The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY August 14, 2025
2025COA72
No. 23CA1376, People v. Chronis — Criminal Law — Sex Offender Registration — Petition for Removal from Registry — Lifetime Mandatory Registration — Adjudications as a Juvenile; Constitutional Law — Eighth Amendment — Cruel and Unusual Punishments — Ex Post Facto Clause
As matters of first impression, a division of the Colorado Court
of Appeals holds that lifetime registration under the Colorado Sex
Offender Registration Act’s section 16-22-113(3), C.R.S. 2024,
because of a juvenile adjudication and an adult conviction does not
implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause and does not constitute an
unconstitutional punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
The division also holds that a district court may consider an
expunged juvenile adjudication when determining whether to grant
a petition for deregistration as a sex offender under section 16-22-
113(3)(c), provided the applicable expungement statute permits the
court to review the expunged adjudication. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA72
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1376 Jefferson County District Court No. 09CR2302 Honorable Meegan A. Miloud, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David Patrick Chronis,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur
Announced August 14, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Leo T. Nguyen, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Harvey A. Steinberg, Taylor Ivy, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, David Patrick Chronis, appeals the district court’s
denial of his petition to discontinue sex offender registration. He
has an expunged juvenile adjudication for a charge with an
underlying factual basis involving unlawful sexual behavior and an
adult conviction for a sex offense. We reverse the district court’s
order and remand for the court to hold a hearing to determine if
good cause exists to inspect Chronis’ expunged juvenile
adjudication record.
I. Background
¶2 In 2009, Chronis engaged in sexually explicit conversations
online and over the phone with an undercover investigator posing
as an underage teenage girl. After Chronis arranged a meeting with
the undercover officer, he was arrested. Chronis was charged with
(1) internet luring of a child; (2) internet sexual exploitation of a
child; and (3) criminal attempt to commit sexual assault on a child.
Chronis ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal attempt (internet
luring of a child), a class 5 felony; in exchange, the other charges
were dismissed. On June 1, 2010, the district court sentenced
Chronis to two years of probation, requiring him to register as a sex
1 offender. Chronis’ probation officer later recommended terminating
his probation, and the court did so on May 24, 2012.
¶3 On July 21, 2022, Chronis petitioned to discontinue his sex
offender registration, certifying that section 16-22-113(3), C.R.S.
2024 — which mandates lifetime registration for some offenders —
did not make him ineligible for deregistration. He also certified that
it had been ten years since his conviction, and he had not been
convicted of any subsequent crime involving unlawful sexual
behavior. See § 16-22-113(1)(b).
¶4 A probation supervisor, responding to an inquiry from the
court, initially supported Chronis’ petition. But the probation
supervisor soon amended that support, informing the court that
Chronis did not qualify for deregistration because of a 1991 juvenile
adjudication in Denver Juvenile Court Case No. 91JD1752.
¶5 The district court held a hearing on November 1, 2022, noting
that it did not have much information concerning the basis for the
1991 adjudication and that the case had been expunged. But the
court also noted that, regardless of the adjudication’s expungement,
Chronis was ineligible for deregistration under section
16-22-113(3)(c) if the adjudication involved unlawful sexual
2 behavior. The prosecution represented that it would investigate the
basis for the 1991 adjudication, so the court continued the matter.
The prosecution responded later that day and requested that
Chronis’ petition be denied because, in the 1991 adjudication,
Chronis pleaded guilty to “sexual assault in the third degree,” a
class 1 misdemeanor, rendering him ineligible for deregistration.
The record does not show that the court ruled on the matter.
¶6 In July 2023, Chronis again petitioned for deregistration on
the same grounds and requested a hearing. Chronis argued that
expunged adjudications do not preclude deregistration under
section 16-22-113(3)(c), and because his record in the 1991 case
was expunged in 1995, he could deregister. The prosecution again
opposed the petition, arguing that an expunged adjudication for an
offense based on unlawful sexual behavior prohibited
deregistration.
¶7 The court denied Chronis’ petition without a hearing, and this
appeal followed.
II. Issues on Appeal
¶8 Chronis contends that the plain language of section 16-22-
113(3)(c), considered in the context of the Colorado Sex Offender
3 Registration Act (CSORA), §§ 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2024, does
not prohibit deregistration based on expunged adjudications.
Chronis argues that expungement erases an adjudication, and
therefore it cannot provide a legal basis to deny deregistration
where the petitioner “has a conviction as an adult and one or more
adjudications as a juvenile for unlawful sexual behavior.” § 16-22-
113(3)(c) (emphasis added).
¶9 Further, Chronis highlights that section 16-22-113(3)(c) refers
to adjudications “for unlawful sexual behavior or for any other
offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual
behavior pursuant to section 16-22-103(2),” C.R.S. 2024. (Emphasis
added.) And, Chronis notes, section 16-22-103(2)(a) specifies that
registration is required for convictions “[o]n and after July 1, 1994,”
for unlawful sexual behavior, and that section 16-22-103(2)(c)(I)
adds new criteria for those convicted “on or after July 1, 2002.” His
expunged 1991 plea, he says, does not satisfy the statute.
¶ 10 Chronis contends that section 16-22-113(3)(c) only prohibits
deregistration when a petitioner has prior offenses resulting in
convictions “[o]n or after July 1, 1994,” or adjudications “on or after
July 1, 2002,” requiring registration. Chronis adds that construing
4 the statutes to require lifetime registration based on an old and
expunged juvenile adjudication would create an unconstitutional ex
post facto punishment.
¶ 11 Finally, Chronis argues that, if the plain language of the
statutes does not resolve the issue, then we should apply the rule of
lenity to bar the use of expunged juvenile adjudications in
deregistration decisions.
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Statutory Interpretation
¶ 12 “We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” McCoy
v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37. “We review a district court’s denial of
a petition to discontinue sex offender registration for an abuse of
discretion. ‘A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misconstrues or misapplies the law.’” Moore v. 4th Jud. Dist. Att’y,
2024 COA 48, ¶ 6 (citations omitted).
¶ 13 “When a court interprets a statute, its goal is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature.” People v. Patton, 2016 COA 187, ¶ 9.
“To do so, we look first to the language of the statute, giving its
words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. We read
5 statutory words and phrases in context, and we construe them
according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” McCoy,
¶ 37 (citation omitted). We also “must avoid ‘constructions that
would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical
or absurd results.’” Patton, ¶ 9 (quoting Doubleday v. People, 2016
CO 3, ¶ 20). Instead, we must effectuate the legislative scheme “as
a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of
its parts.” McCoy, ¶ 38. “Absent clear legislative intent to the
contrary, a statute affecting substantive rights and liabilities applies
prospectively while a statute addressing procedural matters is
assumed to apply retroactively.” People v. McCreadie, 938 P.2d 528,
530 n.4 (Colo. 1997).
B. CSORA and Deregistration
¶ 14 An individual, like Chronis, with a class 5 felony conviction
involving unlawful sexual behavior may petition for deregistration
ten years after “final release from the jurisdiction of the court,”
provided that they have not “subsequently been convicted of
unlawful sexual behavior or of any other offense, the underlying
factual basis of which involved unlawful sexual behavior.” § 16-22-
113(1)(b).
6 ¶ 15 Some individuals, however, may never deregister as sex
offenders. § 16-22-113(3). As relevant here, “[a]ny adult who . . .
has a conviction as an adult and one or more adjudications as a
juvenile for unlawful sexual behavior or for any other offense, the
underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual behavior
pursuant to section 16-22-103(2),” is never eligible for
deregistration. § 16-22-113(3)(c); see also People in Interest of T.B.,
2021 CO 59, ¶ 14.
¶ 16 CSORA defines a “conviction” for purposes of determining
whether an individual has two or more convictions that may
prevent them from deregistering as “having received a verdict of
guilty by a judge or jury, having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere,
having received a disposition as a juvenile, having been adjudicated
a juvenile delinquent, or having received a deferred judgment and
sentence or a deferred adjudication.” § 16-22-102(3), C.R.S. 2024.
Adjudication is defined as “a determination by the court that it has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact that a
juvenile has committed a delinquent act or that a juvenile has pled
guilty to committing a delinquent act.” § 16-22-102(1). The statute
adds that, “when a previous conviction must be pled and proven as
7 an element of an offense or for purposes of sentence enhancement,
‘adjudication’ means conviction.” Id.
¶ 17 In McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶¶ 28-30, 34, the supreme
court held that a successfully completed deferred judgment does
not fall under the definition of a “conviction” for purposes of section
16-22-113(3)(c). The court reasoned that the present tense use of
“has more than one conviction,” id. at ¶ 29 (quoting § 16-22-
113(3)(c)), did not apply to completed deferred adjudications
because, once completed, they are no longer convictions — the
individual merely had a conviction. Id. at ¶ 30.
¶ 18 In Moore, a division of this court considered section 16-22-
113(3)(c)’s cross-reference to section 16-22-103(2), which provides,
in part, that “[o]n and after July 1, 1994, any person who is
convicted in the state of Colorado of unlawful sexual behavior or of
another offense . . . which involves unlawful sexual behavior” must
register as a sex offender. See Moore, ¶¶ 11-18. The division held
that the reference to the July 1, 1994, cutoff did not mean that only
offenses committed on or after July 1, 1994, satisfy section 16-22-
113(3)(c)’s multiple convictions requirements. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. The
division reasoned that the reference to July 1, 1994, “applies to the
8 affirmative obligation to register, which is a different question from
eligibility to petition for deregistration.” Id. at ¶ 13. Instead, the
timeframe limitation only applies to convictions for “any other
offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual
behavior pursuant to section 16-22-103(2),” § 16-22-113(3)(c), and
not to convictions solely for “unlawful sexual behavior.” Moore,
¶¶ 12, 15. In other words, a person convicted of a qualifying
offense in 1991 would not be required to register until 1994, but the
1991 conviction still counts toward the person’s ineligibility to
deregister.
¶ 19 For the same reasons given by the division in Moore, we reject
Chronis’ argument that his 1991 adjudication may not be used to
deny his petition for deregistration based on the cross-reference to
the timeframes in section 16-22-103(2). The timeframe in section
16-22-103(2)(a) refers to the offenses triggering the obligation to
register as a sex offender. It does not mean that all convictions or
adjudications referenced in section 16-22-113(3)(c) must have
occurred on or after the cutoff of July 1, 1994. See Moore, ¶ 13.
The same reasoning applies to the “July 1, 2002,” conviction and
adjudication timeframe mentioned in section 16-22-103(2)(c)(I). See
9 also § 16-22-103(2)(c)(V) (connecting adjudications to the provisions
in section 16-22-103(2)(c)(I)). And like in Moore, Chronis’
adjudication for third degree sexual assault directly involved
unlawful sexual behavior. See Moore, ¶ 15.
C. The Ex Post Facto Clause and Eighth Amendment
¶ 20 First, we conclude that requiring Chronis to register as a sex
offender for life would not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause or the
Eighth Amendment because he is not prohibited from deregistering
solely because of his juvenile adjudication.
¶ 21 “The ex post facto clauses of the United States and Colorado
constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Colo. Const. art. II, § 11,
address the injustice that arises when government action alters the
legal consequences of an event or act after the fact.” Woldt v.
People, 64 P.3d 256, 270 (Colo. 2003). In turn, the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, section 20 of the
Colorado Constitution, provide that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted,” and prohibit sentences grossly
disproportionate to the crime. Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M,
¶¶ 5, 9 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII).
10 ¶ 22 In Smith v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court held that
Alaska’s sex offender registry scheme was “nonpunitive, and its
retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”
538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). And the Colorado Supreme Court
noted in T.B. that divisions of the “court of appeals have
consistently followed Smith’s reasoning to hold that registration
pursuant to CSORA does not constitute punishment for purposes of
the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Eighth Amendment.” T.B., ¶ 35.
But the Colorado Supreme Court also held that “mandatory lifetime
sex offender registration for offenders with multiple juvenile
adjudications constitutes punishment for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment” and constitutes prohibited cruel and unusual
punishment if the registration system does not “provid[e] a
mechanism for individualized assessments or an opportunity to
deregister upon a showing of rehabilitation.” Id. at ¶¶ 44, 58, 64,
74.
¶ 23 The supreme court noted that the distinction between adult
and juvenile offenders is based on “juveniles’ increased
susceptibility to outside pressure, immature behavior, and
impulsiveness . . . [; thus] the transgressions of minors are viewed
11 as less blameworthy than those of adults.” Id. at ¶ 29. The court
also noted that juveniles are less susceptible to “[d]eterrence-based
justifications for punishment,” they are “more amenable to reform
than adult offenders,” and “the very fact of an offender’s youth
means that lifelong punishments are harsher in practice for
juveniles than for adults.” Id. at ¶¶ 30-32. Looking to these
distinctions, the supreme court held that “CSORA violates the
Eighth Amendment in imposing mandatory lifetime sex offender
registration for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications.” Id.
at ¶¶ 43, 47-58.
¶ 24 The supreme court explicitly “decline[d] to opine on the
constitutionality of mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for
an offender who was adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense as a
juvenile and was subsequently convicted of one or more sex
offenses as an adult.” Id. at ¶ 43 n.14. However, that is the exact
situation before us today. Unlike in T.B., which involved a lifetime
registration requirement for multiple juvenile adjudications and no
adult convictions, Chronis was adjudicated as a juvenile and
convicted as an adult for unlawful sexual behavior offenses.
12 ¶ 25 We conclude that a lifetime registration requirement under
CSORA, § 16-22-113(3), because of a prior juvenile conviction in
addition to an adult conviction does not constitute a punishment
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment; therefore, its retroactive
application does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause.1 See T.B.,
¶ 35; Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.
¶ 26 Unlike an offender whose record only includes multiple
juvenile offenses, an offender with a juvenile adjudication and an
adult conviction does not implicate the heightened concerns
associated with lifetime registration for juvenile offenders for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Adults are not as
“susceptibl[e] to outside pressure, immature behavior, and
impulsiveness” and can better weigh the risks of deterrence-based
justifications for punishment; lifetime punishments are less harsh
for adult offenders in practice; and, most importantly, such adult
offenders have demonstrated their lack of reform after their juvenile
1 This conclusion also adheres to the legislature’s clear intent to
prohibit deregistration where an offender has an adult conviction and one or more juvenile adjudications for unlawful sexual behavior, as evidenced by the plain language of section 16-22- 113(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
13 offenses by committing a subsequent offense as adults. See T.B.,
¶¶ 29-32, 55.
¶ 27 An example of this distinction can be seen in the supreme
court’s reasoning in T.B. that lifetime CSORA registration for solely
juvenile offenses was unconstitutional, in part, because such a
“registration requirement appears to be retributive in nature,
punishing a juvenile for his past conduct without regard to the
threat — or lack thereof — that the juvenile currently poses.” Id. at
¶ 53. While this is true for juveniles who do not reoffend as adults,
a registration requirement for an individual who commits a later
offense as an adult accounts for their current risk to society in light
of a new offense. And while “mandatory lifetime sex offender
registration for juveniles does not bear a rational connection to, and
is excessive in relation to, CSORA’s nonpunitive purposes of
protecting the community and aiding law enforcement,” the same
cannot be said for offenders who later commit offenses as adults.
Id. at ¶ 55.
¶ 28 Therefore, lifetime registration under CSORA is not considered
a punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment or the Ex Post
Facto Clause for offenders with a juvenile adjudication in addition
14 to an adult conviction. And, for the same reason, the court’s
consideration of an expunged juvenile adjudication for purposes of
a deregistration petition does not implicate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. But, as we explain below, the statutory expungement
regime in effect at the time of the expungement controls.
D. The Expungement Statutes and CSORA
¶ 29 We next consider Chronis’ argument that, because his 1991
adjudication was expunged in 1995, section 16-22-113(3)(c) does
not render him ineligible for deregistration.
¶ 30 “[W]hen a record is expunged, it is essentially erased and
treated as if it never existed. Thus, in general, after expungement,
only ‘basic identification information’ contained in the expunged
record remains available to law enforcement agencies.” People v.
Connors, 230 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Colo. App. 2010) (citations omitted);
see also Black’s Law Dictionary 725 (12th ed. 2024) (One definition
of “expunge” is “[t]o remove from a record, list, or book; to erase or
destroy.”). The parties contest which expungement statute applies:
the prosecution argues the request to deregister was made in 2022
and is therefore governed by the statute in effect then, but Chronis
15 notes that the record was expunged in 1995 and therefore asserts
that the 1995 statute applies. We examine both statutory regimes.
1. Expungement in 1995
¶ 31 The 1995 juvenile expungement statute differs from the 2022
statute, which only applies prospectively. See People v. Pennington,
2021 COA 9, ¶ 9 (“Statutes are generally presumed to operate
prospectively.”); McCreadie, 938 P.2d at 530 n.4.
¶ 32 Section 19-2-902(1), C.R.S. 1995, effective when Chronis’
record was expunged, provided that “‘expungement’ means the
designation of records whereby such records are deemed never to
have existed. Upon the entry of an expungement order, the person,
agency, and court may properly indicate that no record exists.”
Expungement was effectuated by “physically sealing or
conspicuously indicating” on the physical or computer record that it
was expunged. Id. at (2)(b). “Basic identification information on the
juvenile” was still accessible by a “district attorney, local law
enforcement agency, and the department of human services.” Id.
at (3). Section 19-2-902(4) allowed courts to order the inspection of
the expunged record “after a hearing and good cause shown,”
16 provided that interested parties were given at least five days’ notice
of the hearing.
2. Current Juvenile Record Expungement
¶ 33 Section 19-1-306, C.R.S. 2024, details how expungement of
juvenile records is now handled.2 It specifies that “[u]pon the entry
of an expungement order, the person who is the subject of the
record that has been expunged may assert that he or she has no
juvenile delinquency record.” § 19-1-306(1)(a). Expungement is
defined as “the designation of juvenile delinquency records whereby
such records are deemed never to have existed.” § 19-1-103(63),
C.R.S. 2024; see also § 19-1-306(1)(a). Unless a statutory exception
applies, expunged records are not available for inspection by others.
See § 19-1-306(1)(b).
¶ 34 Section 19-1-306(3) contains the exceptions making expunged
records available to others. Section 19-1-306(3)(b) provides that
“any record that is ordered expunged is available to any judge and
the probation department for use in any future proceeding in which
the person whose record was expunged is charged with an offense
2 The relevant provisions of the current statute and the one in effect
in 2022 and 2023 (when Chronis moved to deregister) are the same.
17 as either a juvenile or as an adult.” Chronis does not dispute that
this exception would apply here.
E. Expungement’s Legal Effect for Deregistration
¶ 35 We conclude that the statute governing whether the court
could have accessed Chronis’ expunged juvenile adjudication is the
1995 statute in effect at the time of his expungement. Nothing in
the current juvenile expungement statute evidences a clear
legislative intent to apply retroactively, nor can we say that
expungement is a purely procedural matter given that it lawfully
allows an individual to represent that they have no juvenile record.
See McCreadie, 938 P.2d at 530 n.4; § 19-1-306(1)(a). And while it
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply CSORA’s
registration scheme retroactively — including when considering
expunged adjudications as explained above — whether an expunged
conviction can be considered depends on the expungement statute
in effect when the records were expunged.
¶ 36 We still reject Chronis’ main contention, however, that
expunged records cannot be considered at all because they have
been effectively erased. An expunged conviction — despite being
“essentially erased and treated as if it never existed” — is still a
18 conviction that may be considered in a deregistration proceeding or
other matter if the expungement statute permits its consideration.
Connors, 230 P.3d at 1269; see also § 19-1-306(3)(b); § 19-2-902(4),
C.R.S. 1995.
¶ 37 McCulley is instructive on this point. The supreme court
determined that a completed deferred judgment did not count when
deciding if a defendant “has” one or more convictions because, once
a deferred judgment is completed, they no longer have a conviction.
McCulley, ¶ 30. This is similar to how vacated or illegal convictions
are treated, which become null and void. See, e.g., United States v.
Jackson, 132 F.4th 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2025) (“When a sentence is
vacated, the defendant is rendered unsentenced.”); United States v.
Merrell, 37 F.4th 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2022) (“We start from the
settled principle that the vacatur of appellants’ original sentences
legally ‘wiped the slate clean.’” (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562
U.S. 476, 507 (2011))); see also People v. Rollins, 771 P.2d 32, 34
(Colo. App. 1989) (“When an original sentence is illegal, [it is]
therefore void . . . .”).
¶ 38 Expungement allows an individual to assert that they have no
criminal record associated with the criminal conviction or
19 adjudication, but both the 1995 and the current juvenile
expungement statutes permit courts to review and consider
expunged records in certain circumstances. See § 19-2-902(1), (4),
C.R.S. 1995; § 19-1-306(1)(a), (3)(b). In effect, individuals with an
expunged adjudication under the current statutory regime have
every right to treat it as if it does not exist — but they still have an
adjudication that, in the proper circumstances, may be reviewed.3
See McCulley, ¶ 29.
¶ 39 In Chronis’ case, section 19-2-902(4), C.R.S. 1995, provided
that his expunged adjudication could “only be inspected by order of
the court, after a hearing and good cause shown,” provided the
interested parties received at least five days’ notice before the
hearing. The plain language of this provision indicates that a court
could have inspected Chronis’ expunged record if it held a properly
noticed hearing and found good cause to do so. See Patton, ¶ 9; see
3 This conclusion is also supported by the legislature’s clear
understanding of how expungement should be treated under the current regime, as evidenced by the exception in section 19-1- 306(3)(b), C.R.S. 2024, allowing courts to review expunged adjudications for purposes of “future proceeding[s] in which the person whose record was expunged is charged with an offense as either a juvenile or as an adult.”
20 also McCoy, ¶ 37. But, based on the record before us, we cannot
say with certainty that this occurred.
¶ 40 The probation supervisor sent the amended report notifying
the court of Chronis’ juvenile adjudication on August 3, 2022, and
the court held a hearing on November 1, 2022. During the hearing,
at the request of the prosecution, the court explicitly ordered that
the prosecution was permitted to access the expunged record “for
the limited purposes of dealing with the defendant’s motion to
deregister.” So, on one hand, it seems that the parties had some
notice of the hearing more than five days in advance and the court
implicitly found that good cause existed to inspect the expunged
record.
¶ 41 But, on the other hand, while the court seemed to know at the
outset that it was dealing with an expunged record, it is unclear
whether all parties were aware that accessing the expunged record
could be a focus of the hearing. And after the prosecution
recommended rejecting Chronis’ petition for deregistration, the
court did not hold another hearing on the matter, nor did it invite
Chronis to respond to the prosecution’s recommendation. And after
Chronis’ second July 2023 petition, the court did not hold another
21 hearing. Instead, it simply denied the petition on the grounds that
Chronis was ineligible, presumably reasoning, as it did at the
November hearing, that because the prior adjudication (though
expunged) involved unlawful sexual behavior, Chronis would not be
eligible for deregistration.
¶ 42 As a result, we conclude that expunged adjudications may be
considered when determining whether to grant or deny a petition
for deregistration under CSORA where the applicable expungement
statute allows it. But in this case, a remand is appropriate for the
district court to determine in a properly noticed hearing whether
good cause exists to inspect Chronis’ expunged record in
accordance with the 1995 statute. After the hearing, if the district
court determines there is good cause to inspect the record, it may
consider the adjudication, regardless of its expungement, when
determining whether to grant or deny Chronis’ petition.
F. The Rule of Lenity
¶ 43 Finally, we reject Chronis’ argument that the rule of lenity
applies here. We have found no ambiguity in the expungement
statutes or CSORA, so the rule of lenity is not implicated. See
People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo. 2003) (“The
22 rule of lenity should not be applied to defeat the evident intent of
the General Assembly.”).
IV. Disposition
¶ 44 We reverse and remand the case for the district court to hold a
hearing to determine whether good cause exists to inspect Chronis’
expunged adjudication. Depending on its findings, it may then rely
on the expunged adjudication to determine whether Chronis is
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.