v. Pennington

2021 COA 9, 481 P.3d 1186

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 28, 2021
• Docket: 20CA1116, People
• Status: Published

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY January 28, 2021

2021COA9

No. 20CA1116, People v. Pennington — Crimes — Unauthorized Absence; Criminal Law — Sentencing — Amendatory Statutes — Retroactive Application; Colorado Constitution — Article III — Separation of Powers

A division of the court of appeals agrees with People v.

Gregory, 2020 COA 162, and concludes that the unauthorized

absence provision of the 2020 Prison Population Reduction and

Management Act (PPRMA) applies retroactively. The division also

concludes that the district court infringed on the separation of

powers doctrine when it sua sponte amended the defendant’s

criminal charge.

The special concurrence reaches the same result but

questions whether the supreme court’s reasoning in People v.

Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, directs retroactive application of ameliorative legislation changing the elements of an existing offense

and simultaneously creating a new crime.

The partial dissent would affirm the judgment of the district

court in its entirety, concluding that the district court had the

authority to amend the defendant’s criminal charge. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA9

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1116 Larimer County District Court No. 20CR444 Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Emily Marie Pennington,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE TERRY Richman, J., specially concurs Martinez*, J., concurs in part and dissents in part

Announced January 28, 2021

Clifford E. Riedel, District Attorney, Erin E. Butler, Deputy District Attorney, David P. Vandenberg, Second Assistant District Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jeffrey A. Wermer, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020. ¶1 This appeal involves a new twist on the issue decided in People

v. Gregory, 2020 COA 162. There, a division of this court held that

newly amended section 18-8-208(11), C.R.S. 2020, which originated

as part of the Prison Population Reduction and Management Act

(the Prison Reduction Act), H.B. 20-1019, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d

Reg. Sess., 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 23, applies retroactively to cases

being prosecuted as of the effective date of the new statute.

¶2 In this case, the prosecution appeals the district court’s order

of June 19, 2020, that sua sponte amended the charge against

defendant, Emily Marie Pennington, from felony escape under

section 18-8-208, C.R.S. 2019, to a charge of unauthorized absence

under a provision of the Prison Reduction Act, section 18-8-208.2,

C.R.S. 2020, and effectively dismissed the escape charge.

According to the prosecution, the court’s order violated the

separation of governmental powers and improperly applied the 2020

statute retroactively to Pennington.

¶3 We conclude that the district court did not err by retroactively

applying H.B. 20-1019 to Pennington. But we conclude that the

district court did err by amending Pennington’s charge to a charge

1 under the 2020 statute, because that action violated the separation

of powers.

¶4 As a result, we affirm the court’s order dismissing the escape

charge against Pennington, but we reverse the court’s amendment

of the charge to one under the 2020 statute, and remand for further

proceedings.

I. Background

¶5 Pennington was sentenced to concurrent terms in Larimer

County Community Corrections for two drug felonies. According to

the prosecution, on February 14, 2020, Pennington left the

Community Corrections facility and never returned. Pennington

was later arrested in April and charged with escape, a class 3

felony.

¶6 While Pennington was still at large, on March 6, 2020,

Governor Jared Polis signed H.B. 20-1019 into law. As relevant

here, the enactment redefined felony escape so that the act of

leaving and failing to return to a community corrections facility is

no longer an escape and instead constitutes the new misdemeanor

offense of unauthorized absence. § 18-8-208(11), C.R.S. 2020;

§ 18-8-208.2, C.R.S. 2020.

2 ¶7 After her arrest, Pennington moved to dismiss the felony

escape charge, arguing that she was entitled to retroactive

application of the Prison Reduction Act and that consequently she

could only be charged with unauthorized absence. Though the

district court denied dismissal of the case, it ruled that H.B. 20-

1019 should be applied retroactively, and as a result, the court

amended the escape charge to a charge of unauthorized absence

under the 2020 statute.

II. Retroactive Application of H.B. 20-1019

¶8 The prosecution argues that the district court erred by

applying H.B. 20-1019 retroactively. We disagree.

A. Legal Standards for Retroactive Application

¶9 Statutes are generally presumed to operate prospectively. § 2-

4-202, C.R.S. 2020; see also § 2-4-303, C.R.S. 2020 (“The

[amendment] of any statute or part of a statute . . . shall not have

the effect to release, extinguish, alter, modify, or change . . . any

penalty, forfeiture, or liability . . . which shall have been incurred

under such statute, unless the repealing, revising, amending, or

consolidating act so expressly provides . . . .”). But if a statute is

silent as to whether it applies only prospectively, a defendant may

3 seek retroactive application if she benefits from a significant change

in the law. People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 3.

¶ 10 In Stellabotte, our supreme court held that “ameliorative,

amendatory legislation applies retroactively to non-final convictions

under section 18-1-410(1)(f), unless the amendment contains

language indicating it applies only prospectively.” Id.; see also § 18-

1-410(1)(f)(I), C.R.S. 2020 (a defendant may request postconviction

relief if “there has been significant change in the law, applied to the

applicant’s conviction or sentence, allowing in the interests of

justice retroactive application of the changed legal standard”).

Stellabotte also reaffirmed a long line of cases that retroactively

applied legislative changes when a criminal defendant stood to

benefit from those amendments. Stellabotte, ¶ 26; see, e.g., Glazier

v. People, 193 Colo. 268, 269, 565 P.2d 935, 936 (1977) (“As we

have repeatedly held, a defendant is entitled to the benefits of

amendatory legislation when relief is sought before finality has

attached to the judgment of conviction.”); People v. Thomas, 185

Colo. 395, 398, 525 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1974) (the district court erred

by failing to retroactively apply a legislative change that mitigated

the penalties for attempted burglary).

4 ¶ 11 However, in cases where a legislative amendment has

substantially changed the elements or definition of a crime,

Colorado courts have held that such legislation does not apply

retroactively. See People v. Marlott, 191 Colo. 304, 308-09, 552

P.2d 491, 494 (1976) (refusing to retroactively apply an amended

definition of assault because the elements of the offense had been

substantially changed from those in the statute under which the

defendant had originally been charged); People v. Ellis, 41 Colo.

App. 271, 274, 589 P.2d 494, 496 (1978) (refusing to retroactively

apply an amended homicide statute because the new statute was

considerably altered from the statute under which the defendant

was originally charged).

B. Discussion

¶ 12 We conclude that the legislative changes in H.B. 20-1019

should be applied retroactively to Pennington’s case. The parties

agree, as do we, that H.B. 20-1019 does not contain language

indicating that it applies only prospectively. See Stellabotte, ¶ 3

(legislation does not apply retroactively if the legislation says that it

applies only prospectively); see also Gregory, ¶ 50 (H.B. 20-1019

does not specify that the unauthorized absence provision only

5 applies prospectively). We further conclude that because H.B. 20-

1019’s legislative changes are plainly ameliorative in nature,

Pennington is entitled to the benefit of those changes.

¶ 13 Before the General Assembly enacted H.B. 20-1019, leaving

and failing to return to a community corrections facility constituted

escape under section 18-8-208, C.R.S. 2019. Under that 2019

statute, Pennington’s actions in this case would have resulted in a

class 3 felony escape charge, an offense punishable by up to twelve

years in jail.

¶ 14 H.B. 20-1019 changed the type of conduct for which a

defendant could be charged with escape. As enacted, the statute

now provides that a person serving a direct sentence to community

corrections is “not in custody or confinement for purposes of” the

statute. § 18-8-208(11), C.R.S. 2020. And leaving and failing to

return to a community corrections facility is no longer an escape.

Id. Instead, such conduct is now an unauthorized absence under

section 18-8-208.2, C.R.S. 2020; cf. Gregory, ¶¶ 7-8 (discussing

unauthorized absence offense under section 18-8-208.2(1)(b), which

addresses removal of or tampering with an electronic monitoring

device).

6 ¶ 15 In Pennington’s case, if the new statute were to apply, a

charge of unauthorized absence would be a class 3 misdemeanor

punishable by no more than six months in jail. § 18-8-208.2(2)(b);

§ 18-1.3-501, C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 16 As relevant here, H.B. 20-1019 reduced the penalty and level

of offense for certain walkaways from correctional facilities by

redefining custody and confinement to remove certain conduct from

the crime of escape and instead categorizing such conduct under

the lesser crime of unauthorized absence. Gregory, ¶¶ 37-38. Such

changes are plainly ameliorative in nature. Stellabotte, ¶ 3;

Gregory, ¶¶ 37-38 (the unauthorized absence provision in H.B. 20-

1019 was ameliorative because it mitigated the penalty for the

defendant’s conduct). And they are exactly the types of legislative

changes that Stellabotte held are entitled to retroactive application.

Stellabotte, ¶ 3 (“ameliorative, amendatory legislation applies

retroactively” unless the statute says to the contrary).

¶ 17 Thus, applying the reasoning of Stellabotte, we conclude that

H.B. 20-1019 applies retroactively, and that Pennington is entitled

to the benefit of its legislative changes. See Gregory, ¶ 6.

7 ¶ 18 We also reject the prosecution’s argument that H.B. 20-1019

cannot apply retroactively because it creates a new offense. The

Gregory division held that H.B. 20-1019 applies retroactively, even

though it creates a new offense, because the legislative changes

effectuated by the new enactment benefit the defendant. Id. at

¶ 41. We agree with that division’s reasoning and apply it here.

¶ 19 The prosecution’s citation to Marlott does not change our

conclusion. It is true that in Marlott, our supreme court held that

the assault statute under the new criminal code could not apply

retroactively because “where, as here, the new Criminal Code

changes the elements of the crimes, there can be no measure by

which to determine whether the standards of punishment have

increased or decreased because the crimes are no longer the same.”

Marlott, 191 Colo. at 308-09, 552 P.2d at 494 (footnote omitted).

¶ 20 But Pennington’s case is distinguishable from the facts of

Marlott. Unlike the circumstances in that case, H.B. 20-1019 did

not overhaul the entire criminal code. And unlike the legislative

change in Marlott, H.B. 20-1019 does not present a situation where

the elements of escape have been so changed that there is no way to

determine “whether the standards of punishment have increased or

8 decreased because the crimes are no longer the same.” Id. The

newly enacted statute clearly changes the category of crime for

conduct that was previously chargeable as felony escape. Thus, we

conclude that H.B. 20-1019 applies retroactively despite its creation

of a new crime.

¶ 21 Pressing further, the prosecution contends that Pennington is

not entitled to the retroactive application of H.B. 20-1019 because

she has not yet been convicted of a crime. According to the

prosecution, a defendant can only assert that she is entitled to

retroactive application of a legislative change after the defendant

has already been convicted. See § 18-1-410(1) (“[E]very person

convicted of a crime is entitled as a matter of right to make

applications for postconviction review.”). We are not persuaded.

¶ 22 Section 18-1-410(1) postconviction relief is not the only vehicle

for retroactive application of a legislative change to a criminal

defendant’s case. In Thomas, the supreme court held that where

the defendant filed his motion for application of the newly revised

criminal statute before his conviction became final, “[t]he court

therefore had jurisdiction to entertain his motion for relief.”

Thomas, 185 Colo. at 397, 525 P.2d at 1137. Subsequent

9 developments in Colorado law have not disturbed this holding.

Indeed, Stellabotte held that “relief under an amended statute is

available only to those defendants whose convictions were not final

when the amendment was enacted.” Stellabotte, ¶ 37 (emphasis

added); accord Gregory, ¶ 27. Certainly, a defendant who has not

yet been convicted does not have a final conviction.

¶ 23 The prosecution contends that H.B. 20-1019 should not be

applied retroactively because the new law redefined the crime of

escape. According to the prosecution, Stellabotte does not permit

the retroactive application of legislation that redefines crimes, and

that case only permits retroactive application when the legislation

either decreases the severity of or reduces the maximum sentence

for a crime. We disagree. Stellabotte was not so limited. See

Stellabotte, ¶ 18 (numerous cases held that criminal defendants

should get the benefit of amendatory legislation enacted before their

convictions became final on appeal). Because H.B. 20-1019

provides such relief to Pennington, and her conviction was not final

before enactment, the amendment applies to her case.

10 III. Amendment of Pennington’s Felony Escape Charge

¶ 24 Our conclusion that Pennington is entitled to the benefit of the

statutory change does not end our inquiry, though. The

prosecution further contends that the district court erred by

amending Pennington’s charge from felony escape to misdemeanor

unauthorized absence. We agree that the court erred by doing so

because this action violated the separation of powers between

governmental entities.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 25 Whether a district court violated the separation of powers

doctrine is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Reyes,

2016 COA 98, ¶ 23.

¶ 26 This issue was preserved for appeal.

Article III of the Colorado Constitution provides that the powers of the state government are divided into three different branches — the legislative, executive, and judicial branches — and that “no person . . . charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one . . . shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others,” unless expressly directed or permitted by the Colorado Constitution.

11 People v. Mazzarelli, 2019 CO 71, ¶ 29. Prosecutors belong to the

executive branch, and as members of that branch, they are vested

with broad discretion to prosecute people for violations of criminal

law. Reyes, ¶ 24. “The scope of this discretion extends to the

power to investigate and to determine who shall be prosecuted and

what crimes shall be charged.” People v. Dist. Ct., 632 P.2d 1022,

1024 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 27 Prosecutors also have broad discretion to alter or dismiss

criminal charges. Reyes, ¶ 24. Generally, a prosecutor’s discretion

in charging or requesting the dismissal of pending charges “may not

be controlled or limited by judicial intervention.” Dist. Ct., 632 P.2d

at 1024; see also People v. Renander, 151 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. App.

2006) (“[I]nterference by a court with the authority of the

prosecution to dismiss charges once filed may occur only in limited

circumstances: (1) when exercising its supervisory authority to

dismiss on constitutional grounds (e.g., infringement of defendant’s

due process rights); (2) when exercising its supervisory authority to

protect the integrity of the judicial process (e.g., prosecutorial

misconduct . . . ); (3) upon determination that the evidence is

insufficient to support prosecution; or (4) when authorized by

12 statute . . . .”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Ch. 362,

sec. 7, § 18-6-403, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 2056.

¶ 28 We conclude that the district court infringed on the separation

of powers when it sua sponte amended Pennington’s criminal

charge. In this case, there was no valid reason for the district court

to interfere with the prosecution’s discretion to charge Pennington

by amending her charge from one of felony escape to one of

misdemeanor unauthorized absence. See Renander, 151 P.3d at

660. Instead, upon finding that H.B. 20-1019 applied retroactively,

and that Pennington could thus no longer be charged with felony

escape, the district court should have simply dismissed the felony

escape charge. Cf. Harris v. Dist. Ct., 843 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Colo.

1993) (if the prosecution cannot establish probable cause, the

charged offense must be dismissed).

¶ 29 The district court asserted that it had the authority to amend

Pennington’s charge because it would have had the authority to do

so at a preliminary hearing. But the district court did not amend

Pennington’s charge in the context of a preliminary hearing. Simply

because a court has the ability to amend charges at a preliminary

hearing does not mean that that authority extends to amending

13 charges in other procedural contexts. Instead, it is the prosecution

that has the authority to decide what a criminal defendant should

be charged with if the original charge is no longer available to it.

See Reyes, ¶ 24 (prosecutors have broad discretion to alter

charges).

¶ 30 Given our disposition, the prosecution’s last contention — that

the district court erred by amending the date of the offense in

Pennington’s charge — is moot.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 31 We affirm the district court’s order to the extent that it

dismissed the escape charge against Pennington. The district

court’s amendment of Pennington’s charge from one of felony

escape to one of unauthorized absence is reversed, and the case is

remanded for the district court to dismiss the unauthorized absence

charge.

JUDGE RICHMAN specially concurs.

JUSTICE MARTINEZ concurs in part and dissents in part.

14 JUDGE RICHMAN, specially concurring.

¶ 32 I agree with the majority that the legislative amendments to

the escape statute should apply retroactively to Pennington’s case,

but not for the same reasons advanced by the majority.

¶ 33 The majority relies in part on the division’s opinion in People v.

Gregory, 2020 COA 162, which in turn relied on the opinion in

People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, to conclude that the amendments

to section 18-8-208(11), C.R.S. 2020, enacted as part of the Prison

Population Reduction and Management Act (PPRMA), apply

retroactively to Pennington’s case. See H.B. 20-1019, 72d Gen.

Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 23. I write

separately because I do not read Stellabotte to clearly apply to this

case. I think the holding of Stellabotte is ambiguous; applying the

ambiguous holding as the majority does here could create

unforeseen circumstances in this case and unanticipated results in

future cases, if it is not clarified.

¶ 34 The explicit holding in Stellabotte is that “[o]ur decision in

People v. Thomas, 185 Colo. 395, 525 P.2d 1136 (1974), remains

good law.” Stellabotte, ¶ 38. In at least two places, the Stellabotte

opinion describes the decision in Thomas as holding that

15 “amendatory legislation mitigating the penalties for crimes should be

applied to any case which has not received final judgment.”

Stellabotte, ¶¶ 16, 27 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas, 185 Colo.

at 398, 525 P.2d at 1138). The statutory change at issue in

Stellabotte was a change in the classification of the offense of theft

and a revision to the penalties applied to the new classifications.

See id. at ¶ 6. Thus, the holding of Thomas, as stated in the

conclusion of Stellabotte, fits the facts in Stellabotte and directed

application of the amendatory legislation to reduce the sentence

imposed on the defendant in that case. See People v. Godinez, 2018

COA 170M, ¶ 29 (Stellabotte clearly “addressed statutes that either

decreased the severity of a previously defined crime or reduced the

maximum sentence that could be imposed for commission of that

crime.”). I find that holding and result to be clear, and I have relied

on that holding in subsequent opinions that I have authored or

joined.

¶ 35 But immediately after stating the holding in Thomas, the

Stellabotte opinion goes on to state that “[a]ccordingly, we hold that

ameliorative, amendatory legislation applies retroactively to non-

final convictions under section 18-1-410(1)(f), unless the

16 amendment contains language indicating it applies only

prospectively.” Stellabotte, ¶ 38. Giving the word “accordingly” its

usual meaning — that what comes next follows from — the

statement should read that amendatory legislation that “mitigates

the penalties for crimes” is applied retroactively. But instead,

without expressly stating so, the court appears to have expanded its

holding in Thomas to presume retroactive applicability of any type

of ameliorative, amendatory legislation.

¶ 36 In my view, this recitation leaves an ambiguity. If the

controlling decision of Thomas, by its quoted language, applies only

when the amendatory legislation mitigates the penalties, the next

sentence in Stellabotte should logically include that limitation. But

because it does not, I remain uncertain whether the supreme court

intended to hold that any ameliorative, amendatory legislation

should apply retroactively to non-final convictions. If so, the

relevant language was technically dicta because it was not

necessary to decide Stellabotte’s case. Although the majority in this

case and the majority in Gregory read Stellabotte to apply to any

ameliorative, amendatory legislation, I am not certain that is a

correct reading.

17 ¶ 37 Whether that is a correct reading is essential to whether

Stellabotte applies to Pennington’s case. The PPRMA did not

mitigate the penalties applicable to escape, the offense for which

Pennington was charged under section 18-8-208, C.R.S. 2019, and

it did not modify the classification of the offense. Instead, as the

majority acknowledges, the PPRMA created an entirely new (lesser)

offense — unauthorized absence from a community corrections

program. See § 18-8-208.2, C.R.S. 2020. In this regard, the

PPRMA was not amendatory legislation that mitigated the penalties

available for the charges filed against Pennington, as was the case

in Stellabotte.

¶ 38 However, the PPRMA did effectively change the definition of

custody or confinement, an element of the offense of escape. In the

2019 version, only persons placed in community corrections for

residential treatment were “not in custody or confinement” for

purposes of the statute; the 2020 version expanded the categories

of those “not in custody or confinement” to include persons serving

a direct sentence in a community corrections program (like

Pennington). Compare § 18-8-208(11), C.R.S. 2019, with § 18-8-

208(11), C.R.S. 2020. Because the changed definition, if applicable

18 to Pennington’s conduct, would have reduced her offense from a

felony to a misdemeanor, it is arguably an ameliorative amendment.

¶ 39 The problem I have with applying Stellabotte to this case, and

with agreeing with the majority’s analysis, is that there is Colorado

authority stating that a legislative amendment that substantially

changes the definition of a crime does not apply retroactively. See

People v. Marlott, 191 Colo. 304, 308-09, 552 P.2d 491, 494 (1976);

People v. Ellis, 41 Colo. App. 271, 274, 589 P.2d 494, 496 (1978).

The majority acknowledges the holding from these cases.

¶ 40 In Marlott and Ellis, the defendants argued that under

Thomas, the benefits of amendatory legislation should be applied to

them, but each decision rejected the argument. In Ellis, a division

of this court expressly stated, “Thomas involved changes in criminal

penalties, and the argument that it should be extended to changes

in substantive criminal definitions was addressed and rejected by

the [s]upreme [c]ourt in People v. Marlott, Colo., 552 P.2d 491

(1976).” 41 Colo. App. at 274, 589 P.2d at 496.

19 ¶ 41 The majority distinguishes Marlott because the PPRMA “did

not overhaul the entire criminal code,”1 supra ¶¶ 19-20, like in

Marlott, and because here, unlike in Marlott, we can clearly

determine that the punishment for Pennington’s conduct is

decreased under the new statute. The majority, however, does not

address the statement in Ellis that a change in a definition in a

statute is not applied retroactively. See 41 Colo. App. at 274, 589

P.2d at 496. In my view, the holdings of these cases apply to

Pennington’s case, and Stellabotte does not address a situation

where the definition of a crime was changed, because those were

not the facts in that case.

¶ 42 We are left with conflicting authority in relation to Pennington.

On the one hand, Stellabotte appears to state, arguably in dicta,

1 The PPRMA did amend several statutes in addition to modifying statutes related to escape. It (1) redefined “private contract prison,” see § 17-1-102(7.3), C.R.S. 2020; (2) prescribed new inmate capacity for the Centennial correctional facility, see § 17-1-104.3, C.R.S. 2020; (3) established a new function of the Department of Local Affairs Division of Local Government — to study future prison bed needs, see § 24-32-104(3), C.R.S. 2020; (4) added subsections (3) and (4) to section 17-1-104.5, C.R.S. 2020, regarding incarceration of inmates from other states; and (5) revised sentencing hearing requirements for termination from community corrections, see § 18-1.3-301, C.R.S. 2020.

20 that any ameliorative, amendatory legislation applies retroactively

to non-final convictions; on the other hand, Marlott and Ellis

explicitly state that a legislative amendment that substantially

changes the elements or definition of a crime does not apply

retroactively.

¶ 43 I thus write separately to identify this apparent conflict and to

urge the supreme court to clarify the breadth of its holding in

Stellabotte, with respect to its holding in Marlott. If the holding of

Stellabotte is not clarified, and it continues to be applied in any case

where amendatory legislation is arguably ameliorative, I am

concerned there may be unforeseen circumstances that will

interfere with the prosecution of criminal conduct that the General

Assembly did not intend to change. One of these unintended

consequences may arise in this very case.

¶ 44 However Stellabotte may be clarified, we still must decide

whether the district court in this case properly applied the changed

definition of “custody or confinement” in the PPRMA retroactively, to

dismiss the prosecution’s escape charge. Retroactive application of

the PPRMA raises particular concerns here. There is no doubt that

at the time Pennington committed the acts giving rise to the charge

21 of escape, her conduct, if proven, amounted to a violation of the

escape statute. See § 18-8-208, C.R.S. 2019. But if the changed

definition of custody or confinement contained in section 18-8-208,

C.R.S. 2020, is applied retroactively, Pennington cannot be charged

with escape.

¶ 45 But can she be charged under the new statute with

unauthorized absence? The new statute, section 18-8-208.2, would

certainly apply to Pennington’s conduct; but it did not become

effective until March 6, 2020. As the majority notes, Pennington

absented herself from community corrections on February 14,

2020, before the new statute became effective. This raises the

question of whether Pennington can be prosecuted for conduct that

occurred before the new statute became effective, and whether that

is what the legislature intended. If not, does she avoid prosecution

altogether because we are applying the PPRMA retroactively to

dismiss the escape charge against her? I am not sure of the answer

to that question under the facts of this case, and therefore take no

position on the issue.

¶ 46 Despite my reservations about applying Stellabotte, I agree

with the majority that the legislative amendments to the escape

22 statute should apply retroactively to Pennington’s benefit and result

in a dismissal of the escape charge. As the majority correctly

concludes, the PPRMA is silent as to whether it only applies

prospectively. And, as stated above, in my view whether it applies

retroactively under Stellabotte is uncertain. Thus, I see application

of the PPRMA to Pennington’s case as an ambiguous proposition.

¶ 47 Because the PPRMA is ambiguous, I turn to the principle of

statutory interpretation that requires that we “ascertain and give

effect to the legislature’s intent . . . [and] effectuate the purpose of

the legislative scheme.” People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶¶ 15, 16. It is

clear from the title of H.B. 20-1019 that the General Assembly’s

intent in enacting the PPRMA is to reduce the prison population.

Accordingly, I conclude that the General Assembly intended the

amendments to the escape statute to apply retroactively.

¶ 48 I agree with the majority that the district court’s order

dismissing the escape charge against Pennington should be

affirmed, and I agree with Judge Terry that the district court did not

have authority to unilaterally amend the charges.

23 JUSTICE MARTINEZ, concurring in part and dissenting in

part.

¶ 49 I agree with the opinion of Judge Terry, to which I refer as the

majority (it enjoys a majority of the panel, albeit with different

judges joining each of its two parts), that Pennington is entitled to

the benefit of the ameliorative legislation. I part ways with the

majority when it concludes that the district court violated the

separation of powers under article III of the Colorado Constitution

by amending the escape charge to unauthorized absence, and

should instead just dismiss the escape charge. Because I do not

agree that separation of powers principles prohibit amendment of

the escape charge, or that dismissal of the entire escape charge is

the benefit of the ameliorative legislation, I respectfully dissent in

¶ 50 Although neither of the other two opinions in this case states

so directly, it is precisely because unauthorized absence is a subset

of the escape charge brought against Pennington that the Prison

Population Reduction and Management Act is ameliorative

legislation and reduces the penalty to which she is subject. If

unauthorized absence were not a subset of escape, People v.

24 Marlott, 191 Colo. 304, 552 P.2d 491 (1976) — which declined to

consider an amended definition of assault as ameliorative

legislation because the elements of the offense had been

substantially changed from those in the statute under which the

defendant had originally been charged — would compel a different

result. It is for this same reason, because unauthorized absence is

a subset of escape, that principles of separation of powers do not

prevent the district court from amending the escape charge to

unauthorized absence; in effect, the unauthorized absence charge

was brought by the prosecution when it charged Pennington with

escape.

¶ 51 The separation of powers doctrine insures “that the three

branches of government are separate, coordinate, and equal,” and it

“imposes upon the judiciary a proscription against interfering with

the executive or legislative branches.” Pena v. Dist. Ct., 681 P.2d

953, 956 (Colo. 1984). However, this doctrine does not preclude the

necessary overlap that occurs between the powers exercised by

each branch. Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 205-06 (Colo. 2006).

¶ 52 Generally, as members of the executive branch, prosecutors

have broad discretion to file or dismiss charges. People v. Reyes,

25 2016 COA 98, ¶ 24. These actions “may not be controlled or limited

by judicial intervention.” People v. Dist. Ct., 632 P.2d 1022, 1024

(Colo. 1981).

¶ 53 As the majority notes, district courts have discretion to

dismiss charges under certain circumstances. People v. Renander,

151 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. App. 2006) (district court may determine

unit of prosecution for sexual exploitation of a child), superseded on

other grounds by statute, Ch. 362, sec. 7, § 18-6-403(5), 2006 Colo.

Sess. Laws 2056; see also People v. Villapando, 984 P.2d 51, 55

(Colo. 1999) (district court may screen charged offense for probable

cause during a preliminary hearing); People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d

1234, 1243-44 (Colo. 1994) (district court can dismiss pending

charges against a defendant on constitutional grounds); People v.

Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987) (district court can dismiss

prosecution at pretrial stage pursuant to statute); People v. Dennis,

164 Colo. 163, 166, 433 P.2d 339, 340 (1967) (district court can

dismiss case where evidence is insufficient to support prosecution);

People v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956, 957-58 (Colo. App. 1991) (dismissal of

case proper if government’s conduct violates fundamental fairness

and is shocking to the universal sense of justice). But the district

26 court may also amend or reduce a charge under certain

circumstances. Hunter v. Dist. Ct., 184 Colo. 238, 240-41, 519 P.2d

941, 943 (1974) (district court has authority at preliminary hearing

to bind over a defendant on a lesser included charge); People v.

Houser, 2013 COA 11, ¶ 83 (district court may instruct jury on

lesser included offense if there is supporting evidence); People v.

Carey, 198 P.3d 1223, 1234 (Colo. App. 2008) (district court may

instruct jury on lesser nonincluded offense if the defendant

requests or consents to it); People v. Scott, 10 P.3d 686, 688 (Colo.

App. 2000) (district court has authority to submit jury instruction

on lesser included offense after granting judgment of acquittal on

greater offense).

¶ 54 Here, the district court amended Pennington’s charge,

reasoning by analogy that because it would have had authority at a

preliminary hearing to bind over a count that did not suffice as a

felony but met the requirements of a misdemeanor, it had the same

authority in this circumstance. The majority contends that there

was no valid reason for the district court to interfere with the

prosecution’s discretion to amend Pennington’s charge. Further,

the majority argues that a district court’s authority to amend

27 charges at a preliminary hearing does not extend to amending

charges in other procedural contexts. At the same time, the

majority acknowledges that a district court may dismiss charges

under certain circumstances.

¶ 55 In support of its assertion that amending charges is solely

within the discretion of the prosecutor, the majority cites only

general propositions of prosecutorial authority rather than any

authority prohibiting amendment of charges by the court. See, e.g.,

Reyes, ¶ 24 (prosecutors have broad discretion to alter or dismiss

charges). In my view, to the extent that the majority reasons that

the district court should dismiss the escape charge, it is

inconsistent to hold that the district court may not amend the

charge because separation of powers generally prohibits both

dismissing and amending charges. However, despite this general

prohibition, there are many circumstances in which the district

court may dismiss or alter charges. As our supreme court noted in

Crowe, the separation of powers doctrine does not require absolute

division of authority among the branches of government. 126 P.3d

at 205-06. Part of this overlap in authority among branches of

government permits courts to dismiss charges (1) on constitutional

28 grounds; (2) to protect the integrity of the judicial process; (3) for

insufficient evidence to support prosecution; and (4) when

authorized by statute. Renander, 151 P.3d at 660; see also Hunter,

184 Colo. at 240-41, 519 P.2d at 943; Houser, ¶ 83; Carey, 198

P.3d at 1234; Scott, 10 P.3d at 688.

¶ 56 When the district court amended the escape charge to a

charge of unauthorized absence, it was effectively dismissing only a

portion of the escape charge and allowing the case to proceed on a

subset of the initial escape charge. While the majority would

require the district court to dismiss the entire escape charge, I do

not agree that the district court is somehow prevented by principles

of separation of powers from dismissing only a portion of the escape

charge and proceeding with the lesser remainder of the escape

charge, unauthorized absence. The conclusion that the legislative

change to escape confers an ameliorative benefit expresses our best

understanding of the intent of the legislature, a conclusion we

reach in the absence of an expressed intent by applying legislative

guidance and following the direction of our supreme court. Thus,

dismissing part of the escape charge and proceeding with the

remaining part, unauthorized absence, is both authorized by

29 statute and a permitted variance from the general principle that

dismissing and amending charges is with the providence of the

prosecutor. Therefore, I find no error with the district court’s

amendment of the offense charged from escape to unauthorized

absence.

¶ 57 For the reasons discussed above, I would affirm the judgment

of the district court in its entirety.