Verizon Wireless v. DOUGLAS CNTY. KS BD. OF COM'RS.

544 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15337, 2008 WL 559704
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedFebruary 28, 2008
Docket07-2255-DJW
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 544 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (Verizon Wireless v. DOUGLAS CNTY. KS BD. OF COM'RS.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Verizon Wireless v. DOUGLAS CNTY. KS BD. OF COM'RS., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15337, 2008 WL 559704 (D. Kan. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID J. WAXSE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is an action for declaratory, injunc-tive, and mandamus relief pursuant to the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “TCA”). 1 More specifically, Plaintiff Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) alleges that the decision of Defendant Douglas County Board of County Commissioners (“Defendant” or “Board of Commissioners”) to deny Verizon’s application for a conditional use permit to construct a wireless telecommunications facility violates the TCA in that (1) Defendant’s denial fails to meet the “in writing” requirement of the TCA; and (2) Defendants failed to base its denial upon substantial evidence, as required by the TCA. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing both of these issues. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Verizon’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part, find Verizon’s Motion for Summary Judgment moot in part and deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Procedural History

With regard to Verizon’s allegations pertaining to Defendant’s failure to comply with the “in writing” requirement of the TCA, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order on February 1, 2008 finding that the June 28 letter submitted by Defendant and summarizing the reasons why Commissioner Jones did not vote to approve the conditional use permit was insufficient to satisfy the “in writing” requirements of the TCA. In support of this finding, the Court noted the June 28 letter was drafted and sent to Defendant’s counsel by a member of the Douglas County Planning Staff and not by a member of the Douglas County Board of Commissioners, the Defendant in this action.

Instead of summarily granting judgment in favor of Verizon on this issue, however, the Court ordered Defendant to submit a(l) a written decision separate from the written record (2) describing the reasons for denying Verizon’s application with (3) sufficient explanation to allow a reviewing court to evaluate whether there is evidence in the record to support the stated reasons. Defendant has submitted the written decision as directed and the Court is now ready to rule on the merits of the sole remaining legal issue: whether Defendant’s denial of Verizon’s application for a conditional use permit to construct a wireless telecommunications facility violates the TCA in that Defendant failed to base its denial upon substantial evidence, as required by the TCA. 2

*1223 Summary Judgment Standard 3

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 4 In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 5 A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” 6 An issue of fact is “genuine” if “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” 7

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 8 In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party’s claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party’s claim. 9

Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmov-ing party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 10 The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. 11 Rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.” 12 To accomplish this, the facts “must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein.” 13 Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut”; rather, it is an important procedure “designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” 14

*1224 Uncontroverted Facts

A. The Parties

1. Verizon is in the telecommunications business and provides commercial mobile radio service in Douglas County, Kansas pursuant to an 850 megahertz “cellular license” and a 1900 megahertz “PCS license” issued by the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”).

2. Defendant exercises the powers that Douglas County, Kansas has as a body corporate and politic, including the power to sue and be sued.

B. Verizon’s Application for a Conditional Use Permit

3. On or about February 21, 2007, Selective Site Consultants, Inc. (“SSC”), on behalf of Verizon, submitted an application for a conditional use permit, which Defendant designated CUP-03-05-07, for approval to construct a wireless telecommunications facility, including a 150-foot tall monopole tower, antenna, single standard-mount platform, and related ground-based telecommunication equipment (collectively, the “Proposed Tower”) on a 100-foot by 100-foot parcel of land leased by Verizon from the owner of 261 East 1250 Road, Baldwin City, Kansas, 66006 (the “Masur Property”).

4. Verizon’s application consisted of the following:

a. Project Description Letter;
b. Application form for conditional use permit;
c. “Consent to Act on Behalf of the Owners of Property” by Judy Mas-ur;
d. Vicinity Street Map;
e. Topographical Map;
f. Assessment and Property Tax Information for the Masur Property;
g. Verification of Ownership of the Masur Property;
h. Zoning District Map;
i. FEMA Flood Hazard Map;
j. Affidavit of Darren Hunter, Site Acquisition Contractor for Verizon, Regarding Co-Location Opportunities;
k.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
544 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15337, 2008 WL 559704, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/verizon-wireless-v-douglas-cnty-ks-bd-of-comrs-ksd-2008.