1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAURI VALJAKKA, Case No. 22-cv-01490-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 NETFLIX, INC., Re: ECF No. 79 Defendant. 11
12 13 Before the Court is Netflix’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 79. The 14 Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Plaintiff Lauri Valjakka alleges that Defendant Netflix, Inc., infringes numerous claims of 17 two patents: U.S. Patent No. 10,726,102 (“’102 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. (“’167 patent”). ECF 18 No. 74. The ’102 patent “relates to an apparatus, method and/or system for providing restricted 19 content to a user.” ’102 patent at 1:9–11. The ’167 patent “relates to improvements in data 20 communications networks and to systems, methods and apparatus employed in such networks.” 21 ’167 patent at 1:6–8. 22 Valjakka initially filed suit in the Western District of Texas on September 13, 2021. ECF 23 No. 1. After the case was transferred to the Northern District of California, ECF No. 16, the Court 24 granted Netflix’s motion to dismiss Valjakka’s willful infringement claim on October 11, 2022. 25 ECF No. 60. The Court held a Markman hearing and issued a claim construction order on 26 December 13, 2022. ECF No. 73. Netflix subsequently filed the present motion on January 17, 27 2023, ECF No. 79, which the Court took under submission without a hearing on February 24, 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for 3 judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Because a Rule 12(c) motion is ‘functionally 4 identical’ to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, ‘the same standard of review applies to motions brought 5 under either rule.’” Gregg v. Hawaii, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cafasso v. Gen. 6 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). That is, “a complaint must 7 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 8 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 544, 570 (2007)). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, ‘taking all the 10 allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 11 Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887 (quoting Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998)). 12 “Challenges to patentability under [35 U.S.C. § 101] may be brought based solely on the 13 pleadings, including on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Broadcom Corp. v. 14 Netflix Inc., 598 F. Supp. 3d 800, 804–05 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., 15 78 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). “Section 101. . . defines the subject matter eligible 16 for patent protection” as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 17 matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 18 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). The Supreme Court has “long held that this 19 provision contains an important implicit exception: . . . . abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice, 20 573 U.S. at 216 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 589 21 (2013)). But “an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an 22 abstract concept.” Id. at 217. Courts must distinguish between patents that claim abstract ideas, 23 on the one hand, and patents “that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts,” on the 24 other. Id. (emphasis added). 25 To determine whether a patent claims an abstract concept, courts engage in a two-step 26 inquiry. First, courts determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” an abstract idea. Id. 27 “[S]tep one presents a legal question” only, which “does not require an evaluation of the prior art 1 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020). This analysis often begins “with an examination of eligible and ineligible 2 claims of a similar nature from past cases.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 3 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Under this inquiry, [courts] evaluate the focus of the claimed 4 advance over the prior art to determine if the character of the claim as a whole, considered in light 5 of the specification, is directed to excluded subject matter.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 6 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When a 7 claim recites “a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines 8 the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem,” the “functional nature of the claim 9 confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 10 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The “essentially result-focused, functional character of 11 claim language has been a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in the 12 area of using generic computer and network technology.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 13 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Finally, there is no need to analyze every claim where “all 14 the claims are ‘substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea.’” Content Extraction & 15 Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1348, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 16 If the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry proceeds to step two. At step two, 17 courts “consider the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination” to 18 determine “whether [the claims] contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the 19 claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217, 221 (quoting 20 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73, 79 (2012)). “Stating an 21 abstract idea ‘while adding the words apply it’ is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting 22 the use of an abstract idea ‘to a particular technological environment.’” Id. at 223 (emphasis 23 added) (first quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72; and then quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610 24 (2010)). Rather, this test “is satisfied when the claim limitations ‘involve more than performance 25 of well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” 26 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 27 Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48). Both parts of the inquiry are informed by “the claims 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 At the outset, the Court notes that Valjakka repeatedly emphasizes the novelty of the 3 inventions claimed in each patent. As to the ’167 patent, Valjakka also relies on a Notice of 4 Allowability issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as evidence of 5 novelty.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAURI VALJAKKA, Case No. 22-cv-01490-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 NETFLIX, INC., Re: ECF No. 79 Defendant. 11
12 13 Before the Court is Netflix’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 79. The 14 Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Plaintiff Lauri Valjakka alleges that Defendant Netflix, Inc., infringes numerous claims of 17 two patents: U.S. Patent No. 10,726,102 (“’102 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. (“’167 patent”). ECF 18 No. 74. The ’102 patent “relates to an apparatus, method and/or system for providing restricted 19 content to a user.” ’102 patent at 1:9–11. The ’167 patent “relates to improvements in data 20 communications networks and to systems, methods and apparatus employed in such networks.” 21 ’167 patent at 1:6–8. 22 Valjakka initially filed suit in the Western District of Texas on September 13, 2021. ECF 23 No. 1. After the case was transferred to the Northern District of California, ECF No. 16, the Court 24 granted Netflix’s motion to dismiss Valjakka’s willful infringement claim on October 11, 2022. 25 ECF No. 60. The Court held a Markman hearing and issued a claim construction order on 26 December 13, 2022. ECF No. 73. Netflix subsequently filed the present motion on January 17, 27 2023, ECF No. 79, which the Court took under submission without a hearing on February 24, 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for 3 judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Because a Rule 12(c) motion is ‘functionally 4 identical’ to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, ‘the same standard of review applies to motions brought 5 under either rule.’” Gregg v. Hawaii, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cafasso v. Gen. 6 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). That is, “a complaint must 7 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 8 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 544, 570 (2007)). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, ‘taking all the 10 allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 11 Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887 (quoting Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998)). 12 “Challenges to patentability under [35 U.S.C. § 101] may be brought based solely on the 13 pleadings, including on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Broadcom Corp. v. 14 Netflix Inc., 598 F. Supp. 3d 800, 804–05 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., 15 78 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). “Section 101. . . defines the subject matter eligible 16 for patent protection” as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 17 matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 18 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). The Supreme Court has “long held that this 19 provision contains an important implicit exception: . . . . abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice, 20 573 U.S. at 216 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 589 21 (2013)). But “an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an 22 abstract concept.” Id. at 217. Courts must distinguish between patents that claim abstract ideas, 23 on the one hand, and patents “that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts,” on the 24 other. Id. (emphasis added). 25 To determine whether a patent claims an abstract concept, courts engage in a two-step 26 inquiry. First, courts determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” an abstract idea. Id. 27 “[S]tep one presents a legal question” only, which “does not require an evaluation of the prior art 1 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020). This analysis often begins “with an examination of eligible and ineligible 2 claims of a similar nature from past cases.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 3 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Under this inquiry, [courts] evaluate the focus of the claimed 4 advance over the prior art to determine if the character of the claim as a whole, considered in light 5 of the specification, is directed to excluded subject matter.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 6 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When a 7 claim recites “a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines 8 the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem,” the “functional nature of the claim 9 confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 10 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The “essentially result-focused, functional character of 11 claim language has been a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in the 12 area of using generic computer and network technology.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 13 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Finally, there is no need to analyze every claim where “all 14 the claims are ‘substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea.’” Content Extraction & 15 Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1348, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 16 If the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry proceeds to step two. At step two, 17 courts “consider the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination” to 18 determine “whether [the claims] contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the 19 claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217, 221 (quoting 20 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73, 79 (2012)). “Stating an 21 abstract idea ‘while adding the words apply it’ is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting 22 the use of an abstract idea ‘to a particular technological environment.’” Id. at 223 (emphasis 23 added) (first quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72; and then quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610 24 (2010)). Rather, this test “is satisfied when the claim limitations ‘involve more than performance 25 of well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” 26 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 27 Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48). Both parts of the inquiry are informed by “the claims 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 At the outset, the Court notes that Valjakka repeatedly emphasizes the novelty of the 3 inventions claimed in each patent. As to the ’167 patent, Valjakka also relies on a Notice of 4 Allowability issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as evidence of 5 novelty. But “whether a claimed process is novel or non-obvious is irrelevant to the [Section] 101 6 analysis” because “[t]he obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented 7 must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.” In re Bilski, 8 545 F.3d 943, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub. nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Parker 9 v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). In that vein, “prior determinations by the USPTO regarding 10 novelty have no bearing on whether the asserted claims are parent eligible under [Section] 101.” 11 Aftechmobile Inc. v. Salesforce.com, No. 19-cv-05903-JST, 2020 WL 6129139, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 12 Sept. 2, 2020). The Court does not consider Valjakka’s arguments as to novelty. 13 To the extent that Valjakka relies on the Notice of Allowability as demonstrative of patent 14 eligibility, the Federal Circuit has explained that courts and the USPTO “take different approaches 15 in determining invalidity and on the same evidence could quite correctly come to different 16 conclusions.” Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Consequently, the 17 Notice is of no assistance to this Court’s application of binding precedent. 18 A. ’102 Patent 19 The “aim” of the ’102 patent is “to provide an alternative method of and a system for 20 providing access to access restricted content to a user.” ’102 patent at 1:22–24. Toward that end, 21 claim 10 recites,
22 A method, comprising:
23 obtaining an access restricted content from at least one of a content database and a content providing server; 24 obtaining a first digital rights management key from a content 25 database, wherein the obtaining is based at least in part on a query, the query comprising the content identifier and an 26 identifier associated with the user;
27 deriving, using the first digital rights management key, from on the first digital rights management key; 1 causing the content providing server to validate the 2 fingerprint and, if the validation is successful, accessing the accessing restricted content and information describing 3 encryption properties of the access restricted content, and
4 deriving, using the digital rights management header of the access restricted content, from the access restricted content a 5 second and third digital rights management key,
6 wherein the second and third digital rights management keys are applied to retrieve the payload of the access restricted 7 content and wherein at least one of the second or third digital rights management key is used to encrypt the other key of the 8 second or third digital rights management key,
9 wherein the content is usable without being in an unprotected state. 10 ’102 patent at 14:1–20. 11 1. Alice Step One 12 Netflix argues that claim 10 is directed to an abstract idea because it “does nothing more 13 than serve as a vault for restricted content that allows a person to 1) request access to content, 2) 14 authenticate user identity, 3) apply well-known and conventional rule(s) to ensure that the user is 15 authorized, and 4) if authorized permit access to the content.” ECF No. 79 at 12. Valjakka 16 argues that claim 10 “[i]mprov[es] security for media content” via “a specific technique that 17 departs from earlier approaches to solve a specific computer problem” and is therefore not 18 abstract. ECF No. 83 at 17. 19 The Court agrees with Netflix. The specification explains that “[t]here are numerous ways 20 of controlling and protecting . . . digital content, for example, using digital management methods.” 21 ’102 patent at 1:18–20. While claim 10 describes a process obtaining access to restricted content 22 through the use of digital rights management keys, it does not “incorporate[] specific features” that 23 “limit[]” the claim “to a specific process.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 24 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Rather, the claim describes “generic processes” of obtaining 25 digital rights management keys, deriving a fingerprint, validating the fingerprint, accessing the 26 restricted content, and using the restricted content in an unprotected state “without any limitation 27 on how to produce th[ose] result[s].” Id. at 1314; Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1 1135, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The claim language thus possesses the “essentially result-focused, 2 functional character” typical of claims held to be directed at abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., 830 3 F.3d at 1356; see Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap, Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 703 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding 4 claims abstract because they were “not directed to a specific improvement in computer 5 functionality but, instead, to the use of computers as a tool . . . to identify when a condition is met 6 and then to distribute information based on satisfaction of that condition”); Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC 7 v. Castle Retail, LLC, 60 F.4th 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding claims abstract because they 8 were directed to the “general abstract ideas” of “displaying images, converting them into a format, 9 transmitting them, and so on”); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (holding claims abstract 10 because they entailed “collecting data,” “recognizing certain data within the collected data set,” 11 and “storing the recognized data in memory”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 12 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding claims abstract because they were “directed to the abstract idea 13 of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner”). Accordingly, the Court 14 concludes that claim 10 is “directed to the abstract idea of providing restricted access to 15 resources.” Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 16 Valjakka’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Valjakka first emphasizes that the 17 method “allows a user to view or listen to the content file without the content file being in an 18 unprotected state, something that was not previously used in way [sic] now claimed with these 19 types of DRM keys.” ECF No. 83 at 18. But the method recited by claim 10 arrives at that result 20 without any specific process. Instead, the claim recites in a conclusory manner that “the content is 21 usable without being in an unprotected state.” ’102 patent at 14:20. And, as Netflix points out, 22 ECF No. 84 at 7, even if content obtained using digital rights management keys was not 23 previously usable in a protected state, “a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsis, Inc. 24 v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 25 Second, Valjakka seeks to distinguish the cases on which Netflix relies, including the 26 Federal Circuit’s decision in Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. 27 Cir. 2017). Valjakka argues that the method at issue concerned the “authentication of identity 1 Prism, where the claim at issue recited “[a] method for controlling access . . . to protected 2 computer resources.” 696 F. App’x at 1016. The Federal Circuit noted that the method consisted 3 of:
4 (1) receiving identity data from a device with a request for access to resources; (2) confirming the authenticity of the identity data 5 associated with that device; (3) determining whether the device identified is authorized to access the resources requested; and (4) if 6 authorized, permitting access to the requested resources. 7 Id. at 1017. Similarly, claim 10 entails requesting content via a user-initiated query, deriving and 8 validating a fingerprint to determine whether the user is authorized to access the restricted content, 9 and permitting the user to access that content if so authorized. Prism is thus analogous to the case 10 at hand. 11 Third, Valjakka emphasizes that “[t]he Federal Circuit cautioned a court or party not to 12 rely too much on their precedent when informing Alice analysis.” ECF No. 83 at 20. While it is 13 true that patent eligibility “must be decided on a case-by-case basis,” CosmoKey Sols. GmbH & 14 Co. KG v. Duo Sec. LLC, 15 F.4th 1091, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2021), it is also true that “the decisional 15 mechanism courts . . . apply” in determining patent eligibility “is to examine earlier cases in which 16 a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what prior cases were about, and which way 17 they were decided.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1288. The similar nature of this case to those cited 18 above confirms that claim 10 is directed to an abstract idea. 19 2. Alice Step Two 20 Netflix argues that the ’102 patent does not supply an inventive concept because it “simply 21 takes the abstract idea of providing access to restricted content and then tells a generic computer 22 network to ‘apply it’ using generic software and hardware.” ECF No. 79 at 14. Valjakka argues 23 that the patent “states a specific improvement to authentication that increases content management 24 security, prevents unauthorized access by a third party or misuse of the content files by the user, is 25 easily implemented using a specific process of digital rights management keys, and can 26 advantageously be carried out with mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets of low 27 complexity.” ECF No. 83 at 21. 1 nonetheless “simply instruct[s] the practitioner to implement the abstract idea.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 2 225. The claim features “generic functional language” that details instances of causing, obtaining, 3 and deriving that somehow result in content being usable in a protected state. Two-Way Media 4 Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339. (Fed. Cir. 2017). But it “contains 5 no restriction on how the result is accomplished . . . [and] [t]he mechanism” for accomplishing 6 that result “is not described, although this is stated to be the essential innovation.” Intel. Ventures 7 I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. 8 Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Rather, the claim “simply recites 9 that the abstract idea of [accessing restricted content in a protected state] will be implemented 10 using conventional components and functions generic to [accessing restricted content].” Affinity 11 Labs, 838 F.3d at 1263. Consequently, the ’102 patent “contain[s] no limitations—either 12 individually or as an ordered combination—that transform the claim[] into a patent-eligible 13 application.” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348 14 B. ’167 Patent 15 The parties principally dispute the patent eligibility of independent claim 1 of the ’167 16 patent, but they also dispute the eligibility of dependent claims 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, and 14. 17 However, their arguments as to the dependent claims are both cursory and duplicative of their 18 arguments with respect to claim 1. See ECF No. 79 at 22–23, ECF No. 83 at 28–29. The parties 19 thus “appear to treat” claim 1 “as representative,” and Valjakka “does not present any meaningful 20 argument for the distinctive significance of” the “claim limitations not found in” claim 1. 21 Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365. Accordingly, the Court treats claim 1 as representative. 22 The ’167 patent “seeks to provide improved network systems, methods[,] and apparatus 23 whereby network performance is enhanced.” ’167 patent at 1:18–20. Claim 1 recites:
24 A data communication network comprising: a plurality of terminals; and 25 a main server adapted to manage selective retrieval of data 26 from a first server by at least one target terminal selected from said plurality of terminals, said main server being 27 distinct from said first server; and performance information, wherein 1 at least two of said terminals are adapted to act as relay 2 servers for serving data retrieved from said first server to at least one target terminal; and wherein 3 the main server is adapted to send transport requests direct 4 [sic] to at least one first target terminal on the basis of said terminal performance information, and wherein the main 5 server is further adapted to monitor response times of terminals in the network and in which terminals are selected 6 to act as relay servers for a particular data transfers on the basis of their relative response times, and the first target 7 terminal is adapted to act as relay server; and
8 wherein each such transport request includes details of data to be retrieved, the address of the first server from which the 9 data is to be requested by the first target terminal, the addresses of at least one second target terminal to which the 10 data from the first server to be relayed by the first target terminal and an indication of a relative performance of a 11 further target terminal based on the terminal performance information stored in the network information database; and 12 wherein terminals adapted to act as relay servers are adapted 13 to modify transport requests received from the main server or from other relay servers and to transmit the modified 14 transport request to selected target terminals from a set of target terminals identified in the transport request, wherein 15 the modified transport request further includes addresses of further target terminals for which the recipient of the 16 modified transport request is to act as relay server; and
17 wherein data to be retrieved by said target terminals are divided into a series of packets for transmission to said target 18 terminals and each of said terminals is adapted to communicate directly with said main server to acknowledge 19 receipt of the last packet of a series routed thereto. 20 ’167 patent at 8:64–9:38. 21 1. Alice Step One 22 Netflix argues that claim 1 “is directed to the abstract idea of distributing the delivery of 23 content among multiple actors.” ECF No. 79 at 19. Valjakka argues that the claims “specifically 24 identify how [a] functionality improvement is effectuated in an assertedly unexpected way.” ECF 25 No. 83 at 29. 26 “This case . . . presents a ‘close call[] about how to characterize what the claims are 27 directed to.” BASCOM Glob. Int. Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. 1 claim does contain certain “limiting detail[s] that confine[] the claim to a particular solution to an 2 identified problem.” Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1269. At the same time, however, the claim is, in 3 some respects, “drawn to the abstract idea of allocating tasks across a system of servers.” 4 Broadcom, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 807. As a result, “the claim[] and [its] limitations do not readily 5 lend themselves to a step-one finding that they are directed to a nonabstract idea.” BASCOM, 827 6 F.3d at 1349. The Court therefore “defer[s] [its] consideration of the specific claim limitations’ 7 narrowing effect for step two.” Id. 8 2. Alice Step Two 9 Netflix argues that “nothing in claim 1 is remotely a technological advance.” ECF No. 79 10 at 20. Valjakka argues that the claim is “directed to a specific improvement in the performance of 11 a content management network.” ECF No. 83 at 26. 12 The claim language expressly restricts the process by which data is transferred over the 13 network. The claim requires that (1) a main server manage retrieval of data from a first server by 14 a target terminal; (2) at least two terminals in the network operate as relay servers, which transfer 15 the data from the first server to the target terminal; (3) the main server monitor terminal 16 performance to determine which terminals are optimal for adaptation as relay servers; (4) the 17 network adapt those optimal terminals to act as relay servers; (5) the main server send transport 18 requests to the relay servers, and relay servers further modify those requests include the addresses 19 of further target terminals; (6) data packets be divided for transmission; and (7) each target 20 terminal communicate receipt of all data to the main server. 21 Although each of these limitations invokes certain generic network processes, the Federal 22 Circuit has explained that “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non- 23 generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. Such is the 24 case here. The patent purports to enhance the performance of client/server data networks. The 25 specification explains,
26 In conventional client/server data networks, such as TCP/IP or other routed networks, a main server serves all terminals via a single server 27 socket. This results in extreme spikes in the network load, especially 1 The present invention seeks to provide improved network systems, methods[,] and apparatus whereby network performance is enhanced. 2 3 ’167 patent at 1:11–20. 4 The patent also expressly ties the limitations of claim 10 to that enhanced performance. 5 Consistent with the elements of claim 1, the network first uses the monitored terminal 6 performance to perform a “dynamic routing,” which determines the optimal route through which 7 to transmit data. Id. at 5:43. As part of that routing, “each one of the first set of terminals selects a 8 further two or three ‘best’ terminals/relay servers from the addresses forwarded to it by the main 9 server and passes the modified transport request on to these terminals, including the details of the 10 other remaining target terminals.” Id. at 5:38–43. If a terminal fails, “this is registered in the 11 database and failed deliveries are repeated during the next transfer.” Id. at 5:46–48. Next, “[o]nce 12 the route to a particular target has been established, the packets of the data file are passed along 13 the defined route via the selected relay servers on the basis of the target terminal address in the 14 handle/header of each packet.” Id. at 5:49–52. This “[a]utomatic routing evenly divides the load 15 over a larger network region, reducing the time window required for any particular data transfer 16 operation.” Id. at 5:53–55. Together, the “dynamic routing and distributed data transfer ensures 17 optimal or near-optimal data transfer rates to every terminal in the entire terminal network and 18 dynamic routing ensures data delivery even if part of the network fails.” Id. at 7:55–58. 19 Therefore, although “[t]he solution requires arguably generic components, including 20 network [components] which [transfer data],” the claim “necessarily requires that these 21 components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in [network] 22 functionality.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300–01; see id. at 1301 (holding that the patent contained an 23 inventive concept where it was “tied to a specific structure of various components” and 24 “purposefully arranges the components in a distributed architecture to achieve a technological 25 solution to a technological problem specific to computer networks”); BASCOM, 826 F.3d at 1350 26 (holding that the patent contained the inventive concept of “the installation of a filtering tool at a 27 specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each 1 computer and the benefits of a filter on the [Internet Service Provider] server”); DDR Holdings, 2 LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, 773 F.3d 1245, 1258–59 (holding that the patent claims “recite[d] an 3 invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet” because they 4 “specif[ied] how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result 5 that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of 6 a hyperlink”). Consequently, “[o]n this limited record, this specific method of [transferring data 7 across a client/server data network] cannot be said, as a matter of law, to have been conventional 8 or generic.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. The Court concludes that, in consideration of its 9 elements as an ordered combination, claim 1 supplies an inventive concept. 10 In its argument to the contrary, Netflix quotes cases for the general proposition that data 11 transfer across a network of servers is not inventive and otherwise cites portions of the patent that 12 feature generic technological processes. See ECF No. 79 at 20–22. But Netflix fails to 13 meaningfully engage with the discrete limitations that restrict the claim to a specific process, the 14 elements of the claim as an ordered combination, or the resulting improvement in network 15 functionality over that of conventional client/server data networks when that specific process 16 occurs. The cases on which Netflix relies are readily distinguishable because they concerned 17 patents that lacked these or analogous features. See Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348 (holding 18 that the patents failed to supply an inventive concept where a limitation, for example, “merely 19 described generic optical character technology, which [the] plaintiff conceded was a routine 20 function of scanning technology at the time the claims were filed”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 21 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the patents failed to supply an inventive 22 concept where, “with no further detail,” the claim recited that “a computer receives a request for a 23 guarantee and transmits an offer of guarantee in return”); Broadcom, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 809 24 (holding that the patent failed to supply an inventive concept because “there [wa]s no disclosure 25 that explains how the claimed method causes computer systems to function in any fundamentally 26 different way from traditional computer systems”); Appistry, Inc. v. Amazon.com, No. C15–311 27 MJ, 2015 WL 4210890 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 9, 2015), aff’d sub. nom., Appistry, LLC v. Amazon.com, 1 which efficacy and reliability are achieved—are well understood, routine, and purely 2 conventional .. . .” (emphasis added)). 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, Netflix’s motion is granted as to Valjakka’s claims predicated 5 on the ’102 patent and denied as to his claims predicated on the ’167 patent. Although Valjakka 6 || has already amended his complaint three times, this order represents the first time these issues 7 have come before the Court. Accordingly, the Court grants Valjakka leave to amend the 8 complaint with respect to his claims relating to the ’102 patent. See Gregg, 870 F.3d at 889. “In 9 |} light of the plain language of [claim 10] in the [’102] patent, the Court has some doubt that 10 [Valjakka] can amend around this problem.” Broadcom, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 809. Nonetheless, 11 Valjakka may file an amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this order. Failure to 12 || timely file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of Valjakka’s claims relating to the ’102 13 patent with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: August 22, 2023 . .
16 JON S. TIGAR 17 nited States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28