Valley Constr. Co. v. Hoffman

417 F. Supp. 926, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13963
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedJuly 23, 1976
DocketNo. CV476-145
StatusPublished

This text of 417 F. Supp. 926 (Valley Constr. Co. v. Hoffman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valley Constr. Co. v. Hoffman, 417 F. Supp. 926, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13963 (S.D. Ga. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE, Chief Judge.

Findings and Conclusions

I

This is an action brought by Valley Construction Company, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. and 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314, to enjoin the proposed award of a contract by defendant to R and D Constructors, Inc. for the construction of an Aircraft Corrosion Control Facility at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. The successful bidder has intervened in the action.

On March 16, 1976, the United States Army Corps of Engineers issued an invitation for bids for the construction of the facility at that Base. The invitation required separate bid figures for the base bid, which covered the aircraft hangar and its [928]*928functional equipment, and for Additive I which covered a stabilized platform crane system with two platform cranes. The bid invitation was subsequently amended to request separate bids, Additives 11 and III, for two additional cranes.

The invitation to bid (I.F.B.) included Standard Form 20. Paragraph 14 thereof sets forth the following conditions under which the additives are awarded:

“The low bidder for purposes of award shall be the conforming responsible bidder offering the low aggregate amount for the first or base bid item, plus or minus (in the order of priority listed in the schedule) those additive or deductive bid items providing the most features of the work within the funds determined by the Government to be available before bids are opened.”

The bids were opened on April 22, 1976. The respective bids submitted by Valley Construction Company and R and D Constructors, Inc. were as follows:

R and D VALLEY
Base. Bid 2,953,983 $ 2,985,483
Additive I 294,800 276,000
Base + Additive I 3,248,783 3,260,483
Additive II 97.855 82,500
Base + Additive II 3,346,638 3,342,983
Additive III 97.855 82,500
Base + Additive III 3,444,493 3,425,483

After the bids were opened, the Government revealed that the sum of $3,822,430 was available for the base bid and that $300,000 was available for Additives I, II and III. Because of the limit on the funds available for the additives, only the base bid plus Additive I was considered for award. The result was that R and D Constructors, Inc. (Intervenor herein) was determined to be the low bidder. Its Base Bid plus Additive No. I (stabilized platform crane system with two cranes) was $3,248,783 as compared to Valley’s bid of $3,260,243 for those two items.

Valley contends that the Government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining the funds available for the project. It asks the Court to require the defendant to include Additives II and III in the award in which event Valley would be the low bidder —$3,425,483 as against R and D’s total bid of $3,444,493. Valley seeks mandatory injunctive relief to compel the award of the contract to it or, in the alternative, requirement by this Court of reprocurement and rebidding of the job.

A lengthy evidentiary hearing was held before this Court at Savannah on June 18th and 19th. Eight witnesses testified and a considerable volume of documentary evidence was presented. On July 6th there was another hearing at which time further argument from counsel was heard.

II

Following the opening of the bids last April, a request was made that the Corps of Engineers announce the funds available. The following announcement was made: “MCAF [Military Construction Air Force] funds in the amount of $3,822,430 are available for contract award of this project. An additional $300,000 in equipment funds are available for platform crane system for additives Nos. I, II and III.” It is Valley’s contention that the $3,822,430 available was for the project as a whole and that of necessity it included the platform crane system which was an integral part of the construction.

Defendant says that the appropriation of funds by Congress which included the amount, of $3,822,430 announced at bid opening was restricted to construction of the basic facility and could not be applied to the cost of the mechanized equipment (the platform crane system, Additives I, II and III) which were the subject of a separate and different appropriation by Congress. The Government further contends that MCAF funds cannot be used in payment of a Mechanized Material Handling System (MMHS) under the statutory and regulatory prohibition of use of funds for purposes other than that for which they were appropriated by Congress. “Except as otherwise provided by law, sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditures in [929]*929the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others.” 31 U.S.C. § 628.

“Caution will be exercised to assure the availability of funds before an obligation is incurred, and that such funds are charged solely for the purposes for which the appropriation or funds involved are designated and for no other purposes. . . . ” AR 37-21, 2-5c.

Ill

The test of Valley’s claim that the determination that R and D Constructors, Inc. was the low bidder within the funds available is whether the agency’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Bank of Commerce of Laredo v. City National Bank of Laredo, 484 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ruling is subject to attack only when “it is not supported on any rational basis; something more than error is necessary”. South Dakota v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, et al., 353 F.Supp. 335, 339 (S.D., S.Dakota). Courts should not overturn procurement determinations unless the aggrieved party demonstrates that there was no such basis for the agency’s decision. Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates, Inc. v. Warner, 348 F.Supp. 911 (M.D., Fla.); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 455 F.2d 1289; International Engineering Company v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 640, 650-51 (D.C.). The plaintiff bears the “heavy burden of proving that a procurement officer’s decision was genuinely arbitrary and unreasonable.” Hayes International Corporation v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 258 (5th Cir.). '

The federal courts are not émpowered by the Administrative Procedure Act to substitute their judgment for that of the government agency. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, et al.,

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417 F. Supp. 926, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13963, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valley-constr-co-v-hoffman-gasd-1976.