PER CURIAM:
Like others1 before him who have presented an issue as to obvious[139]*139ness in patent litigation, Charvat has here contended that there was error in the rejection of his application Serial No. 304002 for a grinding wheel. The Patent Office and the District Court concluded that Charvat’s Ramron wheel would have been obvious to one possessed if ordinary skill in the art in light of a single reference, that of Toc-ci-Guilbert who already possessed U.S. Patent No. 3,252,775 covering a polishing wheel. Protracted exchanges of views among the members of this sitting division only have emphasized that what is “obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in every given factual context.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 694, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). The difficulties in these situations must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Id., 18, 86 S.Ct. 684.
The Court in John Deere recognized that there is a notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the court, adding: “While many reasons can be adduced to explain the discrepancy, one may well be the free rein often exercised by Examiners in their use of the concept of ‘invention.’ ” Id. And see Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 488-489, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 1889, 40 L.Ed.2d 315 (May 13, 1974).
In the instant situation, the tribunals of the Patent Office were well aware that the prior art included various means for the production of grinding wheels but nevertheless allowed the Toc-ci-Guilbert patent expressly designed by the patentee for use in the polishing art. The District Court, for its part, seems to have misconstrued the degree of difference between Charvat and all prior art and quite clearly to have ignored factors established at trial through un-contradicted evidence which had not been before the Patent Office.
In this state of the record, we should note at once that Charvat already had been granted a patent on the process for the construction of his Ramron wheel. In determining how to approach the present issue, arising under 35 U.S.C. § 103, concerning his product claims, we turn again to John Deere, supra, where, at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. at 694, we are instructed :
[T]he scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonob-viousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.2
We will hereinafter discuss in detail the processes and the structures involved, having in mind particularly the differences between Charvat’s disclosures and those apparent from the Toc-ci-Guilbert patent, the only reference cited by the Patent Office as defining the prior art. What emerges here is a combination of disparate elements already known to the art. From Tocci-Guilbert, Charvat could perceive the use of plastic resins and the notion of foaming to achieve uniform dispersal of the abrasive. Then came his centrifuging, entirely lacking in Tocci-Guilbert. From the prior art of grinding wheels, he could have taken the idea of clustering the grains at the perimeter of the wheel. His combination was not at all [140]*140made obvious by the prior art. Not only had Tocci-Guilbert never claimed a wheel such as Ramron, he purposefully sought to disclose a polishing wheel. Charvat on the contrary combined his centrifuging process with all other elements so as to set a novel grain configuration which produced his grinding wheel far superior to any known.
To the foregoing general observations as to just what is involved, we may add one additional criterion. The Court has emphasized that while the claims of a patent limit the invention and specifications are not to be utilized to expand the patent monopoly, “it is fundamental that claims are to be construed in light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention”. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49, 86 S.Ct. 708, 713, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966). (Citations omitted) (Emphasis added). Put another way, the Court’s discussion does not forfend against our narrowing the extent of patentability. Here the prior art disclosed other grinding wheels. Tocci-Guilbert disclosed the process and the structure of polishing wheels. Even though such elements were well known in the prior art, Charvat, like Adams, has presented us with a new combination which is entitled to recognition. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court,' surely has authorized us to take the approach to be developed in light of the record before us. He made it clear that “known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in determining obviousness”. United States v. Adams, id. at 52, 86 S.Ct. at 714.
After extensive consideration of all aspects of this case as to the facts and applicable legal principles, we conclude with “thorough conviction” that we must reverse the District Court. “Processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of matter and improvements thereof, which meet the tests of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness are entitled to be patented . . . ”. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 1887, 40 L.Ed.2d 315 (Sl. Op. 12, May 13, 1974). We are satisfied further that Charvat has complied with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, and hence is entitled to a patent on his Ramron grinding wheel.
I.
THE NON-OBVIOUS NATURE OF APPELLANT’S CLAIMS
It is fundamental that an applicant may not be entitled to a patent if his claims are so similar to the prior art that they would be “obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art”. 35 U.S.C. § 103. It does not follow that the mere existence of the basic teachings in the prior art will render obvious a new claim combining such teachings. Courts have long since held that even if all of the elements
used are old, a new result, an unexpected result, a far more efficient result, or a more economical result will satisfy the requirements of patenta-bility.3
Thus, in Blaw-Knox Co. v. I. D. Lain Co.4 the court validated a patent consisting solely of elements old in the art because the patentee had solved a problem that previously had inhibited use of the particular product.5
A claim that combines prior art elements can embody sufficient invention to be patentable, if the claimed invention represents “progress” from the [141]*141prior art.6 Clearly, we must, in every such case, undertake a careful inquiry as to whether or not such combination patents should be allowed. We are quite aware, as previously noted, of the factors involved and the steps to be taken in achieving our determination of whether the claim is obvious and non-patentable,7 or non-obvious when measured in terms of ordinary skill in the art. Thus it is the Supreme Court has indicated the availability of secondary tests which appropriately may govern disposition of close cases.8 These tests include whether the claimed invention has enjoyed commercial success or satisfies a long felt commercial need. As we have found in the past, these secondary tests can be quite helpful:
Evidence of a long standing need tends to indicate nonobviousness, because otherwise the need would not have persisted in the face of efforts directed toward solution. Potential commercial success, it is inferred, would probably have induced innovators to make such efforts. Evidence that the applicant’s device has had commercial success tends to indicate that the other efforts were unsuccessful. Taken together, the evidence of a need and of success where others had tried and failed tends to show that the successful solution was not obvious.9
A. Appellant’s Claimed Invention
Let us first describe what occurs in the production of a Ramron wheel and then pass to other aspects to be considered here.
Appellant’s claimed invention is a uniquely structured abrasive wheel designed for use in high-speed grinding. As stated in the Charvat application,
[a] grinding wheel, in contrast to a polishing or finishing wheel, is capable of making a cut of substantial depth in a workpiece which may be of cast iron or steel . . .10
Abrasive wheels, such as Charvat envisions, consist of small abrasive grains bound together by a resin of some description. There exist a large variety of both grains and resins, and different wheels will employ these in varying proportions and conformations according to the needs of the user. Appellant claims a wheel in which the abrasive material is bound together by a rigid, but non-brittle polyurethane resin, and in which the abrasive grains are spaced slightly apart from each other.11
[142]*142Appellant’s wheel structure is formed by mixing the abrasive material with the resin in a wheel-shaped mold. Once these constituents are mixed, Charvat calls for centrifuging the combined resin and abrasive, a step never mentioned or even suggested by Tocci-Guilbert. The centrifuging procedure forces the abrasive grains to pack against the outer surface of the mold. Ultimately the grains are left in a tight configuration, with a small amount of resin in the interstices of the grains. Next, there is a brief period in which the resin “foams”, spreading the grains slightly apart. When the grains have spread approximately “one grain diameter” apart, the foaming is interrupted and the mixture is gelled. Gellation locks the grains in place in the tiny “sockets” formed by the polyurethane resin that fills the grainwide interstices of the abrasive grit.
As a result of the use of a stiff plastic resin, and of the slight spreading of the abrasive grains, appellant claims a wheel which is essentially rigid. Its individual abrasive grains are exposed at the working face of the tool and are slightly spaced apart and capable of individual adjustment relative to each other. They retain their position in the binder and can accept the high pressures imposed on the individual exposed grains.12
So structured, this wheel appears to have two qualities that make it unique among grinding wheels. First, the wheel is quite strong. This allows use of the wheel on high horsepower grinding machines on which the wheel turns at very high speeds. Indeed, it appears that Charvat’s “Ramron” wheel can safely be run at high speeds up to nearly twice the surface feet per minute of conventional grinding wheels.13 A second unique quality of appellant’s wheel is its homogeneity. That is, the abrasive grains are evenly spaced and dispersed, leaving no clusters of grains or, conversely, pockets of bond.
These two unique qualities are of great significance in the grinding art. As one expert witness testified at trial, increased speed of operation has three consequences: (1) productivity increases in direct proportion to increases in speed; (2) it reduces costs because there is less use of individual abrasive grains; (3) it imparts a greater surface integrity to the workpiece. The same witness testified that Ramron’s homogeneity gives it greater strength and also reduces metallurgical damage to the workpiece.
B. The Prior Art
There are two components of the prior art, although the Patent Office relied upon only one of these in rejecting appellant’s claims. The first component consists of abrasive wheels used for removal of stock from workpieces, i. e., grinding wheels. Typically, such wheels consist of concentrated abrasive material held together by rigid binders. In these wheels the abrasive grains touch each other, and are unevenly dispersed. Accordingly the wheels are quite brittle, and must be used at relatively low speeds or they will break in service. Moreover, prior art grinding wheels [143]*143wear quickly, and unevenly. The latter characteristic can produce both metallurgical — and geometrical — damage to a workpiece, leaving uneven cuts on the workpiece or corrugating the surface. Expert testimony at trial indicated that all prior art grinding wheels share these characteristics.
The second discernible component of the prior art is the Tocci-Guilbert patent, the sole reference upon which the Patent Office based its rejection of appellant’s claims. In contrast to grinding wheels, Tocci-Guilbert teaches an abrading wheel constructed “for the particular operations ... of graining, re-graining, buffing, polishing, and burnishing.” 14
Tocci-Guilbert even stresses, as advantages contemplated in comparison with others, that the Tocci-Guilbert polishing wheels remove a very small amount of stock from the workpiece, and are intended principally to put a finish on a workpiece. Indeed, Tocci-Guilbert expressly disclaims any stock removal, and cites lack of stock removal as a major improvement of his own wheel over prior art polishing wheels. Further, Tocci-Guilbert expressly states that one of the principal objectives of his wheel is to provide polishing wheels
of such character [as] will accomplish their intended purpose with a minimum of surface marking on the working surface in the form of scratches, marks, grooves, etc.
. Patent, Column 3, Lines 6-9. Thus, Tocci-Guilbert contemplates only a “yieldable and resilient” wheel, which can “flow over irregular shapes” while maintaining the “necessary ‘hardness’ of the exterior abrading surface” to accomplish the required abrading tasks “with relatively light pressure”. To be sure, Tocci-Guilbert teaches wheels of relatively high abrasive content, but the most demanding intended objective of his wheels appears to be “surfacing flat or irregular surfaces.” At no place in his patent does Tocci-Guilbert expressly or impliedly claim a grinding wheel; rather, as shown, he expressly disavows any stock removal purpose.
The Tocci-Guilbert patent calls for a process in which abrasive material is mixed with a plastic resin so as to obtain a relatively uniform dispersal of the grains throughout all the resin. Following this initial dispersal, the process calls for a controlled “foaming” of the resin further to disperse the abrasive grains.
The uniform dispersal of the grains gives structure to the soft resins employed by Tocci-Guilbert, and helps to produce the “essentially rigid” wheel which apparently eluded his predecessors. But, because the grains are widely spaced and therefore are capable of substantial retractile movement, the wheel can accomplish sufficient deformation to achieve the various polishing objectives claimed in the patent.
The prior art, as to conventional grinding wheels as well as to Tocci-Guil-bert, contains all the teaching needed merely to produce another wheel. From the prior art grinding wheel come the lessons of tightly packed abrasive grains, and of centrifuging to achieve high pack density. From the prior art of polishing wheels — Tocci-Guilbert— come the lessons of using plastic resins and of foaming those resins to produce uniform dispersal of the abrasive material. We posit that much before undertaking further consideration of Char-vat’s Ramron.
C. Differences in the Claimed Invention and the Prior Art
We have explored the nature of the claimed invention and of the prior art. We must now examine the differences between them. Although we referred to prior art grinding wheels for background information, we are here concerned only with the Tocci-Guilbert ref[144]*144erence. The essential difference between Tocci-Guilbert’s wheel and appellant’s claimed invention arises from the different objectives of each inventor. As discussed above, Tocci-Guilbert wishes to produce only a polishing wheel, whereas appellant’s aim was to produce a wheel for high speed grinding. Accordingly, and quite contrary to Char-vat’s concept, Tocci-Guilbert disclosed a wheel in which the abrasive' grains had to be widely and uniformly dispersed throughout the resin structure. Char-vat, on the other hand, as his claims and specifications reveal, envisioned a wheel in which the abrasive grains are deliberately concentrated at the edges .of the wheel-, indeed, Tocci-Guilbert’s polishing wheel is different even from all prior-art grinding wheels. The latter, with their concentration of abrasive grains at the outer edges of the wheel, nevertheless lacked the foaming disclosed by Charvat and so failed to achieve, first the compacting and then the separation of, the abrasive particles which had been elements of Charvat’s process patent.
The Patent Office at trial argued that Tocci-Guilbert teaches a high concentration of abrasive grains (up to 85% of the wheel’s components), but that position avails nothing in the circumstances here. As testimony at trial showed even if the wheel were made with stiff plastic resin — although Tocci-Guilbert teaches softer resins — a high abrasive content wheel constructed according to Tocci-Guilbert would be an ineffective grinding tool, whether compared to conventional prior art wheels, or to appellant’s wheel. Tocci-Guilbert’s wheel with its abrasive content mixed with its plastic resin is a disclosure only of a “heavy-duty” polishing wheel15 — which is just what he sought to claim.
D. The Effect of the Differences on the Question of Obviousness
Analyzing further the differences in the wheels, the Patent Office argues that it is “obvious” to pack the abrasive grains at the edge of the wheel by centrifuging, and to disperse them by foaming and gellation. But this is not enough, even as Tocci-Guilbert seems clearly to imply. For instance, it is not obvious from Tocci-Guilbert that a wheel could be constructed using plastic resins unless the abrasive grains were dispersed throughout the resin. Nor does it appear obvious that one could centrifuge the abrasive grains and yet retain enough resin in the interstices of the grains to permit a foaming process that achieves homogeneous distribution of those grains. Nor does it seem “obvious” from Tocci-Guilbert that a wheel in which the grains do not touch each other — although they are but a grain’s diameter apart — would be sufficiently rigid to be a useful high-speed grinding wheel.
In retrospect these facts seem the essence of simplicity. But they are not to be judged in retrospect; rather, ,the test of obviousness “must be applied as of the time of the invention and not retrospectively as of the time of the suit.” 16
At the time of Charvat’s invention, the use of plastic resins as viable binders in commercial abrasive wheels was entirely novel. Tocci-Guilbert, whose patent application was filed eighteen months prior to appellant’s, and four years after appellant began his research, [145]*145pioneered in adaptation of such resins in abrading wheels used for polishing. But while Toeci-Guilbert’s teaching is instructive so far as his goal was made to appear, it did not anticipate appellant’s substantial advance in the different, albeit related, art of abrading wheels used for grinding.17
We recognize that much of what we have said above merely approaches a discernment as to what may be the level of ordinary skill in the abrading wheel art. And, as a court, we would not presume that our untutored conclusions match those of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Thus we may take into account, not only the testimony of Charvat himself, but presently, even more important, that of his experts. For example, Mr. John A. Mueller was not only an unchallenged expert, the Patent Office counsel stipulated his qualifications.18 The record discloses that Mr. Mueller indeed was possessed of greater than ordinary skill in the art, well versed in all aspects of industrial grinding. After testifying that the Tocci-Guilbert patent does not teach the Ramron wheel to one of ordinary skill in the art, Mr. Mueller was questioned and answered as follows:
Q. In your judgment, does the Toc-ci-Guilbert reference disclose or suggest to one skilled in the grinding art the manufacture of a grinding wheel such as the Ramron wheel as called for in the claims now before this court?
A. It did not suggest that wheel to me. (Emphasis added).
Q. To your knowledge, did it suggest it to anyone else ?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Pausing for the moment, we may take into account secondary tests of non-obviousness which can give us adequate guidance in the present case. We observe at once that the testimony at trial establishes beyond doubt that the Ram-ron wheel’s unique qualities have brought it substantial commercial success. As Mr. Mueller stated in his testimony:
. I think we have a combination in the Ramron wheel of strength and also of the ability to operate at higher wheel speeds, and this appears to me to be unique in the grinding industry.
The Patent Office, on the other hand, rejected evidence of commercial success. Rather than ascribing such success to Ramron’s uniqueness as a grinding wheel, the Patent Office concluded that Ramron’s success might be due to “availability of particular raw materials, business relationships, advertising, or financial acumen, etc.” That is not our record. We note that testimony at trial showed conclusively that Ramron’s commercial success resulted principally from its qualities as a grinding wheel.
Specifically, e. g., we refer to testimony of Mr. Griffiths about grinding operations at United Engineering and Foundry Co., a manufacturer of solid steel rolls for use in steel and paper mills.19 United purchased from the [146]*146Landis Company a grinding machine that could be used to remove excess stock from its largest rolls. Landis delivered the machine, the largest of its kind in the United States, with assurances that it would remove 18 cubic inches of stock per minute. As delivered, the machine developed 200 horsepower and utilized five conventional grinding wheels simultaneously.
Experience disclosed that the machine performed unsatisfactorily with the conventional wheels. In fact, United tried some 160 different prior art grinding wheels without success. As the supervisor of United’s operation explained,
We weren’t able to utilize all the horsepower that was in the machine for the simple reason that when we tried to add the pressure of the full horsepower, we were getting numerous chatter and bouncing [a condition that leaves an unsatisfactory corrugated sui’face on the workpiece], and it required us that every pass that we made, we had to go back and take the wheels . . . away from the job and take it down to the end of the machine and using a diamond, we would have to dress the wheel.
So, that wasn’t feasible, and we were losing a good deal of time.
On the other hand, the Landis grinder performed adequately using appellant’s wheel. In fact, United found appellant’s wheel to be the only wheel by which the potential of the Landis machine could be realized.
Thus, Ramron secured for United the full benefits of the Landis machine, benefits which could not be obtained with prior art wheels. The witness Griffiths further testified as follows:
Q. Do you consider your Company, the United Engineering and Foundry Company, has benefited by the introduction of the Ram-ron wheel from the point of view of efficiency, cost, and production.
A. Oh my, yes, yes.
Q. Do you consider that the Ramron wheel as a commercial item represents an advance in the grinding art over anything used before in the same category?
A. My personal opinion, yes.
Q. What, by way of summary, would you term these advantages ?
A. Well, first, naturally the terriffic stock removal that you receive. They are a type of wheel that they have, we can use the excessive horsepower without chatter, and without bouncing. We make a product that is subject to scrap if we get too much heat in a roll, and we actually are probably saving two or three changes in operations of wheels for the simple reason with our old type of conventional wheel, due to the chatter and bounce you had to leave approximately 25 thousandths of stock on the work and that naturally had to be taken off.
So, consequently, it saves you not only a great deal of time, it saved you a lot of down time in changing wheels, it gave you a product of good commercial finish that you could actually take out when you were finished with the Ramron wheels and sell it to a customer as a good commercial roll.
Thus, using two Ramron wheels rather than five conventional wheels, and working at full horsepower, the Landis grinder removed twice as much stock as conventional wheels without chatter and [147]*147bounce, and without needing to be dressed.
Moreover, the Ramron wheels never once burst, despite the heavy demands of service on the Landis machine, an experience much different from that with conventional grinding wheels. Finally, the witness testified that United had failed in a continuing search for an adequate substitute for the Ramron, a search stimulated by the need to insure against its possible unavailability.
United Engineering’s experience can be seen to show conclusively that appellant’s wheel is “a new result, an unexpected result, a far more efficient result . ” within the meaning of Higley, supra. We can assume that the increased rate of stock removal can be ascribed in part to the Landis grinder itself. But what is important is that without the Ramron wheel, the Landis machine would be “useless,” in the words of United’s supervisor.
The uncontradicted testimony of Messrs. Mueller and Griffiths confirms our conviction that the Ramron wheel is a unique invention that makes possible grinding operations of a quantity and quality which was not and could not be achieved with prior art grinding wheels. When an invention has so “substantially advanced the art,” as we believe appellant’s wheel has done, then we must be “liberal in [our] construction of the patent, to secure to the inventor the reward he deserves.” 20 Thus, looking to appellant’s “new result” and the commercial success of his device, we reject the District Court’s finding that the claimed invention would be obvious within the intendment of 35 U.S.C. § 103.21
II.
THE PARTICULARITY OF APPELLANT’S CLAIMS
Our disagreement with the district court respecting “obviousness” requires that we address the issue, not reached by the district court, as to the rejection by the Patent Office of certain of appellant’s claims, assertedly because of noncompliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112. Because Charvat’s claims are part of the record, and because the issue presented is purly legal, i. e., application of the statute to undisputed facts of record, and because it seems in the interests of both parties to terminate this lengthy proceeding, we will not remand the case to the District Court for further consideration.
Section 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. . . .
******
Relying on the language in the second paragraph of Section 112, the Patent Office rejected appellant’s claims 38-40 and 42-48,22 deeming those claims to be “unduly broad in the description of the [148]*148resinous binder, . . . [and] unduly broad and vague in the use of various purely relative expressions.”
The Patent Office posited that appellant had claimed too inclusive a group of resins, including resins that would not work in appellant’s claimed wheel (such as non-foaming resins). Additionally rejected was appellant’s use of relative terms such as “on the order of”, “slightly spaced apart”, and “high concentration” in describing the claimed invention.
An abstract reading of the claims at issue is irrelevant to our consideration. Rather, the issue for this court is whether the language of the claims is so indefinite as to defeat the purposes of the statutory requirement of precision. Accordingly, courts have frequently validated claims, even when seemingly vague as including such words as “high” and “substantial.” 23
Courts have so ruled when they could find that the claim as written, when read in context of the particular case, met a suitable standard of precision — a standard which varies from case to case.24 Apropos here is the Second Circuit’s description of the judicial process which we should apply:
[The statutory requirement of precision] serves two primary purposes: those skilled in the art must be able to [149]*149understand and apply the teachings of the invention and enterprise and experimentation must not' be discouraged by the creation of an area of uncertainty as to the scope of the invention. On the other hand, the policy of the patent statute contemplates granting protection to valid inventions, and this policy would be defeated if protection were to be accorded only to those patents which were capable of precise definition. The judicial function requires a balancing of these competing considerations in the individual case.25
We do not have merely “inaccurate suggestions of the functions of the product” which the Supreme Court has deemed to “fall afoul of the rule that a patentee may not broaden his claims by describing the product in terms of function.”26
Rather, as we have noted, objectionable indefiniteness is to be determined by the facts in each case, and not by some reference to an abstract rule. The Second Circuit has said what we wish to say is applicable here:
On the other hand, patentable inventions cannot always be described in terms of exact measurements, symbols and formulae, and the applicant necessarily must use the meager tools provided by language, tools which admittedly lack exactitude and precision. If the claims, read in the light of the specifications, reasonable apprise those skilled in the art both of the utilization and scope of the invention, and if the language is as precise as the subject matter permits, the courts can demand no more. [Citations omitted] That an area of uncertainty necessarily exists in such a situation cannot be denied, but the existence of an inescapable area of uncertainty is not sufficient justification for denying to the patentee the fruits of his invention.27 (Emphasis added).
These cases refine the issue we face: when read by a person of ordinary skill in the grinding art, are appellant’s claims sufficiently definite (1) to distinguish the claims from prior art; (2) “to circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise;” and (3) to allow production of the claimed invention without undue experimentation? And when answering these questions, we must look not only to the language of the claim but also to the specifications, for it is settled that details in the specifications will save ambiguous claims.28
In addition to the claims, appellant’s application contains the following information, as our Joint Appendix discloses:
(1) the form of and problems with the prior art wheels and the differences contained in claimed wheel;
(2) eleven Figures depicting the inherent character of the claimed wheel;
(3) the preferred method of manufacture;
(4) a description of the type of abrasive material preferred;
(5) the type of filler material suggested ;
(6) the type of binding material suggested specifying four preferred resins and giving their formulas;
(7) a detailed description of the composition and density of the wheel;
[150]*150(8) basic wheel characteristics;
(9) other tool forms for which the wheel mixture may be utilized.
It is with this information from the specifications that we must read the claims, together with knowledge that appellant had previously received a patent for this method of constructing the Ramron wheel.
We turn then to the first test, supra, page 149, whether the instant claims are distinctive enough to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. In light of our discussion of the prior art in Part I, there appears little doubt that appellant’s claims are sufficiently definite, when read with the specifications, to distinguish appellant’s wheel from prior art, both Tocci-Guilbert and conventional prior-art grinding wheels. We have previously pointed out the critically distinguishing features. Under the circumstances, an overly broad description of resins becomes irrelevant. Likewise, the challenged use of relative expressions is not so vague as to fail to distinguish appellant’s wheel from a polishing wheel — indeed, the latter is not even meant to withstand pressures “on the order of 1,000 pounds per square inch.”
Our conclusion assumes, of course, that the phrase “on the order of” would trigger some recognition in a person of ordinary skill in the grinding art, perhaps delineating, at a minimum, heavy-duty grinding wheels from polishing wheels. As for the other relative phrases- — such as “high concentration,” and particles that are “slightly spread apart” —it seems certain to us that such a person would not fail to distinguish the claimed wheel from Tocci-Guilbert when he reads the detailed figures and descriptions in the specifications, as well as the description of the preferred method of manufacture. Even if broadly construed, these relative expressions describe a grinding wheel which is fundamentally different in structure from Tocci-Guilbert as our earlier analysis demonstrates.
And, of course, appellant’s claims, no matter how broadly written, are surely definite enough, merely in claiming the use of polyurethane resins of whatever formula, to distinguish appellant’s wheel from prior-art grinding wheels. Accordingly, the language of the challenged claims is sufficiently precise to distinguish appellant’s claimed invention from the prior art, and especially from Tocci-Guilbert.
The next test is whether the claims are so broad that they do not adequately “circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.” Although the resolution of this question necessarily may seem speculative,29 we are convinced that appellant’s claims are adequate, for when viewed in the whole context of the application’s specifications and of its eleven different figures, we may see that the claims define a discrete product. An analysis of the relationship between the Patent Office's challenge to the claims and the instant inquiry is now in order.
The Patent Office’s principal challenge is to appellant’s broad claims concerning appropriate resins, but that position is ineffectual for several reasons. First, even if appellant’s claims are broad enough to include resins which could not be used to produce his invention, that fact does not render appellant’s claims too vague with reference to future enterprise. The claims perforce will inform potential inventors that any plastic resin which does work to produce appellant’s wheel is covered by the patent. That is, appellant’s patent will be construed, logically, to include all resins which would produce his wheel. Again, the Patent Office objects to appellant’s [151]*151use of “relative” expressions in his claims. We have pointed out earlier that these expressions, while relative in the abstract, take on sufficiently precise meaning when a person of ordinary skill in the art reads them together with the details contained in the figures and specifications. More importantly, however, in the context of circumscribing future enterprise, this particular objection seems irrelevant. Viewed from the perspective of a potential inventor, the challenged expressions would be sufficiently narrow to define the wheel adequately, for the claims, when read together with the specifications, have a very low degree of variation. Thus, the statement that the grains are to be “slightly” spread apart is not overly ambiguous when read with a specification that the density of the wheel must be at least 1.8 grams per cubic centimeter.
Likewise, the specifications are sufficiently detailed to give meaning to appellant’s claim of a “high” concentration of grain. Certainly such a claim appears no more ambiguous than Tocci-Guilbert’s claim of a wheel in which abrasive content may vary from 10 per cent to 80 per cent. Indeed, one of the prominent features of the art appears to be that the grain content of the wheel must vary according to the specific needs of customers. Thus, the Patent Office’s objections to appellant’s claims as too indefinite do not appear to us to raise the specter of unwitting infringement by future innovators. Rather, the claims seem broad enough “to permit a reasonable tolerance in commercial practice of inventions . . .,” 30 a breadth which we do not disapprove.
The final test is whether the appellant’s claims are sufficiently definite to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to produce appellant’s wheel without undue experimentation. Since as previously noted, appellant has already received a process patent, that very fact implies that one skilled in the art could easily and mechanically reproduce the claimed invention. Moreover, the specifications include a description of the preferred method of manufacturing the wheel, the four preferred resins, the preferred abrasive and fillers, together with descriptions of the content and density of the wheel. Accordingly, the claims, when read with these specifications, would easily lead one to appellant’s wheel.
Thus guided, one skilled in the art surely “could determine and select the necessary experiments or tests without unreasonable difficulty.” 31 He certainly would refrain from use of non-foaming resins. He quickly would ascertain the useful parameters of abrasive content and spacing. We are led to the conclusion that appellant’s claims are not overly broad and should be approved, for they adequately accomplish the purposes which the Supreme Court has ascribed to Section 112.
III.
CONCLUSION
We reach our conclusion here quite aware that as a court we are not as well equipped as those skilled in the art to analyze technical phenomena. But we have a substantial record which we have analyzed with great care in light of the well presented arguments of competing counsel. Uncontroverted by any affirmative evidence of the Patent Office, there is strong evidence in that record from which have been demonstrated the uniqueness and value of the claimed invention. Our conclusion stems from our “thorough conviction”32 that Charvat [152]*152has produced invention and that he is entitled to the fruits of his efforts and of his skills. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with the instruction that the District Court enter its order that the Commissioner is authorized to issue to Charvat a patent on his grinding wheel as claimed in the application of record.
So ordered.