentations by the “copyright 19 owner or copyright owner’s authorized licensee”); 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (“Any person injured by a 20 violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States district 21 court for such violation). 22 This action is brought by Viral DRM “a syndicator of award-winning videographic content 23 created by talented videographers.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 14.) According to the Complaint, “Viral 24 DRM was the exclusive licensee of the Works at issue in this case” and “Viral DRM registered the 25 Works at issue in this case with the Register of Copyrights pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).” (Id. at 26 ¶¶ 38, 39.) The Registration Certificates attached to the Complaint, however, show one of the 27 works is registered to “Michael Brandon Clement” and “Brett Adair,” jointly, and the other work 1 support of the motion for default judgment, he is a principal and one of the owners of Viral DRM 2 LLC. (Dkt. No. 27-2 at ¶ 1.) Mr. Clement attests “[a]ll the works are exclusively licensed to Viral 3 DRM for distribution and syndication pursuant to written agreements that provide Viral DRM 4 with the necessary rights to sue for the infringements at issue in this case.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) 5 In response to the Court’s inquiry at the hearing, Viral DRM filed its “Exclusive Copyright 6 Management Agreement” purportedly with the videographer holding the copyrights.2 (Dkt. No. 7 33-3.) Not so. As explained above, the copyright registrations for the works at-issue in this action 8 are held by Michael Brandon Clement and Brett Adair jointly, and Reed Trimmer, but the 9 Agreement offered here is between Viral DRM and “Ronald Brian Emfinger.” (Compare Dkt. 10 No. 1-2 with Dkt. No. 33-3.) Mr. Emfinger is listed as the author of the work for which Mr. 11 Clement and Mr, Adair are the copyright claimants. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3.) Because Viral DRM 12 filed the Agreement with Mr. Clement in the related action Case No. 23-5594, Dkt. No. 70-3, and 13 the Agreement with Mr. Trimmer in Case No. 23-4300, Dkt. No. 105-3, and the agreements are 14 otherwise identical, the Court will consider them here, but ORDERS Viral DRM to file the correct 15 licenses for this action within seven days of the date of this Order. For the copyright held by 16 Clement and Adair jointly (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3), the license with Clement is insufficient to confer 17 standing on Viral DRM to sue for a copyright held by Clement and Adair jointly. See Corbello v. 18 DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (“a third-party assignee or licensee lacks standing to 19 challenge the attempted assignments or licenses of other copyright owners.”). Viral DRM must 20 also have a license with Adair. 21 2 Viral DRM requests leave to file the Agreement under seal because its agreements with the 22 videographers “are confidential with its photographers, not only to protect Viral DRM’s assets and terms, but also to protect the photographer’s private information.” (Dkt. No. 33.) A party seeking 23 to file documents under seal “bears the burden of overcoming [the] strong presumption” in favor of public access to court records. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 24 (9th Cir. 2016). “[C]ompelling reasons must be shown to seal judicial records attached to a dispositive motion.” Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th 25 Cir.2006); see also Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 347 F. App’x 275, 276 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating default judgment is “case dispositive”). While the Court agrees there 26 are compelling reasons for sealing portions of the Agreement, this does not include the Agreement’s title or paragraph 1 of the Agreement which is discussed in the publicly filed 27 Clement Declaration. (Dkt. No. 34-1 at ¶ 3.) So, the motion to seal is GRANTED except as to 1 The Agreements with Trimmer and Clement state the copyright holder—treferred to as a 2 “Content Creator’—grants Viral DRM: 3 1. Grant of Exclusive Agency Rights. Content Creator hereby grants to VDRM the exclusive agency rights to manage and administer any content submitted by A Content Creator to VORM (the “Works” including but not limited to the right to search for copyright infringements of the Works, to register copyrights for the Works with the 5 United States Copyright Office; to authorize VDRM's attormeys to negotiate settlements, issue takedown notices pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or otherwise file claims on behalf of the Content Creator in an effort to enforce the copyrights in and 6 to the Works; Content Creator grants VORM exclusive agency rights to display, store, transmit, and distribute Works as needed to fulfill obligations set forth in this 7 agreement. 8 (Dkt. No. 33-3 at §] 1; Case No. 23-4300, Dkt. No. 105-3 at 4 1; Case No. 23-5594, Dkt. No. 70-3 9 at J 1.) The Content Creator otherwise retains all copyright and ownership rights in the work. (Ud. 10 43.) 11 In Minden, the photography stock company “entered into agency agreements with its «12 || contributing photographers under which the photographers authorized Minden to license and sell
13 certain photographs to third parties.” DRK Photo, 870 F.3d at 983-84 (citing Minden, 795 F.3d at
14 || 999-1000). “Importantly, in those licensing agreements, the photographers agreed to appoint 15 Minden ‘as sole and exclusive agent and representative with respect to the Licensing of any and all
Q 16 || uses of [specified photographs].’” DRK Photo, 870 F.3d at 984 (quoting Minden, 795 F.3d at
17 1000). “The key to determining whether Minden’s agency agreements conferred a nonexclusive
2 . . . . . Z 18 or exclusive license [] was not whether the photographers retained some fractional right but 19 || instead that the photographers promised ‘that Minden, and only Minden, will have the power, as 20 || the photographers’ licensing agent, to authorize third parties to reproduce, distribute, and display 21 the photographs.’” Jd. (quoting Minden, 795 F.3d at 1005) (emphasis in original)). 22 The Agreement here gives Viral DRM the “exclusive agency right to manage and 23 administer any content.” (Dkt. No. 33-3 at J 1; Case No. 23-4300, Dkt. No. 105-3 at J 1; Case No. 24 || 23-5594, Dkt. No. 70-3 at § 1.) Managing and administering content is not among the exhaustive 25 || list of exclusive rights which confer ownership under 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Agreement provision 26 || giving Viral DRM “the exclusive agency rights to display, store, transmit, and distribute Works as 27 needed to fulfill obligations set forth in this agreement,” also does not confer exclusive ownership 28 rights. (Dkt. No. 33-3 at J 1; Case No. 23-4300, Dkt. No. 105-3 at 4 1; Case No. 23-5594, Dkt.
1 No. 70-3 at 4] 1 (emphasis added).) Giving Viral DRM the rights necessary to enforce the 2 || videographer’s copyright, is not the same as the exclusive right to “authorize third parties to 3 || reproduce, distribute, and display the photographs” required to have standing to bring a copyright 4 infringement action. Minden, 795 F.3d at 1005; see also Silvers, 402 F.3d at 884 (“The right to 5 sue for an accrued claim for infringement is not an exclusive right under § 106.”). Unlike the 6 agreement in Minden, the Agreement does not give Viral DRM the exclusive right to authorize 7 third parties to reproduce, distribute, and display the copyrighted video. 8 Accordingly, Viral DRM is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE as to how it has standing to 9 || bring the copyright infringement claims at issue here including its standing to bring claims under 10 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(f), 1202(a), (b). Viral DRM shall file a written response to this Order by 11 January 6, 2025. 12 Within seven days of this Order Viral DRM shall file the correct licensing agreements 13 || including any licensing agreement with Adair. 14 Viral DRM’s administrative motion to seal is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 3 15 PART as set forth in this Order. (Dkt. No. 33.) a 16 This Order disposes of Docket No. 33. IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: December 9, 2024 19 | 20 ne JXCQVELINE SCOTT CORL 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28