[1221]*1221Opinion
PERLUSS, P. J.
In our initial decision in this case (Viner v. Sweet (Sept. 28, 2001, B138149) [superseded by grant of review Dec. 19, 2001 (S101964)] (Viner I)), we held to establish causation in fact the plaintiffs in a transactional legal malpractice action are not required to prove the opposing side in contract negotiations would have given them a better deal than they actually obtained had their attorney not been negligent and affirmed most of the jury’s multimillion dollar damage award in favor of plaintiffs Michael Viner and Deborah Raffin Viner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding “just as in litigation malpractice actions, a plaintiff in a transactional malpractice action must show that but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result.” (Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1244 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 70 P.3d 1046] (Viner II).) The Court remanded the matter “for proceedings consistent with the views expressed here.” (Ibid.)
Having received supplemental briefing after remand and heard further oral argument from the parties, we now conclude the trial court erred in denying the defendant lawyers’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to five of the seven claims of malpractice asserted against them. Accordingly, we modify the judgment by reducing the award of damages from $13,291,532 to $515,760 and, as so modified, affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Viners1 sued their former attorneys, Charles A. Sweet and his law firm Williams & Connolly (collectively W&C), for negligently negotiating and drafting agreements for the sale of their ownership interest in Dove Audio, Inc. (Dove) to Media Equities International (MEI) and termination of their employment with Dove. Under the terms of the agreements as drafted, MEI purchased a significant portion of the Viners’ Dove stock for more than $3 million, and the Viners’ were to receive $1.5 million from Dove over five years in monthly installments. Dove’s series “E” preferred stock was to be held in escrow for distribution to the Viners if Dove defaulted on the monthly payments to them.2
The Viners’ professional negligence cause of action identified seven acts of malpractice: (1) W&C told the Viners the nonsolicitation clause in the employment termination agreement applied only to the book and audiobook [1222]*1222segments of Dove’s business, but because the clause was ambiguous, Dove successfully asserted in arbitration that the clause also encompassed Dove’s television and motion picture projects; (2) W&C negligently agreed to a noncompetition provision, which violated Business and Professions Code section 16600’s restrictions on such provisions; (3) the employment termination agreement provided for attorney fees only in enforcing an arbitration award; (4) ambiguous language in the provision relating to producer credit caused Dove not to give Deborah Baffin Viner credit as a producer; (5) by virtue of the general release language in the employment termination agreement, the Viners lost their rights to accrued dividends on Dove’s series “A” preferred stock; (6) the employment termination agreement did not contain an indemnity provision providing the same level of protection as the Viners had in their employment agreement; and (7) the series “E” preferred stock afforded inadequate security to the Viners if Dove defaulted on the monthly payments due under the employment termination agreement.
Following a four-week trial, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Viners on each of the seven claims of negligence, awarding the Viners a total of $13,291,532 in damages. The trial court denied W&C’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in which W&C argued (among other grounds asserted) the Viners had failed to prove the requisite causal connection between W&C’s negligent conduct and the damages allegedly resulting from that negligence.
W&C appealed the judgment, arguing with respect to five of the seven claims for negligence that the Viners failed to present substantial evidence, as they were required to do, that a better result would have been obtained absent W&C’s claimed negligence. Alternatively, even if such proof had been presented, W&C argued a new trial would be required because the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the necessary proof of causation in a legal malpractice action—that is, that the Viners were required to demonstrate that proper handling of their matter by W&C would have resulted in a more favorable outcome.3
We affirmed the judgment as modified, holding that the Viners were not required to prove they would have obtained a more favorable result in the [1223]*1223transaction with MEI if W&C had not been negligent. Applying what we described as “ordinary negligence and causation principles,” we held the evidence at trial supported the jury’s finding that W&C’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the Viners to suffer a loss or diminution of their rights and remedies with respect to each of seven separate claimed items of mal practice and affirmed $8,065,732 of the jury’s damage award.* **4
The Supreme Court granted review, limited to the issue “whether the plaintiff in a transactional legal malpractice action must prove a more favorable result would have been obtained but for the alleged negligence.” (Viner II, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1238-1239, italics omitted.) The Court answered that question “yes”: “The Court of Appeal here held that a plaintiff suing an attorney for transactional malpractice need not show that the harm would not have occurred in the absence of the attorney’s negligence. We disagree. We see nothing distinctive about transactional malpractice that would justify a relaxation of, or departure from, the well-established requirement in negligence cases that the plaintiff establish causation by showing either (1) but for the negligence, the harm would not have occurred, or (2) the negligence was a concurrent independent cause of the harm.” (Viner II, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1240-1241.) The court explained, “In both litigation and transactional malpractice cases, the crucial causation inquiry is what would have happened if the defendant attorney had not been negligent. This is so because the very idea of causation necessarily involves comparing historical events to a hypothetical alternative. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1242.) The court reversed our judgment and returned the case to us for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. (Id. at p. 1244.)
CONTENTIONS
Applying the standard for proof of causation in fact in a transactional malpractice case confirmed by the Supreme Court in Viner II, W&C contends the Viners failed to present substantial evidence of causation as to five of their seven claims for malpractice and, because the Viners had a full and fair opportunity to prove their case at trial, the matter should be remanded to the trial court with directions to enter final judgment for the Viners as to the remaining two claims only. The Viners, on the other hand, contend they satisfied the causation standard articulated in Viner II as to all seven of their [1224]*1224claims and it was, in essence, harmless error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury they were required to prove but for causation.
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court’s Omission of an Appropriate Causation Instruction Was Fundamental Error That in All Probability Affected the Jury’s Verdict in Favor of the Viners
In their supplemental briefs and oral argument after remand, the Viners assert they presented substantial evidence they would have obtained a more favorable result but for W&C’s malpractice and W&C was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to correctly instruct the jury on their need to prove but for causation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475;5 Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298] [“there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case ‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)”].) Accordingly, they urge us to affirm the entire judgment in their favor on the record now before the court without remand for further proceedings.
To accept the Viners’ position, we would have to conclude both that they presented substantial evidence of causation in fact and that the absence of a proper causation instruction was harmless error. We disagree on both counts.
With respect to all damage claims other than those relating to producer credit and series “E” preferred stock as security, as to which W&C has conceded sufficient evidence of but for causation was introduced at trial,6 the Viners failed to present substantial evidence that, if W&C had not been negligent, it is more likely than not they would have obtained a more favorable result either by walking away from the transaction with MEI or by securing better terms in the stock purchase or employment termination agreement. Indeed, the evidence before the jury is directly to the contrary, [1225]*1225indicating it was (or would have been) MEI’s negotiating stance, not W&C’s negligence in failing to ask, that led to the unfavorable contract terms.
MEI’s principal, Ronald Lightstone, testified concerning the nonsolicitation clause that he did not want the Viners to interfere with Dove’s future business by contacting its authors and that the broadest possible nonsolicitation clause was therefore an essential element of the transaction from MEI’s standpoint. Lightstone further testified that the noncompetition clause was an extremely important term he would not have given up, a position the Viners’ own expert agreed was consistent with MEI’s position throughout the negotiations. Lightstone testified he would not have agreed to unlimited indemnity for the Viners, the basis for their damage claim, and that a broader attorney fees provision was inconsistent with his usual approach to negotiating deals. Finally, Lightstone said MEI was simply unwilling to increase the basic economic value of the transaction to the Viners (which included both payment for their stock and monthly payments under the employment termination agreement); therefore, MEI would not have permitted the Viners to retain their rights to series “A” stock dividends.
When evaluating this essentially unrefuted evidence to assess the likelihood that the trial court’s instructional error prejudicially affected the verdict, we view the evidence in favor of W&C, not the Viners. (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1413 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 50]; Logacz v. Limansky (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1152, fn. 2 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].) “[W]e must assume the jury might have believed [W&C’s] evidence and, if properly instructed, might have decided in [W& C’s] favor. [Citations.]” (Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 715, 773 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815].) When the evidence at trial is viewed in this light, together with the trial court’s other instructions on causation and damages,7 [1226]*1226and counsels’ arguments,8 it is at the least “reasonably probable” that the jury’s verdict was affected by the omission of a “more favorable result” instruction and that it would not have awarded the Viners $13,291,532 in damages if it had been properly instructed. (Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 580-581 & fn. 11 [“Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial ‘where it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ [Citations.]”]; accord, Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc, (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 983 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203]; Logacz v. Limansky, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.)
2. The Trial Court Erred in Denying W&C’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict as to Five of the Viners’ Seven Claims of Malpractice; Judgment Should Be Entered as if Those Portion of the Motion Had Been Granted
W&C asserts the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing with respect to all damage claims other than those relating to producer credit and series “E” preferred stock security, the Viners failed to present sufficient evidence of causation in fact to support the jury’s verdict, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Viners. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110 [120 Cal.Rptr. 681, 534 P.2d 377] [“ ‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of a jury may properly be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. If there is any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of the verdict, the motion should be denied.’ [Citation.]”; see Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512, 515 [143 Cal.Rptr. 247, 573 P.2d 465] [appellate court in reviewing trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict uses same standard of review as employed by the trial court in deciding the motion].) We agree: As to W&C’s malpractice regarding the scope of the nonsolicitation, noncompetition and indemnity clauses and the absence of provisions for attorney fees and for retention of their rights to series “A” stock dividends, the Viners presented no evidence at all, substantial or otherwise, indicating that, but for W&C’s negligence, it was more likely than not they would have obtained a more favorable result in their negotiations with MEI.
[1227]*1227It follows that the trial court erred in denying W&C’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. To avoid subjecting the parties to further delay and expense, we will modify the judgment as if W&C’s motion had been granted as to the five damage claims lacking evidentiary support and affirm the judgment as so modified. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629 [“If the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict be denied and if a new trial be denied, the appellate court shall, when it appears that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted, order judgment to be so entered on appeal from the judgment. . . .”]; Sagadin v. Ripper (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1170 [221 Cal.Rptr. 675]; Bank of America v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 613, 624 [269 Cal.Rptr. 596] [“The effect of section 629 is that a reversal on appeal for insufficiency of the evidence concludes the litigation just as it would have been concluded if the trial court had correctly entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”].)
a. There Is No Substantial Evidence of a More Favorable Result Under a “No Deal” Scenario
It is true, as the Viners insist, there is substantial evidence in the record that they would have walked away from the transaction if they had not been assured of their ability to work with their business contacts in film and television production projects after leaving Dove—that is, if they had known the nonsolicitation clause (§ 1.10) in the employment termination agreement had not been negotiated and drafted in accordance with their directions to W&C. But the Viners failed to present any evidence to prove they would have been better off economically under this “no deal” scenario (that is, if they had remained the principal owners and key employees of Dove) than they were in fact under the terms of the deal as actually completed.9
Certain types of damages claimed by the Viners are simply nonexistent under the “no deal” scenario. Without the employment termination agreement, the Viners’ indemnification rights would have remained unchanged; neither series “A” stock dividends nor producer credits would be an issue; no security for payments under the agreements with MEI would have been given; and there would be no attorney fees, and therefore no need for reimbursement of those fees, in connection with arbitration to enforce the agreements between the Viners and MEI.
As to the two largest damage categories—the author-reader nonsolicitation issue and the audiobook noncompetition issue—the Viners’ evidence of [1228]*1228injury and damages was premised on the assumption they would have pursued various projects on their own, not that they would have been undertaken by Dove. Yet if the Viners had not terminated their employment, the various projects described by their expert witness in her damage analysis would have been corporate opportunities properly exploited by Dove itself, not the Viners personally. (See Thompson v. Price (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 182, 190 [59 Cal.Rptr. 174] [“ ‘ “a corporate officer or director may not seize for himself to the detriment of his company business opportunities in the company’s line of activities which the company has an interest and prior claim to obtain” ’ ”]; Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v. Perot (1963) 59 Cal.2d 227, 233 [28 Cal.Rptr. 865, 379 P.2d 321] [“[T]he law does not allow [a director or officer] to secure any personal advantage as against the corporation.”], overruled on other grounds by Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 899-900 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 838 P.2d 250]; Heckmann v. Ahmanson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 119, 126-127 [214 Cal.Rptr. 177].) The record is devoid of evidence quantifying any benefit to the Viners through increased compensation or enhanced corporate stock value those projects would have generated if the transaction with MEI had been aborted, nor is there any basis for the jury to compare those projected benefits to the value actually received by the Viners from the deal as structured (which included $3 million for the sale of their stock, as well as more than $1 million in payments under the employment termination agreement).10
b. Mere Disbelief of W&C’s Witnesses Does Not Constitute Substantial Evidence the Viners Could Have Obtained a More Favorable Result
The Supreme Court in Viner II confirmed that causation in a transactional malpractice need not be proved with absolute certainty and that, “[i]n transactional malpractice cases, as in other cases, the plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to satisfy his or her burden. An express concession by the other parties to the negotiation that they would have accepted other or additional terms is not necessary.” (Viner 11, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1242-1243.)
As previously noted, W&C concedes substantial evidence supports the Viners’ claim more favorable contract provisions relating to producer credit and series “E” security could have been obtained but for W&C’s negligence. However, neither direct nor circumstantial evidence exists in this record that reasonably supports an inference the Viners could have obtained better deal [1229]*1229terms on the five contract provisions at issue. Indeed, in the brief they submitted in Viner I, the Viners acknowledged “it is impossible to prove what the other side might have agreed to during negotiations had the malpractice plaintiff’s lawyer known enough to raise certain issues.” We agreed, observing at the outset of our legal analysis, “Appellants contend respondents were required to, but did not, prove [MEI] would have given them a ‘better deal’ than it did, but for appellants’ negligence. Because it is undisputed respondents did not attempt to prove [MEI] would have done so on the specific contract terms at issue in this action, appellants contend reversal is required. Respondents, on the other hand, contend they were not, on the facts of this case, required to prove absent W&C’s negligence, they would have been able to obtain a more favorable deal with [MEI]. Based on the facts before us, we agree with respondents and hold respondents adequately established causation at trial.” (Viner I, supra, at p. 10, fn. omitted; see Viner II, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1238.)
While acknowledging Lightstone’s testimony that MEI would not have agreed to more favorable terms on any of the five disputed damage items is uncontradicted, our dissenting colleague observes the jury was free not to find Lightstone’s denials credible. True as that may be, disbelief of Lightstone’s testimony does not constitute affirmative evidence of the contrary proposition.11 (California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 48 [221 Cal.Rptr. 171] [“If a witness testifies, for instance, that it was not raining at the time of the collision, and if the jury disbelieves that testimony, such disbelief does not provide evidence that it was raining at the time of the collision.”]; Hicks v. Reis (1943) 21 Cal.2d 654, 660 [134 P.2d 788] [if the finder of fact refuses to give credence to a witness’s testimony, the testimony “ ‘is of no more effect than if it had not been given. It disappears from the case . . . .’ ”].) As Judge Learned Hand explained more than a half-century ago, “It is true that the carriage, behavior, bearing, manner and appearance of a witness—in short, his ‘demeanor’—is part of the evidence. The words used are by no means all that we rely on in making up our minds about the truth of a question that arises in our ordinary affairs, and it is abundantly settled that a jury is as little confined to them as we are. . . . [S]uch evidence may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness’ testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of one, who has a motive to deny, may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if [1230]*1230he is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies, [f] Nevertheless, although it is therefore true that in strict theory a party having the affirmative might succeed in convincing a jury of the truth of his allegations in spite of the fact that all the witnesses denied them, we think it plain that such a verdict would nevertheless have to be directed against him. This is owing to the fact that otherwise in such cases there could not be an effective appeal .... He, who has seen and heard the ‘demeanor’ evidence, may have been right or wrong in thinking that it gave rational support to a verdict; yet, since that evidence has disappeared, it will be impossible for an appellate court to say which he was.” (Dyer v. MacDougall (2d Cir. 1952) 201 F.2d 265, 268-269.)
The dissent’s reliance on Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (e), to justify a state-of-mind exception to this general principle is fundamentally flawed. Subdivision (e) provides, “If a party is otherwise entitled to a summary judgment pursuant to this section, summary judgment may not be denied on grounds of credibility . . . except that summary judgment may be denied in the discretion of the court, . . . where a material fact is an individual’s state of mind, or lack thereof, and that fact is sought to be established solely by the individual’s affirmation thereof.” This subdivision of the summary judgment law does not stand for the proposition that disbelief of a witness is sufficient to support an inference the witness’s true state of mind was different from what he or she said it was, as the dissent would have it. Rather, when the moving party is required to prove a witness’s state of mind to prevail on summary judgment and the only evidence presented is testimony from that individual, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (e) simply authorizes the trial court to deny the motion as if no evidence at all had been presented as to that required element. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o) [defendant entitled to summary judgment either by demonstrating that one or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established or by establishing an affirmative defense to that cause of action].) Indeed, the trial court has the same discretion to deny summary judgment “where the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (e).)
Denial of summary judgment under Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (e) does not mean, as the dissent suggests, that a triable issue of fact exists, which would thereafter permit the jury to find in favor of either side, but only that there is an absence of credible evidence needed by the moving party to prevail on summary judgment. (See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 28 P.3d 116]; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854—855 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].) Phrased somewhat differently, disbelief of [1231]*1231affirmative evidence of a witness’s state of mind permits denial of a moving defendant’s summary judgment motion because it is the equivalent of no evidence at all. At trial, however, disbelief of affirmative evidence, which again is the equivalent of no evidence at all, requires entry of a judgment against the party with the burden of proof On that issue—here the Viners.12
c. The Viners Had a Full and Fair Opportunity To Prove Their Case at Trial
The dissent further posits the need for a remand on the possibility the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on but for causation “may also have influenced the evidence the parties, particularly the Viners, produced at the trial.” But there is simply no basis in the record before us to conclude the Viners were somehow led astray by their own insistence it was unnecessary to prove they would have obtained a more favorable result if W&C had not been negligent and, therefore, failed to marshal the best evidence available to them.13
First, as discussed in Viner II, at the time of the trial of this matter the Supreme Court had unequivocally held that jury instructions on causation in negligence cases should use the “substantial factor” test articulated in the Restatement Second of Torts and had further “recognized that ‘the “substantial factor” test subsumes the “but for” test.’ [Citation.]” (Viner II, supra, 30 [1232]*1232Cal.4th at p. 1239.) Thus, even if no published appellate decision had expressly held that a plaintiff suing a lawyer for transactional malpractice was required to prove a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the lawyer’s negligence, the requirement of proof of but for causation in any legal malpractice case was relatively settled at the time of trial (and remained so until our decision in Viner I). (See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1050, 1055 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 287, 856 P.2d 1143], superseded by statute on unrelated grounds [holding weight may qualify as a disability under the FEHA only if it results from a physiological condition and denying retrial to plaintiff who failed to prove prima facie case even though no prior California decision had articulated this requirement].)
Second, there is no suggestion in the record that the court ruled on the causation issue prior to the close of evidence; and the Viners were plainly on notice of the potential importance of evidence relating to but for causation from the outset of the trial. How causation could be proved was addressed not only in dueling proposed jury instructions but also in a motion for directed verdict filed by W&C prior to the close of evidence. The Viners’ inability to prove but for causation was also the focus of much of W&C’s evidentiary presentation and closing argument.
Finally, in their supplemental briefs following remand from the Supreme Court, the Viners have not argued they did not present their strongest possible case on causation and damages because of the trial court’s decision to refuse W&C’s special instruction No. 2 on but for causation and to instruct the jury instead in accordance with the instructions they had proposed. To the contrary, like W&C, they urge that the question “whether the Viners have proven ‘but for’ causation” “can and should be answered on the record now before this Court, without a retrial of all or any part of this case.”
Having had a full opportunity to try their case, the Viners are not now entitled to a remand and new trial because the evidence fails to support the jury’s verdict. “[W]hen the plaintiff has had full and fair opportunity to present his or her case, a reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff based on insufficiency of the evidence should place the parties, at most, in the position they were in after all the evidence was in and both sides had rested. A judgment for the defendant would then be entered, and a new trial permitted only for newly discovered evidence.” (McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1657, 1661 [278 Cal.Rptr. 596]; accord, California Maryland Funding, Inc. v. Lowe (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1798, 1810 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 784]; Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1066; see Bank of America v. Superior Court, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 626 [“the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict must ordinarily be predicated on the assumption that the party against whom the motion is made has [1233]*1233presented the strongest possible case ... the unqualified reversal rule [permitting retrial on remand] has no application in a case where a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was made and denied by the trial court, and the appellate court reverses the judgment for insufficiency of the evidence.”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by reducing the award of damages from $13,291,532 to $515,760. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Appellants Charles A. Sweet and Williams & Connolly are to recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 27(a)(3).)
Woods, J., concurred.