Opinion issued May 17, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00266-CV ——————————— UNOCAL PIPELINE COMPANY, Appellant V. BP PIPELINES (ALASKA) INC., CONOCO PHILLIPS TRANSPORTATION ALASKA, INC., AND EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO., Appellees
On Appeal from the 165th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2013-06244A
OPINION
Appellant, Unocal Pipeline Company (“Unocal”), filed a suit for declaratory
judgment seeking resolution of controversies arising from its withdrawal from the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and the accompanying Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Agreement. Unocal and the appellees, BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc., Conoco
Phillips Transportation Alaska, Inc., and ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. (“the
Remaining Owners”) filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding
interpretation of the transfer provisions in the agreement. On appeal, Unocal argues
that the trial court erred in its construction of the transfer provisions in the
agreement and in concluding that other portions of the dispute were not ripe.
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render in part and remand in part.
Background
In 1970, a group of oil companies including the Remaining Owners and
Unocal or their corporate predecessors entered into a series of agreements for the
purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System (“TAPS”) for bringing oil from the Prudhoe Bay area of Alaska to the City
of Valdez, Alaska. The parties first procured a series of lease agreements with the
United States, the State of Alaska, and private individuals to secure easements and
rights-of-way for constructing TAPS. The parties agree that, specifically relevant
to the present dispute, the right-of-way agreement with the United States
government provided for a dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirement
(“DR&R obligation”):
[U]pon the completion of use of all, or a very substantial part, of the Right-of-Way . . . Permittees shall promptly remove all improvements and equipment, except as otherwise approved in writing by the Authorized Officer, and shall restore the land to a condition that is
2 satisfactory to the Authorized Officer or at the option of Permittees pay the cost of such removal and restoration.”
Additionally, the leases, including the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Agreement itself,
generally contain obligations for dismantling and removing the pipeline and
restoring the land to some extent.
The federal right-of-way lease also contains provisions governing transfers
of the rights and obligations under the right-of-way. Section 22 of that lease
provides that the “Permittees,” including Unocal, cannot transfer any of their
interests under the lease without obtaining prior written consent from the
government and that, to obtain such consent, the transferee must demonstrate that
it is capable of performing all of the liabilities and obligations of the transferor
relating to the interest to be transferred. Section 22.G provides:
A Permittee seeking to be divested in whole or in part of its right, title, and interest in and to the Right-of-Way and this Agreement in connection with a Transfer shall be released from its liabilities and obligations (accrued, contingent, or otherwise) to the United States under this Agreement to the extent and limit that the Transferee assumes unconditionally the performance and observance of each such liability and obligation, provided:
(1) All provisions of this Agreement with respect to the approval or disapproval of the Transfer have been fully complied with to the satisfaction of the Secretary;
(2) The Secretary has consented in writing to the Transfer; and
(3) Thereafter the Transfer and the attendant assumption agreement, if any, are in fact duly consummated on the basis of
3 the documents previously presented to the Secretary for his review, and the Secretary is so notified in writing by the parties to the Transfer.
Subsequently, in 1970, the parties entered into an agreement governing the
design, construction, ownership, maintenance, and expansion of TAPS (the “TAPS
Agreement”). Relevant to the dispute here, Article III of the TAPS Agreement
addressed the ownership of TAPS. Section 3.1 provides that
TAPS (including but not limited to all fee titles, easements, leases, permits, rights-of-way and other interest in land) shall be owned by the Parties hereto with each Party’s undivided interest in TAPS . . . being equal to its percentage of ownership (“Percentage of Ownership”) in TAPS as set forth [in this section].
Section 3.4 sets out ownership of Record Title to certain land rights, providing,
All land rights, including but not limited to fee titles, easements, leases, permits, rights-of-way and other interests in land, required for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of TAPS shall be conveyed to or acquired for the Parties. . . . All instruments and conveyances evidencing such land rights or the trust instruments relating thereto shall indicate each Party’s respective interest therein which interest will be the Party’s Percentage of Ownership as it appears in [this section].
Article VII of the TAPS Agreement governs transfers of interest in TAPS.
Section 7.2 provides for a preferential right to purchase, stating that
An OWNER may sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any part of its undivided interest in TAPS but only by a sale for cash and only after offering such interest to all other OWERNS who are hereby granted the preferential right to purchase such interest (but not a lesser or different interest) on the same terms offered by or to any bona fide, prospective purchaser, who is ready, willing and able to purchase same.
4 It then sets out the mechanism for effectuating the preferential right of purchase. It
provides, in relevant part:
If more than one OWNER desires to join in the purchase of such interest then, unless otherwise agreed by the purchasing OWNERS, all such OWNERS shall purchase the same proportionately in the ratio that their Percentage of Ownership in TAPS prior to said purchase bear to each other.
Section 7.8 governs transfers to successors and assigns. It provides, in
relevant part:
Any transfer of an undivided interest in TAPS shall be subject to this Agreement and shall require the transferee to assume all of the obligations of an “OWNER” and a Party under this Agreement and all commitments made pursuant hereto and its proportionate part of all costs and expenses of TAPS. Any such transferee shall be deemed to be an OWNER and a Party under this Agreement upon (i) the execution by such transferee of a Ratification Agreement confirming and adopting this Agreement and (ii) the execution of an Enabling Agreement by a Parent Corporation, if any, of such transferee.
Article VIII of the TAPS Agreement sets out the term of the Agreement,
including the discontinuance of operation by a party. It states that the original term
was for thirty years, to be followed by five-year renewal terms. The original term
began July 31, 1977, and ran until July 31, 2007.
Section 8.1 states, “If, at the end of any Agreement Term, less than two
Parties desire to continue operations hereunder, this Agreement shall terminate.”
Section 8.2 provides for the “Discontinuance of Operations by One or More
Parties,” and its provisions apply “[i]f at the expiration of any Agreement Term,
5 any one or more of the Parties hereto desire to discontinue operations hereunder
and any two Parties hereto desire to continue operations hereunder[.]” Section
8.2(b) sets out the notice requirements. Section 8.2(c) provides:
Upon the completion of all transfers and undivided interests in TAPS, the Parties desiring to continue operations hereunder shall formally amend Table I in Section 3.1 of this Agreement [setting out percentages of ownership interests] to reflect the Percentages of Ownership in TAPS each has acquired from the Party or Parties desiring to discontinue operations.
Section 8.2(d), entitled “Rights of Parties—Determination of Salvage
Value” provides:
The Parties desiring to continue operations hereunder may do so following the applicable Agreement Term, but the Party or Parties who have elected not to continue operation hereunder shall not be charged with any part of the expenses, costs and liabilities thereafter incurred in the operation, maintenance and repair of TAPS except as provided in subsection (f) hereof, and such Party or Parties discontinuing operations hereunder shall not be entitled to accept any further tenders of shipment. All Parties owning an interest in TAPS shall endeavor mutually to agree within sixty (60) days after termination of the applicable Agreement Term, upon the reasonable net salvage value of the TAPS properties, including transferable interest in land, material, equipment and all other items of value (herein called “Net Salvage Value”), and if such Parties are unable to mutually agree upon such salvage value within the time fixed, then the matter shall be submitted to arbitration, using the procedure set forth in Section 11.1 hereof.
Section 11.1, entitled “Arbitration Procedure,” applies whenever “[a]
determination of Net Salvage Value” pursuant to Subsection (d) of Section 8.2 is to
be made. In that event, “within ten (10) days after it has been determined that the
6 Parties cannot mutually agree upon the Net Salvage Value, the Party or Parties
desiring to discontinue operations shall select one arbitrator and the Parties
desiring to continue operations hereunder shall select another arbitrator.” Those
arbitrators then select a third. Section 11.1 further provides:
It shall be the duty of the arbitrators promptly to arrive at a decision as to Net Salvage Value or Salable Value, as the case may be, and the decision of any two of said arbitrators in writing shall be binding upon all Parties hereto.
Section 8.2(e), entitled “Conveyance to Parties Desiring to Continue
Operations,” provides:
Upon establishing the Net Salvage Value as above provided, the Parties desiring to continue operations shall pay to the Party or Parties desiring to discontinue operations its or their proper proportion of such Net Salvage Value (such proper proportion being determined as to each Party desiring to discontinue operations hereunder by multiplying such Party’s Percentage of Ownership times the Net Salvage Value) and upon receipt of such payment, such Party or Parties shall convey to the purchasing Parties all of its or their interest in TAPS and all rights in connection therewith. Such conveyance shall contain a special warranty of title, shall be made subject to this Agreement and shall require the transferees to assume the obligations accruing under this Agreement subsequent to the last day of the Agreement Term during which such Party or Parties made the election to discontinue operations hereunder as to the interest covered thereby, each transferee severally assuming such obligations insofar as they relate to the interest acquired by it. . . .
Section 8.2(f) provides for a sale to a third party in lieu of acceptance of the Net
Salvage Value.
7 Section 8.3 provides for the disposition of properties upon termination of the
TAPS Agreement. It provides, in relevant part, “Upon termination of this
Agreement, TAPS shall be either continued in operation by the Parties under a new
agreement, sold in place for continued operation or salvage by others, or salvaged
by the Parties as they may agree unanimously.”
The parties also entered into an operating agreement in 1977 which
expressly integrated the TAPS Agreement, stating “This Operating Agreement and
the TAPS Agreement constitute the entire agreement between Owners as to the
design, construction, ownership, expansion, operation and maintenance of the
System.” (“TAPS Operating Agreement”). Section 13 of the TAPS Operating
Agreement provides:
Successors and Assigns. Owners agree with each other that so long as this Operating Agreement remains in force and effect, all sales or other transfers or assignments of interests in the System must be made pursuant to the provisions of the TAPS Agreement and shall be made subject to this Operating Agreement. All obligations and liabilities of the selling Owner shall be assumed by the purchaser in the same manner as obligations and liabilities under the TAPS Agreement. Such purchaser shall be required to execute a ratification of this Operating Agreement and shall thereafter be one of the Owners hereunder for all purposes contemplated by this Operating Agreement. The rights, duties and responsibilities of Operator under this Operating Agreement shall not be assignable without the consent of all Owners except as herein expressly authorized.
Pursuant to section 8.1 of the TAPS Agreement, Unocal gave notice of its
intent to withdraw from TAPS at the end of the Agreement Term ending July 31,
8 2012. After it issued its withdrawal notice, the Remaining Owners elected to
continue without Unocal. However, Unocal was unable to complete its withdrawal
due to disputes between it and the Remaining Owners regarding key aspects of the
TAPS Agreement. These included the inability to agree upon the Net Salvage
Value (“NSV”) of Unocal’s undivided interest in TAPS; a dispute over the intent
of the TAPS Agreement with respect to whether the DR&R obligation in the
rights-of-way agreements subject to the TAPS Agreement transfer to the
Remaining Owners or remain with the withdrawing owner; and a dispute over
whether Unocal is required to pay the Remaining Owners its portion of the NSV if
the value is negative.
To receive a release from the United States and Alaska for its proportionate
share of the DR&R obligation outlined in the rights-of-way agreements, Unocal
filed a declaratory judgment suit seeking a declaration that when it ceases
operations and reverts its ownership to the Remaining Owners, it also transfers the
DR&R obligation. Unocal also sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
construction of section 8.2(e) of the TAPS Agreement, which it calls the “shall
pay” provision. It sought a declaration that section 8.2(e) provides for the
Remaining Owners to pay it in the event of a positive NSV, but no payment is
required by either party in the event of a negative NSV.
9 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on this issue, and the
trial court granted the Remaining Owners’ motion. It determined that the TAPS
Agreement does not transfer to the Remaining Owners or require the Remaining
Owners to assume the DR&R obligation undertaken by Unocal in the right-of-way
leases. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the
Remaining Owners on the “shall pay” claim, reasoning that the issue was not ripe
because the NSV of Unocal’s interest in TAPS had not yet been determined. It
dismissed Unocal’s declaratory judgment claim on that issue for want of
jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
A. Summary Judgment
We review the trial court’s grant of a summary judgment de novo. Tex. Mun.
Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007);
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To prevail on
a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant bears the burden of proving
that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc.
v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).
When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the
trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review both parties’
10 summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented. Dorsett, 164
S.W.3d at 661; FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872
(Tex. 2000). Each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. City of Santa Fe v. Boudreaux, 256 S.W.3d 819, 822
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)
(“The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if . . . there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other
response.”). If we determine that the trial court erred, we render the judgment that
the trial court should have rendered. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661; FM Props., 22
S.W.3d at 872. If the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for its
summary judgment ruling, we affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories
presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. See
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).
B. Declaratory Judgment
Declaratory judgments rendered by summary judgment are reviewed under
the same standards that govern summary judgments generally. Hourani v. Katzen,
305 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). Under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”), a person whose rights, status,
or other legal relations are affected by a statute or contract may have a court
11 determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and
may obtain a declaration of his rights under that instrument. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 2015); Guthery v. Taylor, 112 S.W.3d 715,
720 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). We review declaratory
judgments under the same standards used for other judgments and decrees and look
to the procedure used to resolve the issue at trial to determine the appropriate
appellate standard of review. Guthery, 112 S.W.3d at 720; see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.010 (Vernon 2015) (“All orders, judgments, and
decrees under this chapter may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and
decrees.”). Because, in this case, the trial court resolved the case on competing
summary judgment motions, we review the propriety of the trial court’s denial of
the declaratory judgment under the same standards we apply to the summary
judgments. See Guthery, 112 S.W.3d at 720.
C. Contracts
We construe written contracts to give effect to the parties’ intent expressed
in the text of the contract “as understood in light of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the contract’s execution, subject to the limitations of the parol-
evidence rule.” Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, 440 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. 2014) (citing
Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d
462, 469 (Tex. 2011)). We construe the parties’ intentions as expressed in the
12 document, considering the entire writing and attempting to harmonize and give
effect to all of the contract’s provisions with reference to the whole agreement.
Frost Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311–12 (Tex. 2005).
“We construe contracts ‘from a utilitarian standpoint bearing in mind the particular
business activity sought to be served’ and ‘will avoid when possible and proper a
construction which is unreasonable, inequitable, and oppressive.’” Id. at 312;
accord Ace Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 59 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). If, after the rules of construction are
applied, the contract can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, it is
unambiguous and we construe it as a matter of law. Frost Nat’l Bank, 165 S.W.3d
at 312.
Summary Judgment on Assumption of Unocal’s DR&R Obligation
In its first and second issues, Unocal argues that the trial court erred in
determining that the Remaining Owners were not required to assume Unocal’s
DR&R obligation. It argues that the trial court should have denied the Remaining
Owners’ motion for summary judgment on this issue and granted its own summary
judgment seeking a declaration that the TAPS Agreement unambiguously requires
the Remaining Owners to assume unconditionally the obligations to perform or pay
for the DR&R of TAPS arising their acquisition of Unocal’s undivided interest in
TAPS.
13 Specifically, Unocal argues that section 8.3 of the TAPS Agreement
expressly contemplates incorporation of the DR&R obligation from the rights-of-
way agreements by providing for salvage at the termination of the TAPS
Agreement. It also argues that section 7.8 of the TAPS Agreement, which provides
that “in any transfer, all obligations must transfer with the interest,” applies here.
The Remaining Owners argue, to the contrary, that Texas law requires that the
DR&R obligation must “be located somewhere within the TAPS Agreement itself”
in order to require that they assume that obligation as part of the transfer of
Unocal’s interest. They assert that the DR&R obligations are not part of the TAPS
Agreement but were “created in separate Right-of-Way leases that are not named
in the TAPS Agreement, much less ‘plainly referenced’ with the specificity that
Texas law demands.”
We conclude that the Remaining Owners’ argument ignores the basic nature
of the owner’s interest in TAPS, as set out in section 3.1 of the TAPS Agreement
and in section 13.1 of the TAPS Operating Agreement incorporated therein, and
the TAPS Agreement’s provisions regarding the calculation of the NSV and the
allocation of salvage operations to the owners upon termination of the TAPS
Agreement.
Under the terms of the TAPS Agreement, the paragraph governing the
dispute between the parties here is section 8.2(e), addressing conveyance of a
14 withdrawing owner’s interest in TAPS to parties desiring to continue operations.
Under Section 8.2(e), when a party desires to discontinue operations, as Unocal is
seeking to do here, the parties must establish the NSV. Unocal’s undivided interest
in TAPS cannot be transferred to the Remaining Owners until that is done and the
necessary payment is made. Then, section 8.2(e) provides that Unocal, as the
withdrawing party, “shall convey to the purchasing Parties all of its . . . interest in
TAPS and all rights in connection therewith.”
Section 3.1 of the TAPS Agreement provides that the Owners own an
undivided interest in TAPS, including an interest in “all fee titles, easements,
leases, permits, rights-of-way and other interests in land, required for the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of TAPS,” with each party’s interest
being equal to its percentage of ownership in TAPS. The federal right-of-way
agreement containing the DR&R obligation is an interest in land. Thus, pursuant to
section 3.1, the right-of-way is owned by the Owners in common, with each
Owner’s share being proportionate to its share of the entire value of TAPS as set
out in Article III of the TAPS Agreement.
The rights-of-way were essential to the creation of TAPS, and the TAPS
Agreement recognizes this by providing, in section 3.1, that “TAPS (including but
not limited to all fee titles, easements, leases, permits, rights-of-way and other
interest in land) shall be owned by the Parties hereto with each Party’s undivided
15 interest in TAPS . . . being equal to its percentage of ownership (“Percentage of
Ownership”) in TAPS as set forth [in this section].” (Emphasis added). The TAPS
Agreement likewise provides that a transfer pursuant to section 8.2(e) transfers “all
of [the withdrawing party’s] interest in TAPS and all rights in connection
therewith.” The property rights conveyed in the federal right-of-way cannot be
separated from the accompanying obligations and must be transferred with the
TAPS interest, pursuant to the TAPS Agreement’s plain language. This reading is
confirmed by section 7.8 which provides for the transfer of all “obligations” of the
withdrawing owner as well as all rights. In addition, section 8.3 contemplates the
division of salvage costs among the Owners upon termination of the TAPS
Agreement unless some other agreement takes its place, necessarily implying that
the Owners at the time of termination will share salvage costs pro rata.
Specifically, section 8.3(d) of the TAPS Agreement provides that when the NSV of
the withdrawing Owner’s pro rata share in TAPS has been determined and paid,
Unocal, as the withdrawing party, must “convey to the purchasing Parties all of
its . . . interest in TAPS and all rights in connection therewith.”
This reading is further confirmed by section 8.2 of the TAPS Agreement.
Sections 8.2(d) and (e) expressly provide for the determination of the NSV of the
withdrawing party’s interest at the time of the party’s withdrawal. And they
contemplate the exchange of money based on that NSV in exchange for transfer to
16 the purchasing parties of “all of [the withdrawing party’s] interest in TAPS and all
rights in connection therewith.” The NSV of the withdrawing party’s interest is the
gross salvage value minus the DR&R obligation. Paragraph 8.2(d) makes it clear
that “all transferable interests in land” of the withdrawing owner are assessed in
determining NSV; and section 13.1 of the TAPS Operating Agreement, which is
incorporated in the TAPS Agreement, makes it clear that these “transferrable
interests in land” include the obligations that burden the interest, namely, the
DR&R obligation of the withdrawing party.
Based on this same reasoning, we reject the Remaining Owners’ arguments
that the DR&R obligation under the right-of-way leases is in some way separable
from the rest of the interest in TAPS and must be dealt with separately under the
terms of the rights-of-way themselves. Nothing in the federal right-of-way
contradicts the construction of the TAPS Agreement and TAPS Operating
Agreement as set out above. Regarding transfers of rights and obligations under the
federal right of way, the federal right-of-way agreement states only that
transferring parties must obtain written consent and that transferees (like the
Remaining Owners) must demonstrate their capability to perform the transferred
obligations and liabilities. The federal right-of-way agreement provides that once
the details of a transfer are resolved among the involved parties, approved by the
relevant government entities, and the deal is consummated, “a permittee [like
17 Unocal] seeking to be divested . . . of its right, title, and interest in and to the
Right-of-Way and this Agreement in connection with a transfer shall be released
from its liabilities and obligations (accrued, contingent, or otherwise) to the United
States under this Agreement to the extent and limit that the Transferee assumes
unconditionally the performance and observance of each such liability and
obligation. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The federal right-of-way agreement in no way
prevented the parties from entering into comprehensive agreements—like the
TAPS Agreement and that TAPS Operating Agreement—governing the design,
construction, ownership, operation, maintenance, and expansion of TAPS. The
TAPS Agreement and the TAPS Operating Agreement set out the rights and
obligations of the parties involved in transferring their undivided interest in TAPS.
And the federal right-of-way agreement provides a mechanism for having that
transfer recognized by the federal government.
This does not mean, however, that by withdrawing from the TAPS
Agreement an Owner can shift all of its share of the DR&R costs onto the Owners
left when the TAPS Agreement terminates. We have already concluded that the
DR&R obligations are obligations “accruing under this [TAPS Agreement]”
pursuant to section 8.2(e). Unocal argues that the DR&R obligations have not yet
“accrued” because there is not a present and enforceable right or demand to pay
them. However, as the Remaining Owners point out, TAPS Agreement section
18 8.2(e) addresses the accrual of an obligation, or an accrued liability, thus referring
to a liability or obligation that is properly chargeable in a given accounting period
but which is not yet paid or payable. See NuStar Energy, L.P. v. Diamond Offshore
Co., 402 S.W.3d 461, 469 n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.)
(discussing possible interpretation of contract provision allocating responsibility
for “liabilities” that “accrue” after particular date under contract and citing Black’s
Law Dictionary for definition of “accrued liability”). And, indeed, Unocal
acknowledges that it has followed this interpretation of the contract in its
accounting for the accrued DR&R obligations. Unocal’s argument on appeal that
the contract ought to be given a different meaning is unavailing.
Under the plain language of Section 8.2(e) of the TAPS Agreement, the
conveyance of Unocal’s interest in TAPS “shall require the [Remaining Owners] to
assume the obligations accruing under this Agreement subsequent to the last day of
the Agreement Term during which [Unocal] made the election to discontinue
operations. . . .” (Emphasis added). The Remaining Owners, as the purchasing
parties of “the obligations accruing under this Agreement subsequent to” the
withdrawing party’s election to discontinue operations in order to effectuate the
transfer of its interests in TAPS, assume the DR&R obligation going forward after
the last day of the Agreement Term during which Unocal elected to discontinue
operations, pursuant to sections 8.2(d) and (3) of the TAPS Agreement. But Unocal
19 remains accountable for the portion of the DR&R obligations that had already
accrued under the TAPS Agreement as of the last day of the Agreement Term
during which it elected to discontinue operations—obligations for which it has
already provided an accounting and received tax benefits.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the DR&R
obligations contained in the federal right-of-way are not transferred when a
withdrawing owner like Unocal withdraws from the TAPS Agreement and
transfers its interest to the Remaining Owners. DR&R obligations are transferred,
but the NSV due to the withdrawing party to purchase an interest thus burdened is
determined by subtracting the value of the DR&R obligation at the time of the
transfer from the gross salvage value of the interest transferred.
We sustain Unocal’s first issue.1
Ripeness of the “Shall Pay” Provision
In its fourth issue, Unocal argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
the dispute over the “Shall Pay” provision is not ripe.
1 Because we sustain Unocal’s argument regarding the transfer of the DR&R obligation with the transfer of its interest in TAPS, we need not address Unocal’s additional argument in the alternative that the contract is ambiguous and the trial court erred in rendering judgment as a matter of law at the summary judgment phase. We likewise need not address Unocal’s third issue in which it challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding summary judgment evidence considered in its determination of the summary judgments on DR&R obligations.
20 Because it determined that the parties’ dispute over the “shall pay” provision
implicated its contractual withdrawal rights, Unocal sought a declaration from the
trial court that:
The TAPS Agreement entitles [Unocal] to receive [its] proportion of Net Salvage Value if it is determined to be positive, but does not obligate [it] to pay any proportion of Net Salvage Value to the [Remaining Owners] if it is determined to be negative.
The trial court dismissed this claim, concluding that it was not ripe for
consideration because the parties had not yet submitted the issue of determining
the NSV to the arbitrators as provided for under the TAPS Agreement and thus any
judgment that the court rendered regarding a specific NSV value would be
advisory and improper.
A. Standard of Review
Ripeness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to de
novo review. Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. 2011); Mayhew v.
Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Ripeness requires the
existence of a “concrete injury”—the facts must show “‘that an injury has occurred
or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.’” Robinson, 353
S.W.3d at 755 (quoting Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 852
(Tex. 2000)). The ripeness doctrine “focuses on whether the case involves
‘uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all.’” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442
21 (Tex. 1998) (quoting 13A Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 3532
(2d ed. 1984)).
The requirement that a claim be justiciable or ripe applies to declaratory
judgment actions. Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163–64 (Tex.
2004). “The [UDJA] does not create or augment a trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction—it is merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a
trial court’s jurisdiction.” Anderton v. City of Cedar Hill, 447 S.W.3d 84, 94 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). The purpose of a declaratory judgment claim is
“to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status, and other legal relations. . . .” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 37.002(b) (Vernon 2015); Anderton, 447 S.W.3d at 94. However, the UDJA
“gives the court no power to pass upon hypothetical or contingent situations, or
determine questions not then essential to the decision of an actual controversy,
although such questions may in the future require adjudication.” Riner v. City of
Hunters Creek, 403 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no
pet.) (quoting Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333
(Tex. 1968), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated
in Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1997)).
A declaratory judgment is appropriate if (1) a justiciable controversy exists
as to the rights and status of the parties and (2) the controversy will be resolved by
22 the declaration sought. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 163–64; Tex. Dept. of Public Safety
v. Moore, 985 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (citing Bonham
State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995)). A justiciable controversy
is one in which a real and substantial controversy exists involving a genuine
conflict of tangible interest and not merely a theoretical dispute. Moore, 985
S.W.2d at 153. However, “[i]t is not necessary that a person who seeks a
declaration of rights under [the UDJA] shall have incurred or caused damage or
injury in a dispute over rights and liabilities, but it has frequently been held that an
action for declaratory judgment would lie when the fact situation manifests the
presence of ‘ripening seeds of a controversy.’” Id. at 153–54 (quoting Ainsworth v.
Oil City Brass Works, 271 S.W.2d 754, 760–61 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1954,
no writ)). Jurisdiction under the UDJA primarily depends on the nature of the
controversy—whether it is merely hypothetical or rises to the justiciable level. Id.
at 154.
B. Ripeness of Dispute over “Shall Pay” Provision
As stated above, section 8.2(e) of the TAPS Agreement addresses the
conveyance of a withdrawing owner’s interest in TAPS to parties desiring to
continue operations. It provides that when a party desires to discontinue operations,
as Unocal is seeking to do here, the parties must establish the NSV to effectuate
23 the transfer. Unocal’s undivided interest in TAPS cannot be transferred to the
Remaining Owners until that is done and any necessary payment is made.
To establish the NSV, section 8.2(d) provides that the parties had sixty days
after expiration of the 2012 term to agree on the NSV. Section 8.2(d) further
provides that when the parties cannot agree on the NSV—as happened here—the
issue of determining the NSV “shall be submitted to arbitration, using the
procedure set forth in Section 11.1” of the TAPS Agreement. Under section 8.2(d),
the NSV includes “transferable interests in land, material, equipment and allotment
items of value.”
Section 8.2(e), entitled “Conveyance to Parties Desiring to Continue
Upon establishing the Net Salvage Value as above provided, the Parties desiring to continue operations shall pay to the Party or Parties desiring to discontinue operations its or their proper proportion of such Net Salvage Value (such proper proportion being determined as to each Party desiring to discontinue operations hereunder by multiplying such Party’s Percentage of Ownership times the Net Salvage Value) and upon receipt of such payment, such Party or Parties shall convey to the purchasing Parties all of its or their interest in TAPS and all rights in connection therewith.
Section 8.2(e) goes on to provide that the transferees shall “assume the obligations
accruing under this Agreement subsequent to the last day of the Agreement Term
during which [the withdrawing party] made the election to discontinue operations.”
24 Under the plain language of the TAPS Agreement, the determination of the
nature and amount of any payment depends upon the parties’ first establishing the
NSV. The Remaining Owners argue, and the trial court agreed, that because the
operation of section 8.2(e)’s “shall pay” clause depends on the establishment of the
NSV, this claim is not ripe until the NSV is determined through arbitration.
We disagree. The only question to be submitted to the arbitrators is the
question of the amount of the Net Salvage Value of TAPS itself. Section 11.1 of
the TAPS Agreement does not provide for arbitration to interpret the effect of
section 8.2(e)’s “shall pay” provision, which is why Unocal has filed a declaratory
judgment seeking the Court’s interpretation of this provision. Thus, this question
presents a justiciable controversy in that it seeks an answer to a real and substantial
controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interest. See Moore, 985
S.W.2d at 153. Unocal has taken steps to withdraw from TAPS but has been
unable to complete the process because of a real and substantial controversy
between itself and the Remaining Owners regarding the construction of section
8.2(e) of the TAPS Agreement and the attendant rights and obligations of the
parties. This is not merely a theoretical dispute, and Unocal’s inability to complete
the withdrawal process represents a concrete injury. See Robinson, 353 S.W.3d at
755.
25 Furthermore, the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought. The
court’s construction of section 8.2(e) will “settle and afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations” between
Unocal and Remaining Owners in light of Unocal’s withdrawal from TAPS. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b); Anderton, 447 S.W.3d at 94. A
declaratory judgment construing the effect of section 8.2(e) on the parties’ rights
and obligations under the TAPS Agreement in light of Unocal’s attempts to
withdraw from TAPS provides the parties the information they need going forward
in their business dealings and in the litigation.
The Remaining Owners argue that if the DR&R obligation is not included as
an offset, the NSV could be positive and, thus, Unocal’s issue is unripe because it
might not come to pass that the arbitrators find a negative NSV. However, we have
settled the question of whether the DR&R obligations are part of Unocal’s entire
TAPS interest that transfers pursuant to section 8.2(e). And regardless of what the
arbitrators ultimately determine to be the Net Salvage Value, it is clear from the
current dispute between the parties that section 8.2(e) must be construed to
effectuate Unocal’s withdrawal.
In fact, the parties’ own arguments regarding the transfer of the DR&R
obligations demonstrate the necessity of the courts’ construing the terms of the
TAPS Agreement regarding Unocal’s withdrawal from operations independently
26 of any NSV found by the arbitrators. In the context of their arguments seeking to
construe the transfer of the DR&R obligations, the parties bring forward competing
views of when the DR&R obligations “accrue” under the TAPS Agreement. When
the obligation “accrues” must be considered and determined as a matter of law by a
court before the valuation of the withdrawing party’s interest and obligations—
interests and obligations that will be transferred to the Remaining Owners—can be
completed by the arbitrators. We have now resolved that issue.
We conclude that the trial court erred in determining that this issue is not
ripe for consideration. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment to the
extent it dismissed Unocal’s claim for declaratory judgment seeking construction
of the “shall pay” provision and remand for further proceedings. See Anderton, 447
S.W.3d at 95, 98 (reversing portion of trial court judgment that erroneously
dismissed claim on ripeness grounds and remanding for further proceedings).
We sustain Unocal’s fourth issue.
27 Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court erred in rendering a declaratory judgment in
favor of the Remaining Owners regarding the transfer of the DR&R obligations
and in concluding that the “shall pay” issue was not ripe. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s judgment. We render judgment declaring that the DR&R
obligations are part of a withdrawing owner’s interest in TAPS that are transferred
pursuant to section 8.2(e), and we remand Unocal’s claim seeking declaratory
judgment construing the “shall pay” provision for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Evelyn V. Keyes Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.