Vincent Tracy Morton v. State of Tennessee

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMay 14, 2008
DocketM2007-00900-CCA-R3-CD
StatusPublished

This text of Vincent Tracy Morton v. State of Tennessee (Vincent Tracy Morton v. State of Tennessee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vincent Tracy Morton v. State of Tennessee, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE December 18, 2007 Session

VINCENT TRACY MORTON V. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Williamson County Nos. I-8424, I-8428-B, and I-8430-C Russ Heldman, Judge

No. M2007-00900-CCA-R3-CD - Filed May 14, 2008

The defendant, Vincent Tracy Morton, entered guilty pleas to three counts of delivery of more than .5 gram of cocaine for resale, Class B felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive eleven year Range I sentences for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years. The defendant did not appeal the sentencing determination. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and the court, by agreement of the parties, granted a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court imposed sentences that are excessive in both length and manner of service. The state contends that the trial court imposed appropriate sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court are Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT , JR., and ALAN E. GLENN , JJ., joined.

Eugene J. Honea, Franklin, Tennessee, attorney for appellant, Vincent Tracy Morton.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Jennifer Smith and Andrew Hamilton Smith, Assistant Attorneys General; Ronald L. Davis, District Attorney General; Christina Goodson and Sean B. Duddy, Assistant District Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The record reflects that the defendant entered his guilty pleas to the June 2003 offenses on July 14, 2004, with sentencing to be determined by the trial court at a later date. At the September 8, 2004, sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of twelve years for each count based upon its finding of enhancement factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 114(2),(9),(11), & (17) (2003). The trial court did not give any weight to the defendant’s proposed mitigating circumstances. The trial court further found that the defendant was a professional criminal and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to one another, for a total effective sentence of thirty-six years. One day later, before the filing of the judgments of conviction, the trial court informed the parties via letter that he would reduce each sentence to eleven years upon reconsideration of the weight to be given the defendant’s mitigating factor of remorse. The record reflects that judgments of eleven years each to be served consecutively were filed on October 11, 2004. Counsel representing the defendant throughout the guilty plea and sentencing hearing failed to appeal the trial court’s sentencing determination.

On March 28, 2005, the defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. By the agreement of the parties, the post-conviction court granted this delayed appeal on March 26, 2007. A timely notice of appeal was filed on April 3, 2007.

ANALYSIS

Waiver of Jury Sentencing Determination

Initially, a brief discussion of the history of the jurisprudence related to judicial fact-finding at sentencing hearings is relevant to this case. At the time of the defendant’s guilty pleas, the defendant waived his right to have a jury determine the existence of enhancement factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the sentencing hearing in this case proceeded to a bench trial wherein the trial court made findings beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of enhancement factors it applied to arrive at the length of the defendant’s sentences. At the time of the defendant’s sentencing hearing in September 2004, the sentencing schemes of states employing judicial fact- finding of enhancement factors to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory minimum had recently undergone much scrutiny in the wake of the June 24, 2004, United States Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In Blakely, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of any facts, other than a prior conviction, used to increase the penalty of any crime beyond the statutory minimum. Our supreme court resolved this issue as it relates specifically to Tennessee’s sentencing scheme on October 9, 2007, in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”). Our supreme court held that the holding in Blakely is applicable to our state, resolving the question of utilizing judicial fact-finding to enhance a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory minimum.1

Relevant to the defendant’s waiver of jury determination of sentencing, the record reflects that the defendant signed a waiver of rights related to sentencing at the time of his guilty plea. The document notes that the defendant, “after consultation with counsel, waives whatever rights exist

1 In an effort to correct the potential problem in our prior sentencing scheme, on June 7, 2005, the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-102(6), -114, -210, and -401. See 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 353, §§ 1, 5, 6, and 8. However, these amendments are inapplicable to the defendant’s appeal because the defendant was arrested, indicted, and sentenced prior to these amendments.

-2- under the Sixth Amendment and the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Blakely.” The written waiver further specifies that the defendant waives his right to have a grand jury determine any facts establishing a sentence as well as his right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any facts establishing a sentence. Furthermore, at the July 14, 2004, guilty plea submission, the trial court questioned the defendant extensively regarding his understanding of the waiver relative to sentencing determinations and found that the defendant had knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily waived his right to have a jury find facts necessary to enhance his sentences beyond the statutory minimum. Furthermore, we note that the defendant has not raised any issue relative to Blakely on appeal. For these reasons, we conclude that the defendant’s waiver of a jury determination of his sentences was effective.

Application of Enhancement Factors

At the September 8, 2004 sentencing hearing, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following enhancement factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 35-114(2),(9),(11), & (17) (2003):

(2) the defendant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range;

(9) the defendant, before trial or sentencing, failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community;

(11) the defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high; and

(17) the crime was committed under circumstances in which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was great.

In arriving at the sentencing determination, the trial court placed considerable significance upon enhancement factor nine in light of the defendant’s parole status when the present offenses were committed.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Blakely v. Washington
542 U.S. 296 (Supreme Court, 2004)
State v. Gomez
239 S.W.3d 733 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2007)
State v. Wilkerson
905 S.W.2d 933 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1995)
State v. Jones
883 S.W.2d 597 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1994)
State v. Ashby
823 S.W.2d 166 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1991)
State v. Fletcher
805 S.W.2d 785 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1991)
State v. Moss
727 S.W.2d 229 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1986)
State v. Keel
882 S.W.2d 410 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1994)

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Vincent Tracy Morton v. State of Tennessee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vincent-tracy-morton-v-state-of-tennessee-tenncrimapp-2008.