Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp.

783 N.E.2d 1024, 203 Ill. 2d 64, 270 Ill. Dec. 724, 2002 Ill. LEXIS 957

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Decided: November 21, 2002
• Docket: 92838
• Status: Published

Opinions

JUSTICE THOMAS

delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue in this appeal are several questions regarding both the interpretation and constitutionality of section 2 — 1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1117 (West 1994)), which modified the common law rule of joint and several liability. Pursuant to section 2 — 1117, any tortfeasor whose percentage of fault for a plaintiffs injuries is found to be “less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff’ is only severally liable for the plaintiff’s nonmedical damages. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1117 (West 1994). In this case, plaintiffs, Marlin and Theresa Unzicker, argue that the trial court erred in applying section 2 — 1117, which resulted in a judgment that defendant Kraft Food Ingredients Corporation (Kraft) was liable for only 1% of Marlin’s nonmedical damages. Plaintiffs assert that Marlin’s employer, third-party defendant Nogle & Black Mechanical, Inc. (Nogle), whom a jury found to be 99% responsible for Marlin’s injuries, should not have been included in the division of fault. Plaintiffs contend that an employer who is protected from suit by the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2000)) is not a party who “could have been sued” by the plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiffs contend that section 2 — 1117 is unconstitutional and that the trial court erred in failing to answer the jurors’ questions and to give a certain jury instruction.

BACKGROUND

The essential facts are undisputed. Marlin was injured on July 20, 1991, while he was installing stainless steel piping at Kraft’s plant in Champaign. Marlin and another Nogle employee, Mike Mills, were standing on a “manlift” and welding flanges to a pipe. Marlin’s foreman, Mike Law, attempted to deliver some equipment to him by bringing it in the basket of a forklift that was owned by Kraft and operated by another Nogle employee. The forklift collided with the manlift, causing Marlin and Mills to fall.

Marlin applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits. Additionally, Marlin and his wife, Theresa, sued Kraft, alleging negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act (740 ILCS 150/0.01 through 9 (West 1992), repealed by Pub. Act 89 — 2, § 5, eff. February 14, 1995). Kraft filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Nogle.

The jury found against plaintiffs on the Structural Work Act claim, but in their favor on the negligence counts. The jury awarded plaintiffs $879,400 in total damages, $788,000 of which were nonmedical and $91,400 of which were medical. The jury apportioned 1% of the fault to Kraft and 99% to Nogle.

The trial court applied section 2 — 1117, which modified the common law rule of joint and several liability. At common law, a plaintiff could recover compensation for the full amount of his injury from any defendant responsible for the injury. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 423 (1997). Section 2 — 1117 modified this rule as follows:

“Except as provided in Section 2 — 1118, in actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, all defendants found liable are jointly and severally hable for plaintiffs past and future medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1117 (West 1994).¹

The trial court’s application of this section and the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)) rendered the verdict somewhat of a loss for plaintiffs because Kraft was severally liable for only 1% of the nonmedical damages, and Nogle was liable only for contribution in an amount equal to its workers’ compensation liability (Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155, 164-65 (1991)). Thus, the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict as follows. Kraft and Nogle were jointly and severally liable for Marlin’s past and future medical expenses of $91,400. Kraft was severally liable for 1% of the nonmedical damages ($7,880). On Kraft’s third-party complaint, Nogle was liable to Kraft for $90,486 in contribution, which represented 99% of the medical damages.

Plaintiffs filed a posttrial motion in which they argued that the trial court erred in applying section 2 — 1117. Plaintiffs’ argument was based on the Fifth District of the Appellate Court’s opinion in Lilly v. Marcal Rope & Rigging, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 1105 (1997), in which the court held that a plaintiffs employer should not be included in an allocation of fault under section 2 — 1117 because an employer, who is immune from suit under the Worker’s Compensation Act, is not a “third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff.”

The trial court denied the posttrial motion and found that plaintiffs had waived their argument that section 2 — 1117 should not apply. Kraft had initially raised the application of section 2 — 1117 as an affirmative defense in an amendment to its answer to the complaint. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs had waived their argument about section 2 — 1117 by failing to move to strike the answer. The trial court noted, however, that it would have been bound to follow Lilly if the issue had not been waived.

Plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth District affirmed. 325 Ill. App. 3d 587. The Fourth District disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the section 2 — 1117 issue had been waived and held that section 2 — 1117 does not have to be raised as an affirmative defense. Rather, because that section operates to allocate damages according to the jury’s verdict, issues relating to it can be raised in motions filed after the verdict’s entry. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 592. On the underlying issue, however, the Fourth District disagreed with Lilly and held that an employer can be included within the phrase “any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” The court relied on Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1 (1984), in which this court held that employers are subject to the Contribution Act, which applies where “[two] or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury.” See 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2000). In Doyle, this court explained that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)) is in the nature of an affirmative defense that is waived if not asserted. Until the defense is asserted, the employer is subject to liability in tort. Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d at 10-11. Therefore, the Fourth District concluded, if the phrase “subject to liability in tort” in the Contribution Act can include a plaintiffs employer, the phrase “any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff’ in section 2 — 1117 can also include a plaintiffs employer. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 593. We granted plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal to resolve this conflict in the appellate court.

ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Strike

Before discussing the merits of the appeal, we address two motions that we ordered taken with the case. Kraft moved to strike part of plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal and part of their opening brief. Kraft objected to plaintiffs raising issues that they did not raise in the appellate court. In the appellate court, plaintiffs raised only whether employers can be included in a section 2 — 1117 division of fault and whether the trial court erred in refusing to answer the jury’s questions. In Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 383 (1996), we held that issues that the appellant fails to raise in the appellate court are waived for purposes of our review. See also Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 209-10 (1983).

Here, however, we choose not to apply waiver. Waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the court. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1996). Moreover, we may consider an issue not raised below if the issue is one of law and is fully briefed and argued by the parties. Committee for Educational Rights, 174 Ill. 2d at 11. The issues plaintiffs raise regarding section 2 — 1117 are purely legal questions that have been fully briefed. We believe that the public interest favors considering the issues now, and thus we will not apply waiver. See Committee for Educational Rights, 174 Ill. 2d at 12. Accordingly, the motions to strike portions of the petition for leave to appeal and the plaintiffs’ brief are denied.

II. Interpretation of Section 2 — 1117

Our first inquiry is one of statutory construction. Plaintiffs argue that the appellate court erred in holding that a plaintiff’s employer can be considered a “third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff’ in determining percentages of fault under section 2 — 1117.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s true intent. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). When determining legislative intent, our starting point is the statute’s language, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature’s objectives in enacting the particular law. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, courts may not read in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419. Only when the meaning of the provision cannot be ascertained from its language may a court look beyond the language and resort to aids for construction. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 533-34 (1997). Because statutory interpretation presents a question of law, our review is de novo. King v. Industrial Comm’n, 189 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (2000).

Whether a plaintiffs employer can be considered in a section 2 — 1117 division of fault was first considered in Lilly. In that case, the plaintiff obtained a judgment of $1,200,005 against the defendant. The jury apportioned 90% of the fault to the plaintiffs employer, who was a third-party defendant, and 10% to the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant argued that it should be responsible for only 10% of the plaintiffs nonmedical damages. The trial court disagreed and refused to reduce the judgment against the defendant. The Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed. Lilly, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1105.

The Fifth District noted that section 5(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that “ ‘[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer *** for injury or death sustained by any employee *** other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, quoting 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 1996). Thus, according to the Fifth District, a plaintiffs employer is not a party who “could have been sued” by the plaintiff. The defendant in Lilly argued that Doyle mandated the opposite result. In Doyle, this court considered whether employers were liable for contribution under the Contribution Act. The relevant portion of the Contribution Act provided that “where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury *** there is a right of contribution among them.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 70, par. 302(a), now 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2000). The issue in Doyle was whether employers, who are immune from suit under the Workers’ Compensation Act, are liable for contribution given that the Contribution Act applies only to those who are “subject to liability in tort.” This court held that the Contribution Act does apply to employers, reasoning as follows:

“The language relied on by the employer is neither unambiguous nor should it be construed in the way the employer seeks to apply it. The Workers’ Compensation Act provides employers with a defense against any action that may be asserted against them in tort, but that defense is an affirmative one whose elements — the employment relationship and the nexus between the employment and the injury — must be established by the employer, and which is waived if not asserted by him in the trial court. [Citations.] Thus, the plaintiff may recover a tort judgment against his employer for a work-related injury if the employer fails to raise the defense the Workers’ Compensation Act gives him [citation], and on occasion the employer may choose not to raise it in the hope that the plaintiff will he unable to prove negligence to a jury’s satisfaction. The potential for tort liability exists until the defense is established. As this court has recently decided in interpreting the phrase of the Contribution Act at issue here, ‘ “liability” is determined at the time of the injury out of which the right to contribution arises, and not at the time the action for contribution is brought’ [citations]. At the time of an injury for which an employer’s negligence is partly responsible, the employer is in fact ‘subject to liability in tort’ to his employee, although that liability can be defeated depending on the response he chooses to make to his employee’s claim in the event the employee decides to sue in tort.” Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d at 10-11.

Lilly distinguished Doyle by noting that in Doyle this court was considering only whether employers were liable for contribution. Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. The court also noted that the legislature was aware of this court’s decision in Doyle when it enacted section 2 — 1117. Thus, according to Lilly, if the legislature had intended for employers to be covered by section 2 — 1117, it would have used the phrase “subject to liability in tort” because that phrase had already been construed to include employers. Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1108. Further, Lilly held that by using the phrase “could have been sued,” the legislature did not mean to include merely theoretical actions. According to Lilly, such a construction could include a plaintiff’s wife, his state, his god, or his pet iguana, because a plaintiff could theoretically file a piece of paper naming such persons, animals, or entities as defendants. Lilly concluded that the legislature did not intend “such a ridiculous result.” Lilly, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1113.

In the present case, the Fourth District rejected the Fifth District’s interpretation. The Fourth District relied on Doyle, finding that the reasoning this court employed in determining that employers are “subject to liability in tort” would apply equally to a statute referring to “any third-party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” Further, the Fourth District concluded that the clear legislative intent in section 2 — 1117 was that minimally responsible defendants should not be responsible for entire judgments and that it would make no sense in allocating fault to ignore the tortfeasor 99% at fault. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 593.

We agree with the Fourth District’s interpretation. When the legislature enacted section 2 — 1117, it was aware of our construction of the phrase “subject to liability in tort” in the Contribution Act. We held that employers, despite their immunity provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act, are still subject to liability in tort because the protection of the Workers’ Compensation Act is in the nature of an affirmative defense that must be raised in the trial court if the plaintiff brings a suit. Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d at 10; see also Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 175 Ill. 2d 201, 207-08 (1997) (section 5(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act is in the nature of an affirmative defense that may be waived by the employer); Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994) (same). In section 2 — 1117, the legislature referred to a division of fault among the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff. Under our analyses in Doyle, Braye, and Geise, a plaintiffs employer who is a third-party defendant is a party who “could have been sued by the plaintiff.”

In coming to this conclusion, we must reject Lilly’s somewhat fanciful hypothesis of legislative intent. According to Lilly, if the legislature had intended to include employers in the division of fault, it would have used the phrase “subject to liability in tort” because this court had already construed that phrase as including employers. Thus, according to Lilly, the legislature must have meant something different by using the phrase “could have been sued by the plaintiff.” If, however, the legislature intended to use language that would exclude employers, we believe that it would have simply put in language specifically excluding employers. If, as Lilly contends, the legislature was considering Doyle when it drafted section 2 — 1117 and wanted that section to mean something different, it is difficult to believe that the legislature would have chosen a phrase such as “who could have been sued by the plaintiff’ instead of excluding employers explicitly.

Further, we disagree with Lilly’s sarcastic conclusion that including an employer who has statutory immunity from tort suits in the division of fault would mean that a plaintiffs pet iguana could also be included because a person could physically file a paper naming his pet as a defendant in a suit. Such an analysis ignores the first part of the relevant statutory phrase. Section 2 — 1117 does not include in the division of fault “anyone who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” Rather, it includes “any third-party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” In other words, the party must already have been brought into the case by a defendant for that party to be included in the division of fault. Unless defendants in tort suits begin filing contribution claims against the plaintiffs pets, Lilly’s fears of iguana litigation will never be realized.

The clear legislative intent behind section 2 — 1117 is that minimally responsible defendants should not have to pay entire damage awards. The legislature set the line of minimal responsibility at less than 25%. In order to apportion responsibility, the legislature looked to those people in the suit: the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff. In our opinion, the broad wording in the statute merely shows that the legislature intended the division of responsibility to include those people in the suit who might have been responsible for the plaintiffs injuries. Here, ignoring the party found to be 99% responsible for the plaintiffs injuries and requiring the party found 1% responsible to pay all of the nonmedical damages would not be in accord with the clear legislative intent that minimally responsible defendants should not be liable for entire judgments. The appellate court did not err in holding that Nogle was properly considered in the division of fault.

III. Alleged Conflict With the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act

Plaintiffs next argue that section 2 — 1117 irreconcilably conflicts with sections 3 and 4 of the Contribution Act. These sections provide as follows:

“Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability. However, no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability.

If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share.” 740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2000).

“Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. A plaintiff’s right to recover the full amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the provisions of this Act.” 740 ILCS 100/4 (West 1994).

According to plaintiffs, these two sections — section 4 explicitly and section 3 implicitly — recognize a plaintiffs right to recover all of his or her damages from any responsible defendant. Section 2 — 1117, by contrast, eliminates a plaintiffs ability to recover the full amount of his or her nonmedical damages from any defendant found to be less than 25% responsible for the plaintiffs injuries.

Where there is an alleged conflict between two statutes, a court has a duty to interpret those statutes in. a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible. McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 427 (1998). Here, giving such an interpretation is not difficult because the statutes simply do not conflict. Section 4 of the Contribution Act merely clarifies that nothing in the Contribution Act affects a plaintiffs right to recover the full amount of damages from any one or more defendants. Section 2 — 1117 is not in the Contribution Act, so its modification of joint and several liability does not conflict with Section 4. Section 3 explains how the amount of contribution is determined and what happens when one or more of the tortfeasors is insolvent. Likewise, this section simply does not conflict with section 2 — 1117’s modification of the rule of joint and several liability for minimally culpable defendants. Section 2 — 1117 comes into play before the Contribution Act and is applied to determine liability. Any defendant who pays damages in an amount greater than his or her proportionate share of fault can then seek contribution under the Contribution Act.

Plaintiffs rely on dicta from Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 424-26, in which this court discussed a potential conflict between the amended version of section 2 — 1117 and section 4 of the Contribution Act. We noted that, as part of Public Act 89 — 7, the legislature simultaneously amended section 4 to provide that, with the exception of limited contribution against a plaintiffs employer, nothing in the Contribution Act was intended to affect a plaintiffs right to recover all of his or her damages from one or more responsible tortfeasors. As part of the same public act, the legislature passed amended section 2 — 1117 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1117 (West 1996)), which abolished joint and several liability in favor of complete proportional several liability. Thus, the legislature passed legislation that abolished joint and several liability and at the same time recognized its continuing existence. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 425. Also, as part of Public Act 89 — 7, the legislature enacted section 3.5 of the Contribution Act, which codified the Kotecki decision and provided that an employer’s contribution liability would be capped at an amount equal to the employer’s workers’ compensation liability. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 416. We recognized a potential conflict with the simultaneous enactment of this section and amended section 2 — 1117 because there would never be a reason to seek contribution if defendants were only severally liable for a plaintiffs damages. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 416-18. Ultimately, however, this court never determined whether these conflicts could be resolved because we held that section 3.5 of the Contribution Act and amended section 2 — 1117 were both facially invalid — section 3.5 because of internal inconsistencies and amended section 2 — 1117 because it was passed in violation of the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 416-33.

Defendant’s reliance on Best is misplaced. The potential conflicts we identified there are simply not present between original section 2 — 1117 and the Contribution Act. Section 2 — 1117 retains full joint and several liability for all past and future medical expenses. Further, the act retains full joint and several liability for those whose percentage of fault for the plaintiffs injuries is 25% or greater. Joint and several liability is abrogated in favor of several liability only for those defendants whose percentage of fault is less than 25%. Thus, the Contribution Act and section 2 — 1117 are not in conflict. That those defendants whose percentage of fault is less than 25% will not need to avail themselves of the Contribution Act does not mean that the statutes conflict.

IV Conflict With the Purpose of Joint and Several Liability

Plaintiffs next contend that section 2 — 1117 conflicts with “the purposes of joint and several liability.” Plaintiffs’ argument is based on Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104 (1983), and dicta from Best. Plaintiffs argue that in Coney and Best this court recognized certain policies supporting the retention of joint and several liability. Neither of these decisions, however, intimate that the legislature cannot make a policy decision in favor of modifying joint and several liability. In Coney, the issue was whether our adoption of comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1 (1981), required us to abandon joint and several liability. We noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions that had adopted comparative negligence have retained joint and several liability. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 120-21. We recognized certain policy justifications for retaining joint and several liability and concluded that our adoption of comparative negligence did not require us to abandon joint and several liability. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 121-24. In Best, we discussed the purpose of joint and several liability and quoted extensively from Coney. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 426-29. This discussion arose in the context of considering whether the defendants’ justifications for the legislature’s complete abolition of joint and several liability in favor of proportional several liability were at odds with our understanding of joint and several liability. However, we never resolved this question because we decided that amended section 2 — 1117 was passed in violation of the Illinois Constitution’s special legislation clause. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 429.

Plaintiffs’ argument on this point is not entirely clear. The legislature’s intent in passing the statute was to modify the common law rule of joint and several liability. The legislature maintained joint and several liability, but modified it with respect to payment of nonmedical damages by those less than 25% at fault. The plaintiffs’ argument begs the question of whether the legislature can modify joint and several liability. Plaintiffs have cited no authority for the proposition that such a change is not the legislature’s prerogative. In both of the above decisions, we recognized certain policies in favor of joint and several liability. We did not hold that no policies supported modifying the rule or that the legislature is powerless to act in this area. Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that section 2 — 1117 is invalid on this basis.

V. Arbitrary Ehmination of a Common Law Remedy

Plaintiffs next argue that section 2 — 1117 is unconstitutional as an arbitrary abolition of an established common law remedy. Plaintiffs rely on article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that “[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12. However, we have held repeatedly that this constitutional provision is merely an expression of philosophy and not a mandate that a certain remedy be provided in any specific form. Segers v. Industrial Comm’n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 435 (2000); DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57, 72 (1992); Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277 (1972).

Further, any suggestion that Marlin has not found a certain remedy in the law for all injuries and wrongs which he received to his person is not well-taken. A jury found Nogle 99% responsible for Marlin’s work-related accident. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Marlin applied for and received worker’s compensation benefits. In Kotecki, we noted that the central concept behind worker’s compensation is that “ ‘the employer and employee receive the benefits of a guaranteed, fixed-schedule, non-fault recovery system, which then constitutes the exclusive liability of the employer to his employee.’ ” Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162-63, quoting Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 119-20, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977). Here, Marlin received the benefit of the no-fault workers’ compensation system when he applied for and received his benefits. Additionally, a jury assessed his tort damages and found that Kraft was 1% responsible. Kraft was jointly and severally liable for Marlin’s medical damages and severally liable for 1% of his nonmedical damages. Thus, Marlin’s “certain remedy” in this case is that his employer paid his workers’ compensation benefits, all of his past and future medical expenses will be paid, and Kraft will pay its proportionate share of the nonmedical damages. Plaintiffs’ argument suggests that anything less than full payment of workers’ compensation benefits and full payment of a tort judgment by a 1% responsible defendant is not a “certain remedy” for all injuries and wrongs suffered by Marlin. We cannot agree. The legislature did not arbitrarily abolish a remedy in section 2 — 1117, as plaintiffs suggest. Rather, the legislature merely determined how judgments would be paid and determined that minimally responsible defendants should not be required to pay entire judgments.

VI. Special Legislation and Equal Protection

Plaintiffs next contend that section 2 — 1117 violates both the special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV § 13) and equal protection (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) clauses of the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiffs claim that the legislature created an invalid classification when it enacted sections 2 — 1117 and 2 — 1118 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

As we noted, section 2 — 1117 preserves the common law rule of joint and several liability for medical damages and for all other damages for those found to be 25% or more at fault for a plaintiff’s injuries. The statute replaced joint and several liability with several liability with respect to nonmedical damages for those found less than 25% responsible for a plaintiff’s injuries. Section 2 — 1118 exempts two classes of defendants from section 2 — 1117. Defendants in medical malpractice cases and defendants in actions in which the injury was caused by the “discharge into the environment of any pollutant, including any waste, hazardous substance, irritant or contaminant, including, but not limited to smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, asbestos, toxic or corrosive chemicals, radioactive waste or mine tailings, and including any such material intended to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.” (Hereinafter referred to as toxic tort cases.) 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1118 (West 1994).²

Plaintiffs contend that the legislature created an arbitrary and invalid classification when it retained full joint and several liability for bodily injury or property damage only in toxic tort and medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs argue that they are directly harmed by the classification because if Marlin’s injury would have been caused by a 1% responsible toxic tort or medical malpractice defendant, plaintiffs could have recovered all of their damages from that defendant. Because Kraft does not fall into one of those classifications, plaintiffs can recover only 1% of their nonmedical damages from Kraft.

All statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the party challenging the statute bears the burden of clearly rebutting this presumption. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57-58 (2001). The constitutionality of a statute is a purely legal question; thus, our review is de novo. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 31 (2001).

The special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 391. However, the legislature has broad discretion in making statutory classifications, and the clause prohibits only those which are arbitrary. In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510, 519 (2002). In other words, the clause prevents legislative classifications that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound and reasonable basis. Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d at 519. The special legislation clause supplements the equal protection clause, which prohibits arbitrary discrimination against a person or class. Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1988). When a legislative classification neither affects fundamental rights nor makes a suspect classification, the statute is reviewed under the rational basis test. Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d at 520. Under this test, the statute is constitutional if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Bilyk, 125 Ill. 2d at 236. If the court can reasonably conceive of circumstances that justify distinguishing the class that the statute benefits from the class outside its scope, the classification is constitutional. In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995).

Here, plaintiffs concede that the appropriate test is the rational basis test. Plaintiffs argue that there is no conceivable rational basis for treating plaintiffs in toxic tort and medical malpractice cases differently than other plaintiffs.

The reason for the classification is not apparent from the face of the statute. Consequently, we have undertaken a comprehensive review of the legislative history of Public Act 84 — 1431 (Pub. Act 84 — 1431, eff. November 25, 1986), which added sections 2 — 1117 and 2 — 1118 to the Code of Civil Procedure. These sections were enacted as part of a larger bill that addressed a perceived insurance crisis in the state. Public Act 84 — 1431 was entitled, “An act in relation to the insurance crisis.” Speaking in support of the legislation, Representative Greiman explained that:

“Early in this year and in the late days of last year, it became apparent to people all across this country that there was a problem in the accessibility of insurance in some lines and the affordability of commercial lines everywhere. *** And so, we came to this Legislature to see if we could develop a balanced piece of legislation that would make insurance affordable for Illinois businesses, for Illinois people, and accessible to us, so that some of the excesses of the civil justice system might be addressed, so that customers of insurance companies might have a fair and reasonable time after they have been cancelled or non-renewed, to go into the marketplace and secure substituted insurance.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 5-6 (statements of Representative Greiman).

Public Act 84 — 1431 made extensive amendments to the Illinois Insurance Code. Additionally, the legislation amended the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1 — 101 et seq. (West 2000)) to expand the scope of immunities provided to local public entities. See Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 509 (1997) (explaining that Public Act 84 — 1431 expanded immunities afforded to local public entities in an effort to reduce the cost of their liability insurance). Public Act 84 — 1431 also made several amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, including adding sections 2 — 1117 and 2 — 1118. Section 2 — 1117 modified joint and several liability for those found less than 25% responsible. Representative Greiman explained the exceptions to the rule as follows:

“We made three exceptions to that [25%] rule. We said there should be no medically indigent in this state, and that if you are ... and for medical bills, medical expenses, defendants are jointly and severally liable. We said that for environmental cases, because so often there are hundreds of defendants that may, in fact, cause an environmental danger, joint and several remains. And finally, we said because the Medical Malpractice Act was just passed last year, we should see how that works, and we should not touch that. And so, we excluded the healing arts from that.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 9 (statements of Representative Greiman).

The above explanation is the only reference in the legislative debates to the exemption for toxic tort cases. Nevertheless, we find that statement sufficient to discern a rational basis for the exception. The legislature apparently believed that the numbers of defendants involved in toxic tort cases would make the abolition of joint and several liability unduly burdensome on such plaintiffs. Representative Greiman explained that hundreds of defendants can contribute to an environmental injury. Apparently, the legislature was concerned that with this many potentially responsible defendants, the modification of joint and several liability would mean that a plaintiff would have to file suit against scores of defendants in order to have a chance at a complete recovery. This explanation is a rational reason for treating toxic tort cases differently, and plaintiffs have not argued that such a distinction is invalid. Accordingly, we believe that the legislature had a rational basis for exempting toxic tort cases from section 2 — 1117.

Plaintiffs rely on Best in arguing that the exception for medical malpractice cases is without a rational basis. In Best, we considered a similar argument as it related to amended section 2 — 1117. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 429-33. The amended version of 2 — 1117 provided for complete proportional several liability. However, subsection (b) of that section provided that:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), in any healing art malpractice action based on negligence or wrongful death, any defendants found liable shall be jointly and severally liable if the limitations on non-economic damages in Section 2 — 1115.1 of this Act are for any reason deemed or found to be invalid.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1117(b) (West 1996).

Earlier in the Best opinion, we had held that section 2 — 1115.1 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1115.1 (West 1996)) was invalid. Thus, section 2 — 1117(b) was activated. We held that section 2 — 1117(b) violated the special legislation clause because it arbitrarily benefitted only medical malpractice plaintiffs. The defendants in that case had failed to demonstrate a “discernable rational basis for treating medical malpractice plaintiffs differently from other plaintiffs in death, bodily injury and property damage cases.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 432. We further concluded that section 2 — 1117(b) was directly contrary to the stated purpose of Public Act 89 — 7, which stated in its preamble that “ ‘it is the public policy of this State that a defendant should not be liable for damages in excess of its proportional share of fault.’ ” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 432, quoting Pub. Act 89 — 7, Preamble, eff. March 9, 1995.

We disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that Best is controlling. Unlike with the amended version of section 2 — 1117, we find that the legislature had a rational basis for excluding medical malpractice cases from the 25% rule in the original version of section 2 — 1117. As set forth above, Representative Greiman explained that joint and several liability was preserved in medical malpractice cases because the legislature had recently passed medical malpractice legislation and wanted to see how the legislation worked before making other changes. Representative Greiman further explained this point in response to a question from Representative Davis about the medical malpractice exemption:

“What we have said is, that last year we dealt with healing arts and with the Liability of healing arts. The Supreme Court of Illinois has suggested that that is a separate classification. We thought it would be inappropriate to interfere in what we did last year and to see how it’s working. We cannot ... part of it is predictability, Mr. Davis, and if we change the law on them every year, then we would destroy the essence of predictability.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1986, at 38-39 (statements of Representative Greiman).

The legislation to which Representative Greiman referred was Public Act 84 — 7 (Pub. Act 84 — 7, eff. August 15, 1985), which made several amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, all of which were aimed at medical malpractice litigation. The purpose of Public Act 84 — 7 was to respond to what was perceived to be a crisis in the area of medical malpractice. Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 63; Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 229 (1986). The legislature’s intent was to “reduce the burdens existing in the health professions as a result of the perceived malpractice crisis.” Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 252. Some of the changes the legislation made in the area of healing art malpractice cases were (1) the establishment of review panels, which would make determinations as to liability and damages before a healing art malpractice plaintiff could go to trial (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2 — 1012 through 2 — 1020)³; (2) allowing periodic payment of certain damages (Ill. Rev Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2 — 1701 through 2 — 1719); (3) modification of the collateral source rule to allow negligence judgments against physicians or hospitals to be reduced by up to one-half for benefits received from collateral sources (Ill. Rev Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1205); (4) prohibiting punitive damage awards in healing art malpractice cases (Ill. Rev Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1115); (5) establishment of a sliding scale of the allowable fees that an attorney may charge in representing a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1114); (6) abolishing the special injury requirement in malicious prosecution suits arising out of healing art malpractice suits (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 114); and (7) requiring a plaintiff, prior to filing a medical malpractice action, to obtain a certificate from a qualified health professional certifying that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing the action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 622).

Given all of the changes that the legislature made in the area of medical malpractice litigation the previous year, we believe that the legislature’s decision to exempt medical malpractice defendants from section 2 — 1117 was rational. The legislature was not acting arbitrarily. Rather, the legislature’s decision to see how Public Act 84 — 7 was working in practice before making any additional changes to this area of the law was reasonable. Also, it is noteworthy that the changes made in Public Act 84 — 7 were beneficial to medical malpractice defendants and detrimental to medical malpractice plaintiffs. Thus, when the legislature conferred a benefit on other defendants in section 2 — 1117, it was rational for it to exempt medical malpractice defendants, the one class of defendants for whom the legislature had implemented numerous favorable changes in the law the year before.

In Bernier and Miller, this court upheld several sections of Public Act 84 — 7 against special legislation challenges. In Bernier, we rejected special legislation challenges to the provisions of Public Act 84 — 7 that (1) permitted periodic payment of damage settlements (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 238-39); (2) modified the collateral source rule (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 242-43); (3) abolished punitive damages (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 245-47); and (4) provided for a sliding scale for contingent fee awards (Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 252-53). In Miller, we upheld the sections of Public Act 84 — 7 that (1) eliminated the special injury requirement in malicious prosecution suits by medical malpractice defendants (Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 60-68); and (2) required a potential plaintiff to get an affidavit from a qualified health professional certifying the merits of the cause of action (Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 64-65). We noted that the legislature was responding to a perceived crisis in the area of medical malpractice litigation and had chosen rational means to address the problem. Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 62-68; Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234-53. If the legislature had a rational basis for placing these additional burdens on medical malpractice plaintiffs, we believe that it likewise had a rational basis for exempting these plaintiffs from the additional burdens placed on other plaintiffs in section 2 — 1117. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the legislature arbitrarily conferred a benefit on medical malpractice plaintiffs by exempting them from section 2 — 1117 is not well-taken. Rather, the legislature acted rationally in not further burdening medical malpractice plaintiffs after passing extensive legislation the previous year that burdened medical malpractice plaintiffs but no others.

Further, unlike in Best, we do not believe that the medical malpractice exemption was diametrically opposed to the purposes of the public act that implemented it. As stated, the purpose of Public Act 84 — 1431 was to relieve a perceived insurance crisis in the state and to attempt to reduce insurance premiums. Section 2 — 1117’s modification of the joint and several liability rule was part of the attempt to resolve this problem. However, having recently taken steps to reduce medical malpractice premiums, it was not arbitrary for the legislature to conclude that no further action in that area was required. As Representative Greiman explained, the legislature wished to see how the previous legislation was working before making additional changes. This was not arbitrary and was, indeed, entirely reasonable.

Plaintiffs also suggest that section 2 — 1117 creates invalid classifications because it applies only to “actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability.” Plaintiffs contend that there is no rational basis for modifying the common law rule of joint and several liability only as to these actions, and that defendants in other types of tort cases are still jointly and severally liable. However, as noted above, the legislature’s intent in passing Public Act 84 — 1431 was to resolve a perceived insurance crisis in the state, and the legislature was trying to find ways to reduce insurance premiums. Generally, liability insurance is purchased to provide coverage for claims of bodily injury or property damage caused by the insured. Thus, plaintiffs have not shown that the legislature acted arbitrarily in limiting section 2 — 1117 to cases of bodily injury, death, or property damage arising from negligence or product liability based on strict tort liability.

VII. Separation of Powers

Plaintiffs next contend, in a two-sentence argument, that section 2 — 1117 is unconstitutional under the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1) because it amounts to a mandatory arbitrary legislative remittitur, thus invading on the province of the judiciary to exercise its discretionary powers of remittitur on a case-by-case basis. Plaintiffs rely on Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 410-15, in which we held that section 2 — 1115.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was an unconstitutional legislative remittitur. That section placed a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in actions seeking damages for death, bodily injury, or property damage based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory. We held that the cap invaded the judiciary’s prerogative of “determining whether a jury’s assessment of damages is excessive within the meaning of the law.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 414.

Plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. Section 2 — 1117 is simply not a legislative remittitur. Unlike section 2 — 1115.1, which set an arbitrary cap on noneconomic damages, section 2 — 1117 merely determines when a defendant can be held liable for the full amount of a jury’s verdict and when a defendant is liable only in an amount equal to his or her percentage of fault. Section 2 — 1117 does not reduce the amount of the jury’s verdict.

VIII. Vagueness

Plaintiffs next contend that section 2 — 1117 violates the due process guarantee of article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) because it is so vague, indefinite, and uncertain, that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning. A legislative act that is so vague, indefinite and uncertain that the courts are unable, by accepted rules of construction, to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty what the legislature intended will be declared to be void. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 163 (1998). When faced with a vagueness challenge to a statute, a court considers not only the language used, but also the legislative objective and the evil the statute is designed to remedy. R.W. Dunteman Co., 181 Ill. 2d at 163.

Plaintiffs base their vagueness challenge on two main points. First, that courts have reached different conclusions as to how section 2 — 1117 should be applied, and second, that its meaning cannot be discerned when it is considered in conjunction with the Contribution Act. We disagree on both points.

When, construing section 2 — 1117, it is not difficult to determine “with any reasonable degree of certainty what the legislature intended.” R.W. Dunteman Co., 181 Ill. 2d at 163. The legislature intended to provide that minimally culpable defendants should not be responsible for entire judgments and set forth clear rules for how that policy would be implemented. That various courts have interpreted section 2 — 1117 differently does not mean that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. If that were the test, few statutes would remain on the books. Further, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because one can imagine hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms might be called into question. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 425 (1997). Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ suggestion that section 2 — 1117 is vague because it conflicts with the Contribution Act. We have already determined above that there is no conflict. However, we note again that plaintiffs are misreading section 4 of the Contribution Act. Plaintiffs claim incorrectly that section 4 contains a “guarantee of joint and several liability.” As we set forth above, that section is merely a clarification that nothing in the Contribution Act is intended to affect a plaintiff’s right to recover all of his or her damages from any responsible defendant. This is neither a “guarantee” of joint and several liability nor a statement that nothing in the Illinois Compiled Statutes modifies joint and several liability. We reject plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge.

IX. Jury Instruction

The final point raised by plaintiffs is that the trial court erred in refusing to give Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 180.19 (1995) and in refusing to answer the jurors’ questions. Plaintiffs support these points with a six-sentence argument that merely summarizes the contentions and then ends by saying, “As the dissent below indicates, that failure constituted reversible error.” Plaintiffs did not attempt to develop an argument in support of these points with citations to the record and supporting legal authority. Their reliance on the reasoning of the appellate court dissent is no help, as the dissent’s only comment on this issue was, “I do, however, believe the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury after the jury submitted questions. All questions should have been answered. The trial court should also have given IPI Civil (1995) No. 180.19.” 325 Ill. App. 3d at 598 (Myerscough, J., dissenting). Plaintiffs’ argument thus violates Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), which requires that the argument contain “the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Accordingly, we deem the argument waived.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we hold that the appellate court properly determined that Marlin’s employer could be considered in the division of fault under section 2 — 1117. Lilly v. Marcal Rope & Rigging, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 1105 (1997), which held to the contrary, is overruled. Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that section 2 — 1117 in unconstitutional. We thus affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Affirmed.

JUSTICES CARMAN and RARICK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 This section was amended in 1995 by Public Act 89 — 7 to provide for complete proportional several liability. However, this court declared Public Act 89 — 7 (Pub. Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995) unconstitutional in its entirety in Best, 179 Ill. 2d 367. The effect of Best was to leave the law in force as it was before the adoption of the amendment. See People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1990).

2 This section was repealed as part of Public Act 89 — 7. As noted previously, our decision in Best, which held that Public Act 89 — 7 was unconstitutional in its entirety, had the effect of reinstating this section. See Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 390.

3 These sections were held unconstitutional in Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 230-34.