OPINION
BARKER, Judge.
¶ 1 Vanessa H. (“Vanessa”) appeals the termination of her parental rights with respect to her daughter, Emely H. (“Emely”). For the following reasons, we affirm,
Facts and Procedural History
¶ 2 Vanessa was born on March 15, 1986. At age six, after having lived in group homes and shelters since birth, she was adopted and raised by both adoptive parents until age sixteen. At that time, she was placed in the physical custody of Child Protective Services (“CPS”) “because of repeatedly running away.” In June 2003, it was recommended that she participate in a residential program given her “history of noncompliance, running away, and frequent involvement with the legal system.” Vanessa was placed in juvenile detention on drug use charges in 2003 when she was four months pregnant with Emely. She also received services from the Division of Developmental Disabilities throughout this period and after. The record also shows allegations of egregious misconduct, including forcible sexual conduct, allegedly perpetrated against Vanessa while either in State care or under the supervision of those whom the State had entrusted to care for Vanessa.
¶ 3 Vanessa’s IQ, most recently measured at 53, places her in the “mild to moderate mentally retarded range.”1 Test results from August 2003 indicated that her achievement scores were “below 3rd grade level in all broad areas” and below the second or first grade levels in some areas. A June 23, 2003 psychiatric evaluation included the following additional diagnoses for Vanessa: conduct disorder, cocaine abuse, learning disorder, psychosocial past history, relational issues, painful memories and substance use.
¶ 4 On March 25, 2004, Vanessa gave birth to Emely. On July 10, 2004, CPS removed Emely from Vanessa’s care after Vanessa left Emely alone in a grassy area in an apartment complex for several hours, not returning until after the police had arrived. In a July 18, 2004 report to the juvenile court, a caseworker wrote that Vanessa “is not able to adequately care for Emely if she remained independent of a responsible adult.”
[254]*254¶ 5 The State offered various services to Vanessa in an effort to rehabilitate her, including instruction from a-parent aide, supervised visitation with Emely, and individual counseling. Vanessa lived in eight different placements from July 2004 through February 2005. Her behavior during this period included refusal to clean her room or bathroom, slamming doors, starting verbal fights with caretakers, being argumentative and depressed, throwing objects, yelling, threatening harm when she did not get her way, and overdosing on medications. In a February 2005 report, the case manager concluded that
Vanessa [ ] does not have the skills to take care of herself and also lacks the ability to care for a young child. [Vanessa] has twice in the past two months attempted to commit suicide. A child left in her care would not be safe from harm____ While [Vanessa] does have some child care skills, (she is able to put Emely in a car seat and appropriately fasten it), she is not able to meet the health, safety, social, medical, and emotional needs of a child. A child in her care would be at risk of neglect or abuse.
¶ 6 A June 19, 2005 report to the court concluded that “[i]t is not realistic to anticipate that performance will improve if the time frame for compliance is extended” because of Vanessa’s “cognitive deficits and mental health issues.”
¶ 7 During her visitations, Vanessa “holds Emely, kisses and hugs her child, laughs with her child, plays games with her child, sings to her child, [and] feeds and diapers her child.” The parent aide noted that Vanessa “often forgets snacks and water for the formula, forgets to use the highchair, forgets she must keep an eye on her child at all times, forgets appointment times, forgets what time it is, and forgets to give Emely safe toys____[S]he must be supervised when caring for her child.”
¶ 8 On August 10, 2004, Dr. Julio F. Angu-lo performed a psychological evaluation of Vanessa. A caretaker for Vanessa made several observations concerning Vanessa’s behavior and abilities to Dr. Angulo. When Vanessa lived with her adoptive mother, she would leave Emely for “days and nights at a time.” Vanessa was able to maintain her hygiene and grooming without assistance because she was self-conscious about her appearance. She could use the phone on her own. She could not count money, shop, manage a checkbook or household finances, prepare meals, or complete household chores on her own. She would typically forget to turn a stove or oven off if she used it. The caretaker also reported that Vanessa “has strong needs for attention and affection of males.” “If a boy or adult male pays attention to her, she drops whatever she is doing to attend to that male. If unsupervised, she is likely to impulsively leave with that male— without thinking about the consequences.” During the interview, Vanessa “did not know the current year, month, day of week or even the approximate time of the day.”
¶ 9 Dr. Angulo noted that Vanessa “typically acts without thinking about the consequences that her actions have for her safety or the safety of others.” She “displays markedly poor judgment and engages in risky activities whether it is drug abuse or running around in the streets for days, or engaging in promiscuous sex or prostitution.” She has no history of independent living and “is incapable of discharging most everyday tasks without prompt and or supervision— child-rearing tasks and responsibilities included.” Dr. Angulo said that because of her diagnosed disorders and attendant deficits, “her ability to parents [sic] is considered to be impaired. Under her care, her child will be at risk for neglect and/or abuse.” Dr. Angulo recommended specially designed services given Vanessa’s limited cognitive abilities, but emphasized that even with such specialized services, “the prognosis for significant changes [is] poor.” In the end, Dr. Angulo opined that ‘Vanessa might not be able to assume the daily tasks of parenting, unless she is constantly prompted and supervised.”
¶ 10 On August 13, 2005, Dr. Joel E. Parker conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Vanessa. In Dr. Parker’s opinion, Vanessa’s “clear cognitive limitations ... would interfere with her ability to safely parent any child.” Dr. Parker concluded that Vanessa “is unlikely to ever become a minimally adequate parent because of these cognitive limi[255]*255tations.” Dr. Parker did not believe that additional services were appropriate or that they would be “likely to improve her condition to any appreciable extent.” Dr. Parker did “not believe that the [child] will ever be safe to return home. [Vanessa’s] cognitive limitations are simply too severe for [the child] ever to be safe under her care.”2
¶ 11 Kristi teKampe, Vanessa’s assigned counselor, wrote in a June 2005 report that Vanessa’s “disability will be a barrier throughout her lifetime regardless the number of counseling sessions she participates in as she does not have the cognitive ability to retain what is learned.” She did not believe that continued counseling would prepare Vanessa for parenting. At trial, teKampe testified that all the services she thinks could have been offered to Vanessa had been offered, but that Vanessa was still unable to parent her child.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION
BARKER, Judge.
¶ 1 Vanessa H. (“Vanessa”) appeals the termination of her parental rights with respect to her daughter, Emely H. (“Emely”). For the following reasons, we affirm,
Facts and Procedural History
¶ 2 Vanessa was born on March 15, 1986. At age six, after having lived in group homes and shelters since birth, she was adopted and raised by both adoptive parents until age sixteen. At that time, she was placed in the physical custody of Child Protective Services (“CPS”) “because of repeatedly running away.” In June 2003, it was recommended that she participate in a residential program given her “history of noncompliance, running away, and frequent involvement with the legal system.” Vanessa was placed in juvenile detention on drug use charges in 2003 when she was four months pregnant with Emely. She also received services from the Division of Developmental Disabilities throughout this period and after. The record also shows allegations of egregious misconduct, including forcible sexual conduct, allegedly perpetrated against Vanessa while either in State care or under the supervision of those whom the State had entrusted to care for Vanessa.
¶ 3 Vanessa’s IQ, most recently measured at 53, places her in the “mild to moderate mentally retarded range.”1 Test results from August 2003 indicated that her achievement scores were “below 3rd grade level in all broad areas” and below the second or first grade levels in some areas. A June 23, 2003 psychiatric evaluation included the following additional diagnoses for Vanessa: conduct disorder, cocaine abuse, learning disorder, psychosocial past history, relational issues, painful memories and substance use.
¶ 4 On March 25, 2004, Vanessa gave birth to Emely. On July 10, 2004, CPS removed Emely from Vanessa’s care after Vanessa left Emely alone in a grassy area in an apartment complex for several hours, not returning until after the police had arrived. In a July 18, 2004 report to the juvenile court, a caseworker wrote that Vanessa “is not able to adequately care for Emely if she remained independent of a responsible adult.”
[254]*254¶ 5 The State offered various services to Vanessa in an effort to rehabilitate her, including instruction from a-parent aide, supervised visitation with Emely, and individual counseling. Vanessa lived in eight different placements from July 2004 through February 2005. Her behavior during this period included refusal to clean her room or bathroom, slamming doors, starting verbal fights with caretakers, being argumentative and depressed, throwing objects, yelling, threatening harm when she did not get her way, and overdosing on medications. In a February 2005 report, the case manager concluded that
Vanessa [ ] does not have the skills to take care of herself and also lacks the ability to care for a young child. [Vanessa] has twice in the past two months attempted to commit suicide. A child left in her care would not be safe from harm____ While [Vanessa] does have some child care skills, (she is able to put Emely in a car seat and appropriately fasten it), she is not able to meet the health, safety, social, medical, and emotional needs of a child. A child in her care would be at risk of neglect or abuse.
¶ 6 A June 19, 2005 report to the court concluded that “[i]t is not realistic to anticipate that performance will improve if the time frame for compliance is extended” because of Vanessa’s “cognitive deficits and mental health issues.”
¶ 7 During her visitations, Vanessa “holds Emely, kisses and hugs her child, laughs with her child, plays games with her child, sings to her child, [and] feeds and diapers her child.” The parent aide noted that Vanessa “often forgets snacks and water for the formula, forgets to use the highchair, forgets she must keep an eye on her child at all times, forgets appointment times, forgets what time it is, and forgets to give Emely safe toys____[S]he must be supervised when caring for her child.”
¶ 8 On August 10, 2004, Dr. Julio F. Angu-lo performed a psychological evaluation of Vanessa. A caretaker for Vanessa made several observations concerning Vanessa’s behavior and abilities to Dr. Angulo. When Vanessa lived with her adoptive mother, she would leave Emely for “days and nights at a time.” Vanessa was able to maintain her hygiene and grooming without assistance because she was self-conscious about her appearance. She could use the phone on her own. She could not count money, shop, manage a checkbook or household finances, prepare meals, or complete household chores on her own. She would typically forget to turn a stove or oven off if she used it. The caretaker also reported that Vanessa “has strong needs for attention and affection of males.” “If a boy or adult male pays attention to her, she drops whatever she is doing to attend to that male. If unsupervised, she is likely to impulsively leave with that male— without thinking about the consequences.” During the interview, Vanessa “did not know the current year, month, day of week or even the approximate time of the day.”
¶ 9 Dr. Angulo noted that Vanessa “typically acts without thinking about the consequences that her actions have for her safety or the safety of others.” She “displays markedly poor judgment and engages in risky activities whether it is drug abuse or running around in the streets for days, or engaging in promiscuous sex or prostitution.” She has no history of independent living and “is incapable of discharging most everyday tasks without prompt and or supervision— child-rearing tasks and responsibilities included.” Dr. Angulo said that because of her diagnosed disorders and attendant deficits, “her ability to parents [sic] is considered to be impaired. Under her care, her child will be at risk for neglect and/or abuse.” Dr. Angulo recommended specially designed services given Vanessa’s limited cognitive abilities, but emphasized that even with such specialized services, “the prognosis for significant changes [is] poor.” In the end, Dr. Angulo opined that ‘Vanessa might not be able to assume the daily tasks of parenting, unless she is constantly prompted and supervised.”
¶ 10 On August 13, 2005, Dr. Joel E. Parker conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Vanessa. In Dr. Parker’s opinion, Vanessa’s “clear cognitive limitations ... would interfere with her ability to safely parent any child.” Dr. Parker concluded that Vanessa “is unlikely to ever become a minimally adequate parent because of these cognitive limi[255]*255tations.” Dr. Parker did not believe that additional services were appropriate or that they would be “likely to improve her condition to any appreciable extent.” Dr. Parker did “not believe that the [child] will ever be safe to return home. [Vanessa’s] cognitive limitations are simply too severe for [the child] ever to be safe under her care.”2
¶ 11 Kristi teKampe, Vanessa’s assigned counselor, wrote in a June 2005 report that Vanessa’s “disability will be a barrier throughout her lifetime regardless the number of counseling sessions she participates in as she does not have the cognitive ability to retain what is learned.” She did not believe that continued counseling would prepare Vanessa for parenting. At trial, teKampe testified that all the services she thinks could have been offered to Vanessa had been offered, but that Vanessa was still unable to parent her child.
¶ 12_Myriam Barajas, the CPS case manager, testified that as of the time of trial, Vanessa was living in a group home with twenty-four hour monitoring, transportation, and supervision. She expressed several concerns for Vanessa’s parenting abilities: “[Vanessa is] unwilling to provide proper snacks even when she’s told what they are. [Vanessa’s] inability to learn from the one-on-one sessions when she is visually taught about nutrition, clothing sizes, appropriate toys, [her] inability to bring proper gifts to the child. At one time she gave her money, gave her coins, and she was putting them in her mouth.”
¶ 13 Vanessa testified at trial. She was asked what it costs to rent an apartment. She replied, “Like $60 or more than that.” Vanessa said she did not know where she would go to live if Emely were returned to her.
¶ 14 Turning to the procedural history, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) filed an amended dependency petition on August 12, 2004. The court declared Emely dependent as to Vanessa on August 31, 2004. ADES filed an amended motion for termination of the parent-child relationship on November 9, 2005. One of the alleged grounds was that Vanessa was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to mental illness and/or mental deficiency. The severance hearings were held on February 28 and March 7, 2006. The trial court granted the motion to terminate the parent-child relationship on the grounds that Vanessa was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to mental illness or mental deficiency. The court found, among other things, that “[Vanessa] requires twenty-four [hour] assisted living and will require that level of care indefinitely. [Vanessa] is unable to provide for her basic needs or the needs of Emely.” The court found that the condition would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period of time.
¶ 15 Vanessa timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-235 (2007).
Discussion
¶ 16 Termination of the parent-child relationship is appropriate if the statutory grounds are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App.2002). “[W]e will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id.
¶ 17 In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence one of the enumerated statutory grounds. A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (2007). These grounds include the following: “That the parent is unable to discharge the parental responsibilities because of mental illness [or] mental deficiency ... and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” Id. at (B)(3).
¶ 18 As an element of termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the State is required to demonstrate that it has “made a reasonable effort to preserve the family.” [256]*256Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 33, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App.1999). “This principle does not oblige the State to undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile.” Id. at ¶34, 971 P.2d 1046. If the State is obligated to undertake rehabilitative measures, however, it must “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success.” Id. In sum, the State must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that it ha[s] made a reasonable effort to provide [the parent] with rehabilitative services or that such an effort would be futile.” Id. at 193, ¶42, 971 P.2d at 1054 (emphasis added).
¶ 19 Vanessa argues on appeal that the State did not make reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship. Because reasonable efforts are an element of termination, id. at 192, ¶ 33, 971 P.2d at 1053, Vanessa claims that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights as the State did not make “reasonable efforts” to provide services to preserve the family. Other than this argument, Vanessa does not challenge the court’s findings that she was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of mental deficiency and that such condition would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period of time. The State argues that the trial court should be affirmed as the evidence supports a finding that providing such services would have been futile. We agree.
¶ 20 We do not have any quarrel with the dissent’s assertion that “reasonable efforts” includes seeking to reasonably accommodate disabilities from which a parent may suffer. We view reasonable accommodations as a component of making “reasonable efforts.” See Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 33, 971 P.2d at 1053. Without commenting on the standard or approach that the dissent lays out in this regard, one fundamental flaw in the dissent’s position is that on this record there is abundant evidence showing that no amount of “reasonable efforts” in providing services would have enabled Vanessa to function as a minimally adequate parent. This is particularly so when we view the evidence, as we must, in a light most favorable to affirming the trial court. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 106, 876 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1994) (“We view the facts in a light most favorable to affirming the trial court’s findings.”). With all due respect, the dissent is simply mistaken when it contends that “there is nothing to support the conclusion that [Vanessa] would not benefit from appropriate services.” There is an abundance of such evidence.
¶21 For instance, Dr. Parker gave the following answers to the following questions:
[Question] Are there services that could be provided to improve [Vanessa’s] condition? If so, what specific services are recommended?
[Answer] I do not believe that any additional services are appropriate for [Vanessa]. ... I do not believe that any additional services are likely to improve her condition to any appreciable extent. [Question] What is the prognosis that the parent will be able to demonstrate adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future?
[Answer] Vanessa’s prognosis is extremely poor. Her mental retardation, confounded by her mood disorder, personality disturbance, and history of abusing substances, indicate that she is unlikely to ever become a minimally adequate parent.
[Question] Even with the proposed interventions, do you feel that she will be able to discharge parental responsibilities in the foreseeable future ?
[Answer] No, as above.
[Question] Given history of substance abuse, what period of sobriety/abstinence is required for the parent before the children can safely return home?
[Answer] As indicated above, I do not believe that the children will ever be safe to return home. [Vanessa’s] cognitive limitations are simply too severe for them ever to be safe under her care.
(Emphasis added.) Kristi teKampe, Vanessa’s assigned counselor, also opined that Vanessa’s “disability will be a barrier throughout her lifetime regardless [of] the number of counseling sessions she participates in. She does not have the cognitive ability to retain what is learned.” A report [257]*257to the juvenile court also concluded that “[i]t is not realistic to anticipate that performance will improve if the time frame for compliance is extended” because of Vanessa’s “cognitive deficits and mental health issues.”
¶ 22 There was, as the dissent notes, some potentially contradictory evidence including Dr. Angulo’s testimony that with specialized services “the prognosis for significant changes [is] poor,” rather than futile. The trial court, however, is specifically charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence. Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d 923, 928 (App. 2005) (“conflicts in the evidence are for the fact-finder to resolve”); Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d at 207 (“The resolution of such conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the trier of fact; we do not re-weigh the evidence on review.”). That is not an appellate function. Id. Dr. Parker opined that Vanessa’s “cognitive limitations are simply too severe for [the child] to ever be safe under her care.” The trial court could reasonably rely on this and the other abundant evidence.
¶ 23 The dissent also points to allegations of “mistreatment, exploitation, and rape at the hands of the very placement staff with whom [Vanessa] was entrusted.” Infra ¶ 57. As disturbing as these allegations are,3 the dissent does not consider that the evidence of these allegations was also before the trial court. The trial court was able to consider this evidence, as well as all the other evidence, in determining whether “the parent is unable to discharge [her] parental responsibilities because of mental illness [or] mental deficiency.” A.R.S. § 8 — 533(B)(3). The trial court determined, and the evidence supports, that the statutory mandate was met. Thus, regardless of the allegations of misconduct, the statutory requirements were nonetheless satisfied.
¶24 The dissent also suggests that our decision is based on “erroneous assumptions about the parenting ability of the mentally disabled.” Infra ¶ 27. On the contrary, we make no decisions based upon attributes that may or may not be shared by others who have similar disabilities to Vanessa. Our decision is based on the evidence that pertains to Vanessa. Supra ¶¶ 3-13,21.
¶25 To conclude, there was clearly evidence in the record to support a determination that the provision of further services to Vanessa would be futile. Because the State satisfied this requirement and there are no other contested issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Vanessa’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).
Conclusion
¶26 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CONCURRING: G. MURRAY SNOW, Presiding Judge.