Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. United States Department of Agriculture

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

URBAN SUSTAINABILITY DIRECTORS NETWORK, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25-1775 (BAH)

v. Judge Beryl A. Howell

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In August 2025, “[f]ive nonprofit organizations involved in agriculture and ecology-related

projects” were granted a preliminary injunction against the United States Department of

Agriculture (“USDA”) and several component agencies (collectively, defendants), under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., enjoining “the termination of six

grants awarded to plaintiffs,” though requested relief as to a broader swathe of terminated grants

was denied at the preliminary stage to the extent based on “defendants’ alleged broader ‘policy,

pattern, and practice of unlawfully terminating’ en masse ‘hundreds of grants’ due to changes in

agency priorities driven by certain executive orders, notwithstanding the grants’ fulfillment of the

purposes set out in authorizing statutes and appropriations acts.” Urb. Sustainability Dirs. Network

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Urb. Sustainability I), No. 25-cv-1775 (BAH), 2025 WL 2374528, at *1

(D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (quoting First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 1-3, 11-31, 46-96, ECF No. 10). 1

Now, twenty-four new organizations, each of which received a termination letter for a grant under

1 Since then, one of the original plaintiff nonprofit organizations holding one of the grants has voluntarily dismissed its claims. See Urb. Sustainability Dirs. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Urb. Sustainability II), No. 25- cv-1775 (BAH), 2026 WL 1500832, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. May 29, 2026).

1 the Increasing Land, Capital, and Market Access Program (collectively, the “Land Access Program

Plaintiffs”), seek to join the suit, see Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Mot. to

Amend”), ECF No. 62, and simultaneously move for a preliminary injunction, see Land Access

Program Pls.’ Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj.”), ECF No. 63. For the reasons

explained below, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint and Land Access Program

Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background and procedural history in this matter have been detailed in two

previous decisions, see Urb. Sustainability Dirs. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Urb.

Sustainability II), No. 25-cv-1775 (BAH), 2026 WL 1500832, at *2-7 (D.D.C. May 29, 2026);

Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *2-10, and thus described below is more limited

information relevant to the two pending motions.

A. Factual Background

“This lawsuit was initiated by ‘five nonprofit organizations, Urban Sustainability Directors

Network (‘USDN’), Oakville Bluegrass Cooperative (‘OBC’), Agroecology Commons (‘AC’), the

Providence Farm Collective Corp. (‘PFC’), and the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy

(‘IATP’),’ all of which ‘received federal awards, under various statutorily authorized federal

programs, from the USDA or its components that were unexpectedly terminated during from

March through July of 2025, after the Trump administration announced changes in policy

priorities.’” Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *2 (quoting Urb. Sustainability I, 2025

WL 2374528, at *2). “[T]hese programs and the federal awards supporting them cover a broad

range of issues that create jobs and support community, agricultural, and rural development,” and

“[t]he programs range from supporting local urban forestry, to addressing food insecurity, to

2 incentivizing the adoption of more environmentally friendly agricultural practices.” Id.

(alterations in original) (quoting FAC ¶ 47).

The parties agree that at least two executive orders issued by President Trump shortly after

he took office for his second term led to the terminations, see id., namely: (1) Executive Order

14151, “Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing,” which

instructed the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), “assisted by the

Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management,” to “coordinate the

termination of all discriminatory programs, including illegal DEI and ‘diversity, equity, inclusion,

and accessibility’ (DEIA) mandates, policies, programs, preferences, and activities in the Federal

Government, under whatever name they appear,” 90 Fed. Reg. 8339, 8339 (Jan. 20, 2025); see

Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *2; Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *4;

and (2) Executive Order 14222, “Implementing the President’s ‘Department of Government

Efficiency’ Cost Efficiency Initiative,” which instructed agency heads, “in consultation with the

agency’s DOGE Team Lead,” to “review all existing covered contracts and grants and, where

appropriate and consistent with applicable law, terminate or modify (including through

renegotiation) such covered contracts and grants to reduce overall Federal spending or reallocate

spending to promote efficiency and advance the policies of my Administration,” 90 Fed. Reg.

11,095, 11,095-96 (Feb. 26, 2025); see Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *2; Urb.

Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *4. 2

2 “Plaintiffs also point to two other executive orders as driving the termination decisions made here: Executive Order 14173, ‘Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity,’ 90 Fed. Reg. 8,633, 8,634 (Jan. 31, 2025), which instructs agency heads to ‘excise references to DEI and DEIA principles . . . from Federal acquisition, contracting, grants, and financial assistance procedures,’ and Executive Order 14154, ‘Unleashing American Energy,’ 90 Fed. Reg. 8,353, 8,353-54, 8,357 (Jan. 29, 2025), which instructed agencies to ‘immediately pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022’ and review grants for ‘consistency with the’ new policy of prioritizing domestic energy production.” Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *2 n.1 (quoting Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *4 n.2).

3 To facilitate these executive orders, the Secretary released guidance in two memoranda

issued on March 13, 2025. The first, “Directive on Conservation and Natural Resources

Priorities,” directed that “all USDA agencies and staff offices that issue awards must conduct an

internal review of all active awards” to ensure “that the Department does not fund programs or

organizations that promote or take part in climate change or environmental justice initiatives that

are either contrary to law or to the Department’s policy objectives” and “that all awards are free

from fraud, abuse, and duplication” by terminating such grants “in whole or in part or otherwise

modified to minimize the scope of the Department’s obligations.” USDA Secretary’s

Memorandum 1078-003 (Mar. 13, 2025), https://perma.cc/CE9Y-LCFH; see Urb. Sustainability

II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *3; Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *5. The second,

“Directive on Departmental Grant and Cooperative Agreement Priorities,” defined as a priority

“ensuring that the Department’s grants, cooperative agreements, and other similar arrangements,

including mutual interest agreements . . ., do not support programs or organizations that promote

or take part in diversity, equity, and inclusion (‘DEI’) initiatives or any other initiatives that

discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or another protected

characteristic” and stated that grants inconsistent with this priority “shall, to the extent permitted

by applicable law, be terminated, in whole or in part, or otherwise modified in accordance with

any applicable regulations and notice and procedural requirements in the relevant award,

agreement, or other instrument.” USDA Secretary’s Memorandum 1078-004 (Mar. 13, 2025),

https://perma.cc/36P6-E7M9; see Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *3; Urb.

Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *5. The five original plaintiffs in this suit received letters

indicating that their grants had been terminated “before and in the months following the issuance

of the Secretary’s March 13, 2025, memoranda.” Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *5.

4 On around March 23, 2026, holders for 49 of the 50 grants issued under the Increasing

Land, Capital, and Market Access Program (“ILCMAP”) received termination notices for those

grants. See Pls.’ Mot. to Amend, Att. 1, Second Am. Compl. (“Proposed Am. Compl.”) ¶ 174,

ECF No. 62-1. This program, as amended by the Inflation Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 117-169,

136 Stat. 1818 (2022), was designed to benefit “underserved farmers, ranchers, or forest

landowners, including veterans, limited resource producers, beginning farmers and ranchers, and

farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners living in high poverty areas” by, among other things,

“provid[ing] outreach, mediation, financial training, capacity building training, cooperative

development and agricultural credit training and support, and other technical assistance on issues

concerning food, agriculture, agricultural credit, agricultural extension, rural development, or

nutrition,” “provid[ing] grants and loans to eligible entities, as determined by the Secretary, to

improve land access (including heirs’ property and fractionated land issues),” “fund[ing] the

activities of one or more equity commissions that will address racial equity issues within the

Department of Agriculture and the programs of the Department of Agriculture,” “support[ing] and

supplement[ing] agricultural research, education, and extension, as well as scholarships and

programs that provide internships and pathways to agricultural sector or Federal employment,”

and “provid[ing] financial assistance, including the cost of any financial assistance, to farmers,

ranchers, or forest landowners determined to have experienced discrimination prior to January 1,

2021.” Id., 136 Stat. at 2022-23.

The termination letters sent to ILCMAP grant holders are “nearly identical” and “contain

boilerplate language for all but one to two paragraphs in the four-page letters.” Proposed Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 177, 179. The opening paragraph of each letter contains the statement that “[t]he United

States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has determined that awards under this program involved

5 discriminatory preferences based on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) and wasteful spending

that did little to further agricultural land purchases. Accordingly, as discussed below, USDA has

determined your award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities.” Id. ¶ 183.

Additionally, the letters cite the Secretary’s March 13, 2025, memorandum “Directive on

Departmental Grant and Cooperative Agreement Priorities” and contains general concerns about

the program, including that the “program [is] rife with DEI preferences that discriminated based

on immutable characteristics,” “did little to improve land access,” and has “unacceptable risks of

fraud, waste and abuse.” Id. ¶¶ 180, 184. The letters concluded with the statement “following

careful consideration of your award—including any potential reliance interests, intended outcomes

described, as well as consideration of alternatives to termination—USDA has determined the best

use of resources and advancing USDA’s goals and priorities requires a full termination to realign

the program to be consistent with its statutorily mandated purpose and the policies and priorities

of the Department.” Id. ¶ 193. These letters were sent to every ILCMAP grant holder save AC,

whose ILCMAP grant at issue in this lawsuit was protected from termination by this Court’s

injunction issued eight months earlier, on August 14, 2025. See id. ¶ 174.

The “termination letters informed grantees they could appeal their termination to the

National Appeals Division,” but when the Land Access Program Plaintiffs individually appealed,

the National Appeals Division issued identical determinations that “FSA’s March 23, 2026,

decision terminating your ILA grant is not appealable because it concerns matters of general

applicability” and that the “termination is based on the general policy priorities of USDA and its

6 decision to cancel the [Land Access Program] program.” Id. ¶¶ 196-97 (alteration in original and

emphasis removed). 3

B. Procedural Background

The original “[p]laintiffs pursued administrative appeals of their grant terminations, but

‘anticipating that no relief would be forthcoming from the agency,’ ‘USDN, OBC, and AC filed a

complaint before this Court on June 5, 2025, and after being joined by PFC and IATP, filed the

operative first amended complaint on June 24, 2025.’” Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832,

at *3 (quoting Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *9). “They allege that ‘[i]n an apparent

effort to effectuate the President’s sweeping Executive Orders in as quick a manner as possible

regardless of the legality of their conduct, Defendants adopted the policy, pattern, and practice at

issue here, terminating awarded grants without individualized review but rather based on vague

allegations that the projects were not aligned with the President’s newly stated goals of eliminating

funding for DEI and climate initiatives—without any effort to determine whether the projects

could be brought into line.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FAC ¶ 132). “Consequently,

plaintiffs sought both vacatur of the termination of their own awards and relief enjoining

defendants ‘from giving effect to or maintaining award terminations of . . . all other [awards]

enacted pursuant to Defendants’ policy, pattern, and practice.’” Id. (alterations in original)

(quoting FAC pg. 61 (Requests for Relief)).

Two days later, on June 26, 2025, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, see Pls.’ Mot.

for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 14, challenging “a widespread policy and practice of unlawfully

terminating hundreds of grants issued to nonprofit organizations, farmers, ranchers, universities,

3 THRIVE Santa Ana, Inc., one of the Land Access Plaintiffs, has “not yet received a final determination” on its appeal, but plaintiffs credibly reason that “there is no reason to suspect it will receive anything different from what the other Land Access Program Plaintiffs received.” Id. ¶ 197 n.20.

7 cities, and states,” through “minimally edited, boilerplate form letters,” Pls.’ Statement of P. & A.

in Supp. of Their Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 1-2, ECF No. 14-1. Defendants have throughout this

litigation denied plaintiffs’ allegation of en masse grant terminations and this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction to review their claims. See Defs.’ Combined Mem. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mots. for

Leave to File a Second Amend. Compl. & for a Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 8-18, ECF No. 76;

Joint Status Report at 4, ECF No. 74 (Defendants’ Position: “In submitting this discovery plan,

Defendants are not waiving or otherwise prejudicing their arguments regarding Tucker Act

jurisdiction or the scope of relief available to Plaintiff . . . .”); Defs.’ Combined Mem. in Opp’n to

Pls.’ Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. & for Expedited Disc. at 11-16, ECF No. 22. A hearing was held on

the requested preliminary injunction on August 6, 2025, see Hr’g Tr. (Aug. 6, 2025), ECF No. 36,

within twenty-two days of briefing being completed, as extended due to defense counsel’s

availability, see Defs.’ Mot. to Reschedule the Hr’g on Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Disc., ECF

No. 25, and eight days later, the Court “preliminarily set aside and vacated under the APA” the

terminations of plaintiffs’ six individual grants but otherwise denied plaintiffs’ preliminary

injunction relief as to “the alleged policy [of “perfunctory, unreasoned terminations”] . . . due to

the difficulties of identifying on the current record the specific grant terminations that are part of

the en masse implementation of that policy,” Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *27, *39.

Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood that defendants’ terminations, in particular, of AC’s ILCMAP

grant and USDN’s grant were contrary to law, see id. *31 (“Plaintiffs USDN and AC . . . have

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that defendants violated the APA

by acting contrary to statute in terminating their grants for the reasons stated in USDN’s

termination letter and the press release announcing termination of AC’s second grant.”); see id.

*32 (“Likewise, the announced termination of AC’s Grant #2 based on the agency’s new

8 opposition to what it deems to be ‘DEI’ is at odds with the Land Access Program’s statutory

purpose in aiding socially disadvantaged and underserved farmers.”), and that the terminations of

every grant save AC’s ILCMAP were arbitrary and capricious, see id. at *34 (“At the outset,

plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success with respect to this claim for AC’s Grant #2

given that the termination has not yet officially occurred . . . . The five other of plaintiffs’ grant

terminations clearly lacked sufficient explanation.”).

Following a protracted dispute between the parties over defendants’ obligations to produce

documents in the administrative record, defendants were ordered, on May 29, 2026, to

“supplement the administrative record,” “produce a privilege log,” and answer specified

“interrogatories and requests for production,” Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL 1500832, at *14,

but this was followed by continued dispute between the parties on a schedule for defendants’

compliance with that order, see Joint Status Report, ECF No. 74. Those disputes were resolved

and a schedule entered, on June 12, 2026, requiring production of documents to be completed by

September 2, 2026, with additional deadlines for producing, inter alia, “all templates used to craft

the termination letters sent to terminate the grants at issue,” “directions or guidance to leadership

about whether to terminate the grants at issue,” “directions or guidance given to USDA staff about

how to populate and use the spreadsheets that identified the grants at issue for termination,” and

“the origin of the search terms defendants employed to terminate the grants at issue.” Minute

Order (June 12, 2026). 4

4 Defendants moved to modify the June 12, 2026, deadline to begin rolling productions of their responses to plaintiffs’ first interrogatory, noting the “significant additional resources” defendants have employed to meet the production schedule, including that “[t]he Department’s Office of General Counsel is reassigning a Senior Executive Service employee to help lead discovery efforts, as well as at least two additional attorneys in addition to existing staff”; that “[t]he Department has activated five eDiscovery contractor employees to assist with coordinating this effort, including onboarding a new contractor employee”; and that “[t]he Department is also working on awarding a contract to facilitate document review.” Defs.’ Mot. for Extension of Time to Begin Resp. to Pls.’ First Interrog. at 2, ECF No. 77. With plaintiffs’ consent, see Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Extension of Time to Begin Resp. to Pls.’ First Interrog. at 1, ECF No. 78, defendants’ motion was granted, see Minute Order (June 22, 2026).

9 Meanwhile, on May 26, 2026, plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to add twenty-four

plaintiffs, each of which had an ILCMAP grant that was were terminated, explaining that “[i]n

light of USDA’s cancellation of 49 Land Access Program grants using boilerplate letters and

pursuant to the same policy challenged in this case, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint

to include these additional terminations.” Pls.’ Mot. to Amend at 2. Simultaneously, the Land

Access Program Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking “an order that

enjoins Defendants’ terminations of these Plaintiffs’ grants and restores the status quo ante.” Pls.’

Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1. The parties submitted competing proposals for a briefing schedule, see

Joint Status Report, ECF No. 70, and the Court set a schedule, see Minute Order (May 29, 2026),

resulting in both pending motions becoming ripe for resolution on June 23, 2026, see Defs.’ Opp’n;

Pls.’ Combined Reply in Supp. of Their Mots. for Leave to File a Second Am. Compl. & for a

Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Reply”), ECF No. 79.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Set out below are the separate legal standards applicable to plaintiffs’ motion for leave to

amend and the Land Access Program plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

A. Motion for Leave to Amend

“Leave to amend a complaint under Rule 15(a) ‘shall be freely given when justice so

requires.’” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)). “If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject

of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Thus, “a district court should grant leave to amend a complaint ‘[i]n

the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive

on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,

undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 10 amendment, etc.’” Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). The D.C. Circuit has recognized that “the grant of leave to

amend a complaint might often occasion some degree of delay and additional expense, but leave

still should be ‘freely given’ unless prejudice or delay is ‘undue.’” Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Serv.

ex rel. Hylton, 766 F.3d 25, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). The party

opposing the amendment bears the burden to show why leave should not be granted. See Gudavich

v. District of Columbia, 22 F. App’x. 17, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (affirming order granting

leave to amend because non-movant “failed to show prejudice from the district court’s action in

allowing the [movant’s] motion to amend”).

B. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). A plaintiff

seeking a preliminary injunction “must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such

relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The plaintiff must

“establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction

is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “The balance of the equities weighs the harm to

[plaintiffs] if there is no injunction against the harm to [defendants] if there is,” and, when the

government opposes the preliminary injunction, “the [government]’s harm and the public interest

are one and the same, because the government’s interest is the public interest,” so the third and

11 fourth factors merge. Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(emphasis in original). 5

Additionally, “[t]he ‘merits’ on which plaintiff must show a likelihood of success

encompass not only substantive theories but also establishment of jurisdiction.” Elec. Priv. Info.

Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 928 F.3d 95, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc.

v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). The party seeking a preliminary injunction

“carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)

(quoting 11A WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed.1995)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint is considered first, and granted,

followed by the Land Access Program Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, which

motion is also granted.

A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Amend the Complaint

The proposed second amended complaint principally differs from the operative complaint

through the addition to the existing causes of action of the twenty-four Land Access Program

5 Defendants cite the “‘sliding scale’ approach” to evaluating the four injunction factors. Defs.’ Opp’n at 6. The D.C. Circuit has “[i]n the past . . . applied a ‘sliding scale’ approach under which ‘a strong showing on one factor could make up for a weaker showing on another,’” Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392), but now regularly acknowledges that “[t]his approach is arguably in tension with intervening Supreme Court decisions stating without qualification that ‘a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits,’” id. (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008)); see also Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th 1230, 1235-1236 (D.C. Cir 2025) (“It is questionable that the sliding scale approach remains good law after 2008, when the Supreme Court decided Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.[,] [which] can be read to require movants to establish each preliminary injunction factor independently. But we have (somehow) gone seventeen years without needing to say if Winter really meant what it can be read to have said.” (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted)); Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d 314, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]his court has not yet decided whether Winter v. National Resources Defense Council is properly read to suggest a ‘sliding scale’ approach to weighing the four factors be abandoned . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). In accordance with Winter, plaintiffs’ satisfaction of each factor is considered here. See Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (without referencing “sliding scale” approach, holding “that the District Court did not err in granting the preliminary injunction because Appellees have met each element of the test enunciated in Winter . . . .”).

12 Plaintiffs, with accompanying factual allegations in support, and the trifurcation of the original

single APA cause of action for arbitrary and capricious agency action into three causes of action:

one encompassing the original plaintiffs, a second encompassing the Land Access Program

Plaintiffs, and a third encompassing all plaintiffs. Defendants oppose leave to amend on two

grounds—that the proposed second amended complaint’s claims are futile and that “adding

twenty-four additional Plaintiffs more than a year after this lawsuit was filed . . . will unduly

prejudice Defendants.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 35. Neither ground is availing.

First, defendants cannot and do not adequately explain why amending the complaint is

futile in a circumstance where denying leave serves neither judicial economy, because all of the

substantive causes of action in the proposed amended complaint already exist in the operative

complaint, nor conserves the resources of the parties, because, as defendants acknowledge, Land

Access Program Plaintiffs “can file a separate lawsuit,” id. at 45, to which defendants would still

have to respond. Indeed, as plaintiffs observe, “[t]he facts and circumstances on which Defendants

fixate in their opposition to amendment are for all intents and purposes identical to the facts and

circumstances in the live claims that have reached discovery. In the Second Amended Complaint,

the Land Access Program Plaintiffs join the existing Plaintiffs on seven of the nine causes of

action, simply adding new terminations that fit the contours of the pleaded claims.” Pls.’ Reply at

3.

Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ common sense view of the proposed amended complaint,

defendants press their view that adding the Land Access Program Plaintiffs “would be futile,”

arguing that the “APA claim arising from an alleged unlawful policy of terminating grants en

masse will not succeed because the claim does not challenge a discrete final agency actions,” that

“Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on their constitutional and ultra vires claims,” and that claims

13 stating that “the grant terminations violated due process or were inconsistent with OMB guidance”

are also “unlikely to succeed.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 34-35, 43-44. Such focus on the merits of the

underlying claims might have purchase if plaintiffs were attempting to revive claims that had

previously been dismissed or were attempting to circumvent a pending motion to dismiss because

“courts are not obliged to indulge litigants indefinitely, especially when their amendments

constitute futile gestures.” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.21 (D.C. Cir.

1983). That is not the situation at hand, however, where plaintiffs are alleging new factual

allegations and adding identically injured parties to bolster existing claims, and thus denying leave

to amend does not conserve resources for either this Court or defendants. Plaintiffs do not bring

any new substantive cause of action, see Pls.’ Reply at 3 (“Plaintiffs allege only a single additional

cause of action for the Land Access Program Plaintiffs—that their particular terminations were

arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”); rather, the proposed amended complaint adds

entities whose grants were terminated pursuant to implementation of the same alleged policy and

practice challenged in the original complaint. As such, “[t]he lawfulness of Land Access Program

grant terminations is thus already before this Court, and the Amended Complaint at issue builds

on those claims, raising similar allegations arising out of the subsequent termination of 24

additional Land Access Program grants, challenging both the individual terminations as well as

the policy pursuant to which Defendants terminated the grants.” Pls.’ Mot. to Amend at 4.

Defendants also suggest futility due to new appellate decisions, stating that “since the Court

issued the first motion for preliminary injunction, appellate decisions have called into question the

Court’s jurisdiction over grant terminations,” and “the D.C. Circuit will soon issue a ruling in a

case that addresses the same issue.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 44 (citing Climate United Fund v. Citibank,

N.A., No. 25-5122 (D.C. Cir.)). This argument was found unpersuasive, when this Court explained

14 that “a possible adverse ruling to plaintiffs . . . is a risk inherent in a common-law legal system

where a court of review may change or clarify precedent,” Urb. Sustainability II, 2026 WL

1500832, at *6 n.8, such risk poses no jurisdictional bar, see id. at *6 n.7 (“[T]he parties correctly

agree the pending appeal poses no jurisdictional bar to consideration of plaintiffs’ pending

motions . . . .”), and, though defendants have appropriately vigorously asserted jurisdictional

defenses, those defenses have been rejected in this case, Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528,

at *11 (“Contrary to defendants’ argument, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all of

plaintiffs’ claims because they do not fall within the scope of the Tucker Act conferring exclusive

jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims.”). In short, this argument is no more persuasive now.

In sum, defendants have not established the futility of the proposed amendment to the

complaint.

Second, defendants claim that granting leave to amend would create undue prejudice,

emphasizing the “demanding discovery schedule” already in place and arguing that “[g]ranting

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint will increase the number of plaintiffs for whom

Defendants need to add documents to the administrative records from four to twenty-eight, a

sixfold increase.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 44 (citing Minute Order (June 12, 2026)). To be sure, the

addition of twenty-four plaintiffs will trigger additional production demands for completion of the

administrative record, and should such production require additional time, defendants are entitled

to detail the reasons and make any necessary request for deadline extensions. Although the grants

of the twenty-four new proposed plaintiffs were formally terminated starting in March 2026—with

termination letters akin to those sent to the original plaintiffs—many report that their grant funding

was frozen in the same period as the original plaintiffs, in the period from January to June 2025,

seemingly subject to the same alleged policy and practice applied to the original plaintiffs. See,

15 e.g., Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Decl. of Black Or. Land Trust’s Exec. Dir., Qiddist Ashe (“Ashe

Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 63-3 (“In January 2025, a freeze was placed on the grant account. Then,

beginning around April 2025, our primary USDA contact became unavailable and ultimately left

the agency. Communication during this period was inconsistent, and it was not until later in the

summer that we received confirmation that invoicing activities could resume.”); id., Decl. of

Agraria Ctr. for Regenerative Prac.’s President of the Bd. of Dirs., Jessica D’Ambrosio

(“D’Ambrosio Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 63-5 (“Since the start of 2025, USDA has been slow to

responding [sic] to inquiries and approving reimbursements.”); id., Decl. of Grow Food dba Viva

Farms’s Chief Exec. Officer, Michael Frazier (“Frazier Decl.”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 64-1 (“In January

2025, we sought clarification on certain issues raised in our Beneficiary Microgrant Policies from

our Grant Management Specialist[,]” who “advised that he could not interact with us until

receiving guidance from new USDA leadership. For five months, we continued finalizing our

Beneficiary Microgrant Policies while awaiting guidance.”); id., Decl. of Urb. Oasis Project Inc.’s

Exec. Dir., Arthur Friedrich (“Friedrich Decl.”) ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 64-2 (“[W]ork halted again on or

around January 20, 2025, when FSA ceased all reimbursements to and communications with Urban

Oasis. After six months’ delay, FSA made outstanding reimbursement payments in June 2025,

and our work recommenced.”); id., Decl. of Iowa Valley Res. Conservation & Dev.’s Exec. Dir.,

Jason Grimm (“Grimm Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 64-5 (“In January 2025, with no explanation, USDA

and FSA froze our grant, and we were no longer able to obtain reimbursement for any of our

expenses related to our project.”); id., Decl. of Sustainable Iowa Land Trust’s Exec. Dir., Breanna

Horsey (“Horsey Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 64-6 (“Starting in January 2025, many questions we sent

about the program, staffing, and expenses were ignored for months.”); id., Decl. of Afr. All. of

R.I.’s Exec. Dir., Julius Kolawole (“Kolawole Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 65-1 (“However, work was

16 stopped when USDA paused reimbursement of grantees in 2025.”); id., Decl. of 2020 Farmers

Coop.’s Exec. Dir., Sharon Mallory (“Mallory Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 65-4 (“Since the start of 2025,

USDA has been slow to responding to inquiries and approving reimbursements. The lingering

threat of termination—now come to fruition—has also made us cautious in planning further

investments.”); id., Ne. Organic Farming Ass’n of N.J.’s Land Access Coordinator, Nagisa

Manabe (“Manabe Decl.”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 65-5 (“And at the time of termination, NOFA-NJ was

making significant progress with increasing land access, which would have been more extensive

had USDA and FSA not frozen our grant last year.”); id., Decl. of OurSpace World, Inc.’s

President & Chair of the Bd. of Trustees, Yohance Maqubela (“Maqubela Decl.”) ¶ 9, ECF No.

65-6 (“But neither USDA nor FSA examined our progress with increasing land access, which was

well underway and would have been more extensive had USDA and FSA not frozen, delayed, and

then terminated our grant.”); id., Decl. of Ctr. for Heirs’ Prop. Pres.’s Chief Exec. Officer, Jennie

L. Stephens (“Stephens Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 67-2 (“Notably, these outcomes were achieved

despite USDA hampering our ability to accomplish the project’s stated goals, including through a

funding freeze that occurred in the first five months of 2025. While the freeze was in place, CHP

was unable to reimburse a substantial amount of expenses associated with the program, hindering

CHP and its sub-awardees from meeting their deliverables.”).

Other than the possible necessity of additional time for complete production of the

administrative record, however, defendants never explain how such production would constitute

“prejudice,” let alone how any prejudice could not be remediated through such a deadline

extension or would be otherwise “undue.” Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has observed that “the grant

of leave to amend a complaint might often occasion some degree of delay and additional expense,

17 but nonetheless leave should be ‘freely given’ unless prejudice or delay is ‘undue.’” Barkley, 766

F.3d at 39 (quoting Foman, 271 U.S. at 182).

In any event, defendants overstate the perceived increased burden posed by adding

plaintiffs to the compilation and production of the administrative record, given that the new

plaintiffs assert the same alleged pattern and practice by defendants in the same grant program

already at issue. For example, defendants’ existing discovery obligations, such as producing “all

templates used to craft the termination letters sent to terminate the grants at issue,” “directions or

guidance to leadership about whether to terminate the grants at issue,” “directions or guidance

given to USDA staff about how to populate and use the spreadsheets that identified the grants at

issue for termination,” and “the origin of the search terms defendants employed to terminate the

grants at issue,” Minute Order (June 12, 2026), will almost certainly already include materials

relevant to the new plaintiffs. Additionally, as plaintiffs note, “because Defendants do not truly

contest the Land Access Program Plaintiffs’ ability to bring their stand-alone cause of action,

Defendants will have to make that production whether it is part of this case or another.” Pls.’

Reply at 7. Consequently, defendants have not established that permitting the complaint to be

amended would create undue prejudice.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint is granted.

B. Land Access Program Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction

Land Access Program Plaintiffs challenge the termination of their grants as arbitrary and

capricious as well as contrary to law, the latter of which claim already serves as the basis for the

preliminary enjoining of the termination of AC’s ILCMAP grant and USDN’s grant, see Urb.

Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *32-33, and the former of which was the basis for the

preliminary enjoining of the termination of five of the grants held by the original plaintiffs, id. at

18 *34-36. Consequently, analysis principally follows the same reasoning already employed to the

same claims predicated on closely related factual allegations. Id. at *32-33.

The first Winter factor considered is likelihood of success on the merits which necessarily

includes the “threshold” issue of establishing that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over

Land Access Program Plaintiffs’ claims. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-

95 (1998). Defendants again contest this Court’s jurisdiction, contending that “the Court of

Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the prospective plaintiffs’ claims,” that “the Tucker

Act impliedly precludes relief,” and that “decisions on which grants to fund are committed to

agency discretion by law.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9-20 (capitalization standardized and emphasis

removed). These arguments fell short the last time, and for the same reasons already discussed at

length, see Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *11-25, the Court again concludes that

“[t]he grants at issue here would not be considered contracts and therefore would not be subject to

the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction,” id. at *14.

Defendants point to the fact that “seven days after this Court granted the current Plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 15, the Supreme Court issued an emergency-

docket stay order, without oral argument or fulsome merits briefing, in National Institutes of

Health v. American Public Health Association, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025) (mem.), finding that “[t]he

Administrative Procedure Act’s ‘limited waiver of [sovereign] immunity’ does not provide the

District Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims ‘based on’ the research-related grants or to

order relief designed to enforce any ‘obligation to pay money’ pursuant to those grants,” id.

(second alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Educ. v. California, 604 U.S. 650, 651 (2025) (per

curiam)). Nowhere in that stay order, however, did the Supreme Court consider whether the grants

at issue amounted to “contracts” within the meaning of and subject to the Tucker Act. Likewise,

19 neither the district court nor appellate court opinions leading to this Supreme Court stay order

addressed the issue of whether these grants were contracts within the meaning of and subject to

the Tucker Act. See Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 145 F.4th 39 (1st Cir. 2025);

Massachusetts v. Kennedy, 783 F. Supp. 3d 487 (D. Mass. 2025). Consequently, this case is simply

not persuasive for defendants.

Land Access Program Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the grant

terminations were contrary to law. 6 This Court has previously recounted that “[t]he Land Access

Program originated with section 1006 of the American Rescue Plan Act, entitled ‘USDA

Assistance and Support for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers, Ranchers, Forest Land Owners and

Operators, and Groups,’ which appropriated funds for supporting the designated people or groups.

The 2022 IRA [Inflation Reduction Act] amended that section and appropriated additional funds

for programs to benefit ‘underserved farmers, ranchers, or forest landowners, including veterans,

limited resource producers, beginning farmers and ranchers, and farmers, ranchers, and forest

landowners living in high poverty areas’ and to ‘provide financial assistance . . . to farmers,

ranchers, or forest landowners determined to have experienced discrimination prior to January 1,

2021, in Department of Agriculture farm lending programs.’” Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL

2374528, at *32 (quoting American Rescue Plan Act, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4, 13-14;

Inflation Reduction Act, sec. 22007, § 1006(b), (e), 136 Stat. at 2022-23). As a result, the statute

“employs the term ‘socially disadvantaged’ multiple times and defines this term as meaning people

who ‘have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice because of their identity as members of a

6 As Land Access Program Plaintiffs’ contrary to law argument prevails—the same argument that has previously succeeded for AC’s ILCMAP grant, see Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *32-33—their alternative argument that the decisions to terminate the grants were arbitrary and capricious need not be considered, see Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Pls.’ Statement of P. & A. in Supp. of Their Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 14-25, ECF No. 63-1.

20 group without regard to their individual qualities.’” Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a)(5)-(6)).

Nevertheless, defendants still “attempt to recast the statute as one that contemplated aid to growers

based purely on financial status,” a position previously determined to have been “not credible.”

Id. at *33; see Defs.’ Opp’n at 20 (“By its plain text, the provision funds initiatives based on

farmers’ financial status and does not mention race, sex, or sexual orientation.”). While defendants

might have policy disagreements with a statute that considers an applicant’s “race or other

protected class,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 21, they “flout Congress’s mandates . . . when they terminate

grants for the very reason that the grants further the aims Congress explicitly instructed defendants

to pursue,” Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *33.

As to the second Winter factor, Land Access Program Plaintiffs have also demonstrated a

likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief. To make this showing, a

movant must establish that the alleged injury is “‘both certain and great,’ ‘actual and not

theoretical,’ ‘beyond remediation,’ and ‘of such imminence that there is a clear and present need

for equitable relief.” Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(emphasis in original) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290,

297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Such a showing requires “proof indicating that the harm is certain to occur

in the near future.” Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

“Reputational injury can also suffice to establish irreparable harm.” S. Educ. Found. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Educ., 784 F. Supp. 3d 50, 72 (D.D.C. 2025) (PLF) (citing Patriot, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous.

& Urb. Dev., 963 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding plaintiffs’ business “reputation will be

damaged by [agency]’s characterization of them . . . as ‘enticing’ senior citizens into meetings,

and ‘pressuring’ them to obtain reverse mortgages ‘under the guise of sound estate planning’”)).

21 Here, Land Access Program Plaintiffs allege that “[a]cross the board,” they “will have to

stop their projects or drastically reduce the scope of work funded by their terminated grants” and

“have had to divert significant resources away from their organizations’ core missions to comply

with grant close out requirements while simultaneously attempting to find alternative funding

sources.” Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Pls.’ Statement of P. & A. in Supp. of Their Mot. for a Prelim.

Inj. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 26, ECF No. 63-1. Such articulated harms to core operations and mission

qualify as irreparable harm. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Nonprofits v. OMB, 763 F. Supp. 3d 36,

56-57 (D.D.C. 2025) (LLA) (finding irreparable harm where plaintiff organizations would have to

shutter programs, causing “existential injuries”); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F.

Supp. 3d 1094, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Organizations ‘have established a likelihood of irreparable

harm’ based on their showing of serious ‘ongoing harms to their organizational missions,’

including diversion of resources and the non-speculative loss of substantial funding from other

sources.” (quoting Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013))).

These allegations are supported by twenty-four sworn affidavits detailing the harm to the

operations and mission of the new proposed plaintiffs. See Ashe Decl. ¶ 14 (“We have had to stop

all work developing the statewide network of underserved farmers, and do not have the resources

needed to complete the data collection work. We will have to reduce staff hours and reallocate

our organization’s resources to continue to pay the salaries of employees who were hired

specifically to work on this project.”); Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Decl. of World Farmers’s Exec.

Dir., Amie Avila (“Avila Decl.”) ¶ 13, ECF No. 63-4 (“World Farmers also has been forced to

make significant staffing and budgetary adjustments due to the grant termination, as well as

redirect stay time away from our planned program development and enhancement of this and other

critical projects to address the termination. We had to lay off our Marketing Design Coordinator,

22 and we are evaluating whether we will have to do additional layoffs. We also had to institute a

hiring freeze, except for certain temporary positions.”); D’Ambrosio Decl. ¶ 23 (“The Agraria

Center is currently engaged in cost-cutting activities to further offset the loss of the grant. It is

presently having difficulty meeting contractor obligations (including those it entered into to carry

out the project) and without emergency funding or delaying other activities it may not be able to

continue all its non-grant-related activities.”); Frazier Decl. ¶ 18 (“Due to the termination of our

federal award, we have been forced to redirect our resources and staff time away from our mission

and other critical projects to address the termination and comply with award close out

procedures.”); Friedrich Decl. ¶ 14 (“[W]e have had to cease payments to and reduce the workload

of all Advisory Board members (who functioned as the administrators and were primarily local

farmers), and to cancel our contracts with two sub-awardees, disrupting their project plans and

planned income and financial stability. . . . [W]e cannot launch the larger, planned apprenticeship

program and have stopped the process of hiring eighteen apprentice-workers and eight farmer-

mentors.”); Grimm Decl. ¶ 13 (“We had to end the Two-Year New Century Farm Fellowship

Program, laying off the two fellows we had already brought on, and eliminating the opportunity

for the additional fellows we had planned to have go through the program.”); Horsey Decl. ¶ 21

(“The grant terminations also impacts the long-term viability of SILT and the sub-awardee

organizations. The grant supported the salaries of several staff members, leaving those positions

partially unfunded going forward.”); Kolawole Decl. ¶ 12 (“As a result of the grant termination,

we have not been able to provide training and technical assistance to underserved farmers and

could not advance our grant application program. AARI has been unable to fund this work without

the certainty of reimbursements, and hiring for program support has been put on hold.”); Stephens

Decl. ¶ 18 (“Pursuant to the project, at the time of termination CHP and its sub-awardees were in

23 the midst of assisting 42 families in clearing title to their land, leaving those families with an

interruption in the services, and CHP and its sub-awardees with unfunded professional and ethical

obligations to provide assistance.”); Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim Inj., Decl. of Cultivate Kan. City’s Exec.

Dir., Brien Darby (“Darby Decl.”) ¶ 14, ECF No. 63-6 (“We have not yet been able to identify any

funding source that could make up for this large of a loss, and if we are not able to raise future

funds, we will have to reduce staffing levels as early as January 2027.”); id., Decl. of S.D. Food

Sys. All.’s Co-Exec. Dir., Sona Desai (“Desai Decl.”) ¶ 14, ECF No. 63-7 (“The loss of funding

is placing significant financial strain on our organization and project partners and has reduced our

ability to stay operational at the same scale and level of impact originally planned. Some

operational reductions have already occurred, while additional impacts may become more

significant over the next 6-18 months if replacement funding is not secured.”); id., Decl. of Workin

Rootz’s Exec. Dir. & Lead Farmer, Candius Elliott (“Elliott Decl.”) ¶ 14, ECF No. 63-8 (“We had

planned to complete our projects around the funding we were awarded, and now we are stuck

unable to complete tasks we were in the middle of. We are unsure if we will be able to hire part-

time farm apprentices as planned.”); id., Decl. of Agrarian Land Trust’s Commons Manager,

Nathan Michael Galaviz (“Galaviz Decl.”) ¶ 25, ECF No. 64-3 (“Because of the termination,

Agrarian Trust has already had to reduce staff capacity, including laying off four staff members[,

which] layoffs directly reduced Agrarian Trust’s ability to coordinate land acquisitions, manage

partner obligations, prepare and submit reporting materials, compile diligence documents,

communicate with farmer groups and landowners, support local and regional Agrarian Commons

entities, and carry out the land tenure and stewardship work approved under the award.”); id., Decl.

of NDN Collective, Inc.’s President, Wizipan Little Elk Garriott (“Garriott Decl.”) ¶ 15, ECF No.

64-4 (“The funding delay will likely also create challenges in meeting organizational financial

24 obligations, including staffing, operational expenses, and program-related costs.”); id., Decl. of

Rural Advancement Found. Int’l–USA, Kavita Koppa (“Koppa Decl.”) ¶ 13, ECF No. 65-2 (“We

had planned to hire two full-time staff members in January 2025 to support implementation of our

work under the ILA grant. We already prepared and posted the job descriptions for both of these

roles and had begun the interviewing process. RAFI-USA did not fill these roles.”); id., Decl. of

Heru Urb. Farming’s Exec. Dir., Tyrean Markee Lewis Sr. (“Lewis Decl.”) ¶ 13, ECF No. 65-3

(“Heru Urban Farming also has been forced to make significant staffing and budgetary adjustments

due to the grant termination, as well as redirect staff time away from our mission and other critical

projects to address the termination. We had to lay off some staff, and we have had to divert staff

attention to closing out the grant and seeking out alternative funding sources.”); Mallory Decl.

¶ 21 (“Prior to the termination, 2020 Farmers Cooperative had entered into agreements with certain

groups that we will also not be able to fulfill due to the termination. Not only does this mean that

those initial payments are inefficient, but I know those groups were counting on those funds and

may not be able to remain in business if 2020 Farmers Cooperative cannot meet its

commitments.”); Manabe Decl. ¶ 11 (“We have had to stop all our work on five active land access

projects that we have been working on with farmers. We also have had to stop delivering

equipment and providing equipment training to farmers, providing technical assistance to farmers,

and helping farmers identify and assess potential farm sites. In addition, we may have to reduce

the income of or lay off three to four of our employees, and our staff have been experiencing

emotional distress due to the uncertainty of our financial future.”); Maqubela Decl. ¶ 12 (“In

addition to needing to lay off the project manager for this project and halt our hiring process for

previously planned fellow positions, we are no longer able to hire additional staff that we had

planned for, most of our existing staff have been converted from employees to independent

25 contractors, some of our staff have voluntarily reduced their hours or pay, and we had to cancel

our organizational health insurance contract.”); Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Decl. of King Cnty.,

Wash.’s Env’t Programs Managing Supervisor, Richard Peter Martin (“Martin Decl.”) ¶ 19, ECF

No. 66-1 (“If sufficient replacement funding cannot be found by the end of 2026—which King

County is diverting resources to look for—King County will have to cancel six different contracts

that enabled the County to implement the grant, including County contracts with one college

(Highline College), one local Community Development Financial Institution (Business Impact

Northwest), and four community-based organizations (collectively, the County’s ‘Contractors’),”

resulting in layoffs of “staff both within King County and at some of our Contractors . . ., and our

Farmland Access program would be significantly scaled back, starting January 1, 2027.”); id.,

Decl. of Holistic Organic Prac. Educ. for Small Farm Sustainability’s Exec. Dir., Diana Garcia

Padilla (“Padilla Decl.”) ¶¶ 11-14, ECF No. 66-2 (“We have lost the opportunity to expand across

Texas, as we had originally planned, and made promises to purchase land, signed contracts,

ordered appraisals, interviewed staff, and purchased supplies for eight additional sites. . . . HOPE

may not be able to stay operational beyond September 2026, when our one other very small grant

ends.”); id., Decl. of Kan. Black Farmers Ass’n’s Chief Exec. Officer/President, JohnElla Holmes

Reece (“Reece Decl.”) ¶ 12, ECF No. 66-3 (“We have had to cancel our marketing service contract

with a partner that was actively working to secure and develop commercial opportunities and

contracts for KBFA farmers with other organizations[,]” which “has significantly disrupted our

efforts to expand market access and create sustainable sales opportunities for farmers in our

programs.”); id., Decl. of THRIVE Santa Ana, Luis Sarmiento (“Sarmiento Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No.

67-1 (“With the termination of the grant, THRIVE will not be able to pay a percentage of staff

salaries and will have to eventually lay off some current staff. Subawardees will also be forced to

26 further reduce staff time” and “THRIVE will not be able to pay several contractors that we planned

to work with throughout the grant period.”); id., Decl. of Four Bands Cmty. Funds, Inc.’s Exec.

Dir., Lakota Vogel (“Vogel Decl.”) ¶ 17, ECF No. 67-3 (“Four Bands will also have to restructure

staffing and staff responsibilities in significant ways to address the lack of funding promised by

the ILA grant agreement. Finding replacement funding may take years, if it’s possible to do so at

all. Every day that Four Bands cannot make up the funds, the farmers who do not receive said

funds are suffering.”).

Defendants attempt to sidestep these attested harms, arguing that “when a harm is ‘based

on independent market variables such as how [a company’s] customers and/or retailer consumers

might react,’ that harm does not flow directly from the challenge action.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 31

(quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 968 F. Supp. 2d 38, 81 (D.D.C. 2013)). Here, the harms of staff

layoffs, reducing or shuttering programs, diverting resources, etc., to the proposed plaintiffs

directly arises from the grant terminations, but their harm is more than merely economic. These

plaintiffs further describe the reputational harm resulting from the terminated grants, explaining

that “[w]ithout the promised funding, the Land Access Program Plaintiffs will be unable to deliver

on promises made to the communities they serve, causing harm to their reputations as reliable

partners.” Pls.’ Mem. at 27-28; see Ashe Decl. ¶ 15 (“BOLT’s reputation as a reliable source of

funding and services to community members has also been harmed by FSA’s termination of this

grant. Without the ILA grant money, we do not know how we will repay the loan for the 45-acre

incubator farm purchase, which jeopardizes our ability to provide land access to our farmers in our

network. We will also not be able to deliver the $300,000 in micro grants to local farmers on the

edge of viability to support their labor and infrastructure.”); Avila Decl.¶ 14 (“The termination

forced us to cancel these contracts, and I worry that this will harm our prospects for future

27 relationships with these partners. We also built new relationships with farmers who were very

excited about the land access opportunities that our project would provide. Those farmers are

incredibly disappointed that the project will not move forward, and it is my understanding that

they think the failure lies fully with World Farmers, as they have not been following USDA’s grant

terminations.”); D’Ambrosio Decl. ¶ 24 (“The project drew on relationships the staff and

organization had spent years building with farmers and other organizations. Because the

organization cannot now fulfill its commitments, both staff and the organization believe that it will

be harder to be a trusted partner in the future.”); Darby Decl. ¶ 13 (“Cultivate KC’s reputation as

a reliable source of funding and services to community members has also been harmed by FSA’s

termination of this grant. Without the ILA grant money, Kansas City, MO has had to fund the

Food System Coordinator position out of its operational budget rather than using grant funding as

originally planned.”); Desai Decl. ¶ 18 (“We are concerned that the grant termination may cause

SDFSA to lose trust with community members, because we will be unable to fully deliver on

planned programs, funding opportunities, and land access initiatives that had been publicly

discussed and developed in collaboration with those community members. Some producers and

partners may feel disappointed or uncertain after investing time and energy into opportunities that

were ultimately unable to move forward as planned due to the grant cancellation, and we are

worried that they may be less likely to trust us again in the future.”); Elliott Decl. ¶ 16 (“Workin

Rootz’s reputation has also been harmed by the grant termination. We have an entire community

in Detroit that has been counting on us to deliver what we said we would: the CSA, farm stands,

and technical assistance and mini-grants to farmers. . . . When we aren’t able to deliver as planned

because we no longer have access to the grant funding we were relying upon, it damages the trust

of farmers and other community members in our organizations.”); Frazier Decl. ¶ 19 (“FSA’s

28 termination of our grants has also harmed Viva Farms’ reputation as a reliable source of funding

and services to community members.”); Friedrich Decl. ¶ 15 (“FSA’s termination of our grant has

also harmed Urban Oasis’s reputation as a reliable source of funding and services to community

members. And I fear that the project setbacks caused by FSA’s delays and grant termination will

impact our ability to raise funding from other sources.”); Galaviz Decl. ¶ 27 (“The approved

project depended on that trust because it required farmers and partners to work with Agrarian Trust

on land acquisition, governance, lease development, stewardship planning, USDA/FSA program

access, and long-term landholding structures. When FSA terminated the award after approving

the project and without first giving Agrarian Trust an opportunity to clarify or address any concern,

it weakened partner confidence in Agrarian Trust’s ability to fulfill commitments that were made

in reliance on the federal award.”); Garriott Decl. ¶ 14 (“The loss of funding and resulting delays

or elimination of Project elements is severely harming NDN Collective’s reputation as a reliable

source of funding and services to indigenous community members.”); Grimm Decl. ¶ 14

(“IVRCD’s reputation as a reliable source of employment, funding, and services for community

members has also been harmed by FSA’s termination of this grant. When we ended the Two-Year

New Century Farm Fellowship Program, we had to lay off our two fellows. . . . [and] a full-time

farm manager . . . . [and] end our contracts with our two sub-awardees and tell workshop

instructors that we could not hire them. I worry that beginning farmers will be reluctant to apply

to or participate in our programs because of the uncertainty around our funding.”); Horsey Decl.

¶ 19 (“We will not be able to complete the educational models or resource list, will not be able to

distribute mini-grants, and many other aspects of our project work have been delayed. Because

we had indicated to program participants and the public that we would be able to complete this

work, in reliance on the grant, I am concerned that this termination will negatively affect

29 landowners’, farmers’, and employees’ trust in our ability to follow through with commitments,

which will dissuade these groups from engaging with SILT in the future.”); Kolawole Decl. ¶ 14

(“Because of the grant termination, beginning farmers are now much more skeptical of working

with or relying on organizations connected to USDA funding. For organizations like AARI who

have collaborated with USDA, it can diminish AARI’s reputation in the community when

important projects are unfulfilled.”); Koppa Decl. ¶ 16 (“Due to FSA’s termination of this grant,

RAFI-USA is losing trust with farmers and subaward partners that have taken years of dedicated

effort to establish through outreach, collaboration, and consistent support. The disruption has not

only jeopardized ongoing projects but weakened trust in our organization’s ability to fulfil its

commitments, eroding the foundation of trust we have so carefully built over the years.”); Lewis

Decl. ¶ 14 (“The termination will also harm the broader community, and thus our reputation. The

community depends on us to provide produce, workshops, and employment, and the termination

undermines this work.”); Mallory Decl. ¶ 22 (“Put another way, the grant termination has undone

2020 Farmers Cooperative’s long-term work in building trusting relationships, which led us to

apply for the grant, and we must now find new ways to get back to where we were reputationally.”);

Manabe Decl. ¶ 12 (“NOFA-NJ’s reputation as a reliable source of funding and services to

community members has also been harmed by FSA’s termination of this grant. . . . Because of the

unexpected termination of the grant, we will not be able to honor the commitments we have made

to both community members and partners.”); Maqubela Decl. ¶¶ 12-13 (“In addition, once our

incubator farm sites exhaust their funding, they will have to reduce staff hours or even terminate

staff. The termination will also harm the community OurSpace serves. The lack of government

support for small-scale produce farmers who feed the community has far-reaching negative

impacts on health and wellbeing, including increasing food insecurity.”); Martin Decl. ¶ 23

30 (“Without the grant or replacement funding, King County will be unable to provide the same

support to the land and farmers it had intended, which in turn harms the County’s reputation with

those farmers, as well as the community groups on which those farmers rely (including some of

the Contractors). In the long term, this will undermine the County’s effort to expand farmland

access and support the next generation of farmers, which will reduce agricultural production and

community benefits.”); Padilla Decl. ¶ 12 (“HOPE’s reputation as a reliable source of funding and

services to community members has also been harmed by FSA’s termination of this grant. Without

the ILA grant money, we have had to cancel land use contracts and service agreements with several

partners, which may undermine our organizational reputation in relation to our commitments and

contractual agreements.”); Reece Decl. ¶ 13 (“Families, youth, and entire rural and urban

communities will be affected through the loss of educational programming, workforce

development opportunities, mentorship, and agricultural training initiatives connected to the grant.

KBFA’s partnerships with universities, community organizations, and technical assistance

providers were designed to create long-term infrastructure for underserved producers, and the

termination undermines years of planning, relationship-building, and community trust.”);

Sarmiento Decl. ¶ 12 (“THRIVE and subawardees had publicly announced when we were awarded

our ILA grant and outlined for our community how the funding would be spent on programming

and to increase land, capital, and market access for farmers. We have had to continuously go back

to our community and let them know that funding has been delayed and now terminated.

Community members were counting on THRlVE to purchase and provide land and programming

for the 2026 growing season. The termination of the grant has negatively impacted community

members financially as well as eroded their trust in THRIVE and subawardees as well as in USDA

and FSA.”); Stephens Decl. ¶ 20 (“Moreover, both staff and the participating organizations rely

31 on their deep relationships with the served communities to successfully conduct outreach and

deliver services. As individuals and organizations, their inability to fulfill their commitments due

to the grant termination will undermine the trust the staff and organizations have built and thereby

hinder their ability to work with these communities going forward.”); Vogel Decl. ¶ 18 (“On tribal

lands, reputation and trust are everything; they are the primary driver of client participation, partner

collaboration, and capital deployment. Communities are tightly connected, and information travels

quickly, so reputational harm is both rapid and durable. . . . This massive loss of expected ILA

grant funding will reverberate throughout our community. The reputational damage to Four Bands

is immediate and also growing and becoming more persistent with every passing day.”).

Compounding this reputational harm is the premise of defendants’ action in terminating

the grants “based on the accusations that their programming was discriminatory and fiscally

irresponsible.” Pls.’ Mem. at 28; see, e.g., Mallory Decl., Ex. B, Termination Letter from Steven

Peterson, Assoc. Admin., Farm Serv. Agency, to 2020 Farmers Coop., Inc. (Mar. 23, 2026), ECF

No. 65-4 (“The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has determined that awards

under this program involved discriminatory preferences based on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

(DEI) and wasteful spending that did little to further lawful agricultural land purchases.”); Mallory

Decl. ¶ 23 (“2020 Farmers Cooperative’s reputation has also been harmed by the USDA’s

suggestion we were part of a program in which there was fraud, waste, and abuse. I am concerned

that this will hamper our ability to obtain other funding and partner with other organizations. I am

also concerned the constituents we serve will be less likely to trust us to support them in the future.

The termination letter’s statements may also lead participants to be reluctant to participate in other

federal programming opportunities fearing rash, baseless accusations.”); D’Ambrosio Decl., Ex.

B, Termination Letter from Steven Peterson, Assoc. Admin., Farm Serv. Agency, to the Agraria

32 Ctr. (Mar. 23, 2026), ECF No. 63-5 (“The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has

determined that awards under this program involved discriminatory preferences based on

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) and wasteful spending that did little to further lawful

agricultural land purchases.”); D’Ambrosio Decl. ¶ 25 (“The specific allegations in the termination

letter of discrimination, waste, fraud, and abuse have enhanced the above harms. Staff have been

whipsawed by the government, which previously approved this grant. They also worry about

whether these allegations will follow them in future work, harming their ability to partner or raise

funds.”). These extensive declarations from the Land Access Program Plaintiffs leave little doubt

as to their irreparable harm resulting from the grant terminations.

The remaining Winter factors—the balance of the equities and the public interest—merge

where, as here, the government is the opposing party. Pursuing Am.’s Greatness, 831 F.3d at 511.

These merged factors likewise favor the Land Access Program Plaintiffs. As explained above,

these plaintiffs have established a likelihood that defendants acted contrary to law, and “[t]here is

generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action,” but “[b]y contrast,

‘there is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws

that govern their existence and operation.’” Urb. Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *38

(internal quotation marks removed) (quoting League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d

1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).

Defendants’ principle argument in support of the merged factors favoring defendants is

that “[t]he public has an interest in permitting the Department to take decisive action when it comes

to setting its policy priorities” and that “a preliminary injunction would disrupt the Department’s

efforts to ensure that it is funding grants consistent with Congressional mandates, the Equal

Protection Clause and the Secretary’s priorities.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 33. As was true when these

33 merged factors were under consideration in the previous preliminary injunction, “plaintiffs and the

public face significant injury from defendants’ actions, which are likely violative of the APA, and

defendants’ relative delay in fulfilling their agency priorities pales in comparison.” Urb.

Sustainability I, 2025 WL 2374528, at *38. Indeed, each of the grants had been determined to

fulfill congressional mandates, which is the reason that these projects had been selected in the first

place, see, e.g., Mallory Decl., Ex. A, Notice of Grant and Agreement Award Number

FSA24GRA0011585 (Nov. 5, 2024) (showing, under heading “Authority,” “Section 1006 of the

American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Pub. L 117-2), as amended”). Despite defendants’ denial that

the terminations were decided en masse and without individualized review, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 25

(“[E]ach termination letter explains specifically why the given grant award was inconsistent with

Congressional intent . . . .”), the process employed resulting in the termination decision appears

suspect given the elimination of 49 of the 50 grant holders almost simultaneously as well as, for

instance, assertions of waste, fraud, and abuse in the termination letters that have not been

substantiated against any specific organization or pressed in any filings in this matter, see, e.g.,

Friedrich Decl. ¶ 13 (“The termination letter states that ILA awards were used for frivolous

expenses, such as ‘gazebos, massages, a camper/RV.’ Urban Oasis did not make any such

purchases, and USDA and FSA do not claim that we did. . . . All expenses incurred under the

program were approved by USDA.”).

Land Access Program Plaintiffs have thus carried their burden of persuasion on all four of

the Winter factors and, consequently, have demonstrated entitlement to a preliminary injunction.

C. Defendants’ Request For a Stay

Having determined that Land Access Program Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary

injunction, two requests posed by defendants are considered. First, defendants request, in a single

34 sentence, without citation to any authority or further reasoning, that any grant of preliminary

injunctive relief “be stayed pending the disposition of any appeal that is authorized by the Solicitor

General, or, at a minimum, administratively stayed for a period of seven days to allow the United

States to seek an emergency, expedited stay from the Court of Appeals if an appeal is authorized.”

Defs.’ Opp’n at 34. To start, such request may be denied because “perfunctory and undeveloped

arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are deemed waived.”

Johnson v. Panetta, 953 F. Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.D.C. 2013) (BJR). Regardless, “[a] stay is not a

matter of right.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United

States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). “It is instead ‘an exercise of judicial discretion,’ and ‘[t]he

propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. (alteration

in original). Stays pending appeal “are granted only in extraordinary circumstances.” Graves v.

Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1972) (Powell, J., in Chambers). In deciding whether to grant a stay

pending appeal, a court must consider “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing

that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured

absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested

in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hilton

v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).

The foregoing analysis has already demonstrated that Land Access Program Plaintiffs have

established a likelihood of success on the merits and that the balance of equities and public interest

favor them. Land Access Program Plaintiffs argue that staying the preliminary injunction “would

be counterintuitive to the very purpose of the preliminary relief sought,” namely restoring millions

of dollars in interrupted funding. Pls.’ Reply at 25. Defendants make no argument regarding

irreparable injury, but, as a general matter, disbursing funds as required by a congressional statute

35 cannot constitute an irreparable injury because executive agencies “may not decline to follow a

statutory mandate or prohibition simply because of policy objections.” In re Aiken County, 725

F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the Nken factors do not favor a stay.

Second, defendants request that plaintiffs post a bond as a condition of preliminary relief

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). See Defs.’ Opp’n at 34; Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)

(“The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant

gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained

by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”). Land Access Program

Plaintiffs respond that “[a]s one court explained, ‘[i]n a case where the Government is alleged to

have unlawfully withheld [large sums] of previously committed funds to countless recipients, it

would defy logic—and contravene the very basis of this opinion’” to impose a bond. Pls.’ Mem.

at 30 (first alteration added) (quoting Nat’l Council of Nonprofits v. OMB, 775 F. Supp. 3d 100,

130 (D.D.C. 2025) (LLA)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides “broad discretion in

the district court to determine the appropriate amount of an injunction bond.” DSE, Inc. v. United

States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Accordingly, to avoid exacerbating Land Access

Program Plaintiffs’ financial straits, a nominal bond of $5.00 will be imposed.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have established entitlement to amend the complaint,

and Land Access Program Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the terminations of their individual

grants were likely contrary to statute, that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief,

and that the balance of equities and public interest favor preliminary injunctive relief. Thus, these

36 grant terminations are preliminarily vacated, and defendants are enjoined from giving them any

effect. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

Date: June 30, 2026

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge