NELSON, Circuit Judge:
After a court trial, appellant was found guilty of knowingly procuring naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (1976). The indictment alleged that appellant misstated orally and on his Application to File Petition for Naturalization that he had not been convicted of any offenses other than traffic violations. An exhibit (Exhibit 4) was admitted into evidence, however, which indicated that appellant had been convicted of a number of offenses in Israel including (among others) perjury, assault, theft, and obtaining goods by false pretenses. Appellant was fined $5000 and sentenced to six months in prison. The trial court also cancelled appellant’s certificate of naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(g) (1976). Perlmuter appeals from the conviction and the cancellation of his certificate claiming that two exhibits (Exhibits 3 and 4) should not have been received into evidence. He contends that neither exhibit was properly authenticated and that Exhibit 4 was inadmissible hearsay, received into evidence in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) and the confrontation clause. We reverse.
I. FACTS
Appellant immigrated to the United States from Israel and was granted lawful permanent residence in 1968. In 1974, appellant was granted naturalization and became a United States citizen.
Gregory Ball, an examiner for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), testified that he conducted the preliminary investigation of appellant’s application for citizenship. Mr. Ball stated that if appellant had revealed any convictions, Ball would have requested a further investigation concerning appellant’s good moral character before making a recommendation on appellant’s application for citizenship.
Harold Nowlan, an investigator with the INS, testified that he contacted an immigration investigator in Washington, D.C. who served as liaison to Interpol, and requested a certified copy of any criminal record for appellant held by the Israeli National Police. He received a document, identified as Exhibit 4, which purports to list four convictions suffered by appellant in Israel between 1955 and 1964. He also received an identification form, marked as Exhibit 3, which purports to contain the fingerprints of the person whose criminal record is shown in Exhibit 4. These fingerprints, it is stipulated, matched appellant’s.
Appellant claims that neither Exhibit 3 nor Exhibit 4 was properly authenticated according to the FRE. He also claims that Exhibit 4 should have been excluded from evidence as hearsay not falling- within any recognized exception. Finally, appellant contends that the admission of Exhibit 4 violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation of the witnesses against him.
II. AUTHENTICITY
It appears that the trial court decided that Exhibits 3 and 4 were authentic, based only on the documents’ “aura of authenticity” and not on compliance with the FRE. The standard of review of a district court’s decision regarding authenticity of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 159, 70 L.Ed.2d 130 (1981); United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847, 102 S.Ct. 165, 70 L.Ed.2d 135 (1981). This is because authenticity is merely an aspect of relevancy. Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee note.
Although the trial court was correct in finding that neither Rule 901 nor 902(3) was complied with, the court did abuse its discretion in holding the evidence authentic and admissible. This circuit requires strict compliance with the authenticity rules. Sandoval-Vera v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 667 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir.1982); Iran v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.1981); Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 866-67 (9th Cir.1962).
[1293]*1293In this case, the extrinsic evidence, consisting of the testimony of an INS agent, was not enough to sustain a finding of authenticity under 901(a). That testimony was not “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). In addition, the requirements of 902(3) for self-authentication of foreign public documents were not met.1 The trial court was correct in its determination that the first requirement of 902(3) was not met; that requirement is that the document be executed or attested by a person who is acting in an official capacity and who is authorized by the laws of that country to make the attestation or execution. The trial court was not satisfied that Herstig, who signed the documents, was properly authorized. We agree, since no evidence was presented as to the nature of Herstig’s authority or position.2
The FRE offers generous opportunity to authenticate by presentation of sufficient evidence to support the authenticity, of a document. Alternatively, if 902(3) is met the document is self-authenticating. But the rules offer no third means of authentication; certainly it is not enough that the documents present an “aura of authenticity.” Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the unauthenticated documents into evidence.
III. HEARSAY OBJECTIONS
Appellant also claims that Exhibit 4 was admitted in violation of the prohibition against hearsay evidence in Fed.R.Evid. 802, since that exhibit is hearsay that does not fit within any of the exceptions to the prohibition provided in Rule 803. The trial court’s decision to admit evidence over hearsay objections is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d at 1349.
A. THE PUBLIC RECORDS EXCEPTION, Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)
The public records exception to the rule against admission of hearsay evidence is found in Fed.R.Evid. 803(8), which states in part:
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NELSON, Circuit Judge:
After a court trial, appellant was found guilty of knowingly procuring naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (1976). The indictment alleged that appellant misstated orally and on his Application to File Petition for Naturalization that he had not been convicted of any offenses other than traffic violations. An exhibit (Exhibit 4) was admitted into evidence, however, which indicated that appellant had been convicted of a number of offenses in Israel including (among others) perjury, assault, theft, and obtaining goods by false pretenses. Appellant was fined $5000 and sentenced to six months in prison. The trial court also cancelled appellant’s certificate of naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(g) (1976). Perlmuter appeals from the conviction and the cancellation of his certificate claiming that two exhibits (Exhibits 3 and 4) should not have been received into evidence. He contends that neither exhibit was properly authenticated and that Exhibit 4 was inadmissible hearsay, received into evidence in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) and the confrontation clause. We reverse.
I. FACTS
Appellant immigrated to the United States from Israel and was granted lawful permanent residence in 1968. In 1974, appellant was granted naturalization and became a United States citizen.
Gregory Ball, an examiner for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), testified that he conducted the preliminary investigation of appellant’s application for citizenship. Mr. Ball stated that if appellant had revealed any convictions, Ball would have requested a further investigation concerning appellant’s good moral character before making a recommendation on appellant’s application for citizenship.
Harold Nowlan, an investigator with the INS, testified that he contacted an immigration investigator in Washington, D.C. who served as liaison to Interpol, and requested a certified copy of any criminal record for appellant held by the Israeli National Police. He received a document, identified as Exhibit 4, which purports to list four convictions suffered by appellant in Israel between 1955 and 1964. He also received an identification form, marked as Exhibit 3, which purports to contain the fingerprints of the person whose criminal record is shown in Exhibit 4. These fingerprints, it is stipulated, matched appellant’s.
Appellant claims that neither Exhibit 3 nor Exhibit 4 was properly authenticated according to the FRE. He also claims that Exhibit 4 should have been excluded from evidence as hearsay not falling- within any recognized exception. Finally, appellant contends that the admission of Exhibit 4 violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation of the witnesses against him.
II. AUTHENTICITY
It appears that the trial court decided that Exhibits 3 and 4 were authentic, based only on the documents’ “aura of authenticity” and not on compliance with the FRE. The standard of review of a district court’s decision regarding authenticity of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 159, 70 L.Ed.2d 130 (1981); United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847, 102 S.Ct. 165, 70 L.Ed.2d 135 (1981). This is because authenticity is merely an aspect of relevancy. Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee note.
Although the trial court was correct in finding that neither Rule 901 nor 902(3) was complied with, the court did abuse its discretion in holding the evidence authentic and admissible. This circuit requires strict compliance with the authenticity rules. Sandoval-Vera v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 667 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir.1982); Iran v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.1981); Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 866-67 (9th Cir.1962).
[1293]*1293In this case, the extrinsic evidence, consisting of the testimony of an INS agent, was not enough to sustain a finding of authenticity under 901(a). That testimony was not “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). In addition, the requirements of 902(3) for self-authentication of foreign public documents were not met.1 The trial court was correct in its determination that the first requirement of 902(3) was not met; that requirement is that the document be executed or attested by a person who is acting in an official capacity and who is authorized by the laws of that country to make the attestation or execution. The trial court was not satisfied that Herstig, who signed the documents, was properly authorized. We agree, since no evidence was presented as to the nature of Herstig’s authority or position.2
The FRE offers generous opportunity to authenticate by presentation of sufficient evidence to support the authenticity, of a document. Alternatively, if 902(3) is met the document is self-authenticating. But the rules offer no third means of authentication; certainly it is not enough that the documents present an “aura of authenticity.” Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the unauthenticated documents into evidence.
III. HEARSAY OBJECTIONS
Appellant also claims that Exhibit 4 was admitted in violation of the prohibition against hearsay evidence in Fed.R.Evid. 802, since that exhibit is hearsay that does not fit within any of the exceptions to the prohibition provided in Rule 803. The trial court’s decision to admit evidence over hearsay objections is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Burreson, 643 F.2d at 1349.
A. THE PUBLIC RECORDS EXCEPTION, Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)
The public records exception to the rule against admission of hearsay evidence is found in Fed.R.Evid. 803(8), which states in part:
Records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel
Because there is no indication that Herstig, the person who signed the conviction report (Exhibit 4) and the identification form (Exhibit 3), had first hand knowledge of the convictions and because of the probability of multiple levels of hearsay in this situation, Exhibit 4 does not fit within Rule 803(8). Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note; United States v. Hudson, 479 F.2d 251, 254-55 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1012, 94 S.Ct. 377, 38 L.Ed. 2d 250 (1973). It is apparent that Herstig, who [1294]*1294signed the conviction report, did not act on the basis of first hand knowledge since the alleged convictions had occurred from 17 to 26 years earlier in a variety of different courts. Since there is no countervailing evidence that suggests that Herstig did possess first hand knowledge, the evidence cannot be admitted. Id. at 254-55.
In addition, there is no evidence of any duty on the part of Herstig or anyone else to record this information. It may have been prepared just for the INS request and not as part of any duty to record day to day. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), (8) advisory committee notes.3 This is another factor preventing us from finding the 803(8) exception helpful to the Government here.4
B. THE JUDGMENT OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION EXCEPTION, Fed.REvid. 803(22)
Rule 803(22), which allows “evidence of a final judgment” to be used “to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment,” was intended as a vehicle for proving underlying facts when a judgment of conviction is presented.5 Here, we have a situation where appellant would have the court stretch the rule to allow the fact of conviction itself to be proved by lesser evidence. The fact of a judgment of conviction is a prerequisite to the use of this rule, not the thing to be proved. Rule 803(22) will not serve the Government without introduction into evidence of the judgment of conviction. See Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1190 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969, 99 S.Ct. 461, 58 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978); J. Weinstein, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 803(22)[01] at 803-271 et seq.
C. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION, Fed. R.Evid. 803(24)
Rule 803(24) provides a residual exception for evidence which does not meet the requirements of any of the other exceptions, but which has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and is more probative than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts. The trial court did not address the issue of whether Exhibit 4 could be admitted under 803(24)6 because it admitted the document on other grounds. The issue is, however, raised on appeal. There is nothing indicating that Exhibit 4, when compared with other hearsay exceptions, has “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(24). In addition, there is nothing in the record to indicate that through reasonable efforts the government could not procure more probative evidence such as the actual judgments of conviction. As a result, the evidence cannot be admitted under this exception.
[1295]*1295IY. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above the case is reversed. Because of our holdings on the authenticity and hearsay issues, we need not reach the confrontation clause claim. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 488, 80 L.Ed. 688, 711 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
REVERSED.