TRAYNOR, J.
— Plaintiff brought this action for separate maintenance and for a division of community property, which she alleged was worth at least $60,000. She relied on an alleged common law marriage contracted in Michigan on December 16, 1938, and accused defendant of extreme cruelty, desertion, and adultery. Defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged that his relations with plaintiff were illicit and that he was legally married to Lido Cappello, named as co-respondent in the complaint. The trial court found that plaintiff and defendant did not on December 16, 1938, or at any other time contract a common law marriage [683]*683in Michigan or elsewhere; that they did not at any time enter into or attempt to enter into an agreement to take each other as husband and wife; that beginning in May, 1936, and for at least three years thereafter, plaintiff cohabited meretriciously with defendant; that between January, 1933, and December 15, 1938, defendant was married to Ethel Chippo Vallera; that plaintiff knew from the beginning of her relationship with defendant that he was married and under a legal disability to enter into a marriage contract with her; that while the marriage between defendant and Ethel Chippo Vallera was dissolved on December 15, 1938, neither plaintiff nor defendant learned of its dissolution until November, 1939; and that on July 6, 1940, defendant entered into a valid marriage with Lido Cappello. The court concluded that plaintiff and defendant had never been husband and wife; that plaintiff was not entitled to maintenance; and that there was no community property. It held, however, that all property acquired by the parties between December 16, 1938, and July 6, 1940, except such property as either might have acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, was held by them as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half thereof, and defendant has appealed from this part of the judgment. He contends that since there was no marriage, no attempt to contract marriage, no belief in the existence of a valid marriage, no evidence of any agreement between the parties as to their property rights, and no evidence concerning the accumulation of property or contributions by the parties thereto, plaintiff could not acquire the rights of a co-tenant in property acquired by him during the period of illicit cohabitation.
It is well settled that a woman who lives with a man as his wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists, is entitled upon termination of their relationship to share in the property acquired by them during its existence. (Feig v. Bank of Italy etc. Assn., 218 Cal. 54 [21 P.2d 421]; Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354 [295 P. 339] ; Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335 [191 P. 533, 11 A.L.R. 1386]; Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671 [118 P. 441, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 844]; see 11 A.L.R. 1394.) The proportionate contribution of each party to the property is immaterial in this state (Coats v. Coats, supra; Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 Cal.App. 98 [201 P. 143]), for the property is divided as community property would be upon [684]*684the dissolution of a valid marriage. (Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal.2d 95 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342]; Feig v. Bank of America etc. Assn., 5 Cal.2d 266 [54 P.2d 3]; Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Coats v. Coats, supra; Macchi v. LaRocca, supra.)
The essential basis of a putative marriage, however, is a belief in the existence of a valid marriage. (Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307]; see Evans, Property Interests Arising from Quasi-Marital Relations, 9 Corn.L.Q. 246; 20 Cal.L.Rev. 453.) In addition, in the majority of cases, the de facto wife attempted to meet the requisites of a valid marriage, and the marriage proved invalid only because of some essential fact of which she was unaware, such as the earlier undissolved marriage of one of the parties (Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110 [176 P. 22, 11 A.L.R. 1391]), a consanguineous relation between the parties (Figoni v. Figoni, supra; Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30 [190 P. 1088]), or the failure to meet the requirement of solemnization. (Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App.2d 62 [89 P.2d 164] ; Macchi v. La Rocca, supra; see) Fung Lai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582.)
Although it is clear from the trial court’s findings that the parties in the present case did not comply with the requisites of a legal marriage, plaintiff contends that the presumption that a person is innocent of crime or wrong (Code Civ. Proc. § 1963, subd. 1), and the fact that the parties lived together as man and wife at a time when both were free to enter into a valid marriage with one another, establishes that plaintiff believed in good faith that she was the lawful wife of defendant. The findings of the trial court, however, amply supported by the evidence, do not substantiate the existence of good faith. (See Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, supra.) The removal of the barrier to a valid marriage between the parties by the dissolution of defendant’s marriage to Ethel .Chippo Vallera does not substantiate plaintiff’s good faith, for the court found that neither plaintiff nor defendant was aware of that dissolution. The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a woman living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during the period of their relationship. It has already been answered in [685]*685the negative. (Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307].) Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith are not present in such a ease.
Plaintiff’s lack of good faith in alleging the belief that she had entered into a valid marriage would not, however, preclude her from recovering property to which she would otherwise be entitled. If a man and woman live together as husband and wife under an agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect the interests of each in such property. (Bacon v. Bacon, 21 Cal.App.2d 540 [69 P.2d 884]; Mitchell v. Fish, 97 Ark. 444 [134 P. 940, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 838]; see Feig v. Bank of America etc. Assn., supra; Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 256 [217 N.W. 192]; Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308 [116 S.W. 43, 132 Am.St.Rep.
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TRAYNOR, J.
— Plaintiff brought this action for separate maintenance and for a division of community property, which she alleged was worth at least $60,000. She relied on an alleged common law marriage contracted in Michigan on December 16, 1938, and accused defendant of extreme cruelty, desertion, and adultery. Defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged that his relations with plaintiff were illicit and that he was legally married to Lido Cappello, named as co-respondent in the complaint. The trial court found that plaintiff and defendant did not on December 16, 1938, or at any other time contract a common law marriage [683]*683in Michigan or elsewhere; that they did not at any time enter into or attempt to enter into an agreement to take each other as husband and wife; that beginning in May, 1936, and for at least three years thereafter, plaintiff cohabited meretriciously with defendant; that between January, 1933, and December 15, 1938, defendant was married to Ethel Chippo Vallera; that plaintiff knew from the beginning of her relationship with defendant that he was married and under a legal disability to enter into a marriage contract with her; that while the marriage between defendant and Ethel Chippo Vallera was dissolved on December 15, 1938, neither plaintiff nor defendant learned of its dissolution until November, 1939; and that on July 6, 1940, defendant entered into a valid marriage with Lido Cappello. The court concluded that plaintiff and defendant had never been husband and wife; that plaintiff was not entitled to maintenance; and that there was no community property. It held, however, that all property acquired by the parties between December 16, 1938, and July 6, 1940, except such property as either might have acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, was held by them as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half thereof, and defendant has appealed from this part of the judgment. He contends that since there was no marriage, no attempt to contract marriage, no belief in the existence of a valid marriage, no evidence of any agreement between the parties as to their property rights, and no evidence concerning the accumulation of property or contributions by the parties thereto, plaintiff could not acquire the rights of a co-tenant in property acquired by him during the period of illicit cohabitation.
It is well settled that a woman who lives with a man as his wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists, is entitled upon termination of their relationship to share in the property acquired by them during its existence. (Feig v. Bank of Italy etc. Assn., 218 Cal. 54 [21 P.2d 421]; Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354 [295 P. 339] ; Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335 [191 P. 533, 11 A.L.R. 1386]; Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671 [118 P. 441, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 844]; see 11 A.L.R. 1394.) The proportionate contribution of each party to the property is immaterial in this state (Coats v. Coats, supra; Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 Cal.App. 98 [201 P. 143]), for the property is divided as community property would be upon [684]*684the dissolution of a valid marriage. (Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal.2d 95 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342]; Feig v. Bank of America etc. Assn., 5 Cal.2d 266 [54 P.2d 3]; Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Coats v. Coats, supra; Macchi v. LaRocca, supra.)
The essential basis of a putative marriage, however, is a belief in the existence of a valid marriage. (Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307]; see Evans, Property Interests Arising from Quasi-Marital Relations, 9 Corn.L.Q. 246; 20 Cal.L.Rev. 453.) In addition, in the majority of cases, the de facto wife attempted to meet the requisites of a valid marriage, and the marriage proved invalid only because of some essential fact of which she was unaware, such as the earlier undissolved marriage of one of the parties (Schneider v. Schneider, supra; Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110 [176 P. 22, 11 A.L.R. 1391]), a consanguineous relation between the parties (Figoni v. Figoni, supra; Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30 [190 P. 1088]), or the failure to meet the requirement of solemnization. (Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App.2d 62 [89 P.2d 164] ; Macchi v. La Rocca, supra; see) Fung Lai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582.)
Although it is clear from the trial court’s findings that the parties in the present case did not comply with the requisites of a legal marriage, plaintiff contends that the presumption that a person is innocent of crime or wrong (Code Civ. Proc. § 1963, subd. 1), and the fact that the parties lived together as man and wife at a time when both were free to enter into a valid marriage with one another, establishes that plaintiff believed in good faith that she was the lawful wife of defendant. The findings of the trial court, however, amply supported by the evidence, do not substantiate the existence of good faith. (See Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, supra.) The removal of the barrier to a valid marriage between the parties by the dissolution of defendant’s marriage to Ethel .Chippo Vallera does not substantiate plaintiff’s good faith, for the court found that neither plaintiff nor defendant was aware of that dissolution. The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a woman living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accumulations during the period of their relationship. It has already been answered in [685]*685the negative. (Flanagan v. Capital Nat. Bank, 213 Cal. 664 [3 P.2d 307].) Equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith are not present in such a ease.
Plaintiff’s lack of good faith in alleging the belief that she had entered into a valid marriage would not, however, preclude her from recovering property to which she would otherwise be entitled. If a man and woman live together as husband and wife under an agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect the interests of each in such property. (Bacon v. Bacon, 21 Cal.App.2d 540 [69 P.2d 884]; Mitchell v. Fish, 97 Ark. 444 [134 P. 940, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 838]; see Feig v. Bank of America etc. Assn., supra; Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 256 [217 N.W. 192]; Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308 [116 S.W. 43, 132 Am.St.Rep. 879].) Even in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, the woman would be entitled to share in the property jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds contributed toward its acquisition. (Hayworth v. Williams, supra; Delamour v. Roger, 7 La.Ann. 152.) There is no evidence that the parties in the present ease made any agreement concerning their property or property rights. The meager evidence with respect to the accumulation of the alleged community property can support only the inference that the property consisted of defendant’s earnings during the period in question, and there is no contention to the contrary. There is thus no support in the record for the trial court’s finding that the parties each owned an undivided one-half of the property acquired by either of them between December 16, 1938, and July 5, 1940.
There is no merit in plaintiff’s contention that defendant is not in a position to challenge the trial court’s ruling because he stands convicted in the District Court of the United States of falsely representing himself to be an American citizen.
The part of the judgment appealed from is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.