1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT WOOTEN, No. 2:25-cv-0873 DC AC (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 DONALD J. TRUMP, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On March 17, 2025, plaintiff filed this action in pro se and paid the filing fee. ECF No. 1. 18 The case was accordingly referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). The 19 complaint contains a request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which 20 was referred to the undersigned for findings and recommendations by the District Judge. ECF 21 No. 6. On April 1, 2025, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, again containing a request 22 for a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 8. The undersigned has reviewed the First Amended 23 Complaint (“FAC”) and believes that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s 24 case, and that this case must be dismissed. 25 I. The Operative First Amended Complaint 26 Plaintiff asserts that this action is a Petition for Redress authorized by the last clause of the 27 First Amendment of the United States Constitution. ECF No. 8 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that federal 28 employees have been improperly fired, and government benefits are threatened by President 1 Trump’s executive orders. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that Trump’s actions violate the 2 Constitution. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that Trump improperly created the Department of 3 Government Efficiency and appointed Musk, a private citizen, to fire thousands of people without 4 cause. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges Trump is violating the separation of powers. Id. at 6, 11. 5 II. Jurisdictional Problems 6 a. Overview 7 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 8 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, (1994). In 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a), “Congress granted federal 9 courts jurisdiction over two general types of cases: cases that “aris[e] under” federal law, § 1331, 10 and cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000 and there is diversity of 11 citizenship among the parties, § 1332(a). These jurisdictional grants are known as “federal- 12 question jurisdiction” and “diversity jurisdiction,” respectively. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. 13 Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019), reh’g denied, No. 17-1471, 2019 WL 3538074 (U.S. Aug. 14 5, 2019). “Subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can 15 never be forfeited or waived.” Rainero v. Archon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2016). 16 Court must dismiss any case over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and a court must 17 examine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, whether or not a motion to dismiss for lack of 18 subject-matter jurisdiction has been brought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 19 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (noting that courts “have an independent obligation to determine 20 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists). 21 Sometimes, even where there would be federal question or diversity jurisdiction, other 22 legal doctrines deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, there are two jurisdictional 23 concerns that the court will address: (1) standing, and (2) the political question doctrine. 24 Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (addressing 25 standing); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (addressing the political 26 question doctrine). 27 /// 28 /// 1 b. Plaintiff Lacks Standing 2 To bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff must have “standing,” meaning they must have a personal 3 injury that gives them a right to bring the lawsuit. This is required by Article III of the U.S. 4 Constitution. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) “an injury in fact—an 5 invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 6 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the 7 conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly ... traceable to the challenged action of the 8 defendant, and not ... the result of the independent action of some third party not before the 9 court”; and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 10 redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) 11 (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 12 Plaintiff does not identify any basis for standing in the First Amended Complaint. 13 However, the court notes that in the original complaint, plaintiff alleged he is a social security 14 beneficiary and sought to “protect the investment, through contributions, he has made in Social 15 Security over the years.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff also raised concerns about President Trump’s 16 education policies and notes that he has grandchildren and great grandchildren who are “in dire 17 need of educational assistance which closing the Department of education will adversely affect to 18 the point they may not be able to continue in school.” Id. at 4. 19 The First Amended Complaint lacks any information that could possibly go to standing, 20 and for that reason the court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. Even the original 21 complaint, in which plaintiff indicates that he is concerned about the future of his social security 22 income and the potential impact that political policy choices will have on his family and on his 23 own finances, does not satisfy the standing requirement. Plaintiff’s concern that he will be 24 personally harmed does not confer standing because the harm has not already happened. At this 25 time, the alleged harms remain speculative. Further, even if the court assumes that plaintiff has a 26 generalized interest in constitutional governance and ensuring that the President is fit for office, 27 that interest is insufficient to demonstrate standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop 28 the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974) (a litigant’s interest cannot be based on the “generalized 1 interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 2 173–78 (1974) (explaining that a taxpayer’s generalized grievance is insufficient for standing); 3 Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 779–84 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting claims that multiple categories 4 of plaintiffs had standing to challenge the President’s eligibility for office). Accordingly, the 5 court believes that the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it does not allege 6 facts sufficient to demonstrate standing. 7 c. The Political Question Doctrine Bars this Case 8 The political question doctrine is “essentially a function of the separation of powers,” 9 Baker v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT WOOTEN, No. 2:25-cv-0873 DC AC (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 DONALD J. TRUMP, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On March 17, 2025, plaintiff filed this action in pro se and paid the filing fee. ECF No. 1. 18 The case was accordingly referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). The 19 complaint contains a request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which 20 was referred to the undersigned for findings and recommendations by the District Judge. ECF 21 No. 6. On April 1, 2025, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, again containing a request 22 for a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 8. The undersigned has reviewed the First Amended 23 Complaint (“FAC”) and believes that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s 24 case, and that this case must be dismissed. 25 I. The Operative First Amended Complaint 26 Plaintiff asserts that this action is a Petition for Redress authorized by the last clause of the 27 First Amendment of the United States Constitution. ECF No. 8 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that federal 28 employees have been improperly fired, and government benefits are threatened by President 1 Trump’s executive orders. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that Trump’s actions violate the 2 Constitution. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that Trump improperly created the Department of 3 Government Efficiency and appointed Musk, a private citizen, to fire thousands of people without 4 cause. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges Trump is violating the separation of powers. Id. at 6, 11. 5 II. Jurisdictional Problems 6 a. Overview 7 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 8 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, (1994). In 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a), “Congress granted federal 9 courts jurisdiction over two general types of cases: cases that “aris[e] under” federal law, § 1331, 10 and cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000 and there is diversity of 11 citizenship among the parties, § 1332(a). These jurisdictional grants are known as “federal- 12 question jurisdiction” and “diversity jurisdiction,” respectively. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. 13 Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019), reh’g denied, No. 17-1471, 2019 WL 3538074 (U.S. Aug. 14 5, 2019). “Subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can 15 never be forfeited or waived.” Rainero v. Archon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2016). 16 Court must dismiss any case over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and a court must 17 examine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, whether or not a motion to dismiss for lack of 18 subject-matter jurisdiction has been brought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 19 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (noting that courts “have an independent obligation to determine 20 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists). 21 Sometimes, even where there would be federal question or diversity jurisdiction, other 22 legal doctrines deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, there are two jurisdictional 23 concerns that the court will address: (1) standing, and (2) the political question doctrine. 24 Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (addressing 25 standing); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (addressing the political 26 question doctrine). 27 /// 28 /// 1 b. Plaintiff Lacks Standing 2 To bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff must have “standing,” meaning they must have a personal 3 injury that gives them a right to bring the lawsuit. This is required by Article III of the U.S. 4 Constitution. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) “an injury in fact—an 5 invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 6 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the 7 conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly ... traceable to the challenged action of the 8 defendant, and not ... the result of the independent action of some third party not before the 9 court”; and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 10 redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) 11 (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 12 Plaintiff does not identify any basis for standing in the First Amended Complaint. 13 However, the court notes that in the original complaint, plaintiff alleged he is a social security 14 beneficiary and sought to “protect the investment, through contributions, he has made in Social 15 Security over the years.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff also raised concerns about President Trump’s 16 education policies and notes that he has grandchildren and great grandchildren who are “in dire 17 need of educational assistance which closing the Department of education will adversely affect to 18 the point they may not be able to continue in school.” Id. at 4. 19 The First Amended Complaint lacks any information that could possibly go to standing, 20 and for that reason the court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. Even the original 21 complaint, in which plaintiff indicates that he is concerned about the future of his social security 22 income and the potential impact that political policy choices will have on his family and on his 23 own finances, does not satisfy the standing requirement. Plaintiff’s concern that he will be 24 personally harmed does not confer standing because the harm has not already happened. At this 25 time, the alleged harms remain speculative. Further, even if the court assumes that plaintiff has a 26 generalized interest in constitutional governance and ensuring that the President is fit for office, 27 that interest is insufficient to demonstrate standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop 28 the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974) (a litigant’s interest cannot be based on the “generalized 1 interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 2 173–78 (1974) (explaining that a taxpayer’s generalized grievance is insufficient for standing); 3 Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 779–84 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting claims that multiple categories 4 of plaintiffs had standing to challenge the President’s eligibility for office). Accordingly, the 5 court believes that the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it does not allege 6 facts sufficient to demonstrate standing. 7 c. The Political Question Doctrine Bars this Case 8 The political question doctrine is “essentially a function of the separation of powers,” 9 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), and it “excludes from judicial review those 10 controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally 11 committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch,” Japan 12 Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). The rule that some 13 governmental actions are beyond the reach of the courts reflects the Constitution’s limitation of 14 the “judicial power of the United States” to “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 15 “[N]o justiciable controversy is presented when parties seek adjudication of only a political 16 question.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 17 Article II, Section 4 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he President, Vice 18 President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 19 Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors 20 U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution 21 deliberately gave the power of impeachment to Congress, not the Judiciary. Nixon v. United 22 States, 506 U.S. 224, 229, 233–35 (1993). 23 To the extent plaintiff seeks by this lawsuit to remove President Trump from office or 24 preemptively stop him from issuing any further executive orders to carry out his policy 25 objectives, the court simply has no power to do so. The question of whether the President is fit 26 for office and subject to removal is a political question categorically excluded from judicial 27 review. Because resolution of this question rests exclusively with Congress, this Court lacks 28 jurisdiction to consider the issue. Accordingly, the First Amended Complaint appears to be 1 || subject to dismissal because the claims are barred by the political question doctrine.! 2 lil. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 3 Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff shall show cause, in 4 | writing, no later than April 18, 2025, why this court has subject matter jurisdiction over his case. 5 | If plaintiff fails to respond by this date, the court will recommend dismissal of his case without 6 || prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 7 || DATED: April 3, 2025 8 ~ 9 Htttenr— Lhor—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 | The political question doctrine does not pose a categorical bar to all lawsuits challenging 27 || specific executive actions. Such suits, however, must be brought by persons who have standing to challenge the particular exercise of asserted executive branch authority at issue, and must 28 | plausibly plead illegality of the executive action rather than disagreement with it.