JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.
On this appeal from a judgment of conviction on two counts of perjury, the questions for our determination are whether the alleged perjured statement in one of the counts was lifted out of the context in which it was made and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction on the other count. A careful scrutiny of the record convinces us that both of these questions must be answered favorably to the Defendant Gordon Van Liew, and the convictions must be reversed.
This is one phase of a triple attack by the Government concerning activities [676]*676of Defendants (and Associates) in the manufacture and sale of an orange juice product. On June 19, 1959, a hearing was held in the United States District Court on the Government’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In that civil action brought for equitable relief, the Government sought a preliminary injunction restraining several named defendants from shipping a certain orange drink on the ground that in the manner sold and labeled it was economically adulterated and misbranded.1 The Government’s action was unsuccessful. The District Court declined to grant the relief, dissolved the prior restraining order and subsequently set the case for trial on its merits.2 The Government then pursued the criminal route. On March 27, 1961, the individual defendants were placed on trial under a six count indictment charging a criminal conspiracy to misbrand and adulterate the orange drink, and the substantive counts of adulteration and misbranding also under 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 342(b) (2) and (4), 343 (a), (b), and (i) (2). On April 7, 1961, the jury returned verdicts of guilty. But as in the earlier civil proceeding, the result was not that sought by the Government since the verdicts found no intent to defraud or mislead, thus reducing the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor. By separate opinion we have this day reversed these convictions by our determination that the indictment was defective. Van Liew v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 664.
On April 20, 1961, just shortly after the criminal trial for adulteration and misbranding, the Defendant Gordon Van Liew and two others3 were charged under a six count indictment4 with having committed perjury at the origi[677]*677nal hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction in the civil case. Though finding the two other defendants not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Defendant Gordon Van Liew on Counts III5 and IV6 (note 4, supra). At the same time it found him not guilty as to Count V.7 This appeal followed.
As was true in the criminal misbrand-ing and adulteration case, Van Liew v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 664, it should be emphasized here that the Government’s attack was for economic adulteration or misbranding.8 Purity, wholesomeness, or nutritiousness of the product widely distributed through reputable local dairies was not questioned.9
The Defendant Gordon Van Liew asserts here, as he asserted in his motion for judgment of acquittal below, that the allegedly perjured statements set out in Count IV (see note 6, supra) were lifted out of the context in which they were spoken at the injunction hearing. Consequently, there was a failure to prove either falsity or intentional falsification. We agree. It is vital, of course, that the stream of justice not be contaminated by untruth, Adams v. United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (dissenting). But the serious[678]*678ness of the crime of perjury and the fact that it turns finally on the subjective knowledge and purpose of the swearer require that the Government not be allowed to predicate its case upon the answer to a single question which in and of itself may be false, but which is not shown to be false when read in conjunction with testimony immediately preceding and following the alleged perjured statement. The oft-quoted rule is applicable here. “A charge of perjury may not be sustained by the device of lifting a statement of the accused out of its immediate context and thus giving it a meaning wholly different than that which its context clearly shows.” Fotie v. United States, 8 Cir., 1943, 137 F.2d 831, 842; Brown v. United States, 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 549, 556; United States v. Geller, S.D.N.Y., 1957, 154 F.Supp. 727, 730, n. 3; cf. Meyers v. United States, 1948, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 171 F.2d 800, 806, 11 A.L.R.2d 1.
At the injunction hearing, the Defendant testified at length about the operations of his plant and the method by which they processed the orange drink. He explained how raw oranges were squeezed, how the raw orange juice was blended, how the mixture was pasteurized by a rapid heating and cooling process, and how the commodity was finally bottled and shipped to consumers. The Government’s contention is that the statement “Not to my knowledge” was made in answer to a question encompassing the entire production of the orange drink. Literally this was untrue since by use of a dairy hose water could be put in the tanks. In other words, the Government’s theory is that the Defendant had stated that from its inception in the raw oranges to the bottled commodity there was no way water could be added. This reading of the questions and answers is unsound. When read in light of the surrounding testimony, one of two things is clear. The first is that we think the Defendant’s answer obviously referred to the pasteurization process alone.10 But second, if this is not so as an established fact, the uncertainties as to what the interrogator thought, or what the swearer thought the interrogator thought by the words “operation or processing” are such that [679]*679neither we nor a jury could hold that knowing falsification was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, there is no showing in the record, either at the injunction hearing, the adulteration and misbranding criminal prosecution, or the perjury trial, that water was added, or could be added, through this pasteurization process. The conviction as to Count IV is accordingly reversed and remanded with directions that a judgment of acquittal be entered.
As to Count III, the Government had the burden of proving by clear, convincing and direct evidence to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally swore to a falsehood. The Government’s proof must be by substantial evidence excluding to the satisfaction of the jury every other hypothesis than that the Defendant in testifying as he did purposefully misstated the fact knowing it to be false and untrue. Brown v. United States, 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 549; Blumenfield v.
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JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.
On this appeal from a judgment of conviction on two counts of perjury, the questions for our determination are whether the alleged perjured statement in one of the counts was lifted out of the context in which it was made and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction on the other count. A careful scrutiny of the record convinces us that both of these questions must be answered favorably to the Defendant Gordon Van Liew, and the convictions must be reversed.
This is one phase of a triple attack by the Government concerning activities [676]*676of Defendants (and Associates) in the manufacture and sale of an orange juice product. On June 19, 1959, a hearing was held in the United States District Court on the Government’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In that civil action brought for equitable relief, the Government sought a preliminary injunction restraining several named defendants from shipping a certain orange drink on the ground that in the manner sold and labeled it was economically adulterated and misbranded.1 The Government’s action was unsuccessful. The District Court declined to grant the relief, dissolved the prior restraining order and subsequently set the case for trial on its merits.2 The Government then pursued the criminal route. On March 27, 1961, the individual defendants were placed on trial under a six count indictment charging a criminal conspiracy to misbrand and adulterate the orange drink, and the substantive counts of adulteration and misbranding also under 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 342(b) (2) and (4), 343 (a), (b), and (i) (2). On April 7, 1961, the jury returned verdicts of guilty. But as in the earlier civil proceeding, the result was not that sought by the Government since the verdicts found no intent to defraud or mislead, thus reducing the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor. By separate opinion we have this day reversed these convictions by our determination that the indictment was defective. Van Liew v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 664.
On April 20, 1961, just shortly after the criminal trial for adulteration and misbranding, the Defendant Gordon Van Liew and two others3 were charged under a six count indictment4 with having committed perjury at the origi[677]*677nal hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction in the civil case. Though finding the two other defendants not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Defendant Gordon Van Liew on Counts III5 and IV6 (note 4, supra). At the same time it found him not guilty as to Count V.7 This appeal followed.
As was true in the criminal misbrand-ing and adulteration case, Van Liew v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 664, it should be emphasized here that the Government’s attack was for economic adulteration or misbranding.8 Purity, wholesomeness, or nutritiousness of the product widely distributed through reputable local dairies was not questioned.9
The Defendant Gordon Van Liew asserts here, as he asserted in his motion for judgment of acquittal below, that the allegedly perjured statements set out in Count IV (see note 6, supra) were lifted out of the context in which they were spoken at the injunction hearing. Consequently, there was a failure to prove either falsity or intentional falsification. We agree. It is vital, of course, that the stream of justice not be contaminated by untruth, Adams v. United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (dissenting). But the serious[678]*678ness of the crime of perjury and the fact that it turns finally on the subjective knowledge and purpose of the swearer require that the Government not be allowed to predicate its case upon the answer to a single question which in and of itself may be false, but which is not shown to be false when read in conjunction with testimony immediately preceding and following the alleged perjured statement. The oft-quoted rule is applicable here. “A charge of perjury may not be sustained by the device of lifting a statement of the accused out of its immediate context and thus giving it a meaning wholly different than that which its context clearly shows.” Fotie v. United States, 8 Cir., 1943, 137 F.2d 831, 842; Brown v. United States, 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 549, 556; United States v. Geller, S.D.N.Y., 1957, 154 F.Supp. 727, 730, n. 3; cf. Meyers v. United States, 1948, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 171 F.2d 800, 806, 11 A.L.R.2d 1.
At the injunction hearing, the Defendant testified at length about the operations of his plant and the method by which they processed the orange drink. He explained how raw oranges were squeezed, how the raw orange juice was blended, how the mixture was pasteurized by a rapid heating and cooling process, and how the commodity was finally bottled and shipped to consumers. The Government’s contention is that the statement “Not to my knowledge” was made in answer to a question encompassing the entire production of the orange drink. Literally this was untrue since by use of a dairy hose water could be put in the tanks. In other words, the Government’s theory is that the Defendant had stated that from its inception in the raw oranges to the bottled commodity there was no way water could be added. This reading of the questions and answers is unsound. When read in light of the surrounding testimony, one of two things is clear. The first is that we think the Defendant’s answer obviously referred to the pasteurization process alone.10 But second, if this is not so as an established fact, the uncertainties as to what the interrogator thought, or what the swearer thought the interrogator thought by the words “operation or processing” are such that [679]*679neither we nor a jury could hold that knowing falsification was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, there is no showing in the record, either at the injunction hearing, the adulteration and misbranding criminal prosecution, or the perjury trial, that water was added, or could be added, through this pasteurization process. The conviction as to Count IV is accordingly reversed and remanded with directions that a judgment of acquittal be entered.
As to Count III, the Government had the burden of proving by clear, convincing and direct evidence to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally swore to a falsehood. The Government’s proof must be by substantial evidence excluding to the satisfaction of the jury every other hypothesis than that the Defendant in testifying as he did purposefully misstated the fact knowing it to be false and untrue. Brown v. United States, 8 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 549; Blumenfield v. United States, 8 Cir., 1962, 306 F.2d 892; Beckanstin v. United States, 5 Cir., 1956, 232 F.2d 1; United States v. Rose, 3 Cir., 1954, 215 F.2d 617; United States v. Neff, 3 Cir., 1954, 212 F.2d 297; McWhorter v. United States, 5 Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 982; Fotie v. United States, 8 Cir., 1943, 137 F.2d 831. The Government did not meet its burden here.
The Defendant asserts two reasons why the proof was insufficient as a matter of law. The first is one with which the parties in brief and argument have been much — if not too much- — preoccupied. The Defendant contends that when he stated no water or sugar had been added to the “product” (see note 5, supra), this meant he was testifying that no water or sugar had been added to the resulting finished commodity after it had been through the mixing stage. Of course there is no showing anywhere that water or sugar was added to the final commodity. The Government takes the opposite viewpoint. It claims that the Defendant understood the term “product” to mean the commodity during any stage in the processing. To show this, the Government points to the fact that in Defendant’s testimony, he frequently used the word “product” when referring to the commodity during its processing stages. The Government’s position in this regard is buttressed by the implied jury finding that the Defendant knew the term “product” meant the in-between processes.11
[680]*680While we do not discard altogether this emphasis on “product” as having no controlling significance, we think the second ground is both sound and unanswerable. It likewise lends intrinsic support to the idea that the witness thought the inquiry related to a time subsequent to blending. The second contention is that the record in the civil injunction proceeding as reflected by excerpts introduced in the perjury trial shows positively that in the making of this “product” frozen orange concentrate was customarily and frequently used when and as needed to stabilize the taste of the finished commodity.12 Actually this practice is so much a part of the processing of drinks of this kind that little was said about it in so many words, and in no event was the use of concentrates claimed to be adulteration or misbranding. Orange concentrate, as its name implies, is the result of evaporation of liquids out of single strength fresh raw orange juice, pulp, peel, etc. Commercial, governmentally recognized standards are used to determine the extent of concentration. The higher the Brix (relative weight of solids to total weight), the higher is the concentration. This is a perishable and concentrate is shipped and stored under deep refrigeration.
Since the testimony from all sources acknowledged that the taste, the sweetness, tartness, insipidness, etc. of orange [681]*681varisb with the type of oranges, climatic conditions, area of growth, state of maturity, and the like, it is necessary frequently to blend juices to maintain a uniform product. A principal factor is uniformity in sweetness or tartness, a matter which relates directly to the relative-acidity or sugar content of any given lot of oranges or juice therefrom.
This blending may be done in several ways. One way is to mix two or more lots of single strength fresh raw orange juice. Another, and altogether legitimate, governmentally recognized way is to use frozen concentrates. But a frozen concentrate is in a semi solid state. If a desired amount of a concentrate is to be mixed with single strength raw orange juice in order to bring taste up or down to the desired level, it means that in the resulting liquid product the amount of solids has thereby been increased.13 This is avoided, however, by mixing water with the concentrate. Restoring to concentrate the water evaporated from it is called reconstituting.
Not only is there no doubt as a physical proposition that in the phenomena of concentrating and reconstituting, water is taken out and then restored, but the Government’s own case in the perjury trial established that when concentrate is used the industry knows two things. First, water will be added. And second, sugar as needed will be added.
The Government had to establish two main things (besides wilful intent) : (1) the testimony given by Defendant in the civil trial, and (2) the falsity thereof. It undertook to prove (2) by testimony of two witnesses who worked in the plant. These witnesses testified that concentrate was used in blending to achieve a uniform product, and that in that operation water, sugar or both were added. But each then acknowledged with like positiveness that when concentrate is used, it is certain that water, sugar or both will be added, and that this is known to the industry. Consequently, when inquiry reveals that concentrate is used, a person in the industry knows that water (and sugar) is added.14 In testifying that no water (sugar) is added when concentrate has been used, a person in the industry would necessarily be referring to steps subsequent to the reconstitution.
Any other conclusion makes little sense. The questions propounded on the civil injunction hearing, as well as frequent references to samples taken for de-chemists appearing as witnesses made it clear that concentrates were regularly used. That being so, it would have been sheer folly for the Defendants to have [682]*682tailed chemical analysis by Government denied that water (and sugar as needed) was mixed with concentrate to reconstitute it. In any event, the Government’s case15 did not do more than show that there were two plausible interpretations to be placed on what the interrogator meant. Assuming that perjury could nonetheless be committed in such context, the deficiency of the proof here is demonstrated by considering what the Government would have to establish in that setting. It would have to establish that (a) the interrogator used the words with the meaning intended by the Government, and that (b) the swearer knew (i) the sense in which the interrogator used the words and (ii) nevertheless intentionally gave an answer which he knew to be false to the question as thus [683]*683put in the sense thus intended. Whatever might be the actual fact, the evidence is not adequate to carry the burden that beyond a reasonable doubt the Defendant knew these things.
Since the words asked and answered cannot change, and nothing may now be dene to alter or improve the Government’s ease, the cause must be remanded with direction to enter a judgment of acquittal on both counts.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
TUTTLE, Chief Judge, concurs in the result.