Vargas v. Pfizer, Inc.

418 F. Supp. 2d 369, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1634, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24874, 2005 WL 2766784
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 26, 2005
Docket04 Civ.9772 WHP
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 418 F. Supp. 2d 369 (Vargas v. Pfizer, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vargas v. Pfizer, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 369, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1634, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24874, 2005 WL 2766784 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAULEY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Ralph Vargas (“Vargas”) and Bland-Ricky Roberts (“Roberts”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this copyright infringement action against Defendants Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”), Publicis, Inc., Fluid Music, East West Communications, Inc. and Brian Transeau (collectively “Defendants”). In particular, Plaintiffs allege that Pfizer’s national advertising campaign for its Celebrex product uses key musical themes from their musical composition and sound recording titled “Bust Dat Groove Without Ride” (“Bust Dat Groove”). Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the action, arguing that Plaintiffs’ musical composition 1 lacks the requisite originality for copyright protection. 2 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ summary judgment motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Vargas composed Bust Dat Groove in 1993 and registered the musical work for a copyright on January 27, 1995. (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, dated July 22, 2005 (“PI. 56.1 Stmt.”) ¶¶ 1, 2, 5; Defendants’ Statement of Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, dated June 30, 2005, (“Def. 56.1 Stmt.”) ¶¶ 1, 2, 5.) The registration certificate describes Bust Dat Groove as “Music-Drum Rhythm/Drum Loops.” (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4.) Bust Dat Groove is a one-bar percussion pattern. (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) Percussion patterns are background rhythm that accompany pitched instruments supplying the melody and harmony in musical compositions. Percussion patterns are not played on their own and are rarely distributed as popular music.

Although the Bust Dat Groove recording runs approximately one minute, it consists of an identical drum pattern looped twenty-seven times. (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) The composition contains a high-hat (cymbal), snare drum and bass drum as its basic elements. (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ ll. 3 ) Plaintiffs contend that the high-hat *371 and snare drum elements are original, because Vargas used “creative choices in selecting and combining these musical elements in Bust Dat Groove.” (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13.) Finally, the bass drum element “consists of two basic three-note groups — one beginning with what is known as a pick-up note on the downbeat, the other containing a ‘short-long-short’ note figure.” (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiffs’ also allege copyright infringement of the sound recording of Bust Dat Groove, owned by Roberts. (PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 3; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6.) Later, Roberts registered the sound recording in 1995. (PL 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3, 6.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that Bust Dat Groove’s composition is original and sufficiently creative to deserve copyright protection. However, Defendants counter that the work is a basic percussion pattern that has existed in other musical works and instructional text books for decades.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The materiality of disputed facts is determined by the governing substantive law, Dister v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir.1988), in this case the Copyright Act, Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 890 (2d Cir.1997). An issue of fact is “material” if it might “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law [while] an issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Shade v. Hous. Auth. of New Haven, 251 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.2001). The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests with the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir.1997). In determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must then come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000). The non-moving party must “do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Instead, the non-movant must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where it is apparent that no rational finder of fact “could find in favor of the non-moving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight,” summary judgment should be granted. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994).

*372 II.

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418 F. Supp. 2d 369, 76 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1634, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24874, 2005 WL 2766784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vargas-v-pfizer-inc-nysd-2005.