Cutter, J.
A Superior Court judge, sitting without a
jury, found the defendant guilty on an indictment in two counts alleging perjury before the Crime Commission (Res. 1962, c. 146). He imposed a sentence to the House of Correction and a fine on the first count and a concurrent sentence to. the House of Correction on the second count. The case has been before us once before on certain issues of law. Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 113, (“the first Giles case”).1
The complete stenographic transcript of the trial (held under G. L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, as amended) is now before us. Various errors are assigned.
The Indictment.
The indictment may be summarized as follows (emphasis supplied). Count 1 charged that before the commission “the question was asked in substance and effect whether . . . Giles had any connection with . . . Nessex Engineering Company [Nessex] in the period of time since it was formed to. the present and to this . . . Giles did willfully . . . testify ... in substance . . . that he had no personal or financial connection with Nessex . . . well-knowing that [4]*4his . . . testimony was false.” Count 2 charged that the defendant was asked whether he “had ever received any amounts of money from Nessex . . . and to this the . . . [defendant] did willfully . . . testify ... in substance . . . that he had never received a salary or commission or money from Nessex for any other purpose . . . than a loan, well-knowing that his said testimony was false.”
The 1964 Hearing.
On October 11, 1963, the commission’s counsel by letter gave the defendant an “opportunity to appear voluntarily at a hearing” concerning Nessex and Stuart Engineering Company (Stuart). Giles, after consulting counsel, did not appear.
Later Giles talked with the Attorney General. As a result, he received a letter dated January 31, 1964, from the Attorney General enclosing a copy of a letter of the same date from the commission’s chairman to the Attorney General, which began (emphasis supplied), “You told me yesterday that Commissioner Giles has requested an opportunity to explain to the Crime Commission his activities with respect to the survey companies that the Commission has investigated. The Commission will arrange a hearing at which he may appear voluntarily. ’ ’2
On February 5, 1964, the defendant (against the advice of his counsel) appeared voluntarily before the Crime Commission. His counsel accompanied him. He was warned of his constitutional rights, was sworn, and was told that the commission had “been conducting an investigation of . . . Nessex . . . [and] Stuart.” He was then given an [5]*5opportunity to make ‘ ‘ some statements ’ ’ concerning the two corporations.3
The following questions were asked and answers given (emphasis supplied). Q. “With reference to Nessex . . . I wonder if you could tell us what your connection with that company was, if any, in the period of time since it was formed to the present!” A. “I have had no personal or financial connection with Nessex . . . from the day it was formed to the present.” Q. “Have you had any communications or dealings of any nature with Nessex . . .!” A. (conference with counsel) “I have not personally, no, not as an individual, no.”
At a later stage in the hearing, the defendant was asked (emphasis supplied): Q. “At any point between the formation of Nessex and the present time, did you receive any amounts of money from Nessex? A. 1 have never received a salary or commission or money from Nessex for any other purpose other than a loan which I have received . . . from Nessex.” This answer (p. 33 of commission hearing transcript) should be read with a subsequent answer (p. 65 — emphasis supplied): Q. “. . . is [it] your feeling that at no time did you indirectly get any funds from Nessex . . .!” A. “That is absolutely so.”4 The de[6]*6fendant told the commission that in 1956, he borrowed from Nessex for a short term with interest an amount which had been paid back and that he had made loans to Nessex on similar terms to enable “them to meet their payroll.”
Apart from the answers mentioned above, Giles in answer to specific questions by the commission’s counsel, made statements disclosing certain relations with Nessex. A summary of the principal points in these statements follows.
‘ ‘ [A] s an individual and as a member of the General Court,” the defendant had shared with Nessex an office in Lawrence “where . . . [he] met . . . constituents.” The defendant paid rent to Nessex. The then president of Nes-sex, one MacLeod, had formerly worked for the defendant at a drive-in theatre. He had started selling candy and became manager. MacLeod at some time left Nessex. The defendant left the theatre in 1957, and thereafter, apart from his service with the Commonwealth (as a member of the Legislature from 1947 to 1961 and later as Commissioner of Public Safety), was employed only by Stuart. Before Nessex was incorporated (July, 1954), the defendant talked with persons later connected with Nessex, including MacLeod, about whether the defendant “could be of any value ... in getting some work from the Commonwealth.” Later the defendant investigated this possibility with the Commissioner of Public Works, who referred him to the Supervisor of Surveys. As representative, he discussed the payment of bills owed by the State to Nessex with a man in the Department of Public Works. Nessex once had offices in premises in Methuen which the defendant had sold to Nessex.
Mrs. Giles, for less than a year prior to her marriage in 1956 to the defendant, had worked for Nessex. She continued to do so until 1958. The defendant’s son “was [7]*7trained first with Nessex” and worked for Nessex until “our own office [apparently Stuart] was set up . . . after he became a graduate engineer.”
The defendant said Stuart was formed because his son (who became “qualified to go out on his own”) did not get on with MacLeod and because Stuart wanted to do work for “more specialized people” than the State at higher rates than the State would pay. The defendant described Stuart as ‘1 my family corporation. ’ ’ It was formed in 1957 by his son (a registered engineer), the defendant’s wife, and one Stramondo. Since 1957 the defendant had been “affiliated with that company . . . and ... on and off the payroll.” Stuart, he said, “performed independent surveys . . . did subcontract work and rented men and equipment to other survey companies . . . and carried on a general survey . . . [and] civil engineering business.” He never had owned stock in Stuart, and had “no actual control over Stuart.”
Stuart first had an office in Lawrence, but later moved its office to the defendant’s house in Methuen. Stuart never performed any work for any State agency (but the defendant said that he did not regard Massachusetts Turnpike Authority as a State agency). Stuart did furnish Nessex, on a per diem basis, men, transportation, and survey equipment. Employees of Nessex worked for Stuart and vice versa. These services were paid for by “billings between the two companies every two weeks or every month.” One Brennan, who took over the Newton office of Stuart, carried on surveys of Massachusetts great ponds (see St. 1958, c. 434, p. 274) and “we [apparently Stuart] sublet some men and some equipment to him.” The defendant on one occasion “may have been present and may have . . . talked” with “Nessex and Stuart employees together” about certain union and health and accident insurance matters. Nessex was then “doing sub work for” Stuart. “ [T]hey were . . . contemplating going into the health and accident insurance together, and there weren’t enough in one company to go ahead with it,” The men “were [8]*8being transferred back and forth” and “had mutual problems. ’ ’ At the time the defendant testified, one Mahoney, then president of Nessex, was working for Stuart, and Nessex had “some rental equipment and property” but no personnel. Giles and his counsel stated that the books and records of Stuart, then in the possession of Giles’ accountant, would be made available to the commission.
The Evidence Before The Trial Judge.
At the outset of the trial of the indictment (which lasted from February 1 through 9, 1965) the Commonwealth introduced the whole stenographic transcript (eighty-eight pages) of the 1964 hearing before the commission. There was evidence of those facts about Nessex and Stuart, already summarized above, which Giles had disclosed to the commission in 1964 in answer to questions by the commission’s counsel.5 There also was testimony6 on matters [9]*9either not disclosed, or much less completely disclosed, before the commission. Certain other items separately were not of as great importance.7
An accountant, who had examined the records of Nessex, Stuart, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the Metropolitan District Commission, and the Department of Public Works testified (i) that, from January 1, 1958, to June 30, 1962, Nessex received from the Commonwealth and the Turnpike Authority a total of $285,522.59, more than sixty-eight per cent of Nessex’s gross receipts for the period,8 and paid to Stuart (for the use of survey teams furnished by it to Nessex) $126,646.28; and (ii) that from January 1, 1958, to October 31, 1962, Stuart paid the defendant in wages and bonuses $47,625 (bonus total $21,500) and paid Mrs. Giles $17,545 (wages $15,545, bonus $2,000). Nessex paid her $5,300. For a day’s work by a four-man survey party Nessex would receive from the State “pretty close to $100. ’ ’ Stuart would charge Nessex for such a party about $90. The daily payroll of Stuart for such a party would be about $65 to $70, exclusive of other expenses incurred by [10]*10Stuart. From this evidence, it could reasonably be concluded (a) that Nessex was charged by Stuart for each' four-man survey party a daily amount which gave Nessex on State business only about a $10 margin for other expenses and profit and gave Stuart about a $20 to $25 margin for expenses other than the survey party’s payroll and for profit, and (b) that Giles and his wife had received in wages and bonuses from Stuart $65,170 (in addition to the $5,300 received by Mrs. Giles from Nessex) during a period when Nessex had a net income (after taxes and expenses) of only about $5,491 and Stuart (on the same basis) had a net income of only a little over $20,000. The stockholders of Stuart were the defendant’s wife (sixty-six shares) and son (thirty-four shares). We assume that the facts concerning Stuart stated above were ascertainable by the commission’s accountants from Stuart’s records offered at the hearing.
The foregoing figures indicate that Nessex had other business. Doubtless, its officers and its employees (as did Mrs. Giles) received compensation. Stuart (see fn. 8) had a substantial gross income other than that from survey parties furnished to Nessex. Presumably part of the compensation paid by Stuart to Giles and his wife was attributable to that other business. We assume that Stuart had expenses for travel, equipment, insurance, and other operating costs. Nevertheless, the figures just summarized, permitted an inference that a significant part of the receipts from Nessex’s large business with the Commonwealth had indirectly gone through Stuart to the defendant and his wife. On the other evidence already mentioned (fns. 6, 7), it could be concluded that the defendant had a close reía- ■ tian with Nessex, had actively participated in various as-. pects of its business, had exercised influence upon it, and had received the benefits of certain Nessex expenditures.
1. We first discuss the judge’s denial (a) of the defendant’s motion for a finding of not guilty on each count, and (b) of rulings that the Commonwealth had not proved its case under either count.
[11]*11A. The First Count.
(1) After Giles gave Ms original general answer that he had “no personal or financial connection with Nessex,” the character of the hearing (with respect to Giles’ “connection” with Nessex) became one in which, for the most part, specific information was sought by more specific questions. The principal issue with respect to count 1 relates to the effect, if any, upon his original answer, to be given to Giles’ subsequent disclosure (in answer to specific questions) to the commission of various “connections” with Nessex (see fn. 4, and related text).
The judge ruled that Giles’ answers “must be read and construed in light of all the related testimony offered by the defendant . . . [and] of the direction of the particular questions asked ... by the” commission. That ruling .was correct. Despite possible implications of cases like United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 576 (see fn. 10, infra), in these circumstances it would be unfair to view Giles’ original answer in isolation from his later disclosures. See e.g. Meyers v. United States, 171 F. 2d 800, 805-807 (Ct. App. D. C.), where it was said that a “statement may not be isolated and thereby given a meaning wholly different from the clear significance of the testimony considered as a whole.” See also Fotie v. United States, 137 F. 2d 831, 840-842 (8th Cir.); Conrad v. United States, 255 F. 2d 247, 248-251 (5th Cir.). Cf. Van Liew v. United States, 321 F. 2d 674, 677-683 (5th Cir.). Giles’ subsequent disclosures were given to the commission as a part of one examination during continuous testimony. His original answer should be appraised, we think, after fair consideration of what he later disclosed.
Consistently with his ruling, it was open to the trial judge to consider the effect (by way of interpretation, explanation, qualification, or retraction) upon Giles’ original answer of Ms subsequent disclosures. The judge was bound to take those disclosures into account (a) in determining what Giles meant by his original answer and in deciding [12]*12whether any falsity in it was unintended, and (b) in weighing whether and to what extent Giles meant to correct or modify that original answer.
(2) The words, used in the original answer to the general question referred to in count 1, ordinarily have a broad and inclusive meaning (as Giles in his brief essentially concedes in passages quoted below). Looking at the original question and answer wholly apart from the later disclosures, a majority of the court are of opinion that the trial judge, as trier of the fact, would have been warranted in deciding that Giles intentionally used “connection” in its ordinary, broad sense. It was his function to determine, within reasonable limits, what Giles meant by his answers. United States v. Marchisio, 344 F. 2d 653, 661-662 (2d Cir.), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Bessette, 345 Mass. 358, 360-361.
Nothing in the question or Giles’ original answer (that he had no personal or financial “connection” with Nessex), viewed by themselves, suggested that “connection” was limited to the possession of a financial or proprietary “interest.”9 Indeed, almost immediately after the original answer Giles told the commission that he had not personally had “any communications or dealings of any nature with Nessex,” thus interpreting in some degree his original answer. Giles was not shown to have had any direct property or ownership in Nessex or its capital stock. There was little direct evidence about the nature of Giles’ then current and past relations and contacts with the officers, directors, and stockholders of Nessex (except for MacLeod and for Mahoney, see fn. 6) or about their activities or the extent of their respective investments in Nessex or the necessity of any large investment in a company of this type. Nevertheless, the evidence (see fns. 6, 7, and related text) permitted the judge to conclude that Giles had a very substantial connection with Nessex and participated in and [13]*13influenced its representatives and its affairs to a much greater extent than his commission testimony indicated, and (as already mentioned) that Giles had received a variety of direct and indirect benefits from Nessex.
(3) When Giles’ original answer is considered, not by itself, but with his later testimony before the commission, there is apparent a substantial inconsistency between the broad ordinary meaning of “no personal or financial connection” and what Giles did disclose to the commission. These later disclosures by no means covered all Giles’ relations with, and actions in behalf of, Nessex which could have been found to have existed on the evidence at the trial. See fns. 6, 7, and related text. Nevertheless, he did disclose a variety of dealings between Nessex and him, both individually and as representing Stuart.
Giles before the commission did not purport to make any express retraction10 of his original answer, if in fact he intended in that answer (which adopted “connection,” the word used by the commission’s counsel in his question) to use the term “no personal or financial connection” in a broad sense. The Commonwealth, indeed, does not appear to argue that the later disclosures were an insufficient attempt to retract an original false answer. Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether Giles’ later disclosures show that he did not intend by his original answer the usual broad meaning of “no personal or financial connection.”
The Commonwealth correctly concedes that the test is “a subjective one” (i.e. what Giles in good faith and in fact did mean, as reasonably “inferred” by the trier of the fact “from all the . . . circumstances, including the commonly accepted meaning of the words used in the question and answer”). The judge correctly gave rulings to the effect that, if Giles believed what he said to be the truth or was [14]*14honestly mistaken or if he meant by his answer to the question about his connection with Nessex “that he had no interest in that corporation, as an owner, shareholder, corporate officer, director, employee, or other such interest,” he could not be convicted of perjury. The judge also correctly ruled that the defendant could not be convicted unless his answers were “wilfully” and “deliberately and intentionally false.” Commonwealth v. Douglass, 5 Met. 241, 244-245. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 12 Met. 225, 227-229. See the first Giles case, 350 Mass. 102, 112-113; Seymour v. United States, 77 F. 2d 577, 582-583 (8th Cir.). See also Commonwealth v. Brady, 5 Gray, 78, 79; Commonwealth v. Sargent, 129 Mass. 115, 121, 124; Commonwealth v. Bessette, 345 Mass. 358, 360-361.
As Giles contends in his brief, his commission testimony “is replete with statements . . . [of] what would be considered ‘personal connections’ within the ordinary meaning of that phrase.” From this he argues that “this type of testimony makes it self-evident . . . when he used the word ‘personal’ he was thinking of that term as something distinct from its normal meaning.” Giles at his trial testified that when .he went before the commission he “was of the opinion, from all the evidence . . . [he] had . . . that the . . . [e]ommission’s intent was to prove that . . . [he] had violated a conflict-of-interest law.”11 His position is that the circumstances, including the “conflict-of-interest law, and his counsel’s advice relative to the meaning of the phrase ‘personally interested’ ’’led him to use his words as [15]*15meaning “financial or proprietary interest.” Cf. Meyers v. United States, 171 F. 2d 800, 804-807 (Ct. App. D. C.), where “connection” was used in addition to the words “ financially interested. ’ ’
The striking inconsistency between the ordinary meaning of Giles’ original answer and his later disclosures leaves what Giles did mean by his original answer, or how he meant to leave his testimony as a whole, significantly ambiguous. Certainly, the inconsistency made appropriate further specific questions to Giles before the commission. The absence of any clarification by further questions gives color to Giles’ argument, already summarized, that in his original answer he was saying in effect that he had no stock ownership or direct financial interest in Nessex.
Giles’ original answer as affected by the later disclosures was permitted to remain ambiguous and confused. Because of that ambiguity it is difficult to say either (a) that Giles intended the answer to have the special meaning for which he now contends, or (b) that it had any other sufficiently definite and certain meaning which would provide an adequate basis for finding it to have been false.
A conviction for perjury must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the intentional falsity of an answer susceptible of a reasonably ascertainable meaning. We have come to the conclusion that the original answer, when read with the subsequent disclosures, was too ambiguous (a) to permit the trial judge, beyond a reasonable doubt, to attribute definite meaning to it under the principles of the Marchisio case, 344 F. 2d 653, 661-662, or (b) to support a conviction for perjury on count 1. See United States v. Lattimore, 215 F. 2d 847 (Ct. App. D. C.), S.C. 127 F. Supp. 405, 408-411 (D. D.C.), affd. by an evenly divided court, 232 F. 2d 334 (Ct. App. D. C.); United States v. Diogo, 320 F. 2d 898, 905-907 (2d Cir.). See also United States v. Rose, 215 F. 2d 617, 622-623 (3d Cir.); Conrad v. United States, 255 F. 2d 247, 248-252 (5th Cir.); Blumenfield v. United States, 306 F. 2d 892, 899-902 (8th Cir.).
Giles, a public official who had asked for a chance to ex[16]*16plain circumstances which he knew were under commission investigation, appropriately should not have permitted any such ambiguity in his testimony to arise or continue. Particularly is this so because testimony at the trial (fns. 6, 7), if believed, warranted the conclusion that Giles revealed to the commission less than his whole relationship with Nessex. Giles, however, was not required before the commission by further questions, after the inconsistency and ambiguities already mentioned should have been apparent, to make a more complete disclosure or to explain what he did mean by his original answer. He must be given the benefit of the substantial doubts and confusion which exist as a consequence.
The judgment on the first count is reversed and judgment is to be entered for the defendant on that count.
B. The Second Count.
As with the answer referred to in the first count, Giles’ original answer alleged in the second count (“I have never received a salary or commission or money from Nessex for any other purpose . . . than a loan”) must be read in the light of his subsequent answers. These include his answer already mentioned given some time later in his testimony (see fn. 4 and related text) agreeing that it was his “feeling that at no time did . . . [he] indirectly get any funds from Nessex” (emphasis supplied). That answer tended to indicate what he meant by the original answer.
We recognize, of course, that Giles, in his later disclosures to the commission, in general terms did describe the Nessex-Stuart intercompany payments for work parties and the sale of the Methuen real estate (fn. 5). Also, even if the aggregate amounts and details of the intercompany payments were not set out in the Stuart records (placed by Giles’ counsel at the commission’s disposal), this information could have been, and later was, ascertained by an audit of Stuart’s records. To discover the significance of the Nessex-Stuart payments as a percentage of Nessex’s gross receipts from State business, of course, required consultation of the Nessex books, A majority of the court, how[17]*17ever, are of opinion that the later disclosures did not create the same type or degree of ambiguity concerning the meaning of Giles ’ original answer alleged in the second count as was produced by the later disclosures pertinent to his original answer alleged in the first count.
The evidence warranted the judge in concluding that there were Nessex payments of moneys which, in whole or part, very directly went to Giles or for his benefit, for example, the payment of expenses, club bills, and contributions of Giles or members of his family, fn. 6, Item (b), and the receipt of money for the discount on Nessex’s new automobile. See fn. 6, Item (d). Also the evidence concerning the Nessex-Stuart business and financial relationship and the extent to which Giles could be found to have participated in and influenced Nessex’s affairs (fns. 6, 7), was relevant to determine the nature and purpose of the inter-company payments. This evidence permitted inferences substantially at variance with the absence of indirect payments or benefits. In the opinion of a majority of the court, on a reasonable interpretation, the question and original answer referred to in the second count (even viewed in the light of Giles’ later disclosures to the commission) could be found to amount to a statement that he had not received “moneys” either directly or indirectly from Nessex. That answer could have been found to have been false.
The judge’s general finding of guilty on count 2 must, however, be tested by his action on the relevant rulings among those12 requested by Giles.13 Requested rulings [18]*18nos. 13, 15 and 16 (fn. 13), suggest that the judge interpreted Giles’ answer, referred to in the second count, as denying that he had been the beneficiary of direct or indirect payments from Nessex. We, however, cannot reconcile these with his ruling (giving request no. 33) that on the evidence Giles “would have perjured himself had he stated that he had received moneys from Nessex.” Giles had not so testified and there was no occasion for giving the ruling. Nevertheless, it was given and creates a doubt concerning the principles applied by the judge. It is possible that the judge interpreted request no. 33 as referring merely to direct payments from Nessex to Giles. If that, however, was his intention the judge did not make this clear. The ruling leaves us sufficiently uncertain how the judge instructed himself on the second count to cause us to reverse the judgment on that count. A majority of the court, however, are of opinion that we should not order judgment entered for the defendant on that count.
■ 2. It was ordered (by a judge other than the trial judge) that Giles be given in advance of trial all his own testimony before the commission which concerned Nessex, and the “specific testimony furnished and all questions asked of . . . [Giles] by the . . . [commission upon which this indictment ... is based.” There is no present occasion to consider whether the failure to furnish the whole commission transcript was error, for it was put in evidence on February 1, 1965, at the beginning of the trial. Giles will have had it for over two years prior to any new trial on count 2.
Although our prior authorities did not require this type of discovery in a criminal case (see Commonwealth v. Ries, 337 Mass. 565, 583; cf. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. [19]*19505, 518), substantial authority supports affording, in advance of trial, to a defendant in a perjury prosecution the complete transcript of his allegedly false testimony. See e.g. United States v. Remington, 191 F. 2d 246, 250-251 (2d Cir.), cert. den. 343 U. S. 907; United States v. Rose, 215 F. 2d 617, 628-630 (3d Cir.). See also Parr v. United States, 265 F. 2d 894, 902-903 (5th Cir.). We think that, in line with such authority, in perjury cases hereafter, the defendant ordinarily should be furnished in advance of trial a copy of what he himself has said in the testimony alleged to have been false, without the necessity of his showing any “particularized need.” See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U. S. 395, 400.
3. Although some assignments of error have become immaterial because of our disposition of count 1, certain assignments must be dealt with to avoid questions on a retrial of count 2.
(a) There was evidence (a) that contracts had been awarded by State agencies to Nessex; (b) that Nessex had obtained a very large number of survey teams from Stuart; (c) that the defendant, while a member of the General Court, had helped to obtain contracts for Nessex; and (d) that he had been on Stuart’s payroll. Before the commission, Giles did not object to or refuse to answer any question as not relevant to the commission’s investigation. In the opinion of a majority of the court, the inquiries made were relevant to the commission’s general legislative investigation under Res. 1962, c. 146, in respects discussed in the first Giles case, 350 Mass. 102, 111-112. This view is supported by the evidence just summarized, by the possible relevance to the Nessex-Stuart transactions of G. L. c. 268, § 10, prior to its repeal in 1962 (see fn. 11), and by testimony of the commission’s counsel concerning a general investigation by him of survey companies.
(b) The inquiry, in the opinion of a majority of the court, was not improper merely because the commission may have had in its possession substantial information about Nessex, Stuart, and Giles prior to the hearing, which (see fn. 2 and [20]*20related text) Giles had himself requested.14 It was, of course, important that even information not sought by the commission be truthful. What Giles had to say was likely to be relevant to the commission’s legislative investigation of a type of complicated intercompany relationship (a) by which proceeds of public contracts might reach a public officer, and (b) which might appropriately be subjected to statutory regulation.
A majority of the court are also of opinion that, on the present record, United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388-389 (D. D.C.), is not here applicable, even if it be assumed (a matter we need not decide) that we would follow that lower court decision upon precisely similar facts. Cf. United States v. Winter, 348 F. 2d 204, 210-211 (2d Cir.), cert. den. 382 U. S. 955.
(c) The judge was not required to rule that, if only one credible witness testified in direct conflict with Giles, the latter could not be convicted without strong corroborative evidence. The so called “two witness” rule has no applicability. A number of witnesses testified about relevant circumstances, and there was documentary material, all bearing upon the truth of what Giles said. See Perkins, Criminal Law, 393. See also Commonwealth v. Gale, 317 Mass. 274, 277-278; Commonwealth v. Fine, 321 Mass. 299, 302-303.
(d) Giles was not prejudiced by the refusal to transfer this trial before a judge, sitting without a jury, to Essex County where related indictments were pending. See [21]*21Crocker v. Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 180. See also Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 333.
(e) Other assignments now require no comment.
4. On the first count, the judgment is reversed and the finding of guilty is set aside. Judgment for the defendant on the first count is to be entered. On the second count, the judgment is reversed and the finding of guilty is set aside.
So ordered.