Vincent L. Hooper v. Stancera, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03409
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VINCENT L. HOOPER, Case No. 2:25-cv-03409-DJC-CSK (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STANCERA, ET AL. (ECF Nos. 7, 18) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pending before the Court are Defendants Stanislaus County Employees’ 18 Retirement Association (“StanCERA”), Thomas Stadelmaier, Donna Wood, and 19 CalPERS’ CEO’s motions to dismiss the Complaint.1 (ECF Nos. 7, 18.) Plaintiff is 20 appearing without counsel. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court submitted the 21 motion upon the record and briefs on file and vacated the March 17, 2026 hearing. 22 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends GRANTING the motions to 23 dismiss and DISMISSING the Complaint with leave to amend. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Allegations2 3 Plaintiff’s Complaint is sparsely detailed and instead refers to several exhibits 4 attached to the Complaint, requiring the parties and the court to interpret those exhibits. 5 Plaintiff is a retired public safety employee alleging he has “vested pension rights.” 6 Compl. ¶ 7 He brings this action against Defendants StanCERA, StanCERA Executive 7 Director Thomas Stadelmaier, Member & Employment Services Donna Wood, Does 1-5, 8 and the CalPERS CEO. Id. at ¶¶ 7-11. 9 Plaintiff’s action challenges “the ongoing deprivation of Plaintiff’s vested pension 10 rights and retaliatory conditioning of an administrative hearing on dismissal of Plaintiff’s 11 court case.” Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges he “sought corrections no later than October 27, 12 2020.” Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges he has filed lawsuits against both Defendant 13 StanCERA and CalPERS in Stanislaus County and Sacramento County, California, 14 respectively. Id. at ¶ 20. On October 6, 2024, Plaintiff alleges StanCERA’s counsel 15 directed him to request a hearing, which Plaintiff alleges he later made on December 10, 16 2024. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff later alleges that “after his suit began,” StanCERA 17 representatives approached Plaintiff and stated, “a hearing would be provided only if 18 Plaintiff first dismissed his case.” Id. at ¶ 16. On or about November 12 to 13, 2025, 19 Plaintiff alleges StanCERA’s counsel approached him again, stating that they would be 20 able to schedule a hearing. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff replied that he would respond “next 21 week,” and alleges StanCERA never offered, noticed, or set a hearing date. Id. 22 B. Procedural Posture 23 Plaintiff commenced this action on November 24, 2025, by filing a Complaint 24 against Defendants StanCERA, Thomas Stadelmaier, Donna Wood, Does 1-5, and 25

26 2 These facts primarily derive from the complaint (ECF No. 1), which are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 27 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court does not assume the truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 28 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 CalPERS’ CEO. (ECF No.1.) On December 30, 2025, Defendants StanCERA, 2 Stadelmaier, and Wood filed a motion to dismiss with a hearing noticed for March 17, 3 2026. (ECF No. 7.) On January 27, 2026, Defendant CalPERS CEO filed a motion to 4 dismiss. (ECF No. 18.) On January 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to 5 dismiss filed by Defendants StanCERA, Stadelmaier, and Wood. (ECF No. 20.) On 6 January 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant 7 CalPERS CEO. (ECF No. 21.) On March 9, 2026, the Court vacated the March 17, 2026 8 hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (ECF No. 23.) 9 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 10 A. Rule 8, Pro Se Pleadings, Construction and Amendment 11 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and afforded the benefit of any 12 doubt. Chambers v. Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the court 13 need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or 14 unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th 15 Cir. 1981). To give fair notice of the claims and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff 16 must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants 17 which support the claims. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A 18 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. 19 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 20 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must 21 allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 22 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 23 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 Upon dismissal of any claims, the court must tell a pro se plaintiff of a pleading’s 26 deficiencies and provide an opportunity to cure such defects. Garity v. APWU Nat'l Lab. 27 Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). However, if amendment would be futile, leave to 28 amend does not need to be provided. Lathus v. City of Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238, 1 1243 (9th Cir. 2023). 2 To determine the propriety of a dismissal motion, the court may not consider facts 3 raised outside the complaint (such as in an opposition brief), but it may consider such 4 facts when deciding whether to grant leave to amend. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 5 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 6 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) 7 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases 8 authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 9 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, 10 ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 11 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 12 (1986)); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 13 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the 14 merits of a case or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d 15 at 1380. A federal court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions 16 arising under federal law or those between citizens of different states in which the 17 alleged damages exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction 18 can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte” 19 subject matter jurisdiction even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 20 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 21 C. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 22 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon 23 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if 24 it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 25 theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). When considering 26 whether a claim has been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual 27 allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non- 28 moving party. Id. However, the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual 1 allegations contradicted by documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions 2 merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 3 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 The Complaint raises four claims: (1) procedural due process under the 6 Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Stadelmaier and Wood in their individual 7 capacities, and against Defendant StanCERA under Monell; (2) First Amendment 8 retaliation against Defendants Stadelmaier and Wood in their individual capacities, and 9 against Defendant StanCERA under Monell; (3) Monell claim against Defendant 10 StanCERA; and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex parte Young against 11 Defendant CalPERS CEO. 12 Defendants StanCERA, Stadelmaier, and Wood move to dismiss arguing Plaintiff 13 has failed to state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, 14 failed to state a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, and failed to plead Monell 15 liability against Defendant StanCERA, and that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by qualified 16 immunity. Defendant CalPERS CEO moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter 17 jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Defendant CalPERS CEO further argues that 18 Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is improper, the Court should abstain from ruling 19 upon Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim because the same issue is pending in state court, 20 and Plaintiff has failed to allege presentation of a government claim. Because the Court 21 recommends dismissal based on failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure 12(b)(6), it declines to reach the qualified immunity, propriety of injunctive 23 relief, abstention, and presentment arguments. 24 A. Rule 8 Pleading Requirements 25 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as 26 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to give with at 27 least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 28 claims. See Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1129. A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals it consists 1 of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of his causes of action and fails to state a claim 2 for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 In addition, Plaintiff may not simply attach various documents to his complaint and 4 require the court and parties to interpret those documents and identify what his 5 allegations may be based on the attached documents. See Bruce v. Becerra, 2024 WL 6 7017263, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2024) (“Plaintiff cannot merely cite to the voluminous 7 investigation reports and exhibits attached to the Complaint, he must clearly state how 8 Defendant is alleged to have violated his legal rights and link those allegations to his 9 actual legal claims, and he must do so within the actual complaint.”). The Complaint itself 10 must contain Plaintiff’s allegations that support his claims in short and plain statements. 11 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 12 B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim 13 Defendants StanCERA, Stadelmaier, and Wood argue that the Complaint fails to 14 state a due process claim where Plaintiff does not plead a constitutionally protected 15 property interest and where adequate process is available even if Plaintiff had a 16 constitutionally protected property right. StanCERA Mot. (ECF No. 7-1 at 4-7). 17 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant 18 committed the alleged conduct while acting under color of state law; and (2) the plaintiff 19 was deprived of a constitutional right as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Balistreri v. 20 Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, to state a procedural 21 due process claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a 22 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate 23 procedural protections. Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003); see Bd. of 24 Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). Liberty or property interests may arise 25 from the United States Constitution or from state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 26 215, 223-27 (1976); Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (a 27 governing state statute that compels a result upon compliance with certain criteria, none 28 of which involve the exercise of discretion by the reviewing body, creates a 1 constitutionally protected property interest). Where a constitutionally protected liberty or 2 property interest is at stake, determination of what process is due is a fact-specific 3 inquiry. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 4 “For a plaintiff to have a property interest in a benefit… He must have more than a 5 unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 6 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Defendants argue Plaintiff does not have a legitimate claim 7 of entitlement to pension payments and is deemed a “new member” according to the 8 Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (“PEPRA”). StanCERA Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff’s 9 employment and benefit status are not, however, appropriate determinations for the 10 court to make in resolving a motion to dismiss. In addition, making such determinations 11 would require interpreting exhibits attached to the Complaint in an attempt to piece 12 together Plaintiff’s employment history and would improperly convert this motion to 13 dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Bruce, 2024 WL 7017263, at *3. The 14 Complaint fails to sufficiently allege a procedural due process claim where its allegations 15 are conclusory. See Compl. ¶ 25; see Rote v. Committee on Judicial Conduct and 16 Disability of Judicial Conference of United States, 577 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1131-32 (D. Or. 17 2021) (finding a procedural due process claim failed based on “speculative, conclusory, 18 and unsupported” allegations); see also Seagraves v. Department of Children Youth and 19 Families, 2025 WL 1031306, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2025) (finding procedural due 20 process claim fails for same reasons). Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a due 21 process claim. 22 C. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 23 Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment 24 retaliation claim. The Court agrees. As stated above, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 25 § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant committed the alleged conduct while 26 acting under color of state law; and (2) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right 27 as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. To state a First 28 Amendment retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege ‘that (1) he was engaged 1 in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a person of 2 ordinary fitness from continuing to engage in the protected activity and (3) the protected 3 activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.’” Capp v. 4 County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting O'Brien v. Welty, 818 5 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016)). “A plaintiff must show that the defendant’s retaliatory 6 animus was a ‘but-for cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would 7 not have been taken absent retaliatory motive.’” Id. (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 8 250, 260 (2006)). 9 Here, Plaintiff alleges he engaged in a constitutionally protected lawsuit by filing 10 his prior action in state court. He further alleges that Defendant StanCERA “conditioned 11 access to an administrative hearing on Plaintiff first dismissing his case.” Compl. ¶ 26. 12 Plaintiff adequately pleads that he was engaging in a constitutionally-protected activity 13 by filing a lawsuit. See Pime Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Services Employees Intern. 14 Union, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1196 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“The right to petition the government 15 extends to the courts and, thus, includes the right to file certain lawsuits.”). However, 16 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendant StanCERA’s actions were “substantially 17 motivated by Plaintiff’s protected activity” is insufficient. Compl. ¶ 26. These allegations 18 are formulaic recitations of a cause of action, which are insufficient to state a claim under 19 Rule 12(b)(6). See Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a First 20 Amendment retaliation claim. 21 D. Monell Claims 22 The Complaint raises a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim 23 and a First Amendment retaliation claim, in addition to a third cause of action that alleges 24 policy-related constitutional violations as Monell claims against Defendant StanCERA. 25 The Complaint is therefore construed to raise § 1983 claims against Defendant 26 StanCERA under a Monell theory of liability for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 27 procedural due process and the First Amendment. 28 “In order to establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show that a 1 ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 2 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of 3 New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that 4 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the 5 policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the 6 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Warner, 7 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th 8 Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the particular policy that the plaintiff alleges 9 caused his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th 10 Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local 11 governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose 12 liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official 13 municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must 14 be the result of a decision of a person employed by the entity who has final decision or 15 policymaking authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link 16 between the policy or custom and the injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate 17 that his injury resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d 18 at 1070. Plaintiff alleges “the constitutional violations were caused by StanCERA’s 19 policies, customs, or final-policymaker decisions,” citing alleged refusal to provide 20 hearings on classification, and “conditioning a hearing on dismissal.” Compl. ¶ 27. 21 Because the headings for the due process and First Amendment claims state “Monell 22 against StanCERA,” the Court construes the reference to constitutional violations in the 23 third claim for “Monell liability” to be references to alleged due process and First 24 Amendment violations. See Compl. at 3, 4. Plaintiff pleads minimal allegations and fails 25 to sufficiently state a Monell claim. As they relate to an ongoing policy to deprive 26 constitutional rights, the allegations are conclusory. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 27 Monell claims against Defendant StanCERA. 28 / / / 1 E. Claim Against Defendant CalPERS CEO 2 The only claim raised against Defendant CalPERS CEO is the fourth claim for 3 declaratory and injunctive relief. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff cites Ex parte Young as his 4 authority to bring Defendant CalPERS CEO into this action. Compl. ¶ 28. “The Ex parte 5 Young doctrine allows suits for declaratory and injunctive relief against government 6 officials in their official capacities--notwithstanding the sovereign immunity possessed by 7 the government itself.” Vann v. U.S. Department of Interior, 701 F.3d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 8 2012). Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief “requiring the CalPERS CEO to 9 set and conduct a fair, unconditional hearing,” among other relief. Compl. ¶ 28. 10 Defendant CalPERS CEO argues Plaintiff failed to plead allegations regarding 11 subject matter jurisdiction. Def. CalPERS CEO Mot. at 4. This argument fails. The 12 Complaint expressly alleges federal question jurisdiction, and the Complaint expressly 13 raises § 1983 claims based on alleged constitutional violations. See Compl. ¶ 6; see id. 14 generally. 15 Defendant CalPERS CEO also argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Def. 16 CalPERS CEO Mot. The Court agrees. Plaintiff fails to allege any constitutional 17 violations, let alone any facts, against Defendant CalPERS CEO. See Compl. Further, 18 “[a] request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action.” Jensen v. 19 Quality Loan Service Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010). Even though 20 Plaintiff has cited federal authority, he fails to state a claim against Defendant CalPERS 21 CEO upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 22 request for declaratory and injunctive relief. 23 F. Leave to Amend 24 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se 25 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and 26 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 27 Leave to amend should be “freely given when justice so requires” absent any declared 28 or apparent reason, “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 1 movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 2 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of 3 amendment[.]” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 15(a)(2). 5 The Court finds it appropriate to recommend granting Plaintiff an opportunity to 6 amend the Complaint. Plaintiff should be provided an opportunity to amend his 7 Complaint to the extent he can allege facts that sufficiently plead his claims. Plaintiff is 8 warned that conclusory and broad allegations are insufficient to meet Rule 8. Plaintiff is 9 again warned that the amended complaint itself must contain all his allegations 10 supporting his claims. Plaintiff may not simply attach various documents to an amended 11 complaint in lieu of including his allegations in the amended complaint itself. Therefore, 12 the Court recommends the Complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. 13 The amended complaint filed should be titled “First Amended Complaint.” 14 Plaintiff should not file a First Amended Complaint until after the district judge 15 rules on these findings and recommendations. The district judge’s order will 16 address whether Plaintiff has permission to file a First Amended Complaint and if 17 leave to amend is granted, the deadline for filing. 18 The amended complaint must not require the Court and the defendant to guess at 19 what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (affirming dismissal 20 of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what facts support the 21 legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended complaint must 22 not require the Court to spend its time “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which 23 Rule 8 obligated plaintiff[] to submit.” Id. at 1180. The amended complaint must not 24 require the Court and defendant to prepare lengthy outlines “to determine who is being 25 sued for what.” Id. at 1179. 26 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in 27 order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 28 amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a 1 | general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the 2 || amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any 3 | function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). 4] IV. CONCLUSION 5 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 6 1. Defendants StanCERA, Thomas Stadelmaier, and Donna Wood’s motion 7 to dismiss (ECF No. 7) be GRANTED. 8 2. Defendant CalPERS’ CEO’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be 9 GRANTED. 10 3. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 11 4. Plaintiff be granted twenty-one (21) days from any order adopting these 12 findings and recommendations to file an amended complaint. Failure to 13 timely file an amended complaint will result in a recommendation that this 14 action be dismissed. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 16 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 17 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 18 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 19 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 20 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 21 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 22 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 23 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 25 || Dated: April 24, 2026 C i s \U 26 CHI SOO KIM 27 | 7. noop.3409.25.mtd UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 12