23CA0571 Peo v Klingensmith 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0571 El Paso County District Court No. 20CR1269 Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eric J. Klingensmith,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Fox and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katherine Gillespie, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Eric J. Klingensmith, was convicted of aggravated
sexual assault on a child, sexual assault on a child - position of
trust - pattern of abuse, aggravated incest, and attempt to commit
sexual assault on a child. Klingensmith appeals, contending that
the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial and should have
permitted him to cross-examine K.S.’s credibility on the basis that
she had previously falsely reported a sexual assault. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 K.S. reported that her father, Klingensmith, began sexually
assaulting her when she was seven years old. The assaults
continued for several years. K.S. described that Klingensmith gave
her Ambien to forget the encounters.
¶3 K.S. reported that Klingensmith also sexually assaulted a
friend of hers, L.C. L.C. was interviewed and disclosed that when
she was nine or ten years old, she slept over at K.S.’s house.
During the sleepover, she was sent to the basement to sleep
because she and K.S. were being too loud. Klingensmith came
downstairs while L.C. was sleeping and removed her blanket. L.C.
stated that after the blanket was removed, she felt something
touching her upper thigh and she saw it was Klingensmith’s
1 genitals. L.C. stated that Klingensmith told her and K.S. that if
they said anything to the authorities, he would kill them.
¶4 Klingensmith was charged with sexual assault on a child by
one in a position of trust, two counts of sexual assault on a child,
sexual assault on a child - position of trust - victim less than fifteen
and as part of a pattern of abuse, and aggravated incest.
¶5 On the day Klingensmith’s trial was set to begin, the trial
court declared a mistrial under Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because the
COVID-19 pandemic prevented the court from safely empaneling a
jury. The trial was continued several more times.
¶6 The court severed the charges relating to K.S. from those
relating to L.C. The charges relating to K.S. were tried to a jury in
November 2022. The jury found Klingensmith guilty of sexual
assault on a child, sexual assault on a child - position of trust -
victim less than fifteen and as part of a pattern of abuse, and
aggravated incest.
¶7 The parties subsequently reached a plea agreement regarding
the counts relating to L.C. In November 2022, Klingensmith
pleaded guilty to an added count of attempted sexual assault on a
2 child in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts involving
L.C.
¶8 The trial court sentenced Klingensmith to the custody of the
Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term of fourteen
years to life for sexual assault on a child and sexual assault on a
child - position of trust - pattern of abuse; an indeterminate term of
twelve years to life for aggravated incest; and a determinate term of
three years for attempted sexual assault on a child. The court
ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
II. Discussion
¶9 Klingensmith contends that the trial court erred (1) by
declaring a mistrial and refusing to dismiss the case on speedy trial
grounds because Crim. P. 24(c)(4) violates the separation of powers
doctrine and (2) by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-
examining K.S. concerning her prior allegations of sexual abuse
against her mother under section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2022. We
disagree with both contentions.
3 A. Crim. P. 24(c)(4) Does Not Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine
¶ 10 Klingensmith argues that the trial court lacked authority to
declare a mistrial under Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because that rule violates
the separation of powers doctrine. Crim. P. 24(c)(4) provides, “At
any time before trial, upon motion by a party or on its own motion,
the court may declare a mistrial in a case on the ground that a fair
jury pool cannot be safely assembled . . . due to a public health
crisis or limitations brought about by such crisis.” Klingensmith
argues that a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial is a
substantive right and that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) unconstitutionally
allows trial courts to extend the speedy trial timeline. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 “Whether a rule adopted by the supreme court is
constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo.” People
v. Eason, 2022 COA 54, ¶ 16; see People v. Pennington, 2021 COA
9, ¶ 25 (we review a separation of powers challenge de novo).
¶ 12 The Colorado Constitution vests the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government with distinct powers. Colo. Const.
art. III. The separation of powers doctrine limits each branch to the
4 exercise of only its powers. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436
(Colo. 1993). While the state’s legislative power is vested in the
General Assembly, the state’s judicial power is vested in the courts.
Colo. Const. art. V, § 1; Colo. Const. art. VI, § 1. This judicial
power includes the Colorado Supreme Court’s authority to
“promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and
criminal cases.” Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21. However, “legislative
policy and judicial rulemaking powers may overlap to some extent
so long as there is no substantial conflict between statute and rule.”
People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275, 279 (Colo. 1978). “No such
conflict exists in the absence of a procedure conflicting with that set
forth in the statute.” People v. Bondurant, 2012 COA 50, ¶ 24. If a
substantial conflict exists, the statute prevails when it governs
traditional areas of legislative concern. § 13-2-108, C.R.S. 2025.
2. Analysis
¶ 13 Klingensmith argues that section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2025,
which requires a defendant to be tried within six months from
entering a not-guilty plea, conflicts with and must prevail over
Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because the right to a speedy trial is substantive
and statutory. Klingensmith claims that Crim. P. 24(c)(4)
5 impermissibly broadens the meaning of a “mistrial,” but he fails to
point to any conflict between the statute and the rule that would
require us to conclude that the statute prevails over the rule.
¶ 14 Section 18-1-405(6) sets forth the exceptions to the six-month
speedy trial requirement. The mistrial exception doesn’t define or
limit what constitutes a mistrial; it merely provides that “[t]he
period of delay caused by any mistrial . . . [is] not to exceed three
months for each mistrial.” § 18-1-405(6)(e). Crim. P. 24(c)(4), on
the other hand, specifically provides that a trial court may declare a
mistrial if a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled due to a
public health crisis. This is consistent with the principle that
courts also traditionally determine what constitutes a mistrial. See,
e.g., People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Colo. 1987) (“In the
absence of a constitutional violation, it is well-established that the
decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is directed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.”).
¶ 15 Further, another division of our court addressed the issue
Klingensmith raises and held that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) was a
procedural rule that did not run afoul of the separation of powers
doctrine. Eason, ¶ 21. The division concluded that Crim. P.
6 24(c)(4) was designed to regulate procedural matters, including
docket management, jury pool assembly, and trial practice. Id. at
¶ 23. And, to the extent that there was some aspect of public policy
underlying Crim. P. 24(c), it didn’t conflict with any legislative or
executive expression of public policy. Id. at ¶ 21.
¶ 16 Although we are not obligated to follow another division, we
are persuaded by Eason’s rationale and see no reason to depart
from the division’s holding. We therefore disagree with
Klingensmith’s contention that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) is unconstitutional.
Consequently, the court did not violate Klingensmith’s speedy trial
rights or err by denying his motion to dismiss.
B. The Rape Shield Statute
¶ 17 Klingensmith argues that (1) People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180
(Colo. 2006), which held that a victim must have made multiple
false accusations of sexual assault before the rape shield statute
may be pierced, was wrongfully decided; (2) we are not bound by
Weiss because the 2024 amendments to section 18-3-407(2) apply
to his case; and (3) the trial court erred by prohibiting defense
counsel from cross-examining K.S. about her prior false allegation
7 of sexual abuse against her mother. We disagree with every
contention.
1. Additional Applicable Facts
¶ 18 Based on two pages of a 2014 report written by the
Department of Human Services (DHS), Klingensmith filed a pretrial
motion to pierce the rape shield statute as it applied to K.S. As part
of a prior dependency and neglect case involving her mother, K.S.
alleged her mother sexually abused her, but DHS determined the
allegation was unfounded. Klingensmith sought to admit K.S.’s
prior accusation as evidence of her untruthfulness under CRE
608(b).
¶ 19 At a July 2021 hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that
K.S. made only one false report but claimed that the evidence
should still be admitted despite the supreme court’s holding in
Weiss, which defense counsel argued was incorrectly decided. The
trial court denied the motion, stating, “The case law is what it is, so,
obviously, I am going to follow the case law.”
¶ 20 The case proceeded to trial in November 2022. K.S. testified
that she had been attending therapy and meeting with her school
counselor during middle and high school to deal with anxiety and
8 mental health concerns. On recross-examination, K.S. attributed
her need for therapy to “flashbacks to the sexual stuff, or even just
my panic attacks and with my dad. I would talk to the counselor or
the middle school . . . therapist and try to find ways to help . . .
lessen the effect of those and help mitigate it on my own.”
¶ 21 Defense counsel immediately filed a motion asking the court to
reconsider its prior ruling under section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2022,
arguing that K.S. attributed her need to see a therapist to the acts
that Klingensmith allegedly committed but that she was already in
therapy because of the alleged sexual abuse her mother inflicted.
The defense argued that because it was prohibited from confronting
K.S. about the falsehood, the court was allowing K.S. to mislead the
jury, which violated Klingensmith’s Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights. Defense counsel claimed that K.S.’s testimony “opened the
door” and that she should be subject to cross-examination to
challenge her credibility.
¶ 22 The trial court held a hearing on the motion and ultimately
denied it for the following reasons:
[F]irst, the defense has not satisfied the elements of the Rape Shield statute that under the statute would allow them to put on
9 evidence that [K.S.] has a history of false reporting of sexual assault. First, there is only an allegation of one false report and under [People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 50,1] the statute requires at least two false reports.
Second, at this hearing that we’re holding now, the . . . case law also establishes that the burden is on the defense to . . . prove the false reports by a preponderance of the evidence. So I find that the defense has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [K.S.] made even one prior false report.
¶ 23 The trial court explained:
[T]here was an admission by [K.S.’s] mother that the touching was reported, that she had touched her daughter in the ways that [K.S.] had reported, but she denied it being sexual in nature, whereas [K.S.] alleged it being sexual in nature. So what we have is a difference in characterization of certain touching that was factually admitted. So to the extent it’s relevant, which it may not be because it’s . . . only one incident rather than two, I find that based on that evidence, . . . I can’t find that the defense has proved by a preponderance that [K.S.] made a false report of sexual abuse.
1 People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 50, reiterated the supreme
court’s holding in People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180 (Colo. 2006), that more than one single false report was necessary to evidence a history of false reporting under the exception to the rape shield statute.
10 2. Weiss Requires More than One “Prior False Allegation”
¶ 24 Klingensmith first argues that Weiss was improperly decided
when it held there must be more than one prior false accusation of
sexual abuse or assault to constitute a “history of false reporting.”
We disagree.
a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 25 We review a trial court’s determination of the admissibility of
evidence under the rape shield statute for an abuse of discretion,
but we review its interpretation of the rape shield statute de novo.
People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 63. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or is based on an erroneous view of the law. People v.
Osorio-Bahena, 2013 COA 55, ¶ 21.
¶ 26 Because sexual assault is a hostile crime of violence and
domination calculated to humiliate, injure, and degrade, the
General Assembly enacted section 18-3-407. People in Interest of
K.N., 977 P.2d 868, 874 (Colo. 1999). The rape shield statute seeks
to protect sexual assault victims from “humiliating and
embarrassing public fishing expeditions into their past sexual
conduct.” Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1185 (quoting McKenna, 585 P.2d at
11 277-78). The rape shield statute deems the prior or subsequent
sexual conduct of any alleged victim to be presumptively irrelevant
to the criminal trial. Id.
¶ 27 But the rape shield statute includes several exceptions to the
presumption that evidence of a victim’s sexual activities is
inadmissible. People v. Lancaster, 2015 COA 93, ¶ 36. One of
those exceptions deals with false reporting. Under the version of
that exception in effect at the time of Klingensmith’s trial, evidence
that the victim had a “history of false reporting of sexual assaults”
was admissible if the evidence was relevant and material and the
defendant followed the procedure for admitting such evidence. Id.
(quoting § 18-3-407(2), C.R.S. 2014). To use this exception, the
defendant must articulate facts that would show that “the alleged
victim made multiple prior or subsequent reports of sexual assault”
that were false. Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1182. And “[a] single false
report is not a ‘history of false reporting of sexual assaults.’” Marx,
¶ 50 (quoting Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1187).
b. Discussion
¶ 28 Klingensmith acknowledges that he alleged only one instance
of false reporting but argues Weiss was wrongly decided. We are
12 bound by the rules expressed by the supreme court, however, and
we are not free to depart from its precedent. People v. Melendez,
2024 COA 21M, ¶ 19. Accordingly, until the supreme court states
otherwise, Weiss controls.
¶ 29 Because the trial court was required to follow Weiss and Marx,
it did not abuse its discretion by requiring evidence of more than
one prior instance of falsely reported sexual assault. People v.
Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 45 (recognizing that trial judges are
bound to follow appellate court decisions).
3. The 2024 Amendments to Section 18-3-407 Do Not Apply
¶ 30 Klingensmith argues that the 2024 amendments to section 18-
3-407, which require only one instance of false reporting, apply to
his case because his conviction is not final and this appeal is a
“proceeding” as used in the “effective date” language of House Bill
24-1072. We disagree.
¶ 31 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 12. In interpreting a
statute, “our focus is on legislative intent, and we construe the
statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible
13 effect to all of its parts.” City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018
CO 37, ¶ 12.
¶ 32 Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the
General Assembly’s intent. Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218, 220 (Colo.
2004). We first look to a statute’s plain language. Bostelman v.
People, 162 P.3d 686, 690 (Colo. 2007). “If the statutory language
is clear and unambiguous, we do not engage in further statutory
analysis.” Id. Only if the statutory language is ambiguous may we
employ other tools of statutory construction, including statutory or
legislative history or the rule of lenity. § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2025;
People v. Dominguez, 2021 COA 76, ¶ 14.
¶ 33 Absent express legislative intent to the contrary, we presume a
statute only operates prospectively, meaning it solely applies to
events occurring after its effective date. § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025;
People v. Di Asio, 2022 COA 140, ¶ 15. To overcome this
presumption, a statute must reveal a clear legislative intent that it
be applied retroactively. Di Asio, ¶ 15.
¶ 34 Until 2024, the legislature included an exception to the rape
shield statute when the alleged victim has a “history of false
reporting of sexual assaults.” § 18-3-407(2), C.R.S. 2023. In 2024,
14 the legislature changed the relevant language in subsection (2) to
include an exception to the rape shield statute when the alleged
victim has “at least one incident of false reporting of unlawful
sexual behavior.” Ch. 123, sec. 2, § 18-3-407(2)(a)(I), 2024 Colo.
Sess. Laws 409. The 2024 amendment also requires the moving
party to articulate facts that would demonstrate that the victim
made a “report of unlawful sexual behavior that was demonstrably
false or false in fact.” § 18-3-407(2)(a)(II), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws at
409.
b. Analysis
¶ 35 Klingensmith relies on People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 36,
to argue that ameliorative amendatory legislation applies to non-
final convictions unless the amendment contains language
indicating it applies only prospectively. This reliance is misplaced
for two reasons.
¶ 36 First, in Stellabotte, the supreme court clarified that a
defendant is entitled to the benefit of ameliorative amendatory
legislation that has mitigated the penalties for the crime at issue if
the defendant requested such relief before their conviction was
final. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 21.
15 ¶ 37 Here, the legislative amendment was not ameliorative because
it did not decrease the severity of a previously defined crime or
reduce the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the
commission of that crime. See People v. Godinez, 2018 COA 170M,
¶ 29. Rather, the legislature simply changed the language in
subsection (2) from “a history of false reporting” to requiring that
there be “at least one incident of false reporting.” 2024 Colo. Sess.
Laws at 409. The amendment addressed an evidentiary
requirement; it did not reduce any criminal penalties.
¶ 38 Second, the amendment does not apply retroactively. House
Bill 24-1072, which revised section 18-3-407, provided that “[t]his
act takes effect July 1, 2024, and applies to proceedings occurring
on or after said date.” Sec. 3, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws at 410. The
legislature expressly provided that the amendment applies
prospectively. Because the 2022 statute was in effect at the time of
the events in this case and the trial, the 2022 version applies to
Klingensmith’s conviction. See People v. Gallegos, 2025 CO 41M,
¶ 6 n.2.
16 4. Klingensmith’s Offer of Proof Was Insufficient
¶ 39 Klingensmith contends that his offer of proof was legally
sufficient because he provided two pages of a DHS report
demonstrating that K.S. alleged sexual abuse against her mother
but that DHS determined it was unfounded. We are unpersuaded.
¶ 40 The defendant seeking to avail himself of the false-reporting
exception to the rape shield statute must file a motion offering proof
of the specific instances of the victim’s false reports of sexual
assaults. § 18-3-407(2)(a), C.R.S. 2022. The motion must be
accompanied by an affidavit in which the facts contained in the
offer of proof are sufficiently stated. § 18-3-407(2)(b). The purpose
of the offer of proof is to inform the court of the legal theory under
which the evidence is admissible, advise the trial judge of the
“specific nature of the evidence so that the court can review its
admissibility,” and to create “a record for appellate review.” Marx,
¶ 46 (quoting State v. Martinez, 991 A.2d 1086, 1094 (Conn. 2010)).
¶ 41 An “offer of proof” typically states (1) what the anticipated
testimony of the witness would be if the witness were permitted to
testify concerning the matter at issue; (2) the purpose and relevance
of the testimony sought to be introduced; and (3) all the facts
17 necessary to establish the testimony’s admissibility. Weiss, 133
P.3d at 1186–87. The defendant is required, in their offer of proof
affidavit, to articulate facts that would show that “the alleged victim
made multiple prior or subsequent reports of sexual assault” that
were false. Id. at 1182.
¶ 42 Klingensmith’s pretrial offer of proof was insufficient as a
matter of law because it failed to articulate why the evidence was
relevant or how it would show by a preponderance of the evidence
that K.S.’s prior allegation was false. Klingensmith failed to list
witnesses that defense counsel intended to call to establish that the
prior allegation of sexual abuse was false, and the defense never
mentioned whether it had interviewed anyone at DHS or how the
facts would be developed at trial. Although the defense filed an
affidavit from its investigator, the affidavit merely indicated that the
investigator read the DHS report but provided nothing more.
Klingensmith did not explain what DHS’s “unfounded” designation
meant or how DHS arrived at such a designation.
¶ 43 Simply put, there was nothing alleged in the offer of proof that
would have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a
hearing that K.S.’s prior accusation was false. And, as case law
18 clarifies, an unfounded designation, standing alone, is insufficient
to constitute a finding that an allegation was false. See, e.g.,
Lancaster, ¶ 40 (where the charges were dismissed, such an
allegation was insufficient in and of itself to establish that the
report was false); Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1188-89 (motion requesting
evidentiary hearing rested solely on allegations that no charges had
been brought as a result of the victim’s prior reports of sexual
assault and was insufficient to pierce the rape shield); cf. Marx, ¶ 55
(“The [a]ffidavit referenced other witnesses besides [the person
accused of sexual assault] who were prepared to testify to the falsity
of the accuser’s accusations and the school’s findings that the
accuser had made false allegations of sexual assault.”).
¶ 44 Klingensmith’s offer of proof was legally insufficient, and
therefore the trial court did not err by denying his motion to pierce
the rape shield or his motion for reconsideration. Legal
insufficiency notwithstanding, at the hearing the trial court
concluded that defense counsel failed to prove “by a preponderance
that [K.S.] made a false report of sexual abuse” based on how
mother characterized the touching (as nonsexual) versus how K.S.
19 characterized it (as sexual). Accordingly, the trial court did not err
by denying Klingensmith’s rape shield motion.
5. The Trial Court did Not Err by Denying Klingensmith’s Request to Admit Evidence
¶ 45 Klingensmith argues that K.S.’s testimony in response to a
jury question opened the door to evidence regarding her prior false
allegation of sexual assault against her mother. Again, we are
unpersuaded.
¶ 46 When a party opens the door to otherwise inadmissible
evidence, the opposing party may then inquire into the previously
barred matter. Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008).
A juror asked K.S. if she experienced any mental or physical health
concerns in middle school or high school. Defense counsel
indicated that it was a “fair question” and did not object. In
response, K.S. testified that she didn’t recall if she was ever
diagnosed with depression or anxiety but that she talked to
“therapists throughout middle school . . . [and] regularly visited the
school counselor . . . almost on a weekly basis” because she had
“pretty bad anxiety attacks throughout high school.”
20 ¶ 47 K.S.’s testimony concerning the counseling she received in
middle school and high school did not open the door to permit
Klingensmith to inquire about her allegation of sexual assault
against her mother for two reasons. First, K.S.’s response to the
juror’s question only mentioned her panic attacks and did not
mention her mother or her father. During defense counsel’s
recross-examination, K.S. testified that she did not disclose the
sexual abuse to her therapist but simply used therapy to help
manage her anxiety and panic attacks. Although K.S. referenced
“[her] dad” in her response, that reference was made directly in
answer to defense counsel’s question concerning her decision not to
disclose prior abuse to her therapists. K.S.’s testimony, which
omitted any mention of her mother and referenced her father only
in the context of subjects not discussed during therapy, did not
establish a sufficient factual basis for defense counsel to inquire
about K.S.’s allegedly false prior allegation.
¶ 48 Second, although the trial court concluded that the evidence
was inadmissible to prove a history of false reporting, it
acknowledged that K.S. had “created a misleading impression that
she was in therapy because of what her father had done to her.” To
21 remedy any misunderstanding, the court asked the parties to
discuss a stipulation or jury instruction that could remedy the
issue. After some debate, the court instructed the jury as follows:
“You are advised that, in addition to her testimony, one of the
reasons [K.S.] was in therapy was due to abuse allegedly committed
by her mother.” Defense counsel did not object to the instruction.
¶ 49 We find Klingensmith’s claim that this instruction failed to
correct any error unpersuasive. First, defense counsel, through
multiple drafts discussed with the court, provided the language that
was later used in the clarifying instruction. Finally, defense
counsel agreed to the final version and did not object when the
court gave the clarifying instruction to the jury. Collectively,
defense counsel’s failure to object to the clarifying instruction and
active participation in its phrasing undermines Klingensmith’s
claim that the instruction was inadequately curative. People v.
Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 817 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Failure to object to a
clarifying instruction, combined with active participation in the
response, waives any right to assert error on appeal unless the
response is so ‘patently wrong’ as to constitute a ‘misstatement of
the law.’” (quoting Boothe v. People, 814 P.2d 372, 378 (Colo. 1991)
22 (Lohr, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment))). Thus, the trial court cured any misleading
impression the jury may have had as to why K.S. was in therapy by
instructing the jury that “in addition to her testimony, one of the
reasons [K.S.] was in therapy was due to abuse allegedly committed
by her mother.” See People v. Kembel, 2023 CO 5, ¶ 50 (There is a
“presumption of law” that jurors are generally able to “understand
and follow a trial court’s limiting instructions.” (quoting Qwest
Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1089 (Colo. 2011))).
III. Disposition
¶ 50 We affirm the judgment of conviction.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.