1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 JANVIER VILLARS, 10 Case No. 25-cv-04239-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING OUTSTANDING 12 MOTIONS, DISMISSING CASE PAM BONDI, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 16 Pro se Plaintiff Janvier Villars continues to file motions and set hearings in contravention 17 of this Court’s rules. Since the Court most recently denied Plaintiff’s requested relief and 18 reminded him of the Civil Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff has filed 19 the following: a motion to issue summons against additional defendants, three further 20 “emergency” motions, a self-styled writ of scire facias, a motion for “constitutional default” 21 against the state of Florida, and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. These motions allege 22 fraud perpetrated by the entire executive and judicial branches, federal officers and employees, 23 and individuals associated with a condominium building located in Miami, Florida. Plaintiff has 24 inconsistently referenced statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1986, constitutional violations, 25 inapposite Supreme Court cases, and entirely unsupported accusations of tortious wrongdoing by 26 parties, not all of whom are named as defendants. Because Plaintiff has not followed the rules as 27 required for a party in this forum, his ability to file electronically is revoked. Additionally, 1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must include “a short and plain 2 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see 3 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (each allegation in a complaint “must be simple, concise, and direct”). 4 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 5 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 6 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content 7 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 8 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must 9 construe all allegations of material fact in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Marcus v. 10 Holder, 574 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court, however, is “not bound to accept as true 11 a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations 12 omitted). 13 A district court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and hold such pleadings “to less 14 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 15 520 (1972). However, pro se pleadings “must [still] meet some minimum threshold in providing a 16 defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 66 17 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]t is axiomatic that pro se litigants, whatever their ability level, 18 are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants.” Munoz v. United States, 28 19 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022). Rule 8(a) is one such requirement. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 20 338, 341–42 (9th Cir. 2010). 21 A court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land 22 Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361–62 (9th 23 Cir.1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 593 (1969)). 24 Such a dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief. See 25 Wong v. Bell at 362; see Hearns v. San Bernadino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 26 2008) (collecting cases where dismissal was warranted for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)). 27 Though there are a wide variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need 1 not exhaust them all before finally dismissing a case. Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 2 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). 3 Plaintiff was repeatedly informed of the deficiencies in his original complaint. See Dkt. 8, 4 Dkt. 14, Dkt. 20. His sixty-nine page complaint, accompanied by 574 supplementary pages, is 5 overlength, confusing, and entirely conclusory. To meet the baseline threshold for bringing a 6 complaint, such a filing must state a claim and establish federal jurisdiction over the matter. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s claims are almost entirely nonsensical and do not allege any facts in 7 support of claims against all named Defendants: Attorney General Pam Bondi, Senator Ashley 8 Moody, Former FBI Director Christopher Wray, FBI Director Kash Patel, and the Securities 9 Exchange Commission. 10 Plaintiff names further Defendants in the body of his complaint and his filings. To the 11 extent Plaintiff seeks to sue state and federal judges in Florida, this Court lacks subject matter 12 jurisdiction over these claims because these Defendants are immune from suit. See Mireles v. 13 Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 910 (1991) (federal judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for 14 damages for their judicial acts); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal 15 judges are also absolutely immune from claims for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief 16 arising from their judicial acts); see also Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 17 (explaining that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908) does not permit federal courts to issue 18 injunctions against state-court judges or clerks because “an injunction against a state court” or its 19 “machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.”). This immunity 20 “applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 21 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Federal court personnel also enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity where, 22 as here, the alleged wrongdoing stems from the performance of their official duties. See, e.g., 23 Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (court 24 clerks are entitled to absolute immunity); see also Whole Women’s Health, 595 U.S. at 39. 25 Plaintiff has not alleged acts or omissions by the judges or individual staff named herein 26 occurring outside of the performance of their official duties.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 JANVIER VILLARS, 10 Case No. 25-cv-04239-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING OUTSTANDING 12 MOTIONS, DISMISSING CASE PAM BONDI, et al., 13 Defendants. 14
15 16 Pro se Plaintiff Janvier Villars continues to file motions and set hearings in contravention 17 of this Court’s rules. Since the Court most recently denied Plaintiff’s requested relief and 18 reminded him of the Civil Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff has filed 19 the following: a motion to issue summons against additional defendants, three further 20 “emergency” motions, a self-styled writ of scire facias, a motion for “constitutional default” 21 against the state of Florida, and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. These motions allege 22 fraud perpetrated by the entire executive and judicial branches, federal officers and employees, 23 and individuals associated with a condominium building located in Miami, Florida. Plaintiff has 24 inconsistently referenced statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1986, constitutional violations, 25 inapposite Supreme Court cases, and entirely unsupported accusations of tortious wrongdoing by 26 parties, not all of whom are named as defendants. Because Plaintiff has not followed the rules as 27 required for a party in this forum, his ability to file electronically is revoked. Additionally, 1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must include “a short and plain 2 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see 3 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (each allegation in a complaint “must be simple, concise, and direct”). 4 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 5 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 6 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content 7 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 8 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must 9 construe all allegations of material fact in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Marcus v. 10 Holder, 574 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court, however, is “not bound to accept as true 11 a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations 12 omitted). 13 A district court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and hold such pleadings “to less 14 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 15 520 (1972). However, pro se pleadings “must [still] meet some minimum threshold in providing a 16 defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 66 17 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]t is axiomatic that pro se litigants, whatever their ability level, 18 are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants.” Munoz v. United States, 28 19 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022). Rule 8(a) is one such requirement. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 20 338, 341–42 (9th Cir. 2010). 21 A court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land 22 Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361–62 (9th 23 Cir.1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 593 (1969)). 24 Such a dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief. See 25 Wong v. Bell at 362; see Hearns v. San Bernadino Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 26 2008) (collecting cases where dismissal was warranted for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)). 27 Though there are a wide variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need 1 not exhaust them all before finally dismissing a case. Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 2 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). 3 Plaintiff was repeatedly informed of the deficiencies in his original complaint. See Dkt. 8, 4 Dkt. 14, Dkt. 20. His sixty-nine page complaint, accompanied by 574 supplementary pages, is 5 overlength, confusing, and entirely conclusory. To meet the baseline threshold for bringing a 6 complaint, such a filing must state a claim and establish federal jurisdiction over the matter. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s claims are almost entirely nonsensical and do not allege any facts in 7 support of claims against all named Defendants: Attorney General Pam Bondi, Senator Ashley 8 Moody, Former FBI Director Christopher Wray, FBI Director Kash Patel, and the Securities 9 Exchange Commission. 10 Plaintiff names further Defendants in the body of his complaint and his filings. To the 11 extent Plaintiff seeks to sue state and federal judges in Florida, this Court lacks subject matter 12 jurisdiction over these claims because these Defendants are immune from suit. See Mireles v. 13 Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 910 (1991) (federal judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for 14 damages for their judicial acts); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal 15 judges are also absolutely immune from claims for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief 16 arising from their judicial acts); see also Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 17 (explaining that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908) does not permit federal courts to issue 18 injunctions against state-court judges or clerks because “an injunction against a state court” or its 19 “machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.”). This immunity 20 “applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 21 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Federal court personnel also enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity where, 22 as here, the alleged wrongdoing stems from the performance of their official duties. See, e.g., 23 Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (court 24 clerks are entitled to absolute immunity); see also Whole Women’s Health, 595 U.S. at 39. 25 Plaintiff has not alleged acts or omissions by the judges or individual staff named herein 26 occurring outside of the performance of their official duties. See Moore, 96 F.3d at 1243 (judicial 27 immunity applies to any action taken by a judge in his or her judicial capacity). Therefore, these 1 claims, even assuming they are properly pled, offer no possibility of relief. 2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Accordingly, 3 this order does not address in detail the merits of Plaintiff's numerous outstanding motions, but 4 || notes all were deficient under relevant legal standards and filed in violation of various local and 5 federal rules of procedure. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(b) (abolishing the common law writ of 6 scire facias). 7 Should Plaintiff wish to file an amended complaint, he must do so within thirty days of this 8 order. Plaintiff should note any amended complaint must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure, including but not limited to those outlined above. 10 || ITISSO ORDERED. 11 = 12 || Dated: July 9, 2025 '
RICHARD SEEBORG 5 14 Chief United States District Judge 15
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT CASE No. 25-cv-04239-RS