United States v. Richardson

418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 25, 1974
• Docket: 72-885
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Chief Justice Burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the respondent has standing to bring an action as a federal taxpayer¹ alleging that certain provisions concerning public reporting of expenditures under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 208, 50 U. S. C. § 403a et seq., violate Art. I, § 0, cl. 7, of the Constitution which provides:

“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”

Respondent brought this suit in the United States District Court on a complaint in which he recites attempts to obtain from the Government information concerning detailed expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the complaint, respondent wrote to the Government Printing Office in 1967 and requested that he be provided with the documents “published by the Government in compliance with Article I, section 9, clause (7) of the United States Constitution.” The Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of the Department of the Treasury replied, explaining that it published the document known as the Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government. Several copies of the monthly and daily reports of the office were sent with the letter. Respondent then wrote to the same office and, quoting part of the CIA Act, asked whether this statute did not “cast reflection upon the authenticity of the Treasury’s Statement.” He also inquired as to how he could receive further information on the expenditures of the CIA. The Bureau of Accounts replied stating that it had no other available information.

In another letter, respondent asserted that the CIA Act was repugnant to the Constitution and requested that the Treasury Department seek an opinion of the Attorney General. The Department answered declining to seek such an opinion and this suit followed. Respondent’s complaint asked the court to “issue a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from publishing their 'Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States Government’ and representing it as the fulfillment of the mandates of Article I Section 9 Clause 7 until same fully complies with those mandates.” ² In essence, the respondent asked the federal court to declare unconstitutional that provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Act which permits the Agency to account for its expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director . . . 50 U. S. C. § 403j (b). The only injury alleged by respondent was that he “cannot obtain a document that sets out the expenditures and receipts” of the CIA but on the contrary was “asked to accept a fraudulent document.” The District Court granted a motion for dismissal on the ground respondent lacked standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and that the subject matter raised political questions not suited for judicial disposition.

The Court of Appeals sitting en banc, with three judges dissenting, reversed, 465 F. 2d 844 (CA3 1972), holding that the respondent had standing to bring this action.³ The majority relied chiefly on Flast v. Cohen, supra, and its two-tier test that taxpayer standing rests on a showing of (a) a “logical link” between the status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislative enactment, i. e., an attack on an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution; and (b) a “nexus” between the plaintiff’s status and a specific constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and spending power. 392 U. S., at 102-103. While noting that the respondent did not directly attack an appropriations act, as did the plaintiff in Flast, the Court of Appeals concluded that the CIA statute challenged by the respondent was “integrally related,” 465 F. 2d, at 853, to his ability to challenge the appropriations since he could not question an appropriation about which he had no knowledge. The Court of Appeals seemed to rest its holding on an assumption that this case was a prelude to a later case challenging, on the basis of information obtained in this suit, some particular appropriation for or expenditure of the CIA; respondent stated no such an intention in his complaint. The dissenters took a different approach urging denial of standing principally because, in their view, respondent alleged no specific injury but only a general interest common to all members of the public.

We conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain a suit for the relief sought and we reverse.

I

As far back as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), this Court held that judicial power may be exercised only in a case properly before it — a “case or controversy” not suffering any of the limitations of the political-question doctrine, not then moot or calling for an advisory opinion. In Baker v. Can, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), this limitation was described in terms that a federal court cannot

“ ‘pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’ Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39.”

Recently in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970), the Court, while noting that “ [generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such,” id., at 151, emphasized that “[o]ne generalization is, however, necessary and that is that the question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which restricts judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ ”⁴

Although the recent holding of the Court in Flast v. Cohen, supra, is a starting point in an examination of respondent’s claim to prosecute this suit as a taxpayer, that case must be read with reference to its principal predecessor, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923). In Frothingham, the injury alleged was that the congressional enactment challenged as unconstitutional would, if implemented, increase the com plain - ant's future federal income taxes.⁵ Denying standing, the Frothingham Court rested on the “comparatively minute[,] remote, fluctuating and uncertain,” id., at 487, impact on the taxpayer, and the failure to allege the kind of direct injury required for standing.

“The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Id., at 488.

When the Court addressed the question of standing in Flast, Mr. Chief Justice Warren traced what he described as the “confusion” following Frothingham as to whether the Court had announced a constitutional doctrine barring suits by taxpayers challenging federal expenditures as unconstitutional or simply a policy rule of judicial self-restraint. In an effort to clarify the confusion and to take into account intervening developments, of which class actions and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were given as examples, the Court embarked on “a fresh examination of the limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court and the application of those limitations to taxpayer suits.” 392 U. S., at 94. That re-examination led, however, to the holding that a “taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.” Id., at 105-106. (Emphasis supplied.) In so holding, the Court emphasized that Art. Ill requirements are the threshold inquiry:

“The ‘gist of the question of standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ ” Id., at 99, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204.

The Court then announced a two-pronged standing test which requires allegations: (a) challenging an enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, §8, of the Constitution; and (b) claiming that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on the taxing and spending power. 392 U. S., at 102-103. While the “impenetrable barrier to suits against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal taxpayers,” id., at 85, had been slightly lowered, the Court made clear it was reaffirming the principle of Frothingham, precluding a taxpayer’s use of “a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.” Id., at 106. The narrowness of that holding is emphasized by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Flast:

“In concluding that the appellants therefore have standing to sue, we do not undermine the salutary principle, established by Frothingham and reaffirmed today, that a taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.' ” Id., at 114.

II

Although the Court made it very explicit in Flast that a “fundamental aspect of standing” is that it focuses primarily on the party seeking to get his complaint before the federal court rather than “on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated,” id., at 99, it made equally clear that

“in ruling on [taxpayer] standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues for another purpose, namely, to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.” Id., at 102.⁶

We therefore turn to an examination of the issues sought to be raised by respondent’s complaint to determine whether he is “a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power,” ibid., with respect to those issues.

We need not and do not reach the merits of the constitutional attack on the statute; our inquiry into the “substantive issues” is for the limited purpose indicated above. The mere recital of the respondent’s claims and an examination of the statute under attack demonstrate how far he falls short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he falls within the Frothingham holding left undisturbed. Although the status he rests on is that he is a taxpayer, his challenge is not addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA, specifically 50 U. S. C. §403j(b). That section provides different accounting and reporting requirements and procedures for the CIA, as is also done with respect to other governmental agencies dealing in confidential areas.⁷

Respondent makes no claim that appropriated funds are being spent in violation of a “specific constitutional .limitation upon the . . . taxing and spending power . . . .” 392 U. S., at 104. Rather, he asks the courts to compel the Government to give him information on precisely how the CIA spends its funds. Thus there is no “logical nexus” between the asserted status of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the expenditures of that agency.⁸

The question presented thus is simply and narrowly whether these claims meet the standards for taxpayer standing set forth in Flast; we hold they do not. Respondent is seeking “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” 392 U. S., at 106. Both Frothingham and Flast, supra, reject that basis for standing.

Ill

The Court of Appeals held that the basis of taxpayer standing

“need not always be the appropriation and the spending of [taxpayer’s] money for an invalid purpose. The personal stake may come from an injury in fact even if it is not directly economic in nature. Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, [397 U. S. 150,] 154 (1970).” 465 F. 2d, at 853.⁹

The respondent’s claim is that without detailed information on CIA expenditures — and hence its activities— he cannot intelligently follow the actions of Congress or the Executive, nor can he properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking national office.

This is surely the kind of a generalized grievance described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and “common to all members of the public." Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 13 (1972). While we can hardly dispute that this respondent has a genuine interest in the use of funds and that his interest may be prompted by his status as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute. As the Court noted in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972):

“[A] mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the APA.” Id., at 739.

Ex parte Levitt, supra, is especially instructive. There Levitt sought to challenge the validity of the commission of a Supreme Court Justice who had been nominated and confirmed as such while he was a member of the Senate. Lévitt alleged that the appointee had voted for an increase in the emoluments provided by Congress for Justices of the Supreme Court during the term for which he was last elected to the United States Senate. The claim was that the appointment violated the explicit prohibition of Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, of the Constitution.¹⁰ The Court disposed of Lévitt’s claim, stating:

“It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.” 302 U. S., at 634. (Emphasis supplied.)

Of course, if Levitt’s allegations were true, they made out an arguable violation of an explicit prohibition of the Constitution. Yet even this was held insufficient to support standing because, whatever Levitt’s injury, it was one he shared with “all members of the public.” Respondent here, like the petitioner in Lévitt, also fails to clear the threshold hurdle of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204. See supra, at 171, and Flast, supra.11

It can. be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the “ground rules” established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. Ill jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.

As our society has become more complex, our numbers more vast, our lives more varied, and our resources more strained, citizens increasingly request the intervention of the courts on a greater variety of issues than at any period of our national development. The acceptance of new categories of judicially cognizable injury has not eliminated the basic principle that to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a “personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, supra, at 204, or a “particular, concrete injury,” Sierra Club, supra, at 740-741, n. 16, or “a direct injury,” Ex parte Levitt, supra, at 634; in short, something more than “generalized grievances,” Flast, supra, at 106. Respondent has failed to meet these fundamental tests; accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1S

Reversed.

[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see post, p. 235.]

1 Respondent’s complaint alleged that he was “a member of the electorate, and a loyal citizen of the United States.” At the same time, he states that he ‘‘does not challenge the formulation of the issue contained in the petition for certiorari.” Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Pet. for Cert. 1. The question presented there was: “Whether a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge the provisions of the Central Intelligence Act which provide that appropriations to and expenditures by that Agenc shall not be made public, on the ground that such secrecy contravenes Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution.” Pet. for Cert. 2.

2 App. 15-16. Respondent’s complaint also asked for a three-judge district court and this application was denied by a single District Judge with directions to place the case on the calendar in the usual manner. The Court of Appeals, in the judgment under review, ordered that, on remand, the case be considered by a three-judge court. The District Court has granted a stay of respondent’s motion to convene a three-judge court, pending disposition of this petition for writ of certiorari. On September 26, 1972, the Third Circuit denied a petition for mandamus,, filed by respondent, to compel the immediate convening of a three-judge court.

3 The majority found that the respondent had standing to bring this suit as a taxpayer. One judge held that he had standing as a citizen. This case was originally argued before a panel consisting of two Circuit Judges and one District Judge sitting by designation. After a second round of briefs, the Court of Appeals determined sita sponte to hear the case en banc without further argument. The District Judge sat with the Court of Appeals en banc. This point was not raised in the question presented in the petition for certiorari but the Solicitor General, in a footnote, called attention to the District Judge’s participation. He expressed the view that, although 28 U. S. C. § 4G (c) limits en banc hearings to circuit judges in active service (and any retired circuit judge who participated in the initial hearing), the error was harmless. Brief for United States 5-6, n. 4. In these circumstances we need not reach the question.

4 397 U. S., at 161. See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.09-6, p. 753 (Supp. 1970).

5 In Frothingham, the plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 224, which provided for financial grants to States with programs for reducing maternal and infant mortality. She alleged violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause on the ground that the legislation encroached on an area reserved to the States.

6 In some cases, the operative effect of this “look at the substantive issues” could lead to the conclusion that the “substantive issues” were nonjusticiable and in consequence no one would have standing. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 9 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 508-509 (1961).

7 See 28 U. S. C. § 537 (Federal Bureau of Investigation); 31 U. S. C. § 107 (foreign affairs); 42 U. S. C. § 2017 (b) (Atomic Energy Commission).

8 Congress has taken notice of the need of the public for more information concerning governmental operations, but at the same time it has continued traditional restraints on disclosure of confidential information. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. §552; Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973).

9 The Court of Appeals thus appeared to rely on Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Abstracting some general language of that opinion from the setting and controlling facts of that case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the crucial factor that standing in that case arose under a specific statute, Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1861. The petitioners in Data Processing alleged competitive economic injury to private business enterprise due to a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to sell their data processing services to other banks and to bank customers whose patronage the data processing companies sought. We recognized standing for those private business proprietors who were engaged in selling the same kind of services the Comptroller- allowed banks to sell; we held only that the claims of impermissible competition were “arguably . . . within the zone of interests protected” by § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act. 397 U. S., at 156. In short, Congress had provided competitor standing. The Court saw no indication that Congress had sought to preclude judicial review of administrative ridings of the Comptroller of the Currency as to the limitations Congress placed on national banks.

10 “No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .”

11 Although we need not reach or decide precisely what is meant by “a regular Statement and Account,” it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest. It is therefore open to serious question whether the Framers of the Constitution ever imagined that general directives to the Congress or the Executive would be subject to enforcement by an individual citizen. While the available evidence is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively conclusive, historical analysis of the genesis of cl. 7 suggests that it was intended to permit some degree of secrecy of governmental operations. The ultimate weapon of enforcement available to the Congress would, of course, be the “power of the purse.” Independent of the statute here challenged by respondent, Congress could grant standing to taxpayers or citizens, or both, limited, of course, by the “cases” and “controversies” provisions of Art. III.

Not controlling, but surely not unimportant, are nearly two centimes of acceptance of a reading of cl. 7 as vesting in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds and to exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive public reporting. See 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 618-619 (1911); 3 id., at 326-327; 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 462 (1836); D. Miller, Secret Statutes of the United States 10 (1918).