Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Earthline Corporation, appeals from the order of the trial court which denied its “SUGGESTION OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL INJUNCTION,” filed pursuant to section 12 of the Injunction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 69, par. 12), and sustained the plaintiffs’ objections to defendant’s pleading.
A preliminary injunction was issued upon the complaint of the plaintiffs prohibiting defendant from storing chemical wastes at a landfill site situated in the Village of Wilsonville and adjacent thereto. On July 18, 1977, in an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (58 Ill. 2d R. 23), this court directed the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction which had been issued. In its suggestion of damages defendant alleged that it suffered *25,000 in damages as the result of the issuance of the preliminary injunction which had been vacated.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 101 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Immunity Act, shields them from the assessment of damages provided by section 12 of the Injunction Act. Defendant urges that the court erred in finding the plaintiffs immune from the sanctions provided in section 12. It also contends that the court erred in denying defendant’s motion which sought a change of venue for the hearing which it urges is mandated by section 12. On June 22, 1978, this court ordered that the issue concerning the change of venue be stricken from appeal because that issue was not yet appealable.
Section 12 of the Injunction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 69, par. 12) provides:
“In all cases where an injunction is dissolved by any court in this state, the court, after dissolving such injunction, and before finally disposing of the suit, upon the party claiming damages by reason of such injunction suggesting, in writing, the nature and amount thereof, shall hear evidence and assess such damages as the nature of the case may require, and to equity appertain, to the party damnified by such injunction, and may award execution to collect the same.
In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, the supreme court repudiated the judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 now provides:
“Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 13, §4.)
By its plain language, that constitution expressly does not undertake to forbid a legislative provision of nonliability for the State or its governmental subdivisions.
In 1965, the legislature adopted “An Act in relation to the tort immunity of local public entities and their employees * * e” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 101 et seq.). That statute adopts the following definitions:
‘Employee’ includes an officer, member of a board, commission or committee, servant or employee, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 202.
“ ‘Injury’ means death, injury to a person, or damage to or loss of property. It includes any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, reputation, character or estate which does not result from circumstances in which a privilege is otherwise conferred, hy law » 9 9 ” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 204.
“ ‘Local public entity’ includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, ” ° ” and all other local governmental bodies. * ° Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 206.
The Act also includes the following provisions creating a nonliability of the entities concerned:
“A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 109.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 201.
“A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, unless he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 208.
A local municipal entity acts by and through duly elected officers and the filing of the injunction proceeding was necessarily the product of the exercise of official discretion. As stated in County of Lake v. Cuneo (1951), 344 Ill. App. 242, 250, 100 N.E.2d 521, 525:
“The wrong in obtaining the invalid injunction was created and could only be created by an act of an agent or attorney for the county. It must be admitted that the obtaining of a preliminary injunction was within the scope of the governmental functions of the county.”
One finds no contention here that any officer or employee of the Village or County acted maliciously or without probable cause in instituting the injunction proceeding.
Parallel with and complementary to the cited provisions of chapter 85, is the statement in People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland (1977), 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149, that it is well established that a public officer is immune from personal liability for the good faith performance of discretionary duties or his judgment of the public need. (See also Fustin v. Board of Education (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308; Kelly v. Ogilvie (1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 144, 212 N.E.2d 279, affd (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 297, 220 N.E.2d 174.) It would be incongruous to charge the Village and County with a liability for the performance of a discretionary duty by its officers when its officers are granted immunity both by the provisions of section 2 — 109 of the Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 109), and by judicial determination.
Earthline cites certain cases as judicial precedent establishing plaintiffs’ liability under section 12 of the Injunction Act, including President & Trustees of Town of Tamaroa v. Trustees of Southern Illinois Normal University (1870), 54 Ill. 334; City of Princeton v. Gustavson (1909), 241 Ill. 566, 89 N.E. 653; People ex rel. Thrasher v. Eisenberg (1918), 212 Ill. App. 337; School Directors v.
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Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Earthline Corporation, appeals from the order of the trial court which denied its “SUGGESTION OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL INJUNCTION,” filed pursuant to section 12 of the Injunction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 69, par. 12), and sustained the plaintiffs’ objections to defendant’s pleading.
A preliminary injunction was issued upon the complaint of the plaintiffs prohibiting defendant from storing chemical wastes at a landfill site situated in the Village of Wilsonville and adjacent thereto. On July 18, 1977, in an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (58 Ill. 2d R. 23), this court directed the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction which had been issued. In its suggestion of damages defendant alleged that it suffered *25,000 in damages as the result of the issuance of the preliminary injunction which had been vacated.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 101 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Immunity Act, shields them from the assessment of damages provided by section 12 of the Injunction Act. Defendant urges that the court erred in finding the plaintiffs immune from the sanctions provided in section 12. It also contends that the court erred in denying defendant’s motion which sought a change of venue for the hearing which it urges is mandated by section 12. On June 22, 1978, this court ordered that the issue concerning the change of venue be stricken from appeal because that issue was not yet appealable.
Section 12 of the Injunction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 69, par. 12) provides:
“In all cases where an injunction is dissolved by any court in this state, the court, after dissolving such injunction, and before finally disposing of the suit, upon the party claiming damages by reason of such injunction suggesting, in writing, the nature and amount thereof, shall hear evidence and assess such damages as the nature of the case may require, and to equity appertain, to the party damnified by such injunction, and may award execution to collect the same.
In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, the supreme court repudiated the judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 now provides:
“Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 13, §4.)
By its plain language, that constitution expressly does not undertake to forbid a legislative provision of nonliability for the State or its governmental subdivisions.
In 1965, the legislature adopted “An Act in relation to the tort immunity of local public entities and their employees * * e” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 101 et seq.). That statute adopts the following definitions:
‘Employee’ includes an officer, member of a board, commission or committee, servant or employee, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 202.
“ ‘Injury’ means death, injury to a person, or damage to or loss of property. It includes any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, reputation, character or estate which does not result from circumstances in which a privilege is otherwise conferred, hy law » 9 9 ” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 204.
“ ‘Local public entity’ includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, ” ° ” and all other local governmental bodies. * ° Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 1 — 206.
The Act also includes the following provisions creating a nonliability of the entities concerned:
“A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 109.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 201.
“A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, unless he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 208.
A local municipal entity acts by and through duly elected officers and the filing of the injunction proceeding was necessarily the product of the exercise of official discretion. As stated in County of Lake v. Cuneo (1951), 344 Ill. App. 242, 250, 100 N.E.2d 521, 525:
“The wrong in obtaining the invalid injunction was created and could only be created by an act of an agent or attorney for the county. It must be admitted that the obtaining of a preliminary injunction was within the scope of the governmental functions of the county.”
One finds no contention here that any officer or employee of the Village or County acted maliciously or without probable cause in instituting the injunction proceeding.
Parallel with and complementary to the cited provisions of chapter 85, is the statement in People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland (1977), 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149, that it is well established that a public officer is immune from personal liability for the good faith performance of discretionary duties or his judgment of the public need. (See also Fustin v. Board of Education (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308; Kelly v. Ogilvie (1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 144, 212 N.E.2d 279, affd (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 297, 220 N.E.2d 174.) It would be incongruous to charge the Village and County with a liability for the performance of a discretionary duty by its officers when its officers are granted immunity both by the provisions of section 2 — 109 of the Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, par. 2 — 109), and by judicial determination.
Earthline cites certain cases as judicial precedent establishing plaintiffs’ liability under section 12 of the Injunction Act, including President & Trustees of Town of Tamaroa v. Trustees of Southern Illinois Normal University (1870), 54 Ill. 334; City of Princeton v. Gustavson (1909), 241 Ill. 566, 89 N.E. 653; People ex rel. Thrasher v. Eisenberg (1918), 212 Ill. App. 337; School Directors v. Mathis (1912), 168 Ill. App. 174; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago (1903), 110 Ill. App. 395; Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326, and Pechous v. Slawko (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 576, 357 N.E.2d 1144. We note that the opinion in Tamaroa antedates section 12 of the Injunction Act, and can hardly be said to illuminate any part of the issue. The opinion in City of Princeton did not concern a proceeding under section 12 of the Injunction Act, for evidence was heard upon the petition, answer, and replication. Eisenberg concerned a proceeding for injunction by a private citizen under the Public Nuisance Act. In Pechous v. Slawko, the action was between individuals who held municipal office and was not an action for or against the municipality. In Chicago Title & Trust, the opinion notes that the award of a $500 solicitor’s fee was not an issue on appeal. In Schuringa, the opinion concerned an action to enjoin the city and found no abuse of discretion in apportioning master’s fees upon a viable constitutional issue. None of the cases cited by Earthline provide persuasive reasoning in '■he interpretation of the several provisions of the immunity statute enacted in 1965.
Plaintiffs cite County of Lake v. Cuneo (1951), 344 Ill. App. 242, 100 N.E.2d 521. That court held that in as much as the County was created by the State for the administration of governmental affairs, there was immunity from liability arising under the provisions of section 12 of the Injunction Act. In that opinion the court used the language, “The wrong of obtaining an invalid injunction is in an action sounding in tort * 0 (344 Ill. App. 242, 250, 100 N.E.2d 521, 525.) In the light of the provisions of the statute, and particularly section 2 — 208 of the Immunity Act, it is not necessary to discuss this issue in the context of a tort. The Cuneo opinion, however, does demonstrate that the language of section 12 of the Injunction Act, “In all cases where an injunction * * *” has not in itself been deemed a complete barrier to the consideration of immunity of a local governmental entity. The absence of such barrier seems to be particularly apparent in the light of the fact that in 1965 the legislature enacted a comprehensive determination of nonliability in enacting the cited portions of the Immunity Act.
The members of the court have considered the possible application of the opinions in Williams v. City of Chicago (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 974, 370 N.E.2d 119, and City of Springfield v. Beck (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 784, 340 N.E.2d 350, where attorney’s fees were assessed as a sanction for failure to provide discovery as required by court rule, and as a sanction for filing untrue pleadings as provided in the Civil Practice Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 41.) In Williams, the opinion expressly notes that the defendant did not question the authority of the court to impose sanctions (54 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978, 370 N.E.2d 119, 122.) It is significantly apparent that in neither case was there the factor that the officials of local governmental entities were exercising their official discretion in instituting judicial proceedings. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 85, pars. 2 — 201, 2 — 208.
In the light of the plain language of the statutes relating to nonliability of municipal entities in the exercise of discretionary matters, including the institution of judicial proceedings, the order of the trial is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WEBBER, J., concurs.