OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Justice Holmes once observed that foreign legal systems can appear to the uninitiated “like a wall of stone,” impenetrable and unyielding.
Diaz v. Gonzalez,
261 U.S. 102, 106, 43 S.Ct. 286, 67 L.Ed. 550 (1923) (Holmes, J.). For over a century, the federal courts attempted to scale this stone wall by treating questions of foreign law as questions of fact to be pleaded and proved. But over the years, this method proved unsatisfactory, obscuring rather than illuminating the content and nuance of foreign laws. Finally, in 1966, following a proliferation of international litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 was adopted to furnish federal courts with a uniform procedure for raising and determining an issue concerning foreign law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note. Now, according to the Rule, a “court’s determination [of foreign law] must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
Despite the clear mandate of the federal rule, this appeal illustrates the difficulty that can arise in determining foreign law and the confusion surrounding the role of foreign law in domestic proceedings. The dispute stems from the transcontinental attempts of Yves Sicre de Fontbrune to protect his copyright in' photographs of Pablo Picasso’s artworks after an American art editor, Aan Wofsy and Alan Wofsy and Associates (collectively, ‘Wofsy”), reproduced the photographic images. As part of his efforts, de Fontbrune received a judgment in French court of. two million euros in
“astreinte”
against Wofsy for copyright violations. De Fontbrune sought to enforce this
astreinte
in federal court in California under the California Uniform Foreign-Court Monetary Judgment Recognition Act (“Uniform Recognition Act” or “the Act”), Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1713
et seq.
The Picasso photographs—intended to convey the quintessence of Picasso’s artworks—now require us to delve into the essence of
astreinte,
a French judicial device. The enforceability of the French award turns on whether, in this case, the
astreinte
functions as a fine or penalty— which the Uniform Recognition Act- does not recognize—or as a grant of monetary recovery—which is statutorily cognizable. The answer to this question is not a simple matter of translation, but, as we explain, requires a broader look at French law to understand the nature of the
astreinte
remedy in this case, in conjunction with an analysis of California law regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments.
In granting Wofsy’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de Fontbrune’s claim, the district court considered the parties’ expert declarations on the nature of
ast-reinte.
We disagree with de Fontbrune’s proposition that consideration of such materials outside the pleadings was error. Rather, under Rule 44.1’s broad mandate, foreign legal materials—including expert declarations on foreign law—can be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss where foreign law provides the basis for the claim. We reverse and remand, however, because, the district court erred in
concluding that the
astreinte
awarded by the French court in this case functioned as a “fine or other penalty” for purposes of the Uniform Recognition Act.
Background
Between 1932 and 1970, Christian Zer-vos created a “catalogue raisonné”
featuring photographs of Picasso’s artistic corpus. The “Zervos Catalog,” which contained almost 16,000 photographs of Picasso’s art, was ultimately published by Cahiers d’Art and has become a universally recognized reference work. De Fontbrune purchased Cahiers d’Art’s publisher’s stock in 1979, thereby acquiring intellectual property rights in the Zervos Catalog under French law.
Almost two decades later, Wofsy reproduced several photographs from the Zer-vos Catalog in two volumes on Picasso, which he offered for sale at a Parisian book fair. De Fontbrune brought suit in French court claiming that these reproductions violated his copyright in the Zervos Catalog.
After a French trial court rejected his claims, de Fontbrune appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal. In a 2001 decision (the “2001 Judgment”), the Court of Appeal concluded that Wofsy was “guilty of infringement of copyright and ha[d] infringed on [de Fontbrune’s] rights.” The court accordingly prohibited Wofsy “from the use in any manner whatsoever of the [Zer-vos] photographs under penalty of ...
[astreinte]
of 10,000 francs by proven infraction,” and required Wofsy “to pay Mr. de Fontbrune 800,000 francs in pecuniary damages in redress of his- injury resulting from the infringement of copyright.”
Ten years later, de Fontbrune filed a claim with an enforcement judge at the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (High Court of Paris) for
“[liquidation d’astreinte]
made against [Wofsy] by judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal[ ].” De Fontbrune sought “a judgment ordering [Wofsy] to pay him the sum of 2,000,000 euros from the amount of the
[liquidation
d’astreinte].”
In a 2012 decision (the “2012 Judgment”), the enforcement judge found that Wofsy had violated the 2001 Judgment by reproducing copyrighted images from the Zervos Catalog. The judge accordingly “[a]ward[ed] the [astreinte] prounounced by the Paris Court of Appeal[ ] ... in the amount of 2,000,000 euros,” as well as 1,000 euros in costs.
De Fontbrune then initiated proceedings in California state court seeking recognition of the 2012 Judgment under the Uniform Recognition Act. Wofsy removed the action to federal court ' on diversity grounds, and filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Wofsy’s motion contested the. characterization of
astreinte
as “damages” in the English versions of the 2001 and 2012 Judgments attached to de Fontbrune’s complaint. Wofsy argued that
astreinte
functions as a penalty—not as an award, of damages—and is thus not cognizable under the Uniform Recognition Act. In sup: port of this assertion, Wofsy supplied a declaration by a French lawyer, Vonnick le Guillou. De Fontbrune countered with a
declaration from Ms own expert on French law, Christopher Mesnooh, explaining that, in the French system,
astreinte
can function as an award of damages. De Font-brune also argued that the district court should strike Guillou’s declaration as evidence outside the pleadings impermissibly filed in support of a motion to dismiss.
Faced with conflicting information about the function of
astreinte
in French law, the district court initially denied Wofsy’s motion in part, concluding that determining whether
astreinte
is a “fine, a penalty, damages, or something else ... require[d] an analysis of French law” that would be “premature at [the] pleadings stage.” The district court also declined to consider Guillou’s declaration under Rule 44.1, on the grounds that the Rule did not “expressly allow the Court to consider evidence outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” and that a party relying on foreign law bears the burden of proving the content of that law.
After Wofsy filed a motion for reconsideration, together with a reply declaration from Guillou, the district court reversed course. This time around, the district court concluded that “its previous finding concerning judicial 'notice of foreign law was in error” and vacated the order denying Wofsy’s motion to • dismiss. In a complete volte face, the district court reasoned that Rule 44.1 permits judicial consideration of any relevant material or source in determining foreign law, irrespective of its admissibility as evidence. Because “determinations of foieign law are issues of law, not fact,” the court also concluded that it could take judicial notice of the declarations of the French legal experts, “insofar as they relate to French law.”
Taking these declarations into consideration, the court determined that the primary purpose of the
astreinte
was not to compensate de Fontbrune for the damages he suffered, but to compel Wofsy’s compliance with the 2001 Judgment. The court concluded that the
astreinte
thus functioned as a penalty and so was not cognizable under the Uniform Recognition Act. De Fontbrune now appeals from the district court’s dismissal of the action with prejudice.
Analysis
The district court’s vacillation illustrates the lingering uncertainty surrounding the role of foreign law in domestic proceedings, even after the advent of Rule 44.1. We take this opportunity to address a question that no circuit has yet answered directly, perhaps because the answer is implicit in the rule: whether Rule 44.1 authorizes district courts to consider foreign legal materials outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss. Our answer is yes, because Rule 44.1 treats foreign law determinations as questions of law, not fact.'
I. Foreign Law under Rule 44.1
Rule 44.1 provides:
A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.
The adoption of Rule 44.1 in 1966 marked a sea change in the treatment of foreign law by the federal courts.
See Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi.,
758 F.2d 1185, 1192-93 (7th Cir. 1985). Prior to its adoption, foreign law was viewed as a question of fact to “be proved like other facts.”
Church v. Hubbart,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 187, 2 L.Ed. 249 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.). The treatment of foreign law as fact reflected understandable judicial discomfort with questions of foreign law due to inevitable unfamiliarity with the substance and nuance of the legal systems of other countries. Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Rule JM..1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death ' Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine,
65 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 619-20 (1967).
Rule 44.1 endeavored to lay to rest this antiquated conception of foreign law as “a question of fact that must be proved at trial and reviewed on appeal only for. clear error."
Rationis Enters, Inc. of Pan. v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co.,
426 F.3d 580, 585 (2d Cir. 2005). The Rule achieved this transformation by making the process of ascertaining foreign law equivalent to the process for determining domestic law, insofar as possible. 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2444 (3d ed. 2008);
see also Matter of McLinn,
739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1984) (analogizing treatment of foreign law and treatment of laws of sister states).
Rule 44.1 thus unshackles courts and litigants from the evidentiary and procedural requirements that apply to factual determinations. It accordingly permits courts to consider “any relevant material, including testimony, without regard to its admissibility under Rule 43,” authorizes the court to “engage in its own research,” eschews any requirement that the court formally take judicial notice of foreign law, and obviates the need for the court to provide “formal notice to the parties of its intention to engage in its own research on an issue of foreign law which has been raised by them, or of its intention to raise and determine independently an issue not raised by them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note.
The Rule’s requirements are intended to be “flexible and informal” to “encourage the court and counsel to regard the determination of foreign law as a cooperative venture requiring an open and unstructured dialogue among all concerned.” Wright & Miller at § 2444. Rule 44.1 exhorts trial and appellate courts alike to make the most of this flexibility to independently research and analyze foreign law—particularly as such issues will undoubtedly continue coming “to the federal courts with increasing frequency as the global economy expands and cross-border transactions increase.”
Curley v. AMR Corp.,
153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998);
see also Twohy,
758 F.2d at 1193 (“In determining [questions of foreign law], both trial and appellate courts are urged to research and analyze foreign law independently.”).
We have likewise stressed the district court’s independent obligation to adequately ascertain relevant foreign law, even if the parties’ submissions are lacking.
See Universe Sales Co., Ltd. v. Silver Castle, Ltd.,
182 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting “it is not novel for an appellate court ... to- determine that a district court performed an inadequate inquiry” into foreign law (citing
Twohy,
758 F.2d at 1193)). Independent research, plus the testimony of foreign legal experts, together with extracts of foreign legal materials, “has been and will likely continue to be" the basic mode” of determining foreign law.
Id.
at 1038. Importantly, such material and testimony may be considered “at any time,
whether or not submitted by a party.”
Stuart v. United States,
813 F.2d 243, 250 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 103 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989);
cf Kaho v. Ilchert,
765 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the traditional' prohibition against considering materials not before an agency does not apply to consideration of foreign legal materials under Rule 44.1).
Yet despite Rule 44.1’s seemingly clear language, federal courts have largely remained hesitant to engage with questions of foreign law as fully and independently as they do with questions of domestic law—confusion and contradiction continue to plague the application of Rule 44.1.
See, e.g.,
Peter Hay,
The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the United States,
62 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 213, 235 (2014) (noting the lack of uniformity in application of Rule 44.1).
The application of Rule 44.1 has also been beset by semantic sloppiness. Courts continue to refer to the “burden of proving foreign law.”
See, e.g., McGee v. Arkel Int’l, LLC,
671 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 2012) (referencing the plaintiffs “burden of proving foreign law” and requiring that litigants “present to the district court clear proof of the relevant legal principles”-(internal quotations and citations omitted));
Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Sea Phoenix,
447 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that, because Rule 44.1 does not impose a duty on courts to conduct independent research into foreign law, the parties “carry the burden of proving” it). Imposing a burden of proof on the parties is at odds with the mandate of Rule 44.1. To be sure, under Rule 44.1, a party raising a foreign law issue “must give notice by pleading on other writings.” But this nptice is not tantamount to a burden of proof.
In light of the lingering conflicts in the application of Rule 44.1—and in the absence of any guiding precedent from the higher courts—it is unsurprising that uncertainty surrounds the precise issue of whether it is appropriate for a district court to consider foreign legal materials outside of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss. District courts addressing this question have—predictably— adopted differing approaches.
Compare Abdallah v. Int’l Lease Fin. Corp.,
2015 A.M.C. 1137, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (acknowledging practical considerations that “often require” reliance on evidence concerning substance of foreign law at Rule 12(b)(6) stage),
with United States v. 591,-161 Pounds of Salmon, More or Less,
687 F.Supp. 525, 526 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (treating a motion to dismiss “in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) as one for summary judgment,” and explaining reluctance to rule on foreign legal questions without “a more complete picture of the [foreign] legal and regulatory system”).
Since matters outside the pleadings are often required to determine foreign law, summary judgment may appear at first blush to be the appropriate mechanism for dismissing a claim when foreign law applies.
Grice v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels,
477 F.Supp. 365, 367 (S.D. Ala. 1979). The continued misplaced emphasis on the parties’ burden of proving foreign law, the frequently intertwined factual questions, and' the sheer complexity of ascertaining foreign law all might superficially support this conclusion. But it would be antithetical to the language and purpose of Rule 44.1 to prohibit courts from considering relevant materials beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the claim depends on a determination of foreign law. This does not preclude the possibility that there may be situations where factual matters underlie the legal determination and that, in such a case, summary
judgment may be the appropriate procedural mechanism for resolution.
The general prohibition against looking at matters beyond the complaint to resolve a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ensures that parties have adequate notice to present additional evidence and establish whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be resolved.
See, e.g., Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P.,
949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the rule requiring the conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment when materials outside the pleadings are considered ensures “that the party against whom the motion to dismiss is made may respond” with evidence of its own). These concerns are not implicated by the consideration of foreign legal materials at the pleading stage. Under Rule 44.1, rulings on foreign law are determinations of law, not of fact. Accordingly, “even differences of opinion on the content, applicability, or interpretation of [a] foreign provision may not be characterized as a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact’_”
Banco de Credito Indus., S.A. v. Tesorería General,
990 F.2d 827, 838 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting John R. Brown,
H.1 Ways to Prove Foreign Law,
9 Mar. L. Rev. 179,194 (1984)).
The Rule authorizes courts to conduct independent research outside the parties’ submissions in determining foreign law. Its deliberately “flexible procedures for presenting and utilizing material on issues of foreign law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note, likewise cut against a determination that district courts should be prohibited from considering relevant foreign legal materials at the motion to dismiss stage.
Importantly, because foreign law interpretation and determination is a question of law, independent judicial research does not implicate the judicial notice and ex parte issues spawned by independent factual research undertaken by a court.
See
Edmund M. Morgan,
Judicial Notice,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 270-72 (1944) (explaining that, while the “judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion” in determining the content of legal rules, “[t]he situation as to disputed and disputable issues of fact is different,” and. the judge is not “permitted to make an independent investigation”);
see also Rowe v. Gibson,
798 F.3d 622, 641 (7th. Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (noting that looking at facts outside the record “turns the court from a neutral decision-maker into an advocate for one side”);
Blunt v. United States,
244 F.2d 355, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (warning that adding to the record “flakes] on the aspect of advocacy”).
Judicial research into domestic law provides an appropriate analog. Although our common law system relies heavily on advocacy by the parties, judges are free to undertake independent
legal
research beyond the parties’ submissions. It is no revelation that courts look to cases, statutes, regulations, treatises, scholarly articles, legislative history, treaties and other legal materials in figuring out what the law is and resolving legal issues. Independent judicial research into the content of foreign law thus leaves undisturbed a bedrock principle of our adversarial system—that “adversarial testing is the surest route to truth,” and the failure to expose facts to such rigorous testing “can undermine the quality- of [factual] findings.” Brianne J. Gorod,
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extrar-Record Factfinding,
61 Duke L. J. 1, 3, 6 (2011). Rather, determining foreign law—like determining domestic law—requires . “adequate study,” without which there can be neither the “adequate reflection” nor “that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions.”
Salve
Regina Coll. v. Russell,
499 U.S. 225, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (quoting
Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 437, 458-59, 79 S.Ct. 921, 3 L.Ed.2d 935 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Two of our sister circuits appear to' have tacitly endorsed this interpretation of Rule 44.1, without explicitly addressing the question before us. In
Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co.,
the Eleventh Circuit considered an expert affidavit on Colombian law that had been submitted to the district court as part of a response to a motion to ■ dismiss under Rule 44.1. 640 F.3d 1338, 1349 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011). Similarly, in
Twohy,
in considering an appeal arising out of a Rule 12(c) motion for a claim arising under Spanish law, the Seventh Circuit chided the district court for considering only “a series of affidavits of foreign law experts concerning issues of Spanish law relevant to the case,” and not “fully me[eting] its duty to ascertain foreign law under Rule 44.1.” 758 F.2d at 1192-93.
Thus, we hold that courts do not transgress the broad boundaries established by Rule 44.1 when considering foreign legal materials—including expert testimony and declarations—at the pleading stage, and the district court here did not err in considering expert declarations on the content of French law in ruling on Wofs/s Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
II. California’s Uniform Recognition Act
The district court erred in concluding that “the award of an
astreinte
in this case constitutes a penalty for purposes of the [Uniform Recognition Act].” To explain why this is so, we first review the requirements governing the recognition of Foreign-Court monetary judgments under California law and then consider the nature of the
astreinte
in the judgment at issue.
See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,
959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (all questions of law, including questions of foreign law, are reviewed de novo).
California’s Uniform Recognition Act governs the enforcement of foreign-country judgments that (1) grant or deny monetary recovery and (2) are “final, conclusive, and enforceable” under the law of the jurisdiction where rendered. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1715(a). A judgment that constitutes “[a] fine or other penalty,” however, is not cognizable under the statute.
Id.
§ 1715(b)(2). The statutory exclusion of fines or penalties reflects an ancient maxim of international law that “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”
The Antelope,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.);
Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee,
232 Cal.App.4th 1379, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 269 (2015).
The prescription against recognizing or enforcing penal laws focuses on whether the character of the foreign judgment is essentially punitive or compensatory.
See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 89 & cmt. a (1971) (explaining that the “narrow” prohibition “applies only to actions brought for the purpose of punishing the defendant for a wrong done by him” and “does not apply to actions brought by a private person ... to i'eeover compensation for a loss”); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 483 cmt. b (1987) (“A penal judgment ... is ... primarily punitive rather than compensatory in character.”). The prohibition “reflect[s] a reluctance of courts to subject foreign public law to judicial scrutiny ... combined with reluctance to enforce law that may conflict with the public policy of the forum state_[and] distrust of foreign criminal procedures.” Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 483 n.2.
Adopting the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892), the California courts likewise concentrate on the character of a foreign judgment.
Java Oil Ltd. v. Sullivan,
168 Cal.App.4th 1178, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 177, 183 (2008). In
Huntington,
the Supreme Court explained that determining whether a foreign law is “a penal law, in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon ... whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.” 146 U.S. at 673-74, 13 S.Ct. 224. This inquiry entails consideration of whether the harm the foreign judgment seeks to redress is private or public. Private harms “are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals,” whereas public harms “are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community.”
Id.
at 668-69, 13 S.Ct. 224 (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2).
The Court acknowledged the elasticity of the terms “penal” and “penalty” in both the British and American systems, noting that, while these terms “[s]trictly and primarily ,,. denote punishment .., imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its laws,” they also commonly encompass “any extraordinary liability, to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged.”
Id.
at 666-67, 13 S.Ct. 224. The Court emphasized that, for purposes of recognition and enforcement, “[pjenal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state, and which ... the executive of the state has the power to pardon;”
Id.
at 667, 13 S.Ct. 224. In contrast, “[statutes giving a private cause of action against the wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but ... neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal.”
Id.
The Court cautioned against being misled by nomenclature, emphasizing that the crux of the analysis is not whether a judgment is termed penal or a penalty by “the courts of the [country] in which it was passed, but whether it appears, to the tribunal which is called, upon to enforce it, to be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person.”
Id.
at 683, 13 S,Ct. 224. This .admonition recognizes that translation will always be incomplete, because the “resonances from centuries of legal, political, and literary use” that necessarily accompany any legal term can never be fully transferred by. translation alone. John E. Joseph,
Indeterminacy, Translation and the Law, in
8 Translation and the Law 13, 17 (Marshall Morris ed., 1995).
In undertaking the
Huntington
inquiry, California uses a nuanced balancing test to determine whether the “essential character and effect” of án award is penal—an approach that acknowledges that courts must consider more than how a term is translated to understand the nature of a foreign judgment. The
Java Oil
test thus looks to a number of factors, including: (1) whether the purpose 'of the award is to compensate an individual-or to “provide an example” or punish “an offense against the public”; (2) whether the award is payable to an individual or to the state or one of its organs; (3) whether the judgment arose in the context of a civil action or through the enforcement of penal laws; and (4) whether the award was a “mandatory, fine, sanction, or multiplier.”
Java Oil,
86 Cal.Rptr.3d at 183-84;
see also Hyundai,
182 Cal.Rptr.3d at 270-71 (relying on
Java Oil
factors in determining whether a foreign judgment was a penalty).
No one factor is determinative, and, not surprisingly, the same factors may point in differing directions. In
Hyundai,
for example, Hyundai Securities sought enforcement of a Korean judgment that included indemnification for a criminal fíne the company had paid on behalf of Ik Chi Lee, its former CEO. 182 Cal.Rptr.3d at 266-67. Lee argued that, because the indemnification order was based on a criminal fine, it was penal in nature and not cognizable under the Act.
Id.
at 267. The California Court of Appeal disagreed, reasoning that the purpose of the Korean judgment was “to compensate Hyundai for the damages it suffered from having to pay a fine,” and that “the prohibition against the recognition of a judgment based on a fine ... does not include an award to compensate a plaintiff.”
Id.
at 1387,1389.
III. The Nature of the
Astreinte
in the French Judgment against Wofsy
With the
Java Oil
factors in mind, we turn to the nature of the
astreinte
in the French legal system generally and more particularly in.. the judgment against Wofsy. Heeding our own- advice, we consider the judgment itself, the expert declarations and materials on the
astreinte
submitted to the district court by de Fontbrune and Wofsy, as well as our own research into American and French law.
At the outset, we note that the
astreinte
is a “device that may appear rather strange” to common law lawyers.
An Introduction to French Law
234 (George A. Bermann
&
Etienne Picard eds., 2008). It currently occupies a role of considerable procedural and substantive complexity. M.P. Mitchell,
Imperium by the Back Door: The
Astreinte
and the Enforcement of Contractual Obligations in France,
51 U, Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 250, 259 (1993). Unsurprisingly, then, the
astreinte
cannot be neatly categorized as either essentially penal or wholly civil in nature. It is hybrid, with elements that cut both ways.
To begin, we emphasize that we cannot ascertain whether the
astreinte
is a “fine or other penalty” simply by turning to translations or dictionary definitions. Citing the
Dictionnaire Jmidique Fran-qais-Anglais
and the
Council of Europe French-English Legal Dictionary,
Wofsy’s counsel argued that
“astreinte
means a fine for ñoncompliance with a judgment.” But the test is not whether
astreinte
is translated as “fine” or “penalty.” Rather, we must look to “whether it appears, to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it, to be, in its essential character and effect, a punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person.”
Huntington,
146 U.S. at 683, 13 S.Ct. 224. Dictionaries may be a starting point, but in this case are of limited utility in looking beneath the surface to determine the “essential character and effect” of the foreign judgment. Indeed, the limitations of terminology for understanding the character and purpose of a foreign award is reflected in the nuanced nature of the
Java Oil
test. Although the Uniform Recognition Act prohibits recognition of a “fine[] or other penalty,” the
Java Oil
factors do not rely on this vocabulary to determine what judgments fall within the Act’s exception to enforcement. We must accordingly be cautious about falling back on bald nomenclature as providing a definitive category in lieu of undertaking the in-depth analysis of foreign judgments required by
Java Oil.
The declarations of the parties’ French-law experts illustrate the variegated character of the
astreinte.
The statements of the experts and argument by counsel conjure up an image of one side pointing a finger one way, and the other side pointing a finger in the opposite direction. On the one hand, the Guillou declarations take the position that the
astreinte
is awarded “independent of damages,” calculated based on the behavior of the defendant rather than injury to the plaintiff. Its purpose is thus not, strictly speaking, to compensate for actual pecuniary harm. Rather, it operates as a sort of “private penalty,” intended to deter and punish noncompliance with the court’s judgment. Although Guillou describes the
astreinte
as a means to vindicate the public interest in compliance with court orders, she does not suggest that the order was intended to punish an “offense against the public.” Thus, Guillou characterizes the
astreinte
as a “private penalty” that is a “personal legal measure of constraint.” But of course, invoking the word “penalty” without benchmarking it against the
Java Oil
analysis does not answer the question.
On the other hand, the Mesnooh declaration states that the
astreinte
is “imposed by a judge, always for an amount of money, ordering a party which is subject to a court order to do something ... to comply with such order.” An
astreinte
can thus be awarded only in connection with a valid and enforceable legal duty. According to Mesnooh, the
astreinte
is a “personal remedy,” payable entirely to the party seeking enforcement of an
astreinte,
not to the court or any other part of the French State. The amount is “within the discretion of the judge,” and “can be modified before it is reduced to judgment.” Although not “a grant of a civil right to a private person,” the
astreinte
is not a punishment for a crime against the public, either. It is awarded, rather, “for the sole benefit of’ the party seeking the remedy.
The experts’ recitations, which sometimes overlap, are useful in laying out some of the characteristics of the
ast-reinte.
However, with the exception of parts of the Mesnooh declaration, they do not provide the answer to our state law inquiry. Additional explanatory materials indicate that French judges devised the
astreinte
as a “coercive sanction which operates in its own right to secure enforcement of a judgment.” Michael Chester-man,
Contempt: In the Common Law but not the Civil Law,
46 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 521, 545 (1997). The
astreinte
is now widely used in the French legal system “to obtain the performance of any type of obligation ... for matters civil or commercial, and also in administrative matters including those in which the party owing performance is the state or a public body.” James Gordley & Arthur von Meh-ren,
An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private Law
533 (2006). In this regard, as Guillou noted,
astreinte
can be seen as analogous to contempt of .court.
The protean nature and wide applicability of
astreinte
warns against a blanket determination that the device is always either punitive or compensatory. Rather, we must consider a particular
astreinte
in the context in which it was awarded.
Turning to the first
Java Oil
factor, the context of the French orders here persuades us that the purpose of the
ast-reinte
awarded to de Fontbrune was not to punish “an offense against the public” or make an example of Wofsy,
see
86 Cal. Rptr.3d at 183, but to safeguard de Font-brune’s copyright. The 2001 Judgment prohibited Wofsy from using the Zervos photographs “under penalty of [astreinte] of 10,000 francs” per violation. The court concluded that Wofsy had infringed de Fontbrune’s copyright in the Zervos Catalog in violation of Articles L335-2 and L335-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code. According to these articles “any reproduction by any means of a work of the mind, any edition of writings, musical compositions, drawings, paintings, or any other printed or engraved production made in violation of rules protecting the authors’ right is an infringement: any infringement is an offence.” Nicolas Bouche,
Intellectual Property Law in France
¶ 294 (2d ed. 2014). Such infringements “may entail criminal and civil sanctions” as remedies.
Id.
at ¶ 324. The criminal sanctions include “a term of three years imprisonment and a fíne of EUR 300,000.”
Id.
at ¶325. We note that the word translated here as “fine” is “amende”—not
ast-
reinte—in the original French version. Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual Property - Code] art. L335-2. The civil remedies include both damages and an order requiring “cessation - of the infringing acts.” Bouche,
supm,
at ¶333. Such an order enjoining the infringing acts may be made, if necessary, under
“ast-reinte.”
Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] art. L331-1-2. .
In the 2001 Judgment, the Paris Court of Appeal awarded both forms of civil remedies—that is, pecuniary damages for de Fontbrune’s injury and an injunction against future reproductions of the Zervos Catalog images under an
astreinte.
The court did not, however, impose any of the criminal sanctions provided for in the Intellectual Property Code. Thus, the
ast-reinte
was not awarded, pursuant to the court’s authority to criminally punish copyright violations under the Intellectual Property Code through- imposing an
amende.
The
astreinte
was awarded separately and apart from the pecuniary damages awarded by both the Paris Court of Appeal and the enforcement judge. The enforcement judge expressly referenced Articles 35 and 36 of the Law of 9 July 1991,
pursuant to which any French judge could order
liquidation d’astreinte,
“taking into consideration the behaviour of the party to whom the injunction has been addressed, and the difficulties that he or she has encountered in executing it.”
Ultimately, the purpose of the
ast-reinte
was to set a sum, per violation, for Wofsy’s failure to comply with the judicial prohibition on the continued use of de Fontbrune’s copyrighted photographs. In this sense, it may be likened to a civil contempt order. The California Supreme Court has clarified that the primary objéct of civil contempt “is to protect the rights of litigants_ Civil contempt is a forward-looking remedy imposed to coerce compliance with a lawful order of the court.”
In re Nolan W.,
45 Cal.4th 1217, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 203 P.3d 454, 466 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Civil contempt orders are thus “remedial,
and for the benefit of the [plaintiff].”
Bagwell,
512 U.S. at 828-29, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (quoting
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911)). Here, as Guillou pointed out, the
astreinte
was a
“personal
legal measure of constraint,” for de Fontbrune’s benefit; in other words “a forward-looking remedy imposed to coerce compliance with” the Paris Court of Appeal’s lawful order to stop Wofsy using de Fontbrune’s copyrighted images.
Cast in another light, the
astreinte
here may also be seen as fulfilling a function akin to statutory damages in American copyright law, although we acknowledge that de Fontbrune was awarded damages separately. In the U.S. system, a party may opt for an award of statutory damages rather than actual damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Such damages are intended to induce copyright holders to enforce their copyrights and to deter infring-ers by preventing unjust enrichment, even where actual damages are unproved. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter,
An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Laiv,
39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1585, 1651-52 (1998). Here, too, the
astreinte
was awarded without determining the actual amount of pecuniary harm suffered by de Fontbrune as a result of Wofs/s continued use of the Zervos Catalog images. Nevertheless, the purpose of the award was not to punish a harm against the public, but to vindicate de Fontbrune’s personal interest in having his copyright respected and to deter further future infringements by Wofsy.
The remaining
Java Oil
factors weigh in favor of our conclusion that the
astreinte
was not essentially penal in nature. Significantly, the
astreinte
awarded was payable directly to de Fontbrune, rather than to a court or the French state. As the Mesnooh declaration noted, an
astreinte
creates a “debt belonging to the party which is condemned [to pay the astreinte].” The result is that “the beneficiaries of the underlying award [for damages] becomes a creditor for the amount of the
astreinte.” See
Francois Chabas,
Regime de la Reparation: JurisClasseur Civil Code Article 1382-1386
¶ 97 (2001).
Turning to the nature of the proceedings, the
astreinte
here was awarded in the context of a civil action in order to enforce a civil remedy provided for in the French Intellectual Property Code. No criminal or penal proceedings were involved. And, finally, the award was not a mandatory' fine, sanction or multiplier. Indeed, an astreinte’s “effectiveness is ... a function of the choice of the amount which is freely determined by the judge.” Gord-ley
&
von Mehren,
supra,
at 532. In fact, the enforcement judge accepted a reduction of the
astreinte
to 2,000,000 euro, which is consistent with the notion that she retained final discretion to determine the amount. In all, the
astreinte
was not essentially “a punishment of an offense against the public;” rather, it “afford[ed] a private remedy to [de Fontbrune,] a person injured by the wrongful act.”
See Huntington,
146 U.S. at 673-74, 683, 13 S.Ct. 224.
■' Our conclusion is buttressed by contrasting the nature of the
astreinte
awarded here with another case - in which our court considered in dicta the character of an
astreinte
imposed under French criminal law and in a different context. The case of
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme
arose from the availability in France of Nazi-related memorabilia on Yahool’s auction site. 433 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam). A French court issued an injunction ordering Yahoo! to remove access to the memorabilia or pay 100,000 euros per day of delay.
Id.
at 1203. Yahoo! claimed that “the threat of a monetary penalty h[ung over it] like the sword of Damocles.”
Id.
at 1218. We stated that “even if the French court were to impose a monetary penalty against Yahoo!,” it is “exceedingly unlikely” that it would be an enforceable penalty under the Uniform Recognition Act.
Id.
at 1218.
Four factors suggested that the
ast-reinte
at issue in
Yahoo!
was penal rather than compensatory in . character. First, the word
astreinte
was consistently translated as “penalty.”
Id.
at 12Í9. Second, the sanctions were imposed for violations of the French Penal Code, “which declares it a ‘crime’ to exhibit or display Nazi emblems, and which prescribes a set of ‘criminal penalties,’ including fines.”
Id.
In other words, the penalty in
Yahoo!
was imposed for “a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community.”
Huntington,
146 U.S. at 668-69, 13 S.Ct. 224 (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2). Third, the penalties imposed by the French court were expressly intended to deter Yahoo! from creating a “threat to internal public order”—obviously, an issue of public interest affecting the whole community, not solely related to a private dispute.
Yahoo!,
433 F.3d at 1220. As we noted, such judgments “designed to deter conduct that constitutes a threat to the public order are typically penal in nature.”
Id.
Finally, the
astreinte
was payable to the government and not a private individual or group—further underscoring the public nature of award.
Id.
Here, in contrast, the
astreinte
was imposed in the context of a civil action for contravening an injunction against the use of copyrighted materials and was payable to the individual copyright holder.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
astreinte
awarded by the French
courts to de Fontbrune falls within the Uniform Recognition Act as a judgment that “[gjrants ... a sum of money.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1715(a)(1). In this case» the
astreinte
was not a “fine or other penalty” for purposes of the Act,
id.
§ 1715(b)(2), and accordingly the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.