1 May 04, 2026 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 URBANNA INC, NO. 2:25-CV-0447-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT CITY OF 9 v. SPOKANE’S JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 CITY OF SPOKANE, CATHOLIC HOUSING SERVICES OF 11 EASTERN WASHINGTON, FR BACH II HOUSING LLC, FR BACH 12 HOUSING III LLC, VALOR HAVEN LLC, FATHER BACH 13 HOUSING IV LLC, FATHER BACH HOUSING V LLC, CATHOLIC 14 CHARITIES OF SPOKANE, ROBERT J McCANN, 15 Defendants. 16
17 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant City of Spokane’s Motion for 18 Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 8). This matter was submitted for 19 consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files 20 herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant City of 1 Spokane’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED in 2 part and DENIED in part.
3 BACKGROUND 4 This case arises out of allegations of public and private nuisance, breach of 5 duties, violations of substantive due process for a state-created danger, and the
6 equal protection clause for failure to enforce or selective enforcement under 42 7 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell, negligence, and tortious interference with business 8 expectancy. ECF No. 1 at 66-80. Plaintiff alleges that the surrounding crime has 9 negatively impacted Urbanna Spa, Salon and Wine and that the Defendants’ failure
10 to address these concerns amounts to numerous violations. ECF No. 1 at 38- 80. 11 Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the City of Spokane’s (“City”) support and 12 endorsement of the other Defendants (collectively “Catholic Charities”) resulted in
13 nuisance, breach of duties, and tortious interference with business expectancy 14 claims including violations under section 1983 and Monell for violations of 15 substantive due process and the equal protection clause. Id. 16 Plaintiff filed this case in Spokane Superior Court on October 29, 2025.
17 ECF No. 1. On November 7, 2025, this case was removed to federal court. ECF 18 No. 1. On February 12, 205, the City filed this Motion for Judgment on the 19 Pleadings. ECF No. 8.
20 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Legal Standard
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c) states a party may move for a 4 judgment on the pleadings, “after the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to 5 delay trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly
6 granted when, taking all the allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party is 7 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & 8 Cnty. of San Francisco, 881 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Heliotrope 9 Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1999)). A motion for
10 judgment on the pleadings is similar to a motion to dismiss except for the timing of 11 the motion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). 12 For a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
13 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim 14 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 15 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requires 16 more than a simple “formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements.”
17 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. There must be facts to support legal conclusions 18 beyond simply stating conclusory legal statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663; 19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986))
20 (stating that for a motion to dismiss, courts are not obligated to accept alleged legal 1 conclusions as true factual allegations); Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 2 1096 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating legal conclusions must be supported by factual
3 allegations). However, a court must construe the facts in the light most favorable 4 to the opposing party of the motion and accept that party’s allegations as true. 5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
6 In addition, a plaintiff must “nudge[] their claims across the line from 7 conceivable to plausible” otherwise plaintiff’s complaint shall be dismissed. 8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In other words, the “plausibility standard requires more 9 than 'a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully’ but ‘is not akin to a
10 probability standard.’” Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 11 2017) (quoting Turner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th 12 Cir. 2015)).
13 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell 14 Plaintiff alleges two theories for section 1983 claims under Monell. Monell 15 v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); ECF No. 1 at 16 71-76. One, the City violated substantive due process because the City created and
17 affirmatively placed Plaintiff in danger. ECF No. 9 at 11. Two, the City violated 18 the equal protection clause because the City selectively enforced ordinances and 19 statutes. ECF No. 9 at 14-15.
20 Under § 1983, municipalities may be liable “for constitutional injuries 1 pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to 2 train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.”
3 Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). 4 This requires the plaintiff showing that there was “deliberate action attributable to 5 the municipality [that] directly caused a deprivation of federal rights.” Horton, 915
6 F.3d at 603 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)). 7 However, they are not liable under respondeat superior. Id. Specifically, “a local 8 government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 9 employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
10 Monell requires that a Plaintiff shows: “(1) he or she had a constitutional 11 right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy 12 amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) ‘the policy is
13 the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Est. of Nelson by & 14 through Nelson v. Chelan Cnty., 2024 WL 1705923, at *15 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 19, 15 2024) (citing Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011)). 16 a. State-Created Danger Doctrine
17 Plaintiff alleges that the City violated substantive due process because the 18 state-created danger doctrine is applicable. ECF Nos. 9 at 11;1 at 71-76. Plaintiff 19 does not allege a special relationship exception. ECF No. 9 at 11. Plaintiff claims
20 that the City provides funds to the Catholic Charities and failed to ensure safety for 1 its residents and failed to enforce its own nuisance abatement codes. ECF No. 1 at 2 73.
3 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause states that “[n]o State shall 4 ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 5 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989)
6 (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1). However, this language does not mean 7 that the State is required “to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens 8 against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. Nonetheless, 9 there are specific limited circumstances that the Constitution provides a duty upon
10 the State affirmative duties to protect and care for specific individuals. DeShaney, 11 489 U.S. at 198. 12 Two of these limited circumstances are when there is a special relationship
13 or where the state created the danger. Campbell v. State of Washington Dep't of 14 Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Deshaney v. 15 Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) and Patel v. Kent Sch. 16 Dist., 648 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011)).
17 There are two initial elements to allege a claim under the state-created 18 danger doctrine. Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2023). First, a 19 plaintiff must provide facts that a state’s “affirmative conduct” led to an exposure
20 of “an actual, particularized danger that [he] would not otherwise have faced.” 1 Polanco, 76 F.4th at 926 (quoting Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th 2 Cir. 2011) and Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019)).
3 “Second, a plaintiff must allege that the state official acted with ‘deliberate 4 indifference’ to that ‘known or obvious danger.’” Polanco, 76 F.4th at 926 5 (quoting Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271).
6 To meet the element for a particularized harm, Plaintiff may allege a danger 7 “directed toward a group rather than an individual.” Polanco, 76 F.4th at 927 8 (citing Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2018)). 9 However, “[a]ffirmative state action that exposes a broad swath of the public to
10 ‘generalized dangers’ cannot support a state-created-danger claim.” Polanco, 76 11 F.4th at 927 (citation omitted). 12 The City argues that Plaintiff did not state it suffered a particularized harm,
13 as required, under the state danger doctrine. ECF No. 8 at 5-12. Plaintiff alleges 14 that the harm is particularized because it is directed at an identifiable group. ECF 15 No. 9 at 12-13. Plaintiff continues that the City created a danger by their 16 affirmative conduct of providing funding to the Catholic Charities, allowing them
17 to be constructed in a small radius, encouraging relocation with knowledge of the 18 high rate of crime and incident calls in the area, and failing to properly staff and 19 fund the police department and other services, and failing to enforce Spokane
20 Municipal Code 10.68. ECF No. 9 at 13. 1 Based on the relevant case law, the group harmed is not identifiable and 2 distinct to represent a particularized harm. For example, in Polanco, 122 inmates
3 were transferred from California Institution of Men, which was experiencing a 4 COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin which placed a specific group of inmates and 5 guards at risk. Polanco, 76 F.4th at 926. The group was easily identifiable and
6 specific and the COVID-19 harm was particularized to that group. 7 In Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2018), 8 officers prevented rally members from leaving through a safe exit and moved the 9 members toward a violent group of protestors. Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897
10 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2018). The group was easily identifiable and were 11 present during a specific timeframe and location for a particular purpose. The 12 group was distinct, and the harm was particularized to that group.
13 Plaintiff’s alleged harm is not a distinct group because it is a “broad swatch 14 of the public.” Polanco, 76 F.4th at 927 (citation omitted). In the relevant case 15 law, the group was easily identifiable and distinct, whereas here, the group is any 16 individual or business within six particular blocks of the city. However, affected
17 individuals may include the surrounding areas for the same or similar harms. This 18 results in generalized harm. This is not particularized and generally defeats the 19 purpose of the state-created danger doctrine. This doctrine was not made to allow
20 the City to be subject to liability regarding broad groups of people or the public but 1 rather distinct groups that were harmed by the State’s direct affirmative actions. 2 This is not the case here.
3 This is further supported by the concept of “particularized” in other contexts. 4 For example, in the context of standing, “particularized” means “must affect the 5 plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,
6 339, as revised (May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 7 561 n.1 (1992)). In other words, “there must be some unique connection between 8 the plaintiff and defendant that ‘[ ]differentiate[s]; the plaintiff so that his injury is 9 not ‘common to all members of the public.’” Clark v. Weber, 699 F. Supp. 3d 879,
10 881 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 11 (1974)). Here, the only connection is general location, and the harms can affect 12 any individual or business in that area. This group does not have a specific
13 identifiable characteristic beyond general location and time frame over years. 14 Therefore, Plaintiff does not allege a required element under this claim and the 15 claim must be dismissed. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned 16 Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020).
17 The City relies on two cases, Hunters Capital, LLC v. City of Seattle, 650 F. 18 Supp. 3d 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2023) and Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674 (9th 19 Cir. 2023). ECF No. 8 at 6. The City also uses White v. City of Minneapolis, 2021
20 WL 5964554 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2021) (unpublished) as persuasive authority. 1 ECF No. 8 at 8. 2 In Hunters Capital, in the city of Seattle, Capital Hill Occupied Protest
3 (“CHOP”) referred to a specific area of protesters. Hunters Cap., LLC v. City of 4 Seattle, 650 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Plaintiffs stated that the 5 city’s “action, assistance, endorsement, and encouragement of CHOP” resulted in
6 the dangers experienced such as property damage, loss of income and revenue, 7 personal injury, public safety concerns, and issues with use and access to their 8 properties. Hunters Cap., 650 F. Supp. 3d at 1197, 1200. However, the Court did 9 not find that this was a particularized danger, but rather one the general public
10 faced, too. Hunters Cap., 650 F. Supp. 3d at 1201. The alleged harms in Hunters 11 Capital and this case are similar and refer to a similar group of businesses and 12 individuals, using a city location. Hunters Cap., LLC v. City of Seattle, 650 F.
13 Supp. 3d 1187, 1197, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Plaintiff attempts to differentiate 14 that case from this one by citing the differences in amount of people and size of 15 location, but that was not the issue in Hunters Capital. Hunters Cap., 650 F. Supp. 16 3d at 1197, 1200. The issue was that the public faced the same harms. Therefore,
17 this argument fails. 18 In Sinclair, CHOP was also the center of the issue where an individual was 19 shot and killed in CHOP. Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674 (9th Cir. 2023).
20 Plaintiff alleged that the city’s actions and inactions led to her son and others in the 1 CHOP zone to be put in a more dangerous position. Sinclair, 61 F.4th at 682. 2 However, the court found that this was not a particularized harm rather one that
3 affected everyone. Sinclair, 61 F.4th 674, 682-83. Moreover, the court found that 4 this was to be solved within the city’s voting system rather than in a court case. 5 Sinclair, 61 F.4th at 684. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff failed to
6 allege a particularized danger for the individual Plaintiff. Sinclair, 61 F.4th at 682- 7 83. However, this case is different because the focus on the particularized element 8 was based on an individual rather than a group. Nevertheless, the same theme 9 follows that general crime within an area does not result in a particularized harm.
10 Also, Defendants use of White v. City of Minneapolis, 2021 WL 5964554 11 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2021) only furthers the idea that businesses and residents 12 within a specific area, such as the third precinct in this case, represent the general
13 public and fail to demonstrate a definable specific group. White v. City of 14 Minneapolis, 2021 WL 5964554, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2021). 15 Plaintiff uses Roe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2024 WL 4505475, at 16 *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024) to allege that the Ninth Circuit has applied the state-
17 created danger doctrine in cases such as assault, shootings and death. ECF No. 9 at 18 13-14. The City argues that this case considers whether the danger was severe 19 enough to allege a claim rather than if it was particularized. ECF No. 11 at 3-4.
20 The Court agrees, in Roe, the cases cited were not used to support a particularized 1 harm or analyze whether the group was identifiable and distinct. Roe v. City & 2 Cnty. of San Francisco, 2024 WL 4505475, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024).
3 b. Selective Enforcement 4 The City states that Plaintiff cannot bring a selective enforcement claim because 5 Plaintiff did not experience an enforcement action. ECF No. 11 at 6.
6 To allege an equal protection claim, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a 7 plaintiff must show that enforcement was conducted with a discriminatory purpose 8 and resulted in a discriminatory effect. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 9 920 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)); R.R.
10 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento, 604 F. Supp. 3d 968, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 11 “Such claims may proceed where a plaintiff alleges that a law was enforced against 12 the plaintiff, but not against other similarly situated individuals.” R.R. 1900, LLC
13 v. City of Sacramento, 604 F. Supp. 3d 968, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Plaintiff must 14 show that the law was enforced against the plaintiff “on the basis of an 15 impermissible ground such as race, religion or exercise of ... constitutional rights.” 16 Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 922 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States
17 v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1989)). 18 The City states that it fails for the same reason that this claim failed in Railroad 19 1900. R.R. 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento, 604 F. Supp. 3d 968, 977 (E.D. Cal.
20 2022); ECF No. 8 at 13-14. The City states that alleging that the City enforced 1 laws against some property owners and not others (the Catholic Charities) does not 2 amount to a selective enforcement claim. ECF No. 8 at 14. In its Complaint,
3 Plaintiff states that its business and other private property owners have been 4 subject to enforcement actions, fines and legal proceedings for lesser conduct. 5 ECF No. 1 at 73.
6 As Defendant argues, Plaintiff has not been subject to an enforcement that 7 similarly situated individuals have not. ECF No. 8 at 13-14. Plaintiff’s selective 8 enforcement claim fails because Plaintiff has not alleged that she has been 9 selectively subject to any specific enforcement. Other cases in this circuit have
10 failed for the same reason. See Jiangong Lei v. City of Lynden, 2015 WL 926562, 11 at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2015) (“As a preliminary manner, there is absolutely no 12 evidence, nor has Plaintiff even pled, that the City selectively enforced its
13 ordinances against Plaintiff.”); R.R. 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento, 604 F. Supp. 14 3d 968, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“[T]he basis of plaintiff's equal protection claim is 15 not that any law was enforced against it.”); Bookstore, Inc. v. Leonard, 474 F. 16 App'x 676, 677 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Appellants did not put forth any evidence that
17 they were treated differently than other similarly situated businesses.”). 18 Plaintiff argues for the failure of enforcement of others, the Catholic Charities. 19 However, “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself
20 a federal constitutional violation.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 1 (1978) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Bloodworth v. City of 2 Phoenix, 26 F. App'x 679, 683 (9th Cir. 2002). This idea and similar context is
3 addressed in R.R. 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento, 604 F. Supp. 3d 968, 978 (E.D. 4 Cal. 2022), when the court stated “[w]hile it may be unfair for a city to afford 5 businesses and residents in certain areas the benefit of enforcing local laws while
6 denying that benefit to those in other areas, as plaintiff argues, it does not amount 7 to a violation of equal protection.” R.R. 1900, LLC v. City of Sacramento, 604 F. 8 Supp. 3d 968, 978 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Based on that, Plaintiff has not alleged facts 9 that suggest Plaintiff was subject to selective enforcement and the enforcement of
10 failure of enforcement of others does not constitute an equal protection violation. 11 Even more, as established, Plaintiff is not the one experiencing the alleged harm 12 of selective enforcement directly. For example, Plaintiff is not a business
13 committing similar or the same violations as the Catholic Charities allegedly are 14 but is instead only potentially collaterally harmed from the lack of enforcement of 15 the same. Plaintiff’s alleged harm is indirect and stems from the failure of 16 enforcement of the Catholic Charities. Plaintiff aims to sue based on that indirect
17 connection on behalf of hypothetical businesses that are facing enforcement that 18 the Catholic Charities are not. United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 678 (2023) 19 (“When ‘a plaintiff ’s asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly
20 unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed’ 1 to establish standing.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U. S. at 562). Therefore, Plaintiff fails 2 to allege a selective enforcement claim against the City.
3 Plaintiff does not have any remaining federal claims. While leave should be 4 freely given, the district court is not required to provide leave where amendment 5 would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041
6 (9th Cir. 2011). As discussed, Plaintiff did not experience enforcement and the 7 harm was not particularized meaning amendment would be futile and would not 8 cure any defects or confer subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, Plaintiff did not 9 request amendment for these federal claims but only state law claims.
10 Accordingly, the Court will not grant leave to amend. 11 C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may refuse to invoke supplemental
13 jurisdiction over any claim that is related to claims in which the district court had 14 original jurisdiction if 15 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over 16 which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 17 jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 18 declining jurisdiction.
19 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this case, all federal claims have been dismissed. However, 20 district courts should consider “at every stage of the litigation, the values of 1 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int'l 2 Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). Usually, the factors will weigh in
3 favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. Acri 4 v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.), supplemented, 121 F.3d 714 5 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Oct. 1, 1997). As a result, this Court declines
6 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. United Mine Workers 7 of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed 8 before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims 9 should be dismissed as well.”).
10 Because this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, this Court 11 will not consider Plaintiff’s state law claims. Instead, because this case was 12 removed from state court, the Court will remand this case back to state court.
13 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). On remand, Plaintiff 14 may seek leave to amend if they wish to do so. 15 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 1. Defendant City of Spokane’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
17 (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under substantive due process for a state-created 19 danger and selective enforcement are DISMISSED without leave to
20 amend. 1 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3), Plaintiff's state law claims are hereby 2 REMANDED to the Superior Court in and for the County of Spokane, 3 former case number 25-2-04651-32. 4 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, furnish copies to 5|| counsel, mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of the Spokane County 6|| Superior Court and CLOSE the file. 7 DATED May 4, 2026.
<> United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ORDER ON DEFENDANT CITY OF SPOKANE’S JUDGMENT ON THE