Valenzuela v. Ruby J Farms LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 9, 2024
• Docket: 4:21-cv-00442
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Robert A Valenzuela, No. CV-21-00442-TUC-JGZ

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Ruby J Farms LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees. 16 Plaintiff requests that the Court award him attorneys’ fees in the amount of $166,840.00. 17 (Docs. 137, 139.) Defendants filed an objection to Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 138), and 18 Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 139). For the following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s 19 Motion and award Plaintiff $166,840.00 in attorneys’ fees. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff Robert A. Valenzuela filed this action against Defendants Ruby J Farms 22 LLC (RJF), and Anthony and Norma Comella (the Comellas), alleging wage and overtime 23 violations under the Arizona Wage Act (AWA), Arizona Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), 24 and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). (Doc. 1.) RJF filed a counterclaim for conversion 25 against Valenzuela, alleging Valenzuela wrongfully took possession of RJF’s Rolex watch. 26 (Doc. 8 at 6–9.) The Court determined that Valenzuela was an employee of RJF under the 27 AWA and an employee of RJF and Anthony Comella under the AMWA and FLSA. (Doc. 28 107 at 5–6.) 1 This action was tried to a jury from August 21 to 25, 2023. The Jury found in favor 2 of Valenzuela on his AWA, AMWA, and FLSA claims. With respect to the AWA claim, 3 the jury determined that RJF breached the parties’ contract, and that RJF owed Valenzuela 4 $6,953.97 as compensation for his services. With respect to the AMWA claim, the jury 5 determined that RJF and Comella failed to pay Valenzuela at least $12.15 per hour for any 6 hours worked after May 31, 2021, and that RJF and Comella owed Valenzuela $6,366.60 7 in minimum wages. (Doc. 123.) Finally, with respect to the FLSA claim, the jury 8 determined that RJF and Comella failed to pay Valenzuela 1.5 times his regular rate for 9 overtime hours worked and owed Valenzuela $2,223.45 in overtime pay. (Doc. 124.) The 10 jury found in favor of RJF on its conversion counterclaim against Valenzuela. Specifically, 11 the jury determined that RJF owned the Rolex watch, Valenzuela knowingly and 12 intentionally controlled the watch in a manner that seriously interfered with RJF’s right to 13 control it, and RJF suffered damages in the amount of $15,000. (Doc. 125.) 14 Post trial, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation,1 the Court awarded Valenzuela treble damages for compensation paid during litigation and rejected Valenzuela’s equitable 15 defenses to RJF’s counterclaim. (Doc. 135.) On Valenzuela’s AWA Claim, the Court 16 awarded an additional $13,907.94 as treble damages on the unpaid commissions remaining 17 due and an additional $48,100.00 as treble damages on the $24,050 in commissions 18 withheld in bad faith until May 2022. On Valenzuela’s AMWA claim, the Court awarded 19 an additional $12,733.20 as treble damages. (Doc. 135.) The Clerk of Court subsequently: 20 (1) entered judgment in favor of Valenzuela on his AWA, AMWA, and FLSA claims 21 against Defendants, and (2) entered judgment in favor of RJF on its conversion 22 counterclaim against Valenzuela. (Doc. 141.) Thereafter, Valenzuela filed a Motion for 23 Attorneys’ fees requesting that the Court award attorneys’ fees in the amount of 24 $166,840.00. 25 // 26 27 1 The parties stipulated to the Court determining (1) whether Valenzuela was entitled to 28 treble damages or additional remedies, (Doc. 86-2 at 2, 4–5), and (2) whether Valenzuela proved equitable defenses to RJF’s conversion counterclaim, (Id. at 5–6). 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Entitlement to attorneys’ fees. 3 The FLSA and the AMWA require that the prevailing party be awarded reasonable 4 attorneys’ fees and costs. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall, in 5 addition to judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s 6 fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”); A.R.S. § 23-346(G) (“A 7 prevailing plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of suit.”). In 8 addition, under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the 9 prevailing party in any contested action arising out of a contract. The prevailing party is 10 one that “succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the 11 benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) 12 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). Plaintiff prevailed 13 on each of his claims against Defendants, therefore, he is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ 14 fees. B. The Lodestar calculation 15 After a court concludes that a party is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, it must 16 determine whether the fees requested are reasonable by using the lodestar method. See 17 Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2003). The lodestar is calculated by 18 multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable 19 hourly rate. McGrath v. Cnty. of Nev., 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995). Based on the 20 lodestar amount, Plaintiff seeks an attorneys’ fee award of $166,840.00. (Doc. 137.) 21 1. Reasonableness of rate 22 A reasonable hourly rate is generally the prevailing market rate in the relevant 23 community. Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016). A memorandum in 24 support of a motion for attorneys’ fees must include an affidavit with a brief description of 25 relevant qualifications, experience, and related contributions performed by each attorney 26 to whom fees are attributed. LRCiv 54.2(d)(4)(A). Once a plaintiff has provided evidence 27 that the charged rate is reasonable, it is defendant’s burden to rebut the evidence. See Blum 28 v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 (1984). 1 The Court finds that the hourly rates billed by Plaintiff’s legal team are reasonable. 2 Four individuals worked on this matter—Partner David C. Kresin, Associate Michael R. 3 Pang, and Legal Assistants Michael Martin and Nancy Cazares. Mr. Kresin billed at $350 4 per hour, Mr. Pang billed at $250 per hour, and Mr. Martin and Ms. Cazares billed at $100 5 per hour. Defendants do not challenge the reasonableness of these rates, and the Court finds 6 the rates to be reasonable based on the prevailing market rates in Tucson, Arizona. 7 In compliance with LRCiv. 54.2(d)(A)(4), Plaintiff provided the Court with proper 8 documentation in support of Mr. Kresin and Mr. Pang’s qualifications, experience, and 9 education. (Doc. 137-1 at 1-4, 32; Doc. 137-2 at 1-3.) According to the Arizona State Bar’s 10 2022 Economics of Law Report, the average hourly rate in Arizona for an equity partner 11 was $407 per hour, for lawyers with 20-29 years of experience was $386 per hour, and 12 civil litigators representing plaintiffs was $357 per hour. (Doc. 137-2 at 2-3.) Mr. Kresin 13 is managing partner at Yen Pilch Robaina & Kresin, PLLC (YPRK) and has 24 years of 14 experience in employment law. (Doc. 137-1 at 12.) Therefore, Mr. Kresin’s hourly rate of $350 is reasonable. According to the Arizona State Bar’s 2022 Economics of Law Report, 15 the average hourly rate in Arizona for an associate was $291 per hour, for lawyers with 10- 16 19 years of experience was $340 per hour, and civil litigators representing Plaintiffs was 17 $357 per hour. (Doc. 137-2 at 2-3.) During this litigation, Mr. Pang was an associate 18 attorney at YPRK and had over ten years of experience. (Doc. 137-1 at 2.) Therefore, Mr. 19 Pang’s hourly rate of $250 is reasonable. 20 Plaintiff provides no information about Mr. Martin or Ms. Cazares’ qualifications 21 or experience. Further, Plaintiff does not include documentation establishing the prevailing 22 rates for legal assistants in Tucson, Arizona. However, after conducting a survey of recent 23 cases, the Court finds that the requested hourly rate for the legal assistants is reasonable. 24 See Evans v. McAllister, 2024 WL 98978, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2024) (“2.4 hours of labor 25 by legal assistant at $100/hour . . . is reasonable.”); Fierros v. Quebedeaux Buick GMC 26 Inc., 2022 WL 3648028, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2022) (A $100 legal assistant rate was in 27 line with the prevailing market rates in the District of Arizona); Tiffany C. Tyner, Plaintiff, 28 1 v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2021 WL 1895254, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 11, 2021) (finding 2 $100 an hour for a paralegal is reasonable). 3 2. Reasonableness of hours expended 4 “In calculating the lodestar, district courts ‘have a duty to ensure that claims for 5 attorneys’ fees are reasonable,’ and a district court does not discharge that duty simply by 6 taking at face value the word of the prevailing party’s lawyer for the number of hours 7 expended on the case.” Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 8 2018) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rather, a district court must ensure the 9 prevailing attorneys have exercised “billing judgment,” and that hours were “reasonably 10 expended.” Id.; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. A reasonable attorneys’ fee award “should 11 compensate the work of paralegals, as well as that of attorneys.” Trustees of Const. Indus. 12 & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 2006) 13 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989)). However, if an “attorney’s hourly 14 rate already incorporates the cost of work performed by non-attorneys,” then such work is not separately compensable. Id. at 1257. 15 The Court finds that the number of hours expended by the Plaintiff’s legal team is 16 reasonable. In compliance with LRCiv. 54.2(e), that work is documented in chronological 17 order and includes: (1) the date on which the service was performed; (2) the time devoted 18 to the service; (3) a description of the service; (4) and the identity of the individual 19 performing the service. (Doc. 137-1 at 8-31.) After careful review of Plaintiff’s task-based 20 itemized statement, the Court finds the tasks and hours listed were reasonably expended in 21 prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims. Further, the tasks performed by legal assistants, such as 22 preparing trial exhibit binders and retrieving client emails in preparation for production, do 23 not appear to be incorporated within the work performed by attorneys. Furthermore, 24 Defendants do not challenge the reasonableness of the hours expended by Plaintiff’s legal 25 team in litigating this matter. (See Doc. 138; see also Doc. 137-1 (“Mr. Loucks and I had 26 a phone call to consult regarding the fee request . . . Mr. Loucks told me that he had 27 reviewed the itemized fees and had no objections to the fees on the list.”)). Having 28 determined the reasonable rates and reasonable hours expended by Plaintiff’s legal team, 1 the Court concludes the lodestar amount is $166,840.00. 2 C. Reducing the lodestar calculation 3 While the lodestar figure is “presumptively reasonable,” the court retains discretion 4 to adjust the loadstar figure upward or downward based on a variety of factors ‘not 5 subsumed in the lodestar figure.’” Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th 6 Cir. 2019). Those factors include (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and 7 difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service 8 properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the 9 case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations 10 imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results 11 obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the 12 ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with 13 the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 14 70 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 15 In their Objection, Defendants state that their “challenge is more focused” than the 16 Kerr factors. (Doc. 138 at 2.) Defendants argue that the Court should, in its discretion, 17 reduce the award because (1) Plaintiff achieved only “limited success” on his claims and 18 (2) the Comellas were not the “employers” on the claim for which Plaintiff was most 19 successful. (Doc. 138 at 3.) 20 1. Plaintiff’s “limited success” 21 When “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, [the lodestar amount] 22 may be an excessive amount.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Defendants state that Plaintiff 23 achieved only limited success because he began trial asking for the principal sum of more 24 than $216,000 in damages, but the jury awarded only about $15,500. (Doc. 138 at 2.) 25 Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s 7% recovery shows that the amount of fees he incurred 26 were excessive. (Id. at 2-3.) 27 The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that reduction of fees is warranted because 28 the jury awarded the Plaintiff less than what he initially asked for. 1 Courts should not reduce lodestars based on relief obtained simply because the amount of damages recovered on a claim was less than the amount 2 requested. Rather, the relief obtained justifies a lower fee if plaintiffs fail to 3 obtain relief on all claims, and if hours spent on unsuccessful claims were not needed to pursue successful claims. 4 5 Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1988); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434– 6 35. When a plaintiff’s claims “involve a common core of facts” or are “based on related 7 legal theories,” much of counsel’s time will be “devoted to litigation as a whole,” such that 8 the court should focus on the significance of the “overall relief obtained by the client in 9 relation to the hours expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Plaintiff prevailed on each of his claims and was awarded nearly $80,000 in 10 damages. (Doc. 123, 124, 135.) There is no evidence to suggest, nor do Defendants assert, 11 that Plaintiff’s counsel expended unnecessary hours on unrelated or unsuccessful claims. 12 Plaintiff’s claims were not discrete or unrelated. The claims stemmed from the same 13 “common core of facts”—Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff compensation, including for 14 wages and overtime, in violation of federal and state law. The Court concludes that all fees 15 incurred were necessary for Plaintiff to achieve success on his claims. As such, the Court 16 will not reduce Plaintiff’s award based on limited success. 17 2. Segregating liability 18 Defendants argue that because the Comellas “are not the employers on the claim for 19 which Plaintiff was most successful . . . the Court should segregate out the liability of the 20 [Comellas] and award an even smaller percentage of the fees Plaintiff requests.” (Doc. 138 21 at 3.) Defendants do not cite caselaw in support of their argument. 22 The Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that the Court should exclude the Comella’s 23 from the responsibility of payment of attorneys’ fees. “While a defendant should not be 24 required to compensate a plaintiff for attorney hours devoted to the case against other 25 defendants . . . attorney hours fairly devoted to one defendant that also support claims 26 against other defendants are compensable.” Watcher v. Pottsville Area Emergency Med. 27 Serv., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 516 (M.D. Pa. 2008). Here, the hours that Plaintiff’s counsel 28 devoted to the Plaintiff’s AWA claim supported Plaintiff’s AMWA and FLSA claims. As ! || explained above, Plaintiffs claims involve a “common core of facts” stemming from 2|| Defendants’ alleged failure to compensate plaintiff, including for wages and overtime, in violation of state and federal law. Plaintiff’s “higher level of success” on the AWA claim 4|| is of no moment. Plaintiff prevailed on each of his claims. As such, Defendants are || appropriately held jointly and severally liable for all fees awarded. Accordingly, 6 IT IS ORDERED: 7 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 137) is granted. 8 2. Defendants Ruby J. Farms, LLC, Anthony Comella, and Norma Comella are 9 ordered to pay to Plaintiff $166,840.00 in attorneys’ fees. Defendants are jointly and 10 severally liable for payment of the fees. 11 Dated this 8th day of July, 2024. 12 13 □

15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-8-