CULLEN, Commissioner.
At the May 1971 primary election Charles B. Upton and Denver Knuckles were candidates for the Republican nomination for State Senator for the Seventeenth Senatorial District. The official canvass of the vote showed that Knuckles was the winner, receiving 3321 votes to Upton’s 3298, a mar[824]*824gin of 23. In the Straight Creek #4 Precinct in Bell County Knuckles received 82 votes and Upton 37, a margin of 45.
Upton brought the instant suit to contest the election. The relief he sought was that all of the votes in Straight Creek Precinct be declared void and the votes received by each candidate in that precinct be deducted from the respective candidate’s totals; and that Upton be declared the winner on the basis of the remaining votes (he then would have a winning margin of 22 votes). The circuit court entered judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Upton has appealed from that judgment.
The circuit court apparently interpreted Watts v. Fugate, Ky., 442 S.W.2d 569, as holding that a precinct can never be thrown out, for illegality in the conduct of the election therein, and the results of the election determined by the votes in the remainder of the election territory. Watts v. Fugate does not so hold.
In substance, the holding in Watts v. Fu-gate was simply that the “20 percent rule” has reference to 20 percent of the total votes in the election and not to 20 percent of the votes in a single precinct. The rule as clarified by Watts, or otherwise, has no bearing on the instant case, because the rule has no application in determining whether certain votes are in fact illegal, nor in cases where it can be determined for whom the illegal votes were cast.
In the instant case, Upton undertakes to assert that all of the votes in Straight Creek Precinct were void — illegal—because the laws governing the conduct of elections were violated to such an extent that it must be considered that there was in substance no election in the precinct. He does not attempt to say that at least 20 percent of the votes in the precinct were illegal and therefore the rest of the votes therein should be thrown out; he says that all of the votes are illegal by reason of the conditions under which the election was held.
Obviously, if all of the votes in a particular precinct are declared to be void, it can be determined for whom the illegal votes were cast, because every vote received by each candidate was an illegal vote. In such a case there is no necessity for the complaint to name each alleged illegal voter and how he voted, because the proof will not be addressed to individual illegal votes, but to the general course of conduct of the election. To the extent that Gregory v. Stubblefield, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 689, and the cases cited therein require the complaint to name the illegal voters where it is alleged that for some reason or reasons affecting the election itself as distinct from the individual votes, all the votes were illegal, they are overruled.
If it should be determined that the election in Straight Creek Precinct was in substance no election at all, wherefore all of the votes cast therein should be considered void, the question would remain whether the result of the election could properly and fairly be determined on the basis of the votes in the remaining portions of the election territory, or whether the entire election should be declared void. It would seem that the answer to that question should depend on whether the number of votes in the voided precinct, in relation to the total number of votes cast in the election, is so substantial that the election cannot be considered to have been free and equal. See Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 164 Ky. 463, 175 S.W. 1022; Hocker v. Pendleton, 100 Ky. 726, 39 S.W. 250; Lakes v. Estridge, 294 Ky. 655, 172 S.W.2d 454. Here the principle is the same as in the “20 percent rule” — it is not enough merely that the number of voided votes be sufficient to have affected the mathematical outcome of the election; in addition the voided votes must be a substantial proportion of the total votes cast in the election. It appears that not only the same principle, but the same [825]*825measure of substantiality — 20 percent— may be used for this purpose.1
The relief sought by Upton in the instant case is the kind of relief that was envisioned in Thurman v. Keen, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 754, as being invocable under appropriate facts, and the kind that was invoked in such cases as Herald v. Turner, 237 Ky. 827, 36 S.W.2d 623 and Johnson v. Hall, 275 Ky. 395, 121 S.W.2d 935. It is indistinguishable on logic from the relief frequently granted where absentee ballots are sought to be invalidated in toto because of violations of the laws governing their treatment. See Arnett v. Hensley, Ky., 425 S.W.2d 546, and Hale v. Goble, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 33.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we conclude the law to be (1) that the vote of a precinct can be thrown out for irregularities in the conduct of the election therein of such magnitude as effectively to destroy any hope that the results as tabulated were a fair indication of the sense of the voters in that precinct and (2) that the result of the election can be determined on the basis of the votes from the remainder of the election territory unless the number of votes in the voided precinct constituted a substantial portion (20 percent or more) of the votes in the entire territory. In the instant case the votes in the senatorial race in Straight Creek Precinct were less than two percent of the total votes in the district, so it would be proper to determine the result of the election on the basis of the remainder of the votes if Straight Creek Precinct were thrown out.
The question remains of whether Upton’s complaint sufficiently alleged grounds for the relief he sought. In approaching that question it is necessary that we determine to what extent “notice” pleading as contemplated by the Civil Rules is acceptable in election contest cases.
Our previous cases have adhered strictly to the rule that where specific votes are attacked as illegal the name of each alleged illegal voter and the candidate for whom his vote was cast must be set forth in the complaint, the Civil Rules to the contrary notwithstanding. See Napier v. Noplis, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 875; Hodges v. Hodges, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 208. But with that one exception, there has been no clear-cut position expressed on the acceptability of “notice” pleading in contest cases. It is true that in Napier v. Noplis, supra, the statement was made that in election contest suits specific pleading is required whenever possible and general charges are not welcomed.
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CULLEN, Commissioner.
At the May 1971 primary election Charles B. Upton and Denver Knuckles were candidates for the Republican nomination for State Senator for the Seventeenth Senatorial District. The official canvass of the vote showed that Knuckles was the winner, receiving 3321 votes to Upton’s 3298, a mar[824]*824gin of 23. In the Straight Creek #4 Precinct in Bell County Knuckles received 82 votes and Upton 37, a margin of 45.
Upton brought the instant suit to contest the election. The relief he sought was that all of the votes in Straight Creek Precinct be declared void and the votes received by each candidate in that precinct be deducted from the respective candidate’s totals; and that Upton be declared the winner on the basis of the remaining votes (he then would have a winning margin of 22 votes). The circuit court entered judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Upton has appealed from that judgment.
The circuit court apparently interpreted Watts v. Fugate, Ky., 442 S.W.2d 569, as holding that a precinct can never be thrown out, for illegality in the conduct of the election therein, and the results of the election determined by the votes in the remainder of the election territory. Watts v. Fugate does not so hold.
In substance, the holding in Watts v. Fu-gate was simply that the “20 percent rule” has reference to 20 percent of the total votes in the election and not to 20 percent of the votes in a single precinct. The rule as clarified by Watts, or otherwise, has no bearing on the instant case, because the rule has no application in determining whether certain votes are in fact illegal, nor in cases where it can be determined for whom the illegal votes were cast.
In the instant case, Upton undertakes to assert that all of the votes in Straight Creek Precinct were void — illegal—because the laws governing the conduct of elections were violated to such an extent that it must be considered that there was in substance no election in the precinct. He does not attempt to say that at least 20 percent of the votes in the precinct were illegal and therefore the rest of the votes therein should be thrown out; he says that all of the votes are illegal by reason of the conditions under which the election was held.
Obviously, if all of the votes in a particular precinct are declared to be void, it can be determined for whom the illegal votes were cast, because every vote received by each candidate was an illegal vote. In such a case there is no necessity for the complaint to name each alleged illegal voter and how he voted, because the proof will not be addressed to individual illegal votes, but to the general course of conduct of the election. To the extent that Gregory v. Stubblefield, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 689, and the cases cited therein require the complaint to name the illegal voters where it is alleged that for some reason or reasons affecting the election itself as distinct from the individual votes, all the votes were illegal, they are overruled.
If it should be determined that the election in Straight Creek Precinct was in substance no election at all, wherefore all of the votes cast therein should be considered void, the question would remain whether the result of the election could properly and fairly be determined on the basis of the votes in the remaining portions of the election territory, or whether the entire election should be declared void. It would seem that the answer to that question should depend on whether the number of votes in the voided precinct, in relation to the total number of votes cast in the election, is so substantial that the election cannot be considered to have been free and equal. See Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 164 Ky. 463, 175 S.W. 1022; Hocker v. Pendleton, 100 Ky. 726, 39 S.W. 250; Lakes v. Estridge, 294 Ky. 655, 172 S.W.2d 454. Here the principle is the same as in the “20 percent rule” — it is not enough merely that the number of voided votes be sufficient to have affected the mathematical outcome of the election; in addition the voided votes must be a substantial proportion of the total votes cast in the election. It appears that not only the same principle, but the same [825]*825measure of substantiality — 20 percent— may be used for this purpose.1
The relief sought by Upton in the instant case is the kind of relief that was envisioned in Thurman v. Keen, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 754, as being invocable under appropriate facts, and the kind that was invoked in such cases as Herald v. Turner, 237 Ky. 827, 36 S.W.2d 623 and Johnson v. Hall, 275 Ky. 395, 121 S.W.2d 935. It is indistinguishable on logic from the relief frequently granted where absentee ballots are sought to be invalidated in toto because of violations of the laws governing their treatment. See Arnett v. Hensley, Ky., 425 S.W.2d 546, and Hale v. Goble, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 33.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we conclude the law to be (1) that the vote of a precinct can be thrown out for irregularities in the conduct of the election therein of such magnitude as effectively to destroy any hope that the results as tabulated were a fair indication of the sense of the voters in that precinct and (2) that the result of the election can be determined on the basis of the votes from the remainder of the election territory unless the number of votes in the voided precinct constituted a substantial portion (20 percent or more) of the votes in the entire territory. In the instant case the votes in the senatorial race in Straight Creek Precinct were less than two percent of the total votes in the district, so it would be proper to determine the result of the election on the basis of the remainder of the votes if Straight Creek Precinct were thrown out.
The question remains of whether Upton’s complaint sufficiently alleged grounds for the relief he sought. In approaching that question it is necessary that we determine to what extent “notice” pleading as contemplated by the Civil Rules is acceptable in election contest cases.
Our previous cases have adhered strictly to the rule that where specific votes are attacked as illegal the name of each alleged illegal voter and the candidate for whom his vote was cast must be set forth in the complaint, the Civil Rules to the contrary notwithstanding. See Napier v. Noplis, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 875; Hodges v. Hodges, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 208. But with that one exception, there has been no clear-cut position expressed on the acceptability of “notice” pleading in contest cases. It is true that in Napier v. Noplis, supra, the statement was made that in election contest suits specific pleading is required whenever possible and general charges are not welcomed. On the other hand, this court has held that violations of the Corrupt Practices Act may be alleged in general terms; Kelley v. Barlow, 287 Ky. 680, 155 S.W.2d 10; Goad v. Jackson, 270 Ky. 92, 109 S.W.2d 17; that precision of pleading is not required, certainty to common intent being sufficient; Siler v. Brown, 215 Ky. 199, 284 S.W. 997; and that because of the haste required in preparing contest suits technical objections to pleadings should be disregarded and the pleadings should be given a rational construction according to their general scope and tenor; Pickard v. Jones, Ky., 243 S.W.2d 46.
CR 1 provides that the Civil Rules shall apply to procedure and practice in special statutory proceedings except to the extent the rules are inconsistent or in conflict with the statute. Various provisions of the rules have been held applicable to election contest cases. See Deaton v. Little, Ky., 452 S.W.2d 384.
We see no valid reason why pleadings in election contest cases should be held to requirements of specificity not applicable to other civil actions. If the defendant is given notice by the pleading of what kind of a ground of contest is being asserted, [826]*826that should be sufficient for pleading purposes, and if the defendant desires more information he has all of the resources of discovery plus the privilege to ask for a more definite statement.
With the foregoing considerations in mind we examine Upton’s complaint. The significant portions of the complaint are as follows:
“(4) Contestant-Plaintiff alleges that on May 25, 1971, at Straight Creek Precinct Number 4, Bell County, the election laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, as set out and prescribed in KRS 118.330, Sub-sections 1, 2, 3 and 4, were violated by:
(a) Allowing unauthorized and illegal persons to be inside the polling place during balloting.
(b) By allowing Election Officers to electioneer within the polls during balloting.
(c) By allowing unauthorized and illegal personnel to electioneer inside the polling place during the balloting.
(d) By allowing unauthorized persons to converse with others concerning their support or non-support of candidates inside the polls during balloting.
“That same were so violently and flagrantly violated as did have the effect of rendering all of the votes cast in said race void. That the acts and unlawful manner in which the election was conducted at the aforesaid precinct did so wrongfully influence, intimidate, coerce and otherwise change the conditions of the balloting at this precinct, and did cause the election processes of this precinct to be so tainted and unfair as to make the results of the voting at said place to be illegal, void and not capable of being counted in reckoning the final results of this Republican Primary Election.
“(4-a) He alleges that on May 25, 1971, at Straight Creek Bell County, Precinct No. 4 the Election Laws of the Commonwealth, as set out in KRS 125.-140, Sub-section (2) relating to assisting persons in voting, was violated as follows :
(a) A great number of persons were allowed to be assisted in voting without making an oath as to the disability of each;
(b) That a great number of persons were allowed into the mechanical voting machine accompanied by one person, when the law required first the oath and accompaniment of the two election judges. That KRS 125.140(2) was violated in such a way as to bring about such fraud and gross impropriety in the conduct of the election that a large proportion of the votes cast were done so illegally, and did thereby make it impossible to determine how the votes were cast so as to charge them to the proper recipient, and therefore the election in said precinct should be voided.
* * * * * *
“(6) That there was such violations of KRS 118.330 and KRS 125.140(2) in the Straight Creek Precinct No. 4, Bell County, and such wrongful conduct in holding said election therein that the results thereof cannot be fairly and reasonably determined with any degree of certainty, and that this Court should declare the election results of said precinct void, and should adjudge that no proper and legal election was held in the Senator’s Race in said precinct on May 25, 1971.”2
[827]*827It will be observed that the complaint alleges squarely that the election laws in the conduct of the election in Straight Creek Precinct were “so” violated as to cause the election therein to be void. The kinds of violations are set forth. The only deficiency that might be charged is that the general allegation of law violations so extensive as to render the election void is a mere conclusion and is one not warranted by or properly drawn from the specific violations enumerated.
The problem of distinguishing “facts” from “conclusions” was designed by the Civil Rule concept of “notice” pleading to be minimized if not completely eliminated. We see no reason why the problem should be perpetuated in election contest cases by continuing to apply ancient rules of pleading.
Certainly, if Upton had alleged, as to each of the specific kinds of statute violations, that the extent of the violations was such as to directly affect practically every voter, his complaint would .be considered sufficient. We think that his general allegations, following the enumerations of the kinds of violations that occurred, does not fall far short of saying the equivalent of the above. In the election contest case of Pickard v. Jones, Ky., 243 S.W.2d 46, p. 50, we said, “Where the pleading is open to construction, a meaning which will reasonably support it should be adopted rather than one which will defeat it.”
It is our conclusion that the allegations of Upton’s complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, we caution that evidence merely of some irregularities of the kind mentioned in the complaint will not be enough proof to sustain the claim for relief. The proof must be of such flagrant, extensive, and corrupt violations as to destroy the fairness and equality of the election. See Hodges v. Hodges, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 208; Burchell v. Smith, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 365. It is only in the most flagrant kind of case that voters will be disfranchised for illegal acts of the election officials. See Thurman v. Keen, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 754.
The judgment is reversed, with directions for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
MILLIKEN, C. J., and EDWARD P. HILL, Jr., PALMORE, REED and STEINFELD, JJ., concur.
OSBORNE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
NEIKIRK, J., not sitting.