OPINION
APODACA, Judge.
The parties’ respective motions for rehearing having been granted, and oral argument having been scheduled and heard, the opinion filed on May 11, 1993 is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted in its place.
These appeals arise from adoption proceedings involving three minor children. In a consolidated hearing, the children’s court heard two conflicting petitions for adoption. The children’s court granted the adoption petition of Judith and Robert Runyon (Runyons), but awarded visitation rights to Rita Vest (Vest), who was the other petitioner and the children’s former foster parent. In their consolidated appeal, the New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) and the Runyons (collectively referred to as HSD) raise the following issues: whether the children’s court had jurisdiction to (1) consider Vest’s petition for adoption or (2) grant visitation rights to Vest. Vest, in her appeal, raises the issues of whether (1) the children’s court had jurisdiction to grant the Runyons’ petition before HSD had formally terminated Vest’s foster-parent rights pursuant to statute, and (2) HSD and the children’s court denied her due process in rejecting her adoption petition. Although we hold that the children’s court had jurisdiction to consider Vest’s petition and we therefore reject HSD’s and the Runyons’ challenge to the award of visitation rights to Vest on that basis, we hold that, on the record before us, the grant of visitation rights to Vest was not supported by sufficient evidence. We also hold that Vest was not denied due process and that the children’s court properly granted the Runyons’ adoption petition. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
HSD has had legal custody of the three children, Francisco A., Luis H., and Augustine V., since May 1985. Beginning at about that time, Vest and her spouse were the children’s foster parents. In 1986, the Vests expressed an interest in adopting the children and began the necessary adoption procedure. An August 1986 report on the Vests’ suitability as adoptive parents was favorable. However, HSD was unable to terminate the biological parents’ rights until April 1988. Vest’s spouse had died in March 1988, but Vest carried on the adoption proceedings in her own behalf. She also continued as the children’s sole foster parent until December 1988, when HSD removed them from her home and placed them with the Runyons.
Before HSD removed the children from Vest’s home, she filed an appeal with HSD challenging its decision to remove the children. She also sought review of HSD’s determination not to proceed with her adoption of the children. Although HSD did not hold a hearing before removing the children, in June 1989 the agency affirmed its decision to remove the children and to deny Vest’s adoption petition. Immediately afterwards, the Runyons filed a petition for adoption of the children in Sandoval County. Vest answered and HSD entered an appearance. The court allowed HSD to intervene and transferred the matter to the children’s court in Santa Fe County. Meanwhile, Vest filed an action in Rio Arriba County requesting the children’s court to review HSD’s decision to deny her request to adopt the children. She also filed her own adoption petition in Rio Arriba County. The Runyons answered this petition. In December 1989 the parties filed a stipulated motion to consolidate these proceedings in Santa Fe County.
The court hearing commenced in October 1990. After the parties presented their cases, the children’s court interviewed the children in camera. They expressed their desire to stay with the Runyons but also to visit with Vest. The court issued its intended decision in January 1991, but the parties filed pleadings contesting the decision. Final judgment was entered in July 1991.
In its decision and judgment, the children’s court granted the Runyons’ adoption petition. The court denied Vest’s petition to adopt the children, but awarded her visitation rights. HSD appeals this decision, arguing that the children’s court had no jurisdiction to consider Vest’s petition or to award her visitation rights. Vest cross-appeals, arguing that the children’s court had no jurisdiction to grant the Runyons’ petition before HSD formally terminated Vest’s foster-parent rights under the pertinent statute. She also argues that HSD and the children’s court denied her due process in rejecting her petition for adoption.
HSD’S APPEAL
A. Jurisdiction.
In arguing that the children’s court had no jurisdiction to consider Vest’s adoption petition, HSD relies on NMSA 1978, Section 40-7-34(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989). This statute provides that, except for certain circumstances that do not apply here, the court may award adoption only to a petitioner or petitioners with whom HSD or another licensed adoption agency has placed the children. Id. HSD argues that, because the agency placed the children with the Runyons, the court had only two options, either to deny or to grant the Runyons’ adoption petition. Id.; see also NMSA 1978, § 40-7-30(N) (Repl.Pamp.1989) (defining placement as the process of selecting potential parents and physically transferring adoptee children to the potential parents).
In response, Vest contends that this jurisdictional argument is moot. She also argues that, while Section 40-7-34(A) dictates to whom the court may award adoption, nothing in that section dictates who may file a petition. HSD’s reading of the statute, Vest claims, effectively means that HSD has absolute power over who may adopt children by having the power to place them with families. Finally, Vest argues that, no matter what the statutes provide, HSD’s decision to prefer the Runyons as adoptive parents is reviewable for constitutional infirmity.
We agree that there is nothing in Section 40-7-34(A) suggesting a limitation on the children’s court’s jurisdiction. Section 40-7-34(A) is merely a statute that limits the court’s power to grant a petition for adoption. If a party cannot prove the facts necessary, then the statute is of no value to that party. Specifically, unless Vest could plead and prove that HSD placed the children with her for adoption, she was not entitled to the right of adoption Section 40-7-34(A) provides. We need not determine whether the children were placed with Vest for adoption because Vest concedes that she could not have established placement for purposes of Section 40-7-34(A). Nevertheless, HSD’s characterization of the children’s court’s consideration of Vest’s petition as beyond the court’s jurisdiction is without merit. See Sundance Mechanical & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 109 N.M. 683, 687, 789 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1990). Vest merely failed to state a claim for adoption for which the court could grant relief. See SCRA 1986, 1-012(B)(6) (Repl.1992). Thus, the children’s court had jurisdiction to consider the petition, even though the petition was dismissible on the merits.
B. Visitation.
In support of its contention that Vest should not have visitation rights, HSD focuses on the policy that adoption starts a family anew with all the rights and responsibilities of a biological family. See In re Estate of Holt, 95 N.M. 412, 622 P.2d 1032 (1981). The Runyons’ adoption of the three children created a new family. Thus, HSD argues, that family should have all the rights of any other family, including the right to determine who should and should not see the family’s children regardless of claimed psychological ties with the children. Vest argues that the adoption statutes grant courts an inherent equitable power to award visitation, based on the statutory policy of protecting the best interests of adopted children.
A review of the case law on adoption, custody, and visitation rights reveals eases that assist in disposing of the issue before us, although there appears to be little uniformity in the case law and there is support for both parties’ positions. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by Natural Parent, 78 AL.R. 4th 218 (1990); Annotation, Visitation Rights of Persons Other Than Natural Parents or Grandparents, 1 A.L.R. 4th 1270 (1980). There are various arguments against allowing third-party visitation following a child’s adoption. Many courts have reasoned that adoption severs the ties of old relationships and granting visitation to third parties or enforcing such agreements would interfere with the new family. See, e.g., Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So.2d 780 (Ala.1983); In re Adoption of Hammer, 15 Ariz.App. 196, 487 P.2d 417 (1971); Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302 (1978); Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974). Some courts have not allowed such visitation because they considered it against public policy, see Hill v. Moorman, 525 So.2d 681 (La.Ct.App.1988), or because it would deter adoptions, see People ex rel. Levine v. Rado, 54 Misc.2d 843, 283 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup.Ct.1967).
However, it appears the trend has been to consider or allow visitation to other persons who have been important to a child in a variety of situations, if visitation would be in the best interests of the child. For example, the right of stepparents who are neither biologically nor legally related to their stepchildren to seek visitation with the children upon divorce from the children’s natural parents has been recognized. See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982); Bryan v. Bryan, 132 Ariz. 353, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ct.App.1982); Wills v. Wills, 399 So.2d 1130 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.1979); Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487 (Okla.Ct.App.1978); Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa.Super. 168, 378 A2d 879 (1977); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). Some courts have allowed grandparents to obtain visitation rights with their grandchildren following the children’s adoption by stepparents. See, e.g., Reeves v. Bailey, 53 Cal.App.3d 1019, 126 Cal.Rptr. 51 (1975); Lingwall v. Hoener, 124 Ill.App.3d 986, 80 Ill.Dec. 265, 464 N.E.2d 1248 (1984), aff'd, 108 Ill.2d 206, 91 Ill.Dec. 166, 483 N.E.2d 512 (1985); Layton v. Foster, 61 N.Y.2d 747, 472 N.Y.S.2d 916, 460 N.E.2d 1351 (1984). Nevada has held that it is within a trial court’s equitable powers to grant an adoption decree conditioned on a stepgrandparent’s right to seek visitation following the child’s adoption by third parties. Morse v. Daly, 101 Nev. 320, 704 P.2d 1087 (1985).
When granting custody to a natural parent, some courts, having rejected the argument that the court may grant visitation rights only to persons specifically authorized by law to receive them, have granted visitation rights to nonparents. See Rogers v. Trent, 594 A.2d 32 (Del.1991); Recknagel v. Roberts, 465 So.2d 844 (La.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 468 So.2d 570, and cert. denied, 468 So.2d 579 (La.1985); Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 488 A2d 157 (1985); Seger v. Seger, 377 Pa.Super. 391, 547 A2d 424 (1988); In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis.2d 375, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987). Some courts have recognized that, in certain circumstances, it may be in the child’s best interests to continue contact with his or her former family and have accordingly held that it is not against public policy to enforce agreements for post-adoption visitation rights even when the child was adopted by persons other than biological relatives or stepparents. See Michaud v. Wawruck, 209 Conn. 407, 551 A.2d 738 (1988). Massachusetts has recognized that, where parental rights are terminated without the parents’ consent, lower courts could permit post-adoption visitation by the natural parents if it was in the child’s best interests. See In re Petition ofDep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 467 N.E.2d 861, 866 (1984).
In New Mexico, there is a strong tradition of protecting a child’s best interests in a variety of circumstances. For example, this court has ruled that, if custody with someone whose sexual orientation may not meet with mainstream approval serves a child’s best interest, then awarding that person custody of the child is appropriate. In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 772, 764 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Ct.App.1988). We have ruled similarly when custody was awarded to a mother who had remarried in a manner that violated the public policy of New Mexico. Leszinske v. Poole, 110 N.M. 663, 666-67, 798 P.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Ct.App.) (affirming award of custody to mother who married her maternal uncle), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 533, 797 P.2d 983 (1990). Even when the custodial parent did not reside with the child, we have affirmed a children’s court ruling that granted that parent physical custody. See Brito v. Brito, 110 N.M. 276, 794 P.2d 1205 (Ct.App.1990) (affirming grant of custody to father although child resided with aunt). We have been no less cognizant of the overriding nature of children’s best interests when visitation in the context of lifestyles that do not meet with mainstream approval was the issue. See AC. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 829 P.2d 660 (Ct.App.) (agreement that psychological parent has a right to visit with child of biological parent not repugnant to public policy even though parents were formerly in a sexually nontraditional relationship), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 449, 827 P.2d 837 (1992).
Additionally, in Christian Placement Service, New Mexico Christian Children’s Home v. Gordon, 102 N.M. 465, 697 P.2d 148 (Ct.App.1985), a case with circumstances analogous to this one, we held that the lower court properly denied a grandparent intervention as of right and permissive intervention in an adoption proceeding. She relied solely upon her status as biological grandmother to the child to demonstrate a tie to the child. We stated that this was insufficient for intervention, but recognized nonetheless that “[t]here are situations where it might be in the best interests of the child to allow intervention.” Id. at 472, 697 P.2d at 155. The grandmother in that case sought intervention to obtain custody of the child. That intervention was as intrusive on the adoption process as Vest’s efforts to seek adoption or visitation rights. Gordon implies that the best interests of the child would have prevailed and the grandmother would have been allowed to intervene had there been facts to support her position.
“The courts [in New Mexico] have consistently recognized that the state is parens patriae and the child’s welfare and best interests are the paramount consideration for the court in custody cases.” Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 111 N.M. 319, 325, 805 P.2d 88, 94 (Ct.App.1990). In that case, we recognized that, in certain situations, it may be in the child’s best interest to allow visitation by a stepparent who had not adopted the child following divorce from the child’s natural parent. Id. at 325, 805 P.2d at 94. As Vest points out, the adoption itself must be in the child’s best interests. See NMSA 1978, § 40-7-51(0) (Repl.Pamp.1989).
Additionally, this Court has recognized that, when dealing with children, the district court is exercising its equitable powers. See In re Guardianship Petition of Lupe C., 112 N.M. 116, 119, 812 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct.App.1991) (stating that “our supreme court has held that the district court sitting as a court of equity has inherent power concerning issues of custody of minors,” and citing In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943)); In re Adoption of Doe, 101 N.M. 34, 37, 677 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 11, 677 P.2d 624 (1984) (although adoption is a special statutory proceeding, trial court retains some equitable powers); see also 4 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 1305 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) [Pomeroy]. The touchstone of equity is that it is flexible; “ ‘the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties.’ ” Navajo Academy, Inc. v. Navajo United Methodist Mission Sch., Inc., 109 N.M. 324, 329, 785 P.2d 235, 240 (1990) (quoting 1 Pomeroy § 109).
“[T]he comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. ‘The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.’ Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 [9 L.Ed. 508].”
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1804, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 1089, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946)).
The Adoption Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-7-29 to -65 (Repl.Pamp.1989), neither specifically authorizes nor specifically forbids an adoption decree incorporating visitation rights for nonrelatives. Section 40-7-52 does not limit the children’s court’s authority to fashion a decree that is in the child’s best interests and that includes, if appropriate, visitation rights for third parties with whom the child has close ties. The primary purpose of that statute is to ensure that adopted children can inherit from their adoptive parents. See Hahn v. Sorgen, 50 N.M. 83, 171 P.2d 308 (1946) (discussing legislative history of predecessor to Section 40-7-52). The Adoption Act also does not contain a statement of factors that should be considered when determining the best interests of a child. However, NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989), directs a court, when determining custody of a child, to consider all relevant factors, including the child’s wishes and the child’s relationship with “any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.” Section 40-4-9(A)(3). There is no reason why a court may not consider similar factors when fashioning an adoption decree.
As one court has pointed out:
Traditional models of the nuclear family have come, in recent years, to be replaced by various configurations of parents, stepparents, adoptive parents and grandparents. We are not prepared to assume that the welfare of children is best served by a narrow definition of those whom we permit to continue to manifest their deep concern for a child’s growth and development.
Michaud, 551 A2d at 742 (citations omitted). For this reason, it is important for the children’s court to maintain maximum flexibility in fashioning a decree that is in the child’s best interests so that the child may maintain contact with other persons who have filled a parental role in his or her life. See Looper, 581 P.2d at 488-89; Seger, 547 A2d at 427; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed 70 Va.L.Rev. 879, 902-11 (1984).
Although granting visitation to a nonparent does affect a parent’s custody rights, this is not sufficient reason to apply a blanket rule against such decrees. It is well established in New Mexico that parents do not have absolute rights in their children; rather, parental rights are secondary to the best interests and welfare of the children. In re Samantha D., 106 N.M. 184, 186, 740 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Ct.App.1987). As one court has stated regarding visitation, “[t]his flexible device, when properly utilized within an adoption decree, not only can promote the best interests of the child but need not unduly impinge on the adoptive parents.” Morse, 704 P.2d at 1091. If at some time the visitation is no longer in the child’s best interests, the court may reconsider it. See Rhinehart, 111 N.M. at 329, 805 P.2d at 98; Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md.App. 252, 466 A2d 1301, 1306 (1983). However, because granting visitation rights does infringe on a parent’s custody, it is appropriate to limit this decision to situations such as this where the party seeking visitation has acted in a custodial or parental capacity. See, e.g., Carter, 644 P.2d at 855 n. 5; Collins, 403 N.E.2d at 923-24. This will prevent visitation rights being granted to any person who happens to feel affection for a child.
In this case, the children’s court believed that the Runyons, as well as Vest, would be fit parents. The difficulty, of course, was that the court could not award adoption to all three petitioners. Thus, the court did what it could to serve the children’s best interests in considering their stated desire to spend time with Vest.1 However, as the parties agreed at oral argument, the only evidence supporting the visitation order was the children’s preference. There is a much wider array of considerations the trial court must undertake in considering the grant of visitation rights. For example, the children’s court must carefully consider how visitation will affect the adoption. See generally People ex rel. Wilder v. Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children, 93 Misc.2d 617, 403 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (Sup.Ct.1978) (visitation denied because it would subject child to ongoing bitter dispute between party seeking visitation and adoptive parents); Reeves, 126 CaLRptr. at 56 (visitation allowed because party seeking visitation would not disrupt the adoptive child’s new family relations).
When the issue of visitation in connection with an adoption confronts a children’s court, the court should undertake a careful study of all the parties involved and all the relevant circumstances. Vest stressed at oral argument that she tried to persuade the children’s court to appoint an expert for a comparative study, but, although expert insight into the issue of visitation may be valuable, expert evidence on a visitation issue is not required. Cf. NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-5-3(I) & 32A-5-14 (Repl.Pamp.1993) (requiring that adoption pre-placement study be done by investigator “certified” to conduct such studies). It is evident that the children’s court consideration of the children’s wishes alone was the result of a misunderstanding of the necessary scope of the inquiry. For this reason, I agree that, on this record, insufficient evidence supports the award of visitation to Vest, and we must reverse.2
VEST’S CROSS-APPEAL
A. Failure to Properly Terminate Foster-Parent Rights.
Initially, Vest argues that she had a constitutional or statutory expectation of continued foster care of the children. In this connection, she contends that HSD agreed to give her a hearing before taking the children away from her and that the law must recognize this expectation interest and protect it by not allowing other parties to adopt the children before the foster-parent relationship has been formally terminated. We assume for the sake of discussion that this expectation interest is legally significant. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2111, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (assuming without deciding that foster parents have liberty interest in continued relations with foster children). From our reading of Vest’s briefs, we view her argument to be that the hearing HSD provided (on the decision to remove the children) was inadequate and not timely.
First, we find nothing in the brief in chief or reply brief on cross-appeal that directly supports the argument that HSD had to formally terminate Vest’s rights as a foster parent before placing the children with other potential adoptive parents. Because Vest cites no authority, we assume there is none. See In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984).
Second, regarding the allegation that HSD agreed to provide Vest with a hearing before removal of the children, prior to briefing nothing in the record supported the claim. By motion, Vest requested that we permit her to supplement the record with copies of the foster-care agreements that apparently were exhibits below. She filed the motion after HSD filed its answer brief on cross-appeal, much later than the time allowed under SCRA 1986, 12-212(A) (Repl.1992). But see SCRA 12-212(C) (allowing appellate court on motion of party and for good cause shown to order that additional exhibits be forwarded to appellate court). Vest contends that she did not designate the exhibit for appeal out of concerns for judicial economy. HSD responds that this is an attempt to excuse Vest’s failure to assure a proper record for review. We agree that Vest’s efforts are very late, but nevertheless we are confronted in this appeal with the question of what is in the best interests of the children. We assess those interests to be weightier than the minimal loss of judicial efficiency that allowing consideration of the exhibits might cause. Having concluded that there is “good cause” to order inclusion of the exhibits into the record, we granted Vest’s motion and directed that the exhibits be forwarded to this Court.
Having now reviewed these exhibits, we determine that they do indeed reveal that HSD was to provide a pre-termination hearing to Vest if she requested one. Vest did request such a hearing, and HSD did apparently review its decision, although not until after the children were removed from Vest’s home. Nonetheless, even if the late review prejudiced Vest’s opportunity to adopt the children by allowing them to bond with the Runyons, we do not see how HSD’s failure to provide an adequate hearing compelled the children’s court to deny the Runyon’s petition and grant Vest’s. Although HSD’s failure to give Vest a timely hearing is a factor the children’s court could consider in determining whether to grant or deny the competing adoption petitions, the overriding goal of the children’s court was to determine whether the adoption was in the best interests of the children, see § 40-7-51(A)(7), not to correct HSD’s mistakes. We thus decline to reverse the children’s court’s decision granting the Runyons’ adoption petition on this basis.
B. Denial of Due Process by HSD.
Vest argues that HSD denied her due process by failing to conduct the necessary studies of her suitability as an adoptive parent. Because of this failure, she argues, she never had an equal chance at being the adoptive parent. HSD counters, however, that the home study the statutes require is not HSD’s responsibility, but rather the petitioner’s responsibility. See §§ 40-7-40, -42(M), -46. We find no request for a home study by Vest in the record. Thus, there are no facts to support the argument that HSD denied Vest her right to a suitability study.
C. Denial of Due Process by the Children’s Court.
Vest also argues the children’s court denied her due process by not hearing the adoption petition until well after the children had time to bond with the Runyons. But for this bonding, she claims, the clear choice for the children’s best interests would have been her adoption of them.
We will assume for the sake of argument that unreasonable delays in deciding an adoption petition could amount to a due process violation. Again, however, Vest cites no authority to support the notion that the children’s court violated any time limitations. She refers to a sixty-day period after the child’s placement within which a party must file a petition for adoption. See § 40-7-41. It appears, however, that Vest failed to raise in the children’s court any contention that the petition for adoption was untimely. Therefore, we will not consider this argument. See SCRA 1986, 12-216(A) (Repl.1992). The remainder of the delays noted by Vest also do not suggest a violation of her rights. Some of the delay in bringing this case to final judgment was not attributable to the children’s court or to the Runyons. Through misfortune, Vest was unable to testify on the date of the hearing. It took time for the court to meet with the children. There were also motions and discovery that preceded the hearing date, a reasonable expectation in a strongly contested case. After considering the record, we can discern no unreasonable delay in the court’s reaching a difficult decision. If Vest had a due process right to a judgment on her adoption petition within a reasonable period of time, the children’s court did not violate that right.
D. Failure to Comply with Section 40-7-34.
Vest contends that the children’s court lacked jurisdiction to grant the adoption because the requirements of Section 40-7-34 were not met. That section requires that an adoption petition not be granted unless the adoptee has been placed for the purpose of adoption in the home of the proposed adopting parents by HSD. That requirement was met in this case. The section also requires that an affidavit setting forth certain facts be filed with the petition. In this case, those facts were set forth in the petition itself, and the petition was verified by the Runyons. This constituted compliance with the statute. We therefore reject Vest’s contentions predicated on Section 40-7-34.
CONCLUSION
Because we hold that the children’s court had jurisdiction to consider Vest’s adoption petition, we reject HSD’s challenge to the award of visitation rights to Vest on that basis. However, because the award of visitation rights was based solely on the children’s preference, we determine that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the grant of visitation rights, and the children’s court’s order must therefore be reversed. We also conclude that Vest was not denied due process by either HSD or the children’s court. We thus affirm the children’s court’s decision granting the Runyons’ adoption petition but reverse that part of the order granting visitation rights to Vest. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. See SCRA 1986, 12-403(A) (Repl.1992).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
MINZNER, C.J., and HARTZ, J., specially concur.