IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
VONDA VENCEL, CASE NO. 2025-T-0085
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division JOHN V. VENCEL, JR., et al.,
Defendant-Appellant. Trial Court No. 2023 DR 00079
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: August 24, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, 26 Market Street, Suite 304, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
James A. Vitullo, 5232 Nashua Drive, Youngstown, OH 44515, and Jeffrey A. Kurz, 42 North Phelps Street, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} This matter is before us on the appeal of John V. Vencel, Jr. (“Husband”)
from the trial court’s judgment granting Husband and Vonda Vencel (“Wife”) a divorce. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶2} On March 30, 2023, Wife filed a complaint for divorce without children and a motion for temporary orders. A magistrate’s order on spousal support, monthly expenses, and access to parties’ safe deposit box was filed on May 15, 2023. Husband filed his answer to the complaint and counterclaim on June 9, 2023. In his counterclaim, Husband alleged that Wife had engaged in financial misconduct.
{¶3} Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that a 1994 Corvette was separate property and had previously agreed to the separation of personal property inside the marital residence. The matter proceeded to trial on September 5, 2025.
{¶4} Wife called four witnesses and testified. Husband called two additional witnesses and also testified. The following testimony was presented at trial:
{¶5} Husband and Wife were married in Las Vegas, Nevada on March 1, 2003.
The parties did not have any children. The parties separated in January 2023. According to Husband, he received divorce papers at the end of January and Wife moved out about a week later.
{¶6} Prior to his marriage to Wife, Husband purchased the residence located at 5223 Taylor Avenue in 1972. A quitclaim deed was executed on November 16, 1983, after his divorce from his first wife. Husband testified that he had a home equity line of credit available on the home that he would use. The parties testified that the house was damaged when they were out of town. Insurance paid approximately $130,000 for the house to be repaired. The damage occurred and repairs were made during the marriage. Wife completed many of the repairs on the home. Christopher Triconi (“Triconi”) was hired to appraise the residence for $500. The residence was valued at $205,000 as of July 25, 2023.
{¶7} Prior to the marriage, Wife owned a four-plex building. The building was sold in June 2018. According to Wife, she made about $65,000-$70,000 from the sale. Wife testified that the money was used for vacations with Husband and that none of the
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proceeds from the sale remained at the time of the divorce. Husband claimed he used $35,000 of his own money to help Wife renovate the four-plex. Husband also vehemently denied that Wife used the proceeds to pay for any vacations.
{¶8} Also, prior to the marriage, Wife was working at Kraftmaid Cabinets.
According to Wife, she was getting an hourly wage plus benefits including dental, hospitalization, and prescriptions. Wife also got retirement through Kraftmaid. Larry Bradley (“Bradley”), Wife’s brother, testified that Husband convinced Wife to quit her job at Kraftmaid. Wife testified that she first took a leave of absence from her job because she was concerned about losing her seniority and her benefits. However, she eventually left her job at Kraftmaid to help Husband at Faces Lounge. She testified that Husband promised retirement after they built the business.
{¶9} In regard to the Faces Lounge, Husband claimed that the business was not marital property. Husband did not bring any documentation with him to show Faces Lounge was not marital property. However, Husband testified that he had purchased the business and that he contracted to buy the building prior to the marriage. Husband claimed he paid $285,000 for the building located at 7 & 9 W. Broad Street, Newton Falls, Ohio, and $75,000 for the business. The building was appraised for $360,000 as of July 25, 2023. Triconi’s appraisal services cost $2,650.
{¶10} Husband made payments on the building during the marriage, and ownership of the building occurred in 2015, during the marriage. Donald Young (“Young”) testified that he sold the business and the building to Husband. According to Young, the parties had a land contract with a monthly payment. The contract for the business was for 5 years, and the building was for 15 years. According to Young, Husband’s down
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payment was $65,000. Neither Husband nor Young retained a copy of either contract. The parties stipulated to the report prepared by Jerry Ricciardi (“Ricciardi”), a certified business evaluator. The cost of Ricciardi’s services was $2,769. Ricciardi opined that a 50 percent ownership interest in Faces Lounge was $24,403.
{¶11} According to Wife, she improved Faces Lounge with cleanliness. Bradley testified that Wife cleaned, prepared food, and handled the banquets. Wife also started a dart league and had built the dart stations. Wife also made flyers, bartended, painted the building, and hung the marquee. Elizabeth Dean (“Dean”) testified Wife did “everything except count the money.” Dean also testified that Wife never drew a paycheck and was always asking Husband for money. Bradley described Husband as “controlling” and “lazy.” Husband testified that Faces Lounge was largely a cash business. Husband stated that he paid Wife $250 in cash every Saturday night or approximately $13,000 a year. At trial, it was established that $5,849 was confiscated from gambling machines that were inside Faces Lounge in 2022.
{¶12} Prior to the separation, on November 30, 2022, Husband and Wife purchased a 2023 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Silverado”) for $81,497.27. The parties traded in their 2016 Chevrolet Colorado for the down payment. According to the agreement, the parties put a down payment of $43,955.75. The parties agreed to pay $521.41 per month for 72 months beginning December 30, 2022. A service plan was also purchased for the vehicle.
{¶13} In his counterclaim, Husband alleged financial misconduct. Specifically, he claimed that Wife took $107,000 from their safety deposit box. Wife admitted that she went to the safety deposit box on January 7, 2023. Wife claimed that she wanted to get
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her jewelry back, but her jewelry was not in the safety deposit box. Wife admitted to taking Husband’s jewelry for leverage to get her jewelry back.1 Wife denied taking any cash.
{¶14} There were two Huntington Bank accounts with both parties’ names on them which accumulated funds during the marriage. As of July 2023, one account had $5,137.24. As of August 2023, the other account had $4,525.21.
{¶15} In addition, there were approximately 50 jars of coins collected during the marriage, which Husband distributed to his various great-grandchildren as Christmas gifts during divorce proceedings and in violation of the mutual restraining order.
{¶16} At trial, each party described their income and expenses. Wife testified that she receives approximately $1,300 per month in social security, and $253.35 per month from her pension from Kraftmaid. Wife also testified that she receives $217.40 per year in dividends from BP stock.
{¶17} Wife also testified that she inherited a condominium after her father passed away. The estimated value of the condominium was $120,000. Wife testified that she and her brother decided that the brother would take the money in her father’s account (approximately $150,000) and Wife would take the condominium. Wife explained that the engine blew in the Silverado, and she has approximately $10,000 in credit card debt. According to Wife, her total monthly bills amount to $2,745.
{¶18} Husband testified that he receives $1,850 per month in rental income from a Mexican restaurant and $150 for the apartment. Husband testified that he does not share the rental income with Wife. Additionally, Husband receives $1,950 in social
1. Wife returned Husband’s items at trial.
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security and $1,180 from his pension monthly. Husband claims $4,633 in monthly expenses, including the amount of the temporary spousal order.
{¶19} After trial, the parties waived closing arguments and opted to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court adopted Wife’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Final Judgment Entry of Divorce was filed on November 6, 2026.
{¶20} Specifically, the trial court determined that both parties would receive a divorce on the ground of incompatibility. The trial court found that the parties were married on March 1, 2003, and separated in February 2023.2
{¶21} The trial court ordered the jars of coins to be collected by Husband and divided equally between the parties.
{¶22} The trial court then ordered that Husband return the heirloom jewelry to Wife. In the event Husband did not return the jewelry, Wife could keep husbands’ jewelry free and clear. Wife was ordered to return the jewelry if her heirloom jewelry was returned to her.
{¶23} The trial court ordered that Wife retain the Silverado. Husband was ordered to continue to pay on the vehicle until it was paid in full or was somehow destroyed or traded in for another vehicle. Wife was ordered to pay any insurance, repair, or upkeep costs and was required to maintain the warranty.
{¶24} The trial court determined that while Husband owned the residential home prior to marriage, that Wife was entitled to $56,000, representing half of $112,000, the increased value of the residence. The trial court also determined that ownership of the
2. The trial court did not specify a day of separation, but characterized the parties’ separation as occurring in the month of February 2023.
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Faces Lounge building vested during the marriage and that Wife was entitled to half of the appraised value of the building or $180,000. The court further concluded that Wife was entitled to half of Husband’s 50 percent interest in the Faces Lounge business, or $12,201.
{¶25} The court ordered Husband to reimburse Wife $1,575 for half of the appraisal fees for Triconi and $1,400 for the fees for Ricciardi. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay Wife $2,300 in spousal support. The trial court found that Husband’s allegation that Wife allegedly removed $107,000 was not established through clear and convincing evidence. The trial court determined that Wife was responsible for her personal credit card debt. The trial court ordered that the parties pay their own legal expenses.
{¶26} Husband appeals.
The Appeal
{¶27} Husband raises the following assignments of error for review:
[1.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it found that [Wife]’s decision to leave Kraftmaid in 2000, approximately 25 years before the commencement of the trial in August 2025, was relevant to her current financial condition because it was too far removed from 2025.
[2.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it failed to determine the duration of the marriage, and then used valuations without determining the relevant dates of the valuations and what the values of the non-marital assets were at the time the marriage began.
[3.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it improperly found 5223 Taylor Ave. to be a marital asset. The result was an inequitable distribution of property in violation of ORC 3105.71.
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[4.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it improperly found Faces Lounge to be a marital asset. The result was an inequitable distribution of property in violation of ORC 3105.71.
[5.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it improperly found 7 [&] 9 Broad St. to be a marital asset. The result was an inequitable distribution of property in violation of ORC 3105.71.
[6.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it improperly found Wife’s condo, $74,992.56 in cash, and the $150,000 account to be separate property.
The result was an inequitable distribution of property in violation of ORC 3105.71.
[7.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it determined that Husband should pay almost four (4) times the amount of spousal support than he was paying in the temporary orders and pay Wife’s monthly payment on the Silverado indefinitely.
[8.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it failed to find that Wife had committed financial misconduct and should have awarded Husband a distributive award or greater amount of marital property.
[9.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it determined that Christmas gifts of bottles with quarters in them given to Husband’s great grandchildren were marital property improperly disposed of, and ordered him to retrieve them and provide ½ of the bottles to Wife.
[10.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it ordered Husband to pay half of Wife’s litigation expenses (appraisal fees).
{¶28} We address Husband’s assignments of error out of order.
Financial Misconduct
{¶29} In his eighth assignment of error, Husband alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to find that Wife committed financial misconduct and should have awarded Husband a distributive award or greater amount of marital property. We disagree.
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{¶30} R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) provides: “[t]he court shall require each spouse to disclose in a full and complete manner all marital property, separate property, and other assets, debts, income, and expenses of the spouse.” “If a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including but not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, or fraudulent disposition of assets, the court may compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater award of marital property.” R.C. 3105.171(E)(4).
{¶31} R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) states:
If a spouse has substantially and willfully failed to disclose marital property, separate property, or other assets, debts, income, or expenses as required under division (E)(3) of this section, the court may compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater award of marital property not to exceed three times the value of the marital property, separate property, or other assets, income, or expenses that are not disclosed by the other spouse.
{¶32} A trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether to compensate one spouse for the financial misconduct of the other, however, “the initial finding of financial misconduct must be supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.” Adante v. Adante, 2024-Ohio-5371, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.), quoting Calkins v. Calkins, 2016-Ohio-1297, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.).
{¶33} As this court recognized in Calkins,
“[W]hile R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) does not set forth an exclusive listing of acts constituting financial misconduct, those acts that are listed * * * all contain some element requiring wrongful scienter. Typically, the offending spouse will either profit from the misconduct or intentionally defeat the other spouse's distribution of marital assets.” Hammond v. Brown, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 67268, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3975, *9 (Sept.
14, 1995); see also Gentile v. Gentile, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
97971, 2013-Ohio-1338The burden of proving financial
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misconduct is on the complaining party. Smith v. Emery– Smith, 190 Ohio App.3d 335, 2010-Ohio-5302, ¶50 (11th Dist.).
“‘The time frame in which the alleged misconduct occurs may often demonstrate wrongful scienter, i.e., use of marital assets or funds during the pendency of or immediately prior to filing for divorce.’” Lindsay v. Lindsay, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-11-
055, 2013-Ohio-3290, ¶21, quoting Jump v. Jump, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-00-1040, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5565, *12-13 (Nov. 30, 2000). In addition, an awareness of a spouse’s wrongdoing during the marriage may weigh against a finding of financial misconduct. See, e.g., Tustin v. Tustin, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 27164, 2015-Ohio-3454, ¶45; Grow v. Grow, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2010-08-209, CA2010-08-218, & CA2010- 11-301, 2012-Ohio-1680, ¶104. Another consideration is whether the spouse made “critical and unilateral decisions concerning the parties’ retirement funds and other assets in anticipation of his divorce.” Smith v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26013, 2012- Ohio-1716, ¶21.
Calkins at ¶ 15-16.
{¶34} Husband asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to find that Wife committed financial misconduct. As the complaining party, Husband had the burden of proof. Husband alleged at trial that Wife committed financial misconduct by removing $107,000 cash from the parties’ safe deposit box at the bank. Husband submitted a video from the bank lobby showing Wife entering the bank in January 2023 to access the deposit box. Wife was observed entering the bank with a small purse and subsequently leaving the bank with an additional bag. Husband alleged that the additional bag contained $107,000 of cash that he says was inside the safe deposit box. Wife admitted that she accessed the safe deposit box but claimed it was to look for her missing heirloom jewelry. Wife testified that the box had silver bars, coins, and other valuable items, but denied that there was cash in the box when she accessed it. Wife testified that she removed Husband’s jewelry from the box as leverage for him to return her heirloom PAGE 10 OF 23 jewelry. Wife brought Husband’s jewelry and the purported bag from the video to the final hearing.
{¶35} The trial court noted that Husband accessed the box six times during the marriage and Wife accessed the box only once. Wife accessed the box in January 2023, a few weeks before the parties separated in February 2023. The trial court concluded that Husband’s allegation was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and declined to find that Wife committed financial misconduct. Other than Husband’s testimony, there was no evidence that the safety deposit box contained additional cash.
{¶36} Accordingly, the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Husband did not meet his burden of establishing Wife engaged in financial misconduct under these circumstances. The trial court's finding that Wife did not engage in financial misconduct was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As such, Husband was not entitled to a distributive award. R.C. 3105.171.
{¶37} Husband’s eighth assignment of error is without merit.
Duration of the Marriage and Valuation Dates
{¶38} In his second assignment of error, Husband asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law or otherwise abused its discretion when it failed to determine the duration of the marriage, and then used valuations without determining the relevant dates of the valuations and what the values of the non-marital assets were at the time the marriage began.
{¶39} Determinations of the duration of the marriage, or a de facto termination date are governed by R.C. 3105.171(A)(2):
“During the marriage” means whichever of the following is applicable:
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(a) Except as provided in division (A)(2)(b) of this section, the period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of the final hearing in an action for divorce or in an action for legal separation;
(b) If the court determines that the use of either or both of the dates specified in division (A)(2)(a) of this section would be inequitable, the court may select dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property. If the court selects dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property, “during the marriage” means the period of time between those dates selected and specified by the court.
{¶40} “The statute, as written, ‘“creates ‘a presumption that the proper date for termination of the marriage is the date of the final divorce hearing.’”’” Turner v. Turner, 2024-Ohio-2200, ¶ 78 (6th Dist.), quoting Budd v. Budd, 2011-Ohio-565, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d 616, 630 (9th Dist. 1999). However, despite the statutory presumption contained in R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a), R.C. 3105.171(G) provides:
In any order for the division or disbursement of property or a distributive award made pursuant to this section, the court shall make written findings of fact that support the determination that the marital property has been equitably divided and shall specify the dates it used in determining the meaning of “during the marriage.”
(Emphasis added.)
{¶41} Here, the trial court determined that the marriage began on March 1, 2003, and noted that the parties had been living “separate and apart” since February 2023. However, the trial court did not explicitly provide a date for the termination of the marriage and did not make any determination as to a de facto termination date pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(A)(2) and (G).
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{¶42} As this court has previously noted, trial courts have broad discretion when determining the dates that constitute the duration of the marriage: “A trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the dates constituting the duration of the marriage.” Riley v. Riley, 2013-Ohio-1604, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.), citing Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 319-320 (1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making. State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.), citing Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004). Therefore, a trial court’s decision defining the dates of a marriage’s duration is not an abuse of discretion when it is reasonable.
{¶43} Upon review of the record, we find that the trial court failed to specify the date it used in determining the meaning of “during the marriage” as required by R.C. 3105.171(G). See Weller v. Weller, 2007-Ohio-4963, ¶ 29 (11th Dist.). The Ninth District Court of Appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion where it failed to determine the duration of the parties’ marriage. Molnar v. Molnar, 2025-Ohio-5114 (9th Dist.). The Ninth District Court of Appeals explained:
The court can rely on the date of the final hearing as the date a marriage ends, or it can choose a de facto date that the marriage ends, but as we recognized in Cochran [v. Cochran, 2025-Ohio-2565 (4th Dist.)], the court must determine the duration of the marriage, i.e., it must determine the beginning and ending dates of the marriage. The amended divorce decree states that the partes [sic] were married on April 16, 2003, but it failed to identify when the marriage ended or otherwise failed to determine the duration of the marriage.
Husband claims that even if the court erred by failing to determine the duration of the marriage, Wife cannot show harm, so the error was harmless and consequently is not reversible error. We disagree. In Cochran, we recognized that failing to comply with the statutory mandates regarding division of property, which includes needing to determine the
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duration of the marriage, “amounts to per se abuse of discretion.” Cochran at ¶ 19. Moreover, the duration of the marriage is [a] critical component in “distinguishing marital, separate, and post-separation assets and liabilities, and determining appropriate dates for valuation.” Id. at ¶ 18.
Therefore, at this time we cannot properly analyze the court's classification or valuation of the property herein, or even the court's award of spousal support, because all require consideration of the duration of the marriage, which the trial court failed to determine.
Molnar at ¶ 36-37.
{¶44} Similarly, Wife asserts that the decree rested on competent valuation evidence, and “[Husband] does not show that a different worded recital of dates would have changed the classification, valuation, or distribution of any asset.” While such may be true, a trial court is required to specify the duration of the marriage so that the court of appeals may properly analyze the trial court’s decisions. This court has previously found that a trial court’s failure to comply with R.C. 3105.171(G) constitutes reversible error. Weller at ¶ 29-30 (holding that the trial court erred where it failed to state any date as a basis for the valuation in the judgment entry.)
{¶45} Here, the trial court failed to specify the dates it used in determining the meaning of “during the marriage” in its judgment entry. This determination is a critical component in distinguishing marital, separate, and post-separation assets and liabilities. Such omission is error.
{¶46} Accordingly, Husband’s second assignment of error has merit and is sustained.
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Valuations and Division of Property
{¶47} In his third, fourth, fifth, and ninth assignments of error, Husband asserts that the trial court erred or otherwise abused its discretion when it concluded that certain property was marital property. Specifically, Husband alleges that the trial court erred when it determined the residence at 5223 Taylor Avenue, Faces Lounge, the business building located a 7 & 9 Broad Street, and jars of coins were marital property. In his sixth assignment of error, Husband alleges that the court below erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it improperly found Wife’s condo, $74,992.56 in cash, and the $150,000 account to be separate property.
{¶48} A trial court reviews property awards and division under an abuse of discretion standard. “Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding appropriate property awards in divorce cases.” Gantous v. Basing, 2024-Ohio-1112, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.), quoting Speece v. Speece, 2021-Ohio-170, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.). “However, a trial court’s discretion is not unbridled. The award need not be equal, but it must be equitable. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court abused its discretion.” Speece, quoting Bisker v. Bisker, 69 Ohio St.3d 608, 609 (1994). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision- making.’” Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, at ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004).
{¶49} When applying the standard of review, an appellate court must review the property division in its entirety and consider the totality of the circumstances when determining if the trial court abused its discretion when dividing and distributing the marital assets. Gantous at ¶ 36, quoting Speece at ¶ 19 “‘“In determining whether the trial court
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has abused its discretion, a reviewing court is not to weigh the evidence, but, rather, must determine from the record whether there is some competent, credible evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court.”’ Gantous at ¶ 36, quoting Speece at ¶ 19, quoting Habo v. Khattab, 2013-Ohio-5809, ¶ 55.” (11th Dist.).
{¶50} As noted above, R.C. 3105.171 governs the division of assets in a divorce case. R.C. 3105.171(G), requires that the trial court “specify the dates it used in determining the meaning of ‘during the marriage.’” As the duration of the marriage is a consideration in determining the classification and valuation of the property, the trial court’s determination of the duration of the marriage on remand may affect these issues. Therefore, Husband’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth assignments of error are not ripe for review. Molnar, 2025-Ohio-5114 at ¶ 50 (9th Dist.).
Appraisal Fees
{¶51} In his tenth and final assignment of error, Husband alleges that the trial court erred when it ordered Husband to pay half of the appraisal fees. As we indicated above regarding Husband’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth and ninth assignments of error, this assignment of error is not ripe for review due to the trial court’s failure to determine the duration of the marriage.
{¶52} R.C. 3105.73(A) provides:
In an action for divorce . . . a court may award all or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable, the court may consider the parties' marital assets and income, any award of temporary spousal support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate.
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{¶53} We review these orders for abuse of discretion. Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 2019-Ohio-2035, ¶ 112 (2d Dist.) citing Rucks v. Moore, 2018-Ohio-4692, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.).
{¶54} Husband asserts that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay half of the fees associated with the appraisals of the residence and the 7 & 9 Broad Street by Triconi, and the evaluation of the business, Faces Lounge, by Ricciardi.
{¶55} As to the appraisals by Triconi, the trial court found that Wife had paid for the appraisals and that Husband admitted he did not contribute any funds toward that expense. The trial court noted that Husband did not present any type of appraisal on his behalf for the court to determine value.
{¶56} As to the business appraisal, the parties stipulated to the report by Ricciardi.
Husband did not otherwise provide or contest the value of the business as described by Ricciardi. Wife paid for the valuation and the trial court determined that Husband should reimburse Wife for half of that expense.
{¶57} In the court below, Husband alleged that the business, the residence, and 7 & 9 Broad Street were separate, premarital property. As noted above, R.C. 3105.171 governs the division of assets in a divorce case and subsection (G) requires that the trial court “specify the dates it used in determining the meaning of ‘during the marriage.’” The duration of the marriage is a consideration in determining the classification and valuation of the property. Because the trial court’s determination could affect the classification of assets, we decline to review this assignment of error because it is not ripe for review.
Spousal Support
{¶58} In his seventh assignment of error, Husband alleges that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it determined that Husband should pay
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almost four (4) times the amount of spousal support than he was paying in the temporary orders and pay Wife’s monthly payment on the Silverado indefinitely. Additionally, and related to the trial court’s determination of spousal support, Husband claims in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it found that Wife’s decision to leave Kraftmaid approximately 25 years before the commencement of the trial was relevant to her current financial condition because it was too far removed from 2025.
{¶59} At the outset, we note that at least one other appellate district has declined to review similar claims regarding spousal support where the trial court has failed to specify the duration of the marriage as required by R.C. 3105.171(A) and (G). Molnar at
¶ 50. The Ninth District Court of Appeals explained that “because the duration of the marriage is a consideration in determining the classification and valuation of property, as well as an element to consider for determining whether spousal support should be awarded, the trial court’s determination of the duration of the marriage on remand may affect these issues.” Id.
{¶60} While the trial court failed to specify the termination date of the marriage or otherwise define “during the marriage” for purposes of R.C. 3105.171(G), the trial court expressly concluded that the parties were married for “decades” when it awarded spousal support to Wife. As the trial court discussed the length of the parties’ marriage, we are not foreclosed from reviewing these assignments of error.
{¶61} The trial court has significant discretion in awarding spousal support in a domestic relations proceeding, provided the award is “‘appropriate and reasonable.’” Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2014-Ohio-5464, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.) quoting Bandish v. Bandish, 2004-
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Ohio-3544, ¶ 14 (11th Dist). In determining what is appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances, the trial court is to consider the factors specified in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)- (n). Bandish at ¶ 14–15. We review a trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Albrecht at ¶ 13.
{¶62} R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) provides:
In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support, which is payable either in gross or in installments, the court shall consider all of the following factors:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;
(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;
(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;
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(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.
{¶63} The duration of the marriage is a consideration in determining spousal support under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(e). The trial court stated that it considered all of the relevant factors contained in R.C. 3105.18(C). Indeed, the trial court noted that the parties had been married for “decades.”
Wife’s Employment at Kraftmaid.
{¶64} Income, retirement benefits, and earning abilities are also factors the trial court must consider in determining spousal support. The trial court noted that Wife left her employment at Kraftmaid to assist Husband in growing the business, Faces Lounge. Wife had given up her retirement and benefits to pursue that venture with Husband. Such consideration was appropriate under R.C. 3105.18(C). As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered Wife’s retirement from Kraftmaid when calculating spousal support.
Increase of Spousal Support from Temporary Orders
{¶65} Husband also claims that the trial court erred when it increased the amount of spousal support awarded in the temporary orders.
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{¶66} As part of the temporary orders, Husband was ordered to pay temporary spousal support to Wife in the amount of $1,115. This amount included Wife’s payment on the Silverado, vehicle insurance, cell phone bill, and cash/check payment. In the divorce decree, the trial court maintained that Husband continue to pay Wife’s payment on the Silverado. However, Wife was ordered to pay any maintenance and the insurance on the Silverado. Additionally, in the final decree, the trial court ordered that Husband pay $2,300 per month in spousal support.3
{¶67} The trial court explained that Wife was eligible for spousal support pursuant to R.C. 3105.18 “[b]ased on [Wife’s] advanced age, her lack of education being only a high school graduate, and the fact that she has been out of the workforce for many years except for working for her self-employed husband.” The trial court noted that Wife worked extremely hard for Husband’s business during the marriage. The trial court also determined that Wife had increased financial needs and that her expenses did not allow her to do simple things for herself like self-care. The trial court further indicated that Husband could afford the increase in support.
{¶68} Husband cites to no authority that the trial court is bound by the amount of support award in temporary orders. App.R. 16(A)(7). Indeed, the record supports Wife’s request for an increase in spousal support as she provided a detailed list of her expenses and sought an additional $600 in support. While the trial court increased the spousal support, it also removed several obligations, such as Wife’s cell phone bill and the vehicle insurance from Husband’s support obligations. Thus, Husband has failed to show how
3. This amount appears to be noninclusive of the $521.41 payment on the Silverado.
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the trial court’s increase in monetary spousal support was an abuse of discretion under these circumstances.
{¶69} Accordingly, Husband’s first and seventh assignments of error are without merit.
Conclusion
{¶70} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this court’s opinion on Husband’s second assignment of error for the trial court to determine the duration of the marriage as required by R.C. 3105.171(A) and (G).
MATT LYNCH, P.J., JOHN J. EKLUND, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Costs to be taxed against the parties equally.
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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