UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MEHRDAD VALIBEIGI,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-3149 (TJK)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Mehrdad Valibeigi owned at least three different apartment complexes in the District of
Columbia in 2018. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5, 7–9. He alleges that the District sued him and his companies
three times over the next several years for housing-code violations under the Consumer Protection
Procedures Act (“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq., and the Tenant Receivership Act
(“TRA”), D.C. Code § 42-3651.01 et seq. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 7–9. In October 2022, he responded by
suing the District for violating several of his constitutional rights, and he amended his complaint
a few months later. ECF Nos. 1, 4. The Court granted the District’s motion to dismiss that
amended complaint but gave Valibeigi a final opportunity to amend. ECF Nos. 26, 27. He did so
in November 2024. ECF No. 29. But because the factual allegations in Valibeigi’s second
amended complaint are mostly the same as those in the one already dismissed, the Court will dis-
miss his operative complaint and the case.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff states a facially plausible claim when he pleads “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded
factual allegations” and “construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Sissel v. HHS, 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But “mere conclusory statements” are not
enough to establish a plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As
Valibeigi proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his complaint liberally. See Bowman v. Iddon,
848 F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017). And the Court must consider not only the facts in his
complaint, but also those he presented in opposing the District’s motion to dismiss. See Watson
v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 249 F. Supp. 3d 462, 464 (D.D.C. 2017); Brown v. Whole Foods
Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ultimately, though, a pro se plaintiff still
must plead a plausible claim to avoid dismissal. See Odutola v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 321
F. Supp. 3d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2018).
In his first amended complaint—the one the Court already dismissed—Valibeigi alleged
that the District violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in bringing its
three lawsuits against him. ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 33–47. First, he alleged that the District selectively
prosecuted him in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by (1) treating him differently
than the District of Columbia Housing Authority (“DCHA”) when it sued him the under the CPPA
and TRA, rather than the Nuisance Abatement Act (“NAA”), D.C. Code § 42-3101 et seq; and (2)
bringing suits relating to his properties, which were in less affluent areas of the city, rather than
properties located in wealthier neighborhoods. Id. ¶¶ 33–38. Second, he alleged that the lawsuits
violated his purported First and Fourth Amendment right to “Free Commerce.” Id. ¶¶ 46–47. The
Court dismissed those claims for two reasons: first, because Valibeigi had not plausibly alleged
that anyone had violated his rights; and second, because he had not plausibly alleged that the Dis-
trict, as a municipality, should be held liable for any alleged violations. ECF No. 27 at 4–10.
2 Valibeigi narrows his legal claims in his second amended complaint. He reasserts only a
claim that the District selectively prosecuted him by suing him under the CPPA and TRA, rather
than the NAA, under which it sued the DCHA several times. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 27–29; see also ECF
No. 33 at 6. But for all the reasons discussed in the Court’s prior opinion, this claim still fails. See
ECF No. 27 at 4–10. The scant new factual allegations Valibeigi asserts do not change that out-
come.
For example, Valibeigi now alleges more facts supporting his contention that the DCHA’s
properties were in far worse conditions than his properties. ECF No. 29 at 3, ¶ 26. He also pro-
vides more allegations undercutting the severity of the housing-code violations at his properties.
Id. at 12; ECF No. 33 at 8–10. But the Court did not dismiss his prior selective-prosecution claim
because he had failed to allege that the DCHA properties were in worse conditions than his own
were. Instead, the Court held that, even if that were the case, he had still failed to state a selective-
prosecution claim because he had not pleaded “that he was similarly situated to the DCHA ‘across
a range of relevant prosecutorial factors.’” ECF No. 27 at 6 (quoting Frederick Douglass Found.,
Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). This is particularly relevant
because of the DCHA’s status as part of the District government: the Court noted that the District
“may well have other methods of forcing the DCHA to comply with the District’s laws and regu-
lations because of its status as a public entity.” Id. Indeed, Valibeigi implicitly acknowledges this
point when he points out that Mayor Muriel Bowser has a “strong hold on this public entity.” ECF
No. 33 at 13. Because the second amended complaint does not remedy this deficiency, it does not
plausibly allege that Valibeigi was selectively prosecuted in violation of the Fifth Amendment.1
1 Valibeigi appears to argue that the Court should not dismiss his complaint at this point because evidence supporting a selective-prosecution claim is “difficult to uncover without discov- ery.” ECF No. 29 at 13; ECF No. 33 at 10. But the federal rules “do[] not unlock the doors of
3 The second amended complaint also fails for the other reason the first did. Even if
Valibeigi had successfully pleaded that he was the victim of selective prosecution, he has not suf-
ficiently pleaded that the District should be held liable as a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In other words, he has not plausibly alleged that his being sued under the CPPA and TRA, rather
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MEHRDAD VALIBEIGI,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-3149 (TJK)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Mehrdad Valibeigi owned at least three different apartment complexes in the District of
Columbia in 2018. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5, 7–9. He alleges that the District sued him and his companies
three times over the next several years for housing-code violations under the Consumer Protection
Procedures Act (“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq., and the Tenant Receivership Act
(“TRA”), D.C. Code § 42-3651.01 et seq. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 7–9. In October 2022, he responded by
suing the District for violating several of his constitutional rights, and he amended his complaint
a few months later. ECF Nos. 1, 4. The Court granted the District’s motion to dismiss that
amended complaint but gave Valibeigi a final opportunity to amend. ECF Nos. 26, 27. He did so
in November 2024. ECF No. 29. But because the factual allegations in Valibeigi’s second
amended complaint are mostly the same as those in the one already dismissed, the Court will dis-
miss his operative complaint and the case.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff states a facially plausible claim when he pleads “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded
factual allegations” and “construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Sissel v. HHS, 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But “mere conclusory statements” are not
enough to establish a plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As
Valibeigi proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his complaint liberally. See Bowman v. Iddon,
848 F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017). And the Court must consider not only the facts in his
complaint, but also those he presented in opposing the District’s motion to dismiss. See Watson
v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 249 F. Supp. 3d 462, 464 (D.D.C. 2017); Brown v. Whole Foods
Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ultimately, though, a pro se plaintiff still
must plead a plausible claim to avoid dismissal. See Odutola v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 321
F. Supp. 3d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2018).
In his first amended complaint—the one the Court already dismissed—Valibeigi alleged
that the District violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in bringing its
three lawsuits against him. ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 33–47. First, he alleged that the District selectively
prosecuted him in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by (1) treating him differently
than the District of Columbia Housing Authority (“DCHA”) when it sued him the under the CPPA
and TRA, rather than the Nuisance Abatement Act (“NAA”), D.C. Code § 42-3101 et seq; and (2)
bringing suits relating to his properties, which were in less affluent areas of the city, rather than
properties located in wealthier neighborhoods. Id. ¶¶ 33–38. Second, he alleged that the lawsuits
violated his purported First and Fourth Amendment right to “Free Commerce.” Id. ¶¶ 46–47. The
Court dismissed those claims for two reasons: first, because Valibeigi had not plausibly alleged
that anyone had violated his rights; and second, because he had not plausibly alleged that the Dis-
trict, as a municipality, should be held liable for any alleged violations. ECF No. 27 at 4–10.
2 Valibeigi narrows his legal claims in his second amended complaint. He reasserts only a
claim that the District selectively prosecuted him by suing him under the CPPA and TRA, rather
than the NAA, under which it sued the DCHA several times. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 27–29; see also ECF
No. 33 at 6. But for all the reasons discussed in the Court’s prior opinion, this claim still fails. See
ECF No. 27 at 4–10. The scant new factual allegations Valibeigi asserts do not change that out-
come.
For example, Valibeigi now alleges more facts supporting his contention that the DCHA’s
properties were in far worse conditions than his properties. ECF No. 29 at 3, ¶ 26. He also pro-
vides more allegations undercutting the severity of the housing-code violations at his properties.
Id. at 12; ECF No. 33 at 8–10. But the Court did not dismiss his prior selective-prosecution claim
because he had failed to allege that the DCHA properties were in worse conditions than his own
were. Instead, the Court held that, even if that were the case, he had still failed to state a selective-
prosecution claim because he had not pleaded “that he was similarly situated to the DCHA ‘across
a range of relevant prosecutorial factors.’” ECF No. 27 at 6 (quoting Frederick Douglass Found.,
Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). This is particularly relevant
because of the DCHA’s status as part of the District government: the Court noted that the District
“may well have other methods of forcing the DCHA to comply with the District’s laws and regu-
lations because of its status as a public entity.” Id. Indeed, Valibeigi implicitly acknowledges this
point when he points out that Mayor Muriel Bowser has a “strong hold on this public entity.” ECF
No. 33 at 13. Because the second amended complaint does not remedy this deficiency, it does not
plausibly allege that Valibeigi was selectively prosecuted in violation of the Fifth Amendment.1
1 Valibeigi appears to argue that the Court should not dismiss his complaint at this point because evidence supporting a selective-prosecution claim is “difficult to uncover without discov- ery.” ECF No. 29 at 13; ECF No. 33 at 10. But the federal rules “do[] not unlock the doors of
3 The second amended complaint also fails for the other reason the first did. Even if
Valibeigi had successfully pleaded that he was the victim of selective prosecution, he has not suf-
ficiently pleaded that the District should be held liable as a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In other words, he has not plausibly alleged that his being sued under the CPPA and TRA, rather
than the NAA, followed an official municipal policy. See ECF No. 27 at 8–10. He again relies on
his allegation that “the District initiated policies aimed at slowing down the pace of gentrification,
stabilizing the rapid dislocation of the poor, and improving the housing conditions of the existing
multifamily rental units,” which resulted in “intensifying the enforcement of the” CPPA and TRA.
ECF No. 29 at 2. These are conclusory allegations, without many specifics. But even assuming
such policies existed, the Court has already held that they are insufficient to plausibly allege mu-
nicipal liability on a selective-prosecution claim. ECF No. 27 at 9. “To say that the District de-
cided to beef up its enforcement practices is not to suggest that it did so in a discriminatory manner
that ‘caused the violation’ of Valibeigi’s rights.” Id. (quoting Baker v. District of Columbia, 326
F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).2 Valibeigi also gestures toward other cases in which either the
District or DCHA was held liable for various types of misconduct. ECF No. 33 at 11–13. But
none involved a selective-prosecution claim, much less one analogous to the one asserted by
Valibeigi.
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant the District’s motion and dismiss Valibeigi’s
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Because Valibeigi has failed to come forward with factual allegations sufficient to allow a plausi- ble inference that he has been selectively prosecuted, “he is not entitled to discovery.” Id. at 686. 2 Valibeigi’s argument that the District was deliberately indifferent to housing-code viola- tions at DCHA properties does not help him make out such a claim. See ECF No. 33 at 11. For a deliberate-indifference theory to succeed, Valibeigi must plausibly allege that the District was de- liberately indifferent to a substantial risk that municipal actors would violate Valibeigi’s constitu- tional rights—not the housing code. See Frederick Douglass Found., Inc., 82 F.4th at 1148.
4 second amended complaint and the case. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: September 10, 2025