BLACK, Circuit Judge:
This case involves an application of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) to the land use decisions of a local government. Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 47 U.S.C.). Preferred Sites, LLC (Appellee) filed suit against Troup County, Georgia (Appellant), alleging the county’s Zoning Appeals and Planning Board (the Board) violated § 704(a) of the TCA by denying its application for conditional use approval to construct a multiple user-wireless communication tower. Appellee alleged the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record, as required by § 704(a). The district court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee and ordering Appellant to approve the conditional use permit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual' and Procedural Background
Appellee owns, operates, and manages free-standing wireless communication towers, which typically are used' to provide cellular telephone service. Appellee also
acts as a site selection firm for the wireless communication industry. As part of this business, Appellee sought to construct a 250-foot tower on a 7.6 acre parcel of property owned by Charles and Ruth Bailey in LaGrange, Georgia, which is located in Troup County. To obtain permission to construct the tower, Appellee, through its agent, applied to the Board for conditional use approval. Appellee’s application was required by the Troup County Zoning Ordinance, which sets forth the standards for placement, design, and removal of telecommunications antennas and towers. Troup County, Ga., Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, Appendix A, Art. IV, § 14 (1999).
On June 8, 2000, the Board held a public hearing at which it considered Appellee’s conditional use application. The minutes of the hearing do not contain the contents of any discussion or debate concerning the application. Appellant, however, submitted to the district court the affidavit of Mike Dobbs, the Zoning Administrator of Troup County, who attended the meeting. The affidavit stated several members of the public verbally opposed construction of the tower. These individuals apparently opposed the visual obtrusiveness of the proposed tower. The affidavit, however, contained no further information concerning these citizens’ objections.
In addition, five-petitions,'which collectively contained the signatures of 58 individuals, were submitted to the Board. The petitions objected generally to the construction of the tower. All five standard form petitions had three groupings of blank lines: (1) a set of blank lines to write in the purpose of the petition, the opinion being expressed, the property concerned, and the. property’s specific location; (2) a set of blank lines to write in an explanation of the proposal for which the petition was being circulated; and (3) a set of lines for individuals’ full signatures and complete addresses. Despite the presence of these blank lines, only two of the petitions were complete, indicating both the purpose of the petition was to oppose the tower and the proposal for which the petition was circulated was to object to the construction of the tower. The third petition merely noted the location of the proposed tower and indicated the proposal for which the petition was circulated was to object to the construction of the tower. Finally, ■ the fourth and fifth petitions submitted to the Board contained no information other than the signatures and addresses of people who live in LaGrange, Georgia. Other than the five petitions, no evidence objecting to "Appellee’s construction of the tower exists in the record.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted unanimously to deny Appel-lee’s request for conditional use approval. Thereafter, in a letter dated June 12, 2000, the Troup County Zoning Department provided written notification to Appellee that the Board denied its application.
On July 11, 2000, Appellee filed suit against Appellant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging the denial of its application violated § 704(a) and requesting mandamus relief. In response, Appellant claimed Appellee’s action was untimely filed and Appellee had failed to meet the requirements of the zoning ordinance. Subsequently, Appellee requested permission from the district court to amend its petition to add a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Upon review of the written record, the district court held Appellee’s action was filed within the statute of limitations. In addition, the court'denied Appellee’s request to amend its petition. The district court also held the Board violated § 704(a) because its denial of the application for conditional use approval was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee and ordered Appellant to approve the conditional use permit.
B.
Background of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The TCA was enacted “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services-to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996),
reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124. In addition, the TCA was intended “to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). Wireless telephone service was one of the many telecommunications technologies Congress considered when enacting the TCA.
With respect to the construction of telecommunications facilities, Congress recognized zoning decisions by state and local governments had created an inconsistent array of requirements, which inhibited both the deployment of personal communications services and the rebuilding of a digital technology-based cellular telecommunications network. H.R.Rep. No. 104-204, at 94 (1995),
reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61. Despite this recognition, Congress also acknowledged “there are legitimate State and local concerns involved in regulating the siting of such facilities ..., such as aesthetic values and the costs associated with the use and maintenance of public rights-of-way.”
Id.
at 94-95,
reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61. As a result, Congress enacted § 704(a) to “preserve[ ] the authority of State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except in ... limited circumstances....” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104^458 (1996), at 207-08,
reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 222.
In § 704(a), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7),
Congress enunciated a number of substantive and procedural limita
tions upon the authority of state or local governments to regulate the construction of facilities for wireless communication services. Local zoning authorities may not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services, may not make zoning decisions which prohibit or effectively prohibit the provision of personal wireless services, and may not make zoning decisions premised on concerns regarding the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions associated with wireless telephone service. 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (1994).
To ensure the enforcement of these limitations, Congress delineated the manner in which zoning decisions are to be made and also provided a mechanism for judicial relief for'persons aggrieved by decisions inconsistent with § 704(a)’s requirements. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), 332(c)(7)(B)(v). For example, decisions to deny approval for the placement, construction, or modification of personal wireless service facilities must be both “in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). In addition, if a state or local government acts in a manner inconsistent with § 704(a)’s statutory requirements, any person adversely affected by the action may, “within 30 days after such action ... commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). By structuring the TCA
in this manner, Congress explicitly preserved local zoning authority over the siting of wireless facilities, while permitting judicial oversight as to the manner in which such decisions ' are made. §§ 332(c)(7)(A), 332(e)(7)(B)(v).
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant raises, the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether Appellee’s suit was timely filed; (2) whether the- Board’s decision to deny the application for conditional use approval was supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record; and (3) whether Appellee was entitled to mandamus relief.
All three issues involve questions of first impression in this Circuit concerning the application of § 704(a) to local zoning decisions.
A.
Timeliness of Appellee’s Suit
The TCA provides any party aggrieved by a state or local authority’s “final action” may challenge such action, if it is inconsistent with § 704(a)’s requirements, in any court of competent jurisdiction, as long as the challenge is filed within 30 days of the final action. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (1994). In this case, Ap-pellee filed its complaint challenging the Board’s denial 29 days after receiving written notification of the decision. Appellant, however, • argued ’ Appellee’s suit was untimely filed. The district court disagreed, holding Appellee’s challenge was filed within the statute of limitations. Appellant contends the Board’s oral decision to deny Appellee’s applicátion was the “final action” which commenced the running of the 30-day statute of limitations, thereby baring Appellee’s suit.
Whether the district'court correctly construed § 704(a)’s statute of limitations is a question of law subject to
de novo
review.
See Atl. Land & Improvement Co. v. United States,
790 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir.1986) (analyzing statute of limitations on tax assessments
de
novo);
see also United States v. Am. States Ins. Co.,
252 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir.2001) (analyzing district court’s interpretation and application of statute of limitations
de
novo).
As with any question of statutory interpretation, we begin by examining the text of the statute to determine whether its meaning is clear.
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 760, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999). We must, therefore, examine the language of the TCA for ambiguity. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(iii) Any
decision
by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities
shall be in writing
and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
(v) Any person adversely affected by
any final action
or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30
days after
such action
or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis.
47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (emphasis added).
The term “final action” is not defined by the statute, but its plain meaning is not ambiguous. The language of the statute requires the issuance of a “decision .in writing.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The language also provides for ah appeal from a “final action” within 30 days of “such action.” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). To determine when the statute of limitations begins to run under § 704(a), we must, therefore, determine the meaning of “final action” in § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) as it relates to a “decision ... in writing” in § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude a “final action” occurs when the state or local authority issues its written decision. The statute expressly mandates a state or local government’s decision to be committed to writing. Until the state or local authority issues its written notification, its task under the statute is not complete. Putting the decision in writing is the last action the authority is statutorily required to take; therefore, the issuance of the written decision is logically the “final action.” This reading of the provisions of § 704(a) makes sense because no action by the state or local authority can be “final” until.the decision is written.
Consequently, the plain language of § 704(a) mandates the written decision is the “final action.”
Cf. Indus. Communications & Elecs., Inc. v. Town of Falmouth,
No. 98-397-P-H, 1999 WL 33117159, at *3 (D.Me. June 10, 1999) (“[Tjhere can be no final action by the local permitting body until there is. a written decision.”) (citation omitted).
Concluding the “final action” is the state or local authority’s written decision is also consistent with traditional appellate procedure. An action filed by an aggrieved party under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) is similar to an appeal. .Customary appellate practice requires entry of a written judgment from which a party can appeal.
See generally Fed.
R.App. P. 3 & Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, 58;
see also
12 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 58.02-58.04 (3d ed.2002). Appellate procedure also provides that the time within which an appeal can be filed runs from the entry of the written decision or order being appealed. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a);
see also
12 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 58.04 (“The time for filing ... a notice of appeal is determined by the time of entry of judgment.”).
See generally Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp.,
213 F.3d 1344, 1345-46 (11th Cir.2000) (“[Cjases from both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeal make it clear that the time to file a notice of appeal does not begin to run until a separate judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 58.” (citations omitted)).
As a result, just like the peri
od of time within which a party may file an appeal traditionally runs from the entry of a written decision, the time within which a party may commence an action under § 704(a) starts to run from the date on which the state or local government issues its written decision. The “final action” which triggers the running of the 30-day statute of limitations, therefore, is the state or local authority’s issuance of its decision in writing. ■
B.
Substantial Evidence for the Board’s Denial
Section 704(a) requires a decision by a zoning board denying a request to construct a personal wireless service facility,
ie.,
a tower, to be both in writing and supported by- substantial evidence contained in a written record. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(Iii) (1994). Appellant contends the district court erred in holding its decision to deny Appellee’s application for conditional use approval was not supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
Although § 704(a) requires a local zoning board’s decision to be both in writing and supported by substantial evidence, it does not statutorily define the term “substantial evidence.”
The Conference Committee for the TCA, however, expressly noted “substantial evidence” is meant to be “the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-458, at 208,
reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, at 223;
see also Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 221
F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding “substantial evidence” as used in the TCA means the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions);
Petersburg Cellular P’ship,
205 F.3d 688, 694 (4th Cir.2000) (same);
Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
181 F.3d 403, 407-08 (3d Cir.1999) (same);
Aegerter v. City of Delafield, Wis.,
174 F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir.1999) (same);
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay,
166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1999) (same). Moreover, “substantial evidence” is a legal-term of art, so we presume Congress intended for us to apply its established meaning.
See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U.S. 337, 342, 111 S.Ct. 807, 811, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Although the “substantial evidence” standard is not as stringent as the preponderance of the evidence standard, it requires courts to take a harder look than when reviewing under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA,
16 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.1994). Finally, to determine whether the substantial evidence standard is met, a court should view the record in its entirety, including evidence unfavorable to the state or local government’s decision.
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490, 523, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2497, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981).
A court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the local board, but it must overturn the board’s decision if
the decision is not supported by substam tial evidence.
See Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. NLRB,
871 F.2d 980, 984 (11th Cir.1989). As a result, the TCA’s requirement that local decisions be supported by substantial evidence “does not 'affect or encroach upon the substantive standards to be applied under established principles of state and local law.’ ”
Oyster Bay,
166 F.3d at 494 (quoting
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
24 F.Supp.2d 359, 366 (D.N.J.1998));
see also AT&T Wireless Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Orange County,
23 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1358-59 (M.D.Fla.1998) (noting same). We have reviewed the record in its entirety and conclude the Board’s decision to deny Appellee’s application for condi-' tional use approval was unsupported by substantial evidence. The record reveals Appellee submitted an application for conditional use approval to construct a 250-foot wireless telecommunications tower on property with an appropriate zoning classification approved for the construction of a tower. Appellee’s application included all the information required by the Troup County zoning ordinance. Although a public hearing on Appellee’s application was held on June 8, 2000, the minutes of the hearing do not reflect that any opposition to the application was raised.
The only evidence of opposition to Ap-pellee’s application contained in the written record are the five petitions signed by a total of 58 citizens of LaGrange, Georgia. Of the five petitions, two contained only individuals’ signatures and addresses. Nowhere on these two petitions was there even an indication of the reason the individuals signed the petitions. Of the other three petitions, one was only partially completed. It noted only the location of the proposed tower, but not the purpose of the petition" nor the opinion being expressed. The petition did, however, indicate the proposal for which the petition was circulated was to object to the construction of the tower. Only two of the petitions were complete, indicating both that the purpose of the petition was to express an opinion opposing the ■ specific tower Appellee intended to build and that the proposal for which the petition was circulated was to object to the construction of that tower. Even these two petitions, however, provided only generalized objections with no articulated reasons for the opposition. Based on the entire written record, we conclude the scant evidence of opposition to the construction of Appellee’s proposed tower did not amount to substantial evidence.
Although the written record does not reflect any opposition to Appellee’s conditional use application other than the petitions, we recognize. Appellant submitted the affidavit of Michael Dobbs to the district court. Dobbs’ affidavit explains that he attended the hearing and recalls several members of.the public, who resided in the vicinity of the site for the proposed tower, verbally opposed construction of the tower. Their opposition apparently consisted of general concerns about the negative aesthetic impact of the proposed tower.
Even if Dobbs’ affidavit could be construed as part of the written record, we conclude the citizens’ generalized concerns hbout aesthetics are insufficient to constitute substantial evidence upon which the Board could rely. Aesthetic concerns may be a valid basis for denial of a permit
if
substantial evidence of the visual impact of the tower is before the board.
Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd,
244 F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir.2001);
Omnipoint,
181 F.3d at 408-09;
Aegerter,
174 F.3d at 890-91;
Oyster Bay,
166 F.3d at 495. Mere generalized concerns regarding aesthetics, however^ are insufficient to create substantial evidence justifying the denial of a permit under § 704(a) of the TCA.
See generally Telespectrum,
227 F.3d at 424;
Omnipoint,
181 F.3d at 409;
Oyster Bay,
166 F.3d at 496. Consequently, even construing the concerns voiced about aesthetics at the hearing as opposition contained in the written record, we conclude such meager evidence is insufficient to support the Board’s denial of Appellee’s application. There being no other evidence in the written record, opposing the approval of Appellee’s application,
the Board’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence.
C.
Remedy for Violation of Requirements of § 701¡,(a)
Section 704(a) does not specify the appropriate remedy if a court of competent jurisdiction determines a state or local authority violated the requirements contained therein. Appellant contends, however, the district court erred by granting mandamus relief requiring Appéllant to grant Appellee’s application for conditional use approval.
Whether the district court properly awarded equitable relief to Appellee is subject to a mixed standard of review.
See United States v. Gilbert,
244 F.3d 888, 908 (11th Cir.2001). We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny equitable relief for abuse of discretion, underlying questions of law
de novo,
and findings of fact upon which the decision to grant equitable relief was made under the clearly erroneous standard.
Id.; see also
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
See generally Boire v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers,
479 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.1973).
The grant of equitable relief is a matter of judicial discretion.
See CNA Fin. Corp. v. Brown,
162 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.1998) (citing
Eccles v. Peoples Bank,
333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 644, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1948));
see also Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc.,
837 F.2d 1550, 1563 (11th Cir.1988) (explaining grant or denial of equitable relief lies in the discretion of the district court). Mandamus, which is an extreme form of equitable relief, “is a writ designed to require an official to perform an act required by law.”
See Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,
904 F.2d 585, 587 (11th Cir.1990). Although the writ of mandamus was abolished by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b), federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000);
see also Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
138 F.3d 1374, 1385 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc) (recognizing the writ of mandamus may issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the failure to carry out a ministerial task).
Pursuant to their powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, federal courts continue to grant equitable relief, which sometimes are referred to as “writs of mandamus.”
See generally Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
260 F.2d 637, 640 (2d Cir.1958) (noting, courts continue to issue orders that “for brevity, we may still speak of as a mandamus.”) As a result, a “writ of mandamus” frequently grants the same relief tooa party as a mandatory injunction, which orders a party to “take action.”
See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
516 U.S. 479, 484, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 1254, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996),
quoted in United States v. Gilbert,
244 F.3d 888, 908 n. 49 (11th Cir.2001);
see also Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc.,
60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir.1995) (“A mandatory injunction, in contrast [to a prohibitory injunction], is said to alter the status quo by commanding some positive act.”).
Although the TCA does not statutorily provide a remedy for a violation of § 704(a), it does require a “court of competent jurisdiction”
to “hear and decide [an action arising from a violation of § 704(a) ] on an expedited basis.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (1994). A number of courts have considered this issue and held an injunction (or other equitable relief) in the form of an order to issue the relevant permits is a proper form of relief under § 704(a).
In this case, the district court found Appellant violated § 704(a), thereby entitling Appellee to relief. As a result, the district court granted Appellee’s petition for summary judgment, which included a request for a writ of mandamus ordering Appellant to grant the application for conditional use approval. Although the district court’s order did not specify the type of relief granted, the nature of the relief granted was in the form of an injunction.
We conclude an injunction ordering issuance of a permit is an appropriate remedy for a violation of § 704(a).
In light of our standard of review, we hold the district court’s determination that remanding this case would frustrate the TCA’s guarantee of expedited relief was not clearly erroneous. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Appellant to approve Appellee’s application for conditional use approval.
III. CONCLUSION
Under § 704(a), the final action which triggers the running of the 30 days within which an aggrieved party may commence an action is a state or local government’s written denial of the party’s request to place, construct or modify a personal wireless service facility. Because Appellee’s action was filed within 30 days of the Board’s written denial, it was timely. Moreover, although, aesthetic concerns may support a denial of a party’s request to place, construct or modify a personal wireless service facility if evidence of the facility’s visual intrusiveness is substantial, the generalized concerns of citizens in this case did not amount to substantial evidence. The Board’s decision, therefore, was unsupported by substantial evidence, and Appellee was entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.